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Abstract
In accordance with the growing engagement of substate entities (SE) in international
affairs, paradiplomacy [foreign policy actions of SEs] and protodiplomacy [secessionist
form of paradiplomacy] represent an expanding debate in which SEs are characterized as:
(1) “complementary” or “extra” units to traditional states, (2) neofunctionalist
constituents of [European] regional integration, and (3) constructivist [green, global or
nationalist] units of global governance. The level and scope of sharing state-power is a
key issue in the debates setting the frontiers for paradiplomacy, eventually limiting the
political-economic space for substate development in a state-centric world of politics.
Moving beyond the mainstream views, this study proposed a new model with SEs being
the “Schumpeterian” pioneers of governance, international development and conflict
management. In the context of dynamically evolving global political economy and the
deformation/failure of post-colonial states, SEs are increasingly “pro-active” units with
state-alike functions of territoriality, security, constitution making, international
agreements and even “hard-policy” engagement separately from their nation state hosts,
clearly seen in the Kurdish regions. Comparing the key intrinsic case: the quadri-regional
Kurdish paradiplomacy (between Iraq, Syria, Turkey and Iran) with Quebec and
Catalonia, this study focuses on progressive vs. antagonist policies/practices of states
towards SEs. Investigating extensively the intersection between paradiplomacy,
international development and conflict in divided societies, this study argues that
progressive power-sharing yields superior outcomes compared to rigid centralized
systems of state-power. Solid evidence from a global sample shows how SEs have
diverse enhanced roles of building capacity, resilience and self-competency in security,
trade, environment, labor, education, health and technology through paradiplomacy, with
the premise of tackling contemporary challenges of world politics.
Key Words: Paradiplomacy, International Relations, Development, Conflict, Kurdistan,
Catalonia, Quebec, Protodiplomacy
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CHAPTER 1: CONTEMPORARY RESURGENCE OF PARADIPLOMACY

The growing engagement of substate entities (SE) in international affairs has been
an increasingly expanding topic of investigation for worldwide scholars of political
science and economics. The literature and research on paradiplomacy (foreign policy
actions of substate entities) and protodiplomacy (antagonist form of paradiplomacy)
accordingly reflect this expansion and growth of the debate, as well as the new directions
of conceptualization. Since the late 1980s, precisely when Ivo Duchacek (1986) coined
the term “paradiplomacy” (Duchacek, 1986, p.240), scholars have proposed new forms of
conceptualization framing paradiplomacy as (a) a liberal/neoliberal phenomena
portraying SEs as “complementary” or “extra” units to the traditional interstate
diplomacy mostly under federal or confederal settings of North American or European
units, (b) a neofunctionalist development in framework of the formation of supranational
authorities and institutions in Europe which also represents the power transfer from the
national center to regions as core political-economic constituents, and (c) a constructivist
trend mostly reflecting the decentralizing dynamics of multiethnic societies ruled by
unitary or confederal/federal systems of politics where conflict is historically a predominant determinant of center-region relations. A later wave of paradiplomacy
scholarship also investigated the new trends in global governance emphasizing the
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increasing involvement of global and green cities and knowledge regions as the emerging
pioneers of global political economy.
Paradiplomacy research has reached a point of true diversity in terms of the types,
motives, interests and outcomes of substate/subnational units when undertaking foreign
policy actions constituting a plural and multidimensional framework globally. This
dissertation research not only represents another significant addition to the growingly
complex framework of paradiplomacy practice in world politics, but also makes a major
theoretical and empirical contribution informing about the future directions and possible
frontiers of substate foreign policy actions. Before proceeding, an important factor to
recall and acknowledge is the increasingly growing weight of substate entities in global
politics and economics, therefore, making paradiplomacy a major constituent in the
discussion of state power and broader debate of statecraft and diplomacy.
The Role of Paradiplomacy in International Development and Cooperation
Various examples underline the emerging significance of paradiplomacy in world
politics with a variety of conditions and features. To briefly summarize these, North
American units are of key importance to start with, especially with the increasing
paradiplomatic involvement of federal and confederal states and provinces of Canada,
USA and Mexico. Canadian provinces were previously defined as the “master” case of
paradiplomacy (Allan and Vengroff, 2012), because they have developed strong political
and economic ties with the federal states of the USA and the rest of the world in a variety
of policy areas such as trade, development, environment, health, labor, education,
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security and technology. The international agreements between Canadian Provinces and
federal states of the USA, more specifically across Canada-USA frontiers are great
evidence for the strong paradiplomatic development between two countries.
Energy, trade and environment related agreements are of key importance notably
between the states of New England and Canada’s Eastern provinces. Moreover, SEs of
Canada, USA and Mexico increasingly engage in interregional collaboration in various
fields of policy1. Beyond these developments, a specific unit: Canada’s Quebec province
is just another evidence of multilayered paradiplomacy in which Quebec not only
strategizes its foreign policy within the context of Canada and North America, but also
acts as a semi-sovereign actor with its unique Francophone identity which enables the
province to construct specific types of relationships with the rest of the world.
California is another major example of an increasingly global SE, given the size
of its economy within the United States. Hosting a large ensemble of global cities,
institutions, companies and sectors, California has become the 6th largest economy in the
world, surpassing the economy of France in 20162 (California Department of Finance,
2016; Respaut, 2016; Vekshin, 2016). While definitely a major global unit with
significant economic input worldwide, California’s foreign policy actions are limited
compared to the City of New York if one looks at the number of diplomatic

1

NAFTA and more specifically the repeated and continuously growing interstate
relations between the governors of US states (especially New England), Canadian
Provinces, and Mexico can be given as examples of this continental paradiplomacy.
2
Also, see http://www.reuters.com/article/us-california-economy-idUSKCN0Z32K2
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representations3. Here, another key issue, however, is that despite the magnitude of
California’s input and international interactions, it also has the most indebted state within
the US, inferentially reflecting the common problem of the US economy. Faced with
environmental, industrial and agricultural issues, this coastal region has various problems
in housing, transport, migration and the gap between rich and poor. Therefore, it would
not be an overstatement to expect California to develop its strength of self-rule to become
more efficient and effective in tackling these emerging problems, which eventually will
include development of its own foreign policy institutions as a remedy: Californian
paradiplomacy.
Another substantial example is Sao Paolo, in Brazil. Being one of the most
interconnected global regions, Sao Paolo is definitely a major hub in South America with
drastically increased foreign policy engagement. In the framework of Brazil’s
constitutional decentralization aiming to enforce the country’s efficiency of economic
and political administration, Sao Paolo represents a success story with its unique
development process. Today, hosting more than 50 consulates and numerous other
diplomatic representations at various levels, Sao Paolo is the second city after New York
in terms of consular diversity and foreign direct investment. While Sao Paolo
successfully strategized its “city diplomacy” to carve out an international path to promote

3

New York City is definitely one of the leading global cities hosting a multiplicity of
international/global institutions and possessing a historical significance in world politics
and economy. Besides its symbolic global image, the multiplicity of international
diplomatic presence in New York can be given as evidence to describe a unique New
Yorker Paradiplomacy.
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its industrial, financial and cultural presence around the world, the international
agreements signed and managed by Sao Paolo’s high-level administration provides strong
insight about how a city’s international policy engagement may be strong.
Sao Paolo’s Head of State Rodrigo Tavares stated that the Foreign Affairs Office
led by Governor Geraldo Alckmin has signed around 50 international agreements per
year, and received 450 foreign delegations per year, and also managed 150 international
cooperation programs per year, signifying more paradiplomatic engagement than any
regional government in South America. Sao Paolo, indeed, with its 26 departments, 645
municipalities and 40 million inhabitants is a leading destination not only in Brazil but in
entire South America, given its unmatched highly-skilled labor force and the locomotive
industrial complex representing around 50% of Brazilian economy (Mohanty, 2014;
Tavares, 2013).
Besides the abovementioned examples from North and South America, Europe
represents another substantial endorsement for paradiplomacy, notably with the
foundation and enlargement of European Union and the integration of its constituents.
While European SEs definitely have historical motives in undertaking their own foreign
policy actions, which in fact stretches the scope of paradiplomacy research to centuries
ago as Duran (2013) clearly analyzes, the recent subnational, national and even
continental developments in Europe has a precisely unique space in regards to the
frontiers of paradiplomacy. Being an interstate union created out of post-war fears among
a handful countries at first, European enlargement and integration heavily relied on the
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creation of supranational authorities and the transfer of state power and from states into
subnational and supranational authorities. Not every member state experienced this
process in the same way, creating a unique ensemble and variety for European
paradiplomacy.
Member states with pre-existing federal systems of politics and economics have
adapted themselves well to the new European regionalism, which officially was defined
and endorsed in the Treaty of European Union and its previous and subsequent forms of
international agreements at supranational levels (such as the Maastricht, Lisbon and
Rome Treaties).
German Länders can precisely be given as concrete examples of those units that
were able to adapt themselves politically and economically to the globalizing dynamics
of the supranational union. Baden-Wurttemberg, for instance, is among the global leaders
of SEs with its economic production, sustainable development and advanced
technological input. Being one of the “Four Motors for Europe”, 4 Baden-Württemberg is
one of the four major European regional powerhouses along with the Rhône-Alpes region
of France with capital Lyon, Lombardy region of Italy with capital Milan, and Catalonia
region of Spain with capital Barcelona (Loughlin, 1996; European Commission, 2015).
Besides generating one-fifth of the overall German R&D, the region has a highlyqualified labor force with one of the world’s finest and most advanced industrialtechnological complexes, as well as the highest contribution to sustainable energy

4

See http://cordis.europa.eu/baden-wuerttemberg/int-coop-four-motors-europe_en.html
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generation and decrease of carbon emissions (The Climate Group, 2015). The magnitude
of such regional contributions to the world economy surpasses dozens of nation states, as
do those of California, Quebec, Catalonia, New York, Hong Kong or Guangdong.
From Paradiplomacy to Protodiplomacy: SEs as Pioneers of Global Conflict
In EU member states with multiethnic societies and historical cases of conflicts
over national identity (such as the Wallonia and Flanders regions in Belgium, Catalan and
Basque Country in Spain, Scotland and Northern Ireland in UK) the European
regionalism functioned more than just a political/economic endorsement, but more of a
new venue in which these SEs found ways and means to capitalize their long-term
interests of developing core functions of statehood. Numerous interregional platforms
were founded such as the Assembly of European Regions (AER) as the major union of
SEs of the EU, Council of Regional and Local Authorities (CRLA) or INTERREG (I-IIICV) representing various levels and scopes of interregional collaboration and
cooperation. While collaboration and cooperation has been a primary motive in forming
these abovementioned platforms, some European SEs definitely have other motives and
interests when it comes to expand their paradiplomatic connections. While also benefiting
from the mostly economic and partially political agenda of European integration and
regionalism, these regions have long-term agenda of substate nationalism, given their
historical cases of conflict with their national contenders. Catalonia, Flanders, Basque
Country, Scotland and Northern Ireland are among these SEs all of which have attempted
to carve out a paradiplomatic strategy in framework of European regionalism. While
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power transfer functioned in favor of these entities seeking ways and means of state
power and authority for a long time, their region-nation conflicts did not necessarily came
to an end, but even has subsequently became a major issue in European politics.
One of the largest member states of Europe, Spain, experienced the center-region
conflicts throughout a long-term of its national political history, notably with Basque
Country and Catalonia. As an outcome of the lack of a rigorous and compelling peace
and reconciliation process in the aftermath of Dictator Franco’s regime, intergroup
hostilities did not secede with Spain’s democratization and European membership. The
traces of the civil war were quite clear on oppressed and politically repressed
communities, enforced with the presence of a strong Spanish nationalist political cluster
which still is in place. While EU membership definitely provided a space for Spain to
take necessary steps during its democratization in the aftermath of Franco Era, the
decentralization process and the recognition of the regional autonomies in the
constitution passed through decades-long turmoil in which Madrid did its best to keep the
power sharing an ambiguous issue, simply fueling Basque and Catalan secessionisms.
What subsequently worsened the situation was the global political and economic crisis
felt strongly in Southern European states including Spain.
For a long time, Spain received funds to complete its infrastructure projects from
Europe, and financial institutions of Europe have developed an increasingly problematic
relationship with Spanish economy. The fiscal weaknesses, and the abnormal regional
fiscal distribution and redistribution made Catalonia the most indebted region in Spain,
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causing significant economic burden, and once again fueling Catalan’s will for
independence even more. Not only at grassroots level, but with full-fledged support of
Catalan institutions that suffered from budget cuts including the Catalan Government
(Generalitat), Catalonia heavily supported the independence process, and put weight on
its foreign policy institutionalization. Therefore, Catalonia’s paradiplomacy increasingly
shifted towards “protodiplomacy” which as a direction indicates Catalan will to develop
state-alike diplomatic capacity. Sharing historical commons despite social, political and
economic differences with Basque Country, Catalonia’s motives also fits well into the
situation which once was called as “me-tooism” by paradiplomacy scholarship (Bursens
and Deforche, 2008) in which a substate entity’s power transfer bargaining is impacted
by the conditions set for another substate entity. Basque Country, indeed, has much
different version of power sharing, notably economically, having a significantly superior
power and word in determining its fiscal contribution to Spain’s economy.
UK has very similar historical cases compared to Spain with its Scottish and Irish
constituents both of which represent centuries long histories of war and political conflict.
While in the last decade, a considerable effort of peacebuilding was visible in UK policy
to resolve or at least minimize the disputes, which partially were influenced by the recent
EU membership of the country, the Brexit vote in 2016 has been a blow to the process.
Similar to Spain, which was influenced by global political economic changes, the recent
migration crisis influenced public opinion in the UK. While the country definitely
received the least of the Syrian or other migrants from the war zones, with populism

10
boosted in the media, the UK voted to leave the European Union -- with the significant
exception of Londoners, Scotland and Northern Ireland. While Scotland voted to remain
within the UK in a recent referendum in 2015, which indicating an improvement of
Scottish-British relations, the Brexit decision definitely created a shockwave to not only
Scottish but also Irish voters. Therefore, Scotland’s recent international political
expressions indicate another shift from paradiplomacy to protodiplomacy.
While the abovementioned cases with conflictive national histories may look like
minor issues in relation to global conflict, it would be naïve to underestimate the
magnitude and impact of substate constituents in global conflict. Data clearly shows that
most of the armed wars and violence take place at intrastate level mostly in the form of
civil wars, while interstate violence significantly declined worldwide (Rustad, Buhaug,
Falch and Gates, 2011, p.22). Democratization has not been a cure to the deadly
subnational conflicts as can be seen in many cases of Europe, Asia, Africa and Middle
East. Kurdish regions, Sri Lanka and Myanmar are solid examples. Between 2001 and
2010, over $5.8 billion in international aid was allocated to Asia’s subnational conflicts,
excluding the billions that arrived to the region following the tsunami catastrophe in 2004
(Barron, 2013).
Even if protracted subnational conflicts are only impacting the daily life
conditions of a relatively small percentage of the population (6.5% in South and
Southeastern Asia), it is important to acknowledge that this corresponds to more than 130
million people (Parks, Coletta and Oppenheim, 2013, p.2). In Africa, large-scale civil
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wars have declined and mainly been transformed into subnational conflicts (Straus,
2012). These subnational conflicts may seem low density and low cost compared to
large-scale civil wars; however, they tend to last longer than the conventional interstate
wars. The assumption that democracy leads to economic growth, stability, and peace is
unfounded in that economic growth does not necessarily represent healthy economic
development. Most of the subnational conflicts in Asia, for instance, emerge and occur in
settings where there is substantial state capacity and high economic growth rates (Failed
States Index, 2013).
The average duration of subnational conflicts in the world between 1946 and 2010
were 33.3 years in Asia, 28.4 years in the Middle East, 12 in Africa, 5.2 in Europe, and
16.8 years globally (Uppsala Armed Conflict Dataset, 2012). As such, more focus is also
being placed on such conflicts in academic research. To this end, a final set of evidence is
provided by Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research including the
subnational level of analysis in its Global Conflict Panorama, where the primacy of
subnational level of global armed conflict is visibly striking (Global Conflict Panorama,
2013).
In this realm, SEs gain importance given they become the central actors in
conflict cases, not only throughout the course of armed violence, but also in terms of
humanitarian interventions and post-conflict reconstruction and recovery efforts. While
SEs are conceptualized as subjects in the entire paradiplomacy research, a striking fact is
that in the context of global conflict, they are not only subjects but they are also the very
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object of global politics with incredible magnitude of impact. Recall the prominence of
Alsace-Lorraine in the making of German-French wars for centuries which shaped not
only Europe but also entire political history of the world.
Today, there are cases with immense significance in global conflict, notably with
their capacity of reactivating the major clusters of armed powers, such as the recently
annexed Crimea Region of Ukraine which quite obviously escalated the global political
tensions between Europe, Russia and the US. Possessing the largest territorial control in
the globe, Russia strategized its overlord foreign policy over an ensemble of Eurasian,
Russian and Caucasian SEs all of which hold key strategic places in world politics.
Besides Crimea, Abkhazia, Tatarstan, Ossetia, Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh and other
are among these SEs with great potential of initiating interstate hostilities and regional
instability. Not only Russia, but many authoritarian major powers with multiethnic
political settings adopt various strategies to keep their SEs secure and to avoid them
becoming a security concern for their national unity. These strategies, in many contexts,
represent a continuous long-term practice of violence over politically and economically
repressed communities.
China, as an emerging global power with visibly state-centric politics and
economics, recently carved out a “regime enforcing” strategy of decentralization in which
it found way to both integrate Hong Kong into its nationalistically inspired politicaleconomic complex and also to shape its Guangdong region in Pearl River Delta to
become a global industrial hub. While using a similar strategy in constructing a new
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colonialist interest in the African continent, the same China simply uses political,
economic and military tactics to suppress its Xin Xiang region with ethnic Uyghur
population in its Eastern territories. Besides China, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, Syria, India,
Pakistan, Nepal and many other countries around the world have similar problems in
which their SEs are a major constituent of violent conflicts. The timely focus of this
dissertation research precisely is about investigating the intersections of international
development and global conflict in relation to SEs and their developments of
paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy.
Description of Scope, Core Issues, and Thesis Structure
In a world of conflict and aggravated political, economic, social, cultural and
environmental problems, especially when the nation-centric state system fails in
reproducing remedies but fuels destruction, what potential role can be adopted by
substate entities? Notably, considering the most up-to-date implications of intrastate
violence, is there a possibility to consider a new actor structure to at least provide a
relatively peaceful setting of politics? When states fail, who can deliver the necessary
services to ensure human development and security? SEs simply emerge as the primary
constituents in any attempt to answer these questions, eventually opening up a new space
of discussion in regards to their roles and possible frontiers of foreign policy actions.
The major contribution of this dissertation research is the very solid evidence of
the practice informing about a new venue and direction of theoretical discussion. Beyond
the previous definitions of paradiplomacy, this new era precisely requires a more flexible
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and innovative understanding of the promising global actors in tackling with the
overwhelming issues faced in a globalized world. In this context, paradiplomacy is no
more just “complementary” or “extra” to the nation-state which already is proven to fail
along with its traditional “inter-national” and highly contested structures that appear to be
gridlock systems today. While acknowledging the actual primacy of state structures in
world politics, the new sphere proposed in this research can be described as
“Schumpeterian”, in which SEs have increasingly promising agendas of international
development and conflict management. They simply emerge as the only possible actors
in certain highly aggravated contexts of conflict, such as the Kurdish regions in Syria,
Iraq and Turkey where the failure of state policies give birth to the rise of the new
promising units with potential global integration.
Before proceeding to the three individual case studies, the second chapter of this
thesis will provide a detailed discussion of the previous literature on paradiplomacy
research. Starting with the emergence and expansion of the paradiplomacy literature, and
developmental stages and contributions to the debate of paradiplomacy and
protodiplomacy, this chapter elaborates on the various conceptual definitions and
typologies of paradiplomacy defined by the scholarsip. Motivations, interests,
opportunity structures based on which paradiplomacy practice expanded and is settled,
and also the various cooperative and secessionist forms of paradiplomacy is discussed in
accordance with the different geographical developments such as the North/South
American motives of integration and cooperation, European integration,
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economic/political decentralization of Asian units and other forms of new
territorialization and reterritorialization. Based on this comprehensive reading and
discussion of the paradiplomacy literature, the third chapter of this thesis precisely opens
up a new venue of theoretical debate of the paradiplomacy, notably aiming to unfold the
specific conceptual re-definition of this research.
Dealing with an ensemble of relevant theoretical points including IR and conflict
theories, nationalism and identity theories, federalism and the devolution of the nationstate, state capacity building and state formation, and also dependency and modernization
theories, this chapter draws the “big picture” of paradiplomacy theory in order to be able
to make the new conceptual redefinition of the forms paradiplomacy takes in its most
recent and up-to-date contemporary practice. This re-conceptualization is eventually a
key for this thesis given the critical approach to the mainstream paradiplomacy theory
provides what this specific research defines. Unlike the previous liberal/neoliberal,
neofunctionalist and constructivist approaches, this thesis most importantly defines the
very first time in literature, the “Schumpeterian” form of paradiplomacy. Such practice is
probably the most solid concept and idea advanced by this thesis both theoretical and
empirically. The fourth chapter describes the empiricism and methodological steps
followed in this thesis, from the first philosophical Interparadigmatic approaches to the
every step followed in this research. Explaining the specific selection of the
methodologies of this study while also evaluating the previous paradiplomacy research,
this chapter clarifies the description of the research problem, and the methods used by
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this thesis to overcome these, as well as the each of the proposed case studies and their
comparative analysis that is the skeleton of this project.
The fifth, sixth and seventh chapter of this thesis are the single case studies that
are: Quebec, Catalonia and Kurdistan respectively. Kurdish regions constitute the key
intrinsic case of this research with their previously undefined form of paradiplomacy.
Defining the Quadri-Regional Kurdish Case of four neighboring but physically divided
Kurdish regions in Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey in literature first time, this dissertation not
only substantially makes a new opening in paradiplomacy research, but also proposes a
strong update to the theory and concept. Kurdish Quadri-Regional case is definitely a
solid evidence supporting my argument that paradiplomacy may indeed represent the
“hard policy engagement” of SEs, opposing to the scholars who portrayed it only as a
“soft” means of policy engagement.
In order to comprehensively and thoroughly analyze and investigate the key
intrinsic case of this study: the quadri-regional Kurdish paradiplomacy, this research is
designed in the form of comparative case study with addition of two other prominent case
studies: Quebec and Catalonia. Given the complex and quadri-regional nature of Kurdish
case with internally comparable Kurdish regions in Turkey, Iraq, Syria and Iran all of
which represent different settings of politics, economics, culture, and power-sharing, both
Quebec and Catalonia are specifically selected as they provide formidable contrasts and
similarities that inform the key intrinsic case.
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As a background case, Quebec has similar interests and motives in undertaking its
paradiplomatic activities within Canadian confederal/consociationalist jurisdiction, and
similarities to the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq. Moreover, another
important reason of selecting Quebec case is the type of paradiplomatic relationship it
developed notably over the control of water resources which play a prominent role in
Kurdish regions and their conflictive relationships within the broader area. Furthermore,
despite the presence of multilingual/multiethnic sovereignty movement and a related
conflictive motive, Quebec, definitely represents a master case in carving out a strategy
of successful and peaceful power transfer which over time seems to represent a
settlement. Catalan case, on the other hand, provides great insight over the ambiguities
over authority and power sharing, as well as the conflict and crisis between center-region
although not representing an armed conflict in contemporary Spain. Still, there is a great
interlink between Catalan and Kurdish cases in terms of the electoral processes and
political party formation as well as the bargaining over power transfer and sharing, and
also the European integration process which has important comparable elements and
outcomes. The ninth chapter is the conclusion of this thesis, making the overall
comparative analysis of the three cases, and summarizing the findings of the theoretical,
empirical and practical points made by this overall study.
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CHAPTER 2: PARADIPLOMACY IN PREVIOUS LITERATURE

The growing involvement of sub-state entities in international affairs has been an
important topic of debate in political science in the past few decades (Keating, 1999;
Duchacek et al., 1988; Hocking, 1997). Although European integration of the regional
and local governments has been the most comprehensive applied framework for the
extranationalization5 of non-central governments (NCGs), numerous countries such as
Canada, the US, Brazil, Australia, Germany, Russia, Spain and China constitute clear
examples of political systems in which NCGs are becoming the crucial constituents of
global political structures. Many scholars agree on the fact that we are now at a critical
juncture6 that promotes the involvement of non-central units7 in international relations
(Bursens and Deforche, 2010; Criekemans, 2008; Lecours, 2002; Lecours and Moreno,
2003; Aldecoa, 1999; Cornago, 1999; Wolff, 2007). Research on paradiplomacy has

5

Most of the literature looks at internationalization of specific regions, which does not
precisely correspond to the foreign policy actions of substate entities, discussed below.
These actions go beyond the classical “international” system of politics, yet there are
other levels of interaction between the regions and the transnational systems of politics
such as interregional, interlocal and supranational.
6
Bursens and Deforche (2010) referred to this term while other scholars have also
pointed out this development.
7
I use units as a more comprehensive term since not all of the non-central actors are
governments or state actors, but there are also non-state actors that are peripheral units in
many examples, such as the Kurdish regions or others in conflictive center-periphery
settings.
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significantly expanded in parallel with this recent rise of regional foreign policy actors in
world politics (see Figure 1).
Paradiplomacy in Literature between 1990 and 2014
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Figure 1: Expanding Research on Paradiplomacy. Citations per were retrieved from
Google Scholar Citation Index (15.05.2015)
The first thing to notice in paradiplomacy literature is the general disagreement
over how to define and conceptualize the “political unit”. The unit of analysis here is the
central issue to this discussion; yet, paradiplomacy has been defined differently by
various scholars who investigated a variety of non-central actors such as substate,
subnational, regional, provincial, länder (German), federal, island and landlocked units.
Each of these terms are, in fact, products of different contexts representing unique forms
of regional governance.
I argue that there is still the possibility of conceptualizing a universal framework
for paradiplomacy research, since all of the abovementioned types of decentralized
administrative units of governance may be defined as “substate entities” or “non-central”
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units. Still, it is crucial to understand and acknowledge that paradiplomacy cases are
unique to the political, economic and sociocultural contexts and represents different
patterns of development. Moreover, regions’ foreign policy actions cannot be solely
explained through the neo-functionalist or neoliberal frameworks anymore, wherein
regions are represented as complementary units at the contours of the nation-state, as is
the case in most early literature on paradiplomacy. Yet, the contemporary world of
politics is increasingly subject to the globalization of conflict, where some regions –
although few- emerge as the very constituent units of new state building with
Schumpeterian characteristics in terms of political constituency as can be seen in the
Kurdish paradiplomacy cases in Syria and Iraq (which I explain towards the end of this
chapter), or some regions emerge as major pioneers of other major challenges such as the
environmental issues or economic development.
Overall, the emergence and increasing involvement of substate entities in world
politics definitely has premises in tackling some of the toughest challenges in political,
economic and environmental areas which increasingly become a prior agenda of global
governance. However, the boundaries between paradiplomacy and traditional state
diplomacy still remain strong given the nation-state centric nature of organizations and
institutions of global governance.
In this chapter, I review the literature on paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy in
various settings of governance. After an assessment of the theoretical foundations and
empirical findings advanced by the growing international scholarship, I conclude with a
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proposed analytical framework to overcome the gaps and limitations of paradiplomacy
[and protodiplomacy] research, and a proposed formal model of paradiplomacy to be
used in the context of global multilevel governance.
Defining Paradiplomacy: A Conceptual Debate
The first wave of the debates on paradiplomacy emerged in late 1980s among a
group of international scholars. This resulted in the publication of a book titled
“Perforated Sovereignties and International Relations: Trans-Sovereign Contacts of
Subnational Governments,” edited by Duchacek, Latouche and Stevenson (1988), in
which the case of Canada was compared to the US, France, Belgium and Switzerland.
Although Duchacek (1984) had previously focused on the international relations of
subnational units, “micro-diplomacy” was used until Canadian scholar Panoyatis
Soldatos coined the term “paradiplomacy” in 1990 (Soldatos, 1990; Soldatos, 1993),
assembling the diverse forms of non-state or non-central diplomacy into one
umbrella/overarching concept (Criekemans, 2006, p. 3). Since then, discussions around
paradiplomacy have expanded steadily. Duchacek (1986) initially conceptualized
paradiplomacy as having three distinct forms: (a) cross-border regional microdiplomacy,
which links non-central units across borders of different states; (b) transregional
microdiplomacy, which links non-central units that do not have common borders but are
regions of neighboring countries; and (c) the global paradiplomacy that links non-central
units to the world regardless of common borders or regional affiliation.
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Paradiplomacy research has developed around a series of debates that can be
delineated as: (1) Paradiplomacy of regions under confederal and federal settings such as
the Province of Quebec in Canada, the states of the US, and the federal administrative
regions of Belgium8, the UK, Australia and Brazil (see e.g., Vengroff and Rich, 2004;
Vengroff, 2009; Vengroff, 2013; Lecours, 2008; Lecours, 2002; Keating, 1999; Hocking,
1993; Cornago, 1999; Kincaid, 1999; Aldecoa, 1999; Balthazar, 1999; McHugh, 2015;
Harper, 2013; Rioux-Ouimet, 2015; Chaloux, Paquin and Séguin, 2015; Chaloux and
Paquin, 2013; Michelmann and Soldatos, 1990; Criekemans, 2008; Criekemans, 2006;
Smith, 1988; Milani, 2011).
(2) Paradiplomacy of regions in the context of European regionalism and the
integration framework, representing both unitary and non-unitary forms of regional
governance, different contexts, and levels of political decentralization. This type of
scenario can be seen in examples of antagonistic cases, such as the Basque Country,
Catalonia, Northern Ireland, Scotland, as well as other cooperative/collaborative regions
such as Flanders, Wallonia, the German and Austrian landër, French9 regions, Italian
regions, Swiss cantons and other regional or local administrative units (Duran, 2013;

8

Although Wallonia and Flanders represent two constituent federations within Belgium,
Brussels-Capital region have a different jurisdiction, which more or less fit to the
definition of a “global city”, therefore, as a third major constituent of Belgium.
9
Although France has a centralized unitary system with partial regionalism, European
integration eventually impacted French regions. While the 1986 decentralization law has
been impactful in endorsing regions to develop their government capacities, a new law in
2016 was passed in France merging regions into larger units of governance, which is still
not certain to function successfully.
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Tatham, 2013; Cornago, 1999; Sodupe, 1999; Castro, 1999; Bursens and Deforche, 2010;
Magone, 2006; Lecours & Moreno, 2008; Zubiri, 1999; Hocking, 1999).
(3) Paradiplomacy of centripetal regions with the aim of bypassing authoritarian
central governments in either federative or unitary settings, such as the regional states of
former Soviet territories that still remain under the rule of the Russian federation (e.g.,
Tatarstan, Abkhazia, Ossetia, Crimea, Chechnya, Dagestan); China’s regions of Xin
Xiang, Tibet, Hong Kong; the Kurdistan Regions in Iraq, Syria, Iran and Turkey;
Baluchistan between Iran and Pakistan; the Kashmir Region between Pakistan and India;
the Tamil Region in Sri Lanka and other regions around the world (Cornago, 2010;
Cordell and Wolff, 2009; Wolff, 2011; Wolff, 2010; Wolff, 2009; Cornago, 1999; Chan,
2015; Derrick, 2012; Anaid, 2014; Sharafutdinova, 2003; Turner, 2007; Mohammed,
2013; Romano, 2004; El-Dessouki, 2010) or African10 and Asian Substate Entities which
are numerous.
(4) The paradiplomacy of landlocked regions, islands and smaller administrative
local units, global cities and environmental cross-border protection zones (Agdeeva,

10

Substate entities probably are the most significant in Africa, notably in terms of
conflict and international development where they play a central role sharing state power,
and they are also numerous given the magnitude of African continent. Although a few
examples such as Oromo/Oromia, Nubia, Puntland, or South African substate entities, or
Casamance region in Senegal, or Nigerian regions are familiar, my knowledge on African
substate entities is limited, except the fact that various studies emphasize the primacy of
substate entities in development and conflict (Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2012;
Smaling and Nandwa, 1997; Naude and Krugell, 2003; Bloch, 2000; Alexander, 2003;
Dickovick, 2005). Africa also has significant protodiplomacy cases such as South Sudan
and Eritrea representing two major conflict zones both of which recently declared their
independent administrations.
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2012; Geldenhuys, 1998; Byron, 2005; Setzer, 2013; Chaloux and Paquin, 2013; Eatmon,
2009). Although this categorization scheme does not represent a clear-cut typology for
the political units that are the subject of paradiplomacy debates, it informs the path of
expansion in paradiplomacy literature and the scholarly debate over the
internationalization of regions. Michelmann (1990) presents a compilation of factors and
motives for regions going international, including economic, political, cultural and
environmental considerations, and he points out the constitutional and institutional
settings of governance, most notably in these federal units and federations.
An explanatory framework was proposed by Soldatos (1990), describing an
ensemble of variables that distinguish between domestic determinants at the regional and
federal levels (Soldatos, 1990, pp. 44-49). He describes electoralism,
regionalism/nationalism, the asymmetry of federal units, growth of federative units, and
“me-tooism”11 as the regional determinants; while federal errors, inefficient nationbuilding processes, institutional gaps, constitutional uncertainties, and external causes
(such as global interdependence, the involvement of external actors, regional
interdependence) comprise the federal problems. Soldatos also noted that there might be
additional favorable conditions for a substate unit’s internationalization, such as the
personality of leaders, historical and cultural content, socio-political climate, geopolitical

11

Me-tooism refers to the settings in which more than one non-central units are subject to
center-periphery contestation, therefore, one unit may encourage another one to have
specific demands on sovereignty which is the case in Catalan and Basque Country in
Spain, or other similar examples.
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position, resources, supportive units such as cities, and foreign direct investment
(Soldatos, 1990, p. 51). Although it constitutes a primary typology for the classification
of regional external activities, this framework did not address the underlying
characteristics of paradiplomacy, notably in regard to the conflictive and cooperative
motives of substate entities (Bursens & Deforche, 2010, p. 13).
As can be seen in the development of this preliminary literature, the typology and
rationale of paradiplomacy have complemented each other and constituted the skeleton of
a primary conceptual framework, which later was contributed to by many others. The
growing practice of and research on paradiplomacy has provided an insight in the field of
political science and international affairs, notably highlighting complex processes such as
regionalization, regional integration, conflictive and cooperative development,
federalization and state formation. Although some scholars recognize the success of this
developing paradiplomacy literature in terms of carving out a substantial research agenda
(Bursens and Deforche, 2010), others emphasize potential limitations, pitfalls,
misconceptualizations and the lack of an agreed-upon framework (Blatter et. al., 2008).
Non-central units may develop formal official international relations in various
ways, such as sending delegations on official visits; signing binding international
agreements, memoranda of understanding and other instruments of diplomatic agreement;
participating in international “local” fora; and establishing permanent representative
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offices and delegations. They may also collaborate and cooperate under interregional
coalitions which sometimes even applies to the antagonist12 cases.
The underlying reasons behind regional foreign policy actions are diverse: each
case has some unique characteristics and has different motives, requires particular
strategies and affords/provides disparate opportunities, as each experiences different
courses of relationships with their national center or transnational/global partners or
contenders. Thus, historical institutionalization was proposed as a major empirical
foundation for investigating paradiplomacy by many scholars (see e.g., Duran, 2013;
Magone, 2006; Lecours, 2001; Milani, 2011; Bursens & Deforche, 2010). Another major
variable for the study of paradiplomacy is globalization, most notably free trade, and the
interpenetration of domestic and international spheres of action (Keating, 1999).
Hocking (1993) emphasizes the continuum of internationalization and localization
in a world of challenges and increased global interactions, and he dissents with Luard
(1990) who views this continuum as a ‘zero-sum’ situation created by globalization rather
than complementary to each other and the international policy action as the only
politically significant action (pp.9-11). He emphasizes the possibility of NCGs emerging
in “unpredictable” ways in the diplomatic stage (Hocking, 1993, p.42), and in a latter
text, he (1999) also keeps warning on the possibility of NCGs constituting themselves as
12

A few recent examples for this can be seen in the formation of regional advocacy coalitions under formal

or informal settings such as the “Nations without states” in which Catalonia, Palestine, Kurdistan, Basque
Country and many others demonstrate solidarity or support for each other’s causes.
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international actors, attempting to assimilate themselves, or at least having a tendency of
doing so, into conventional states (in Aldecoa & Keating).
In context of the practice of global governance, there are definitely motives and
moves of substate entities towards becoming international policy actors, at an increasing
frequency and weight, however, this does not necessarily inflict any greater issues in
world politics, or create confusions or complexities within international agreement
system as expressed by Hocking (1993; 1999), yet, in conflictive contexts where national
state system was in failure, NCGs may also emerge as the units that simply keeps the
national integrity intact, as can be seen in various conflict and international developments
in MENA regions.
Paradiplomacy plays various roles in the context of security redefinition, notably
in the ethno-political conflicts of Europe, Asia, Russia and the Americas. European
Integration, for instance, is one of the most comprehensive updates to regional
governance since its continental policy framework has created highly enforced regionalsupranational interdependence absorbing the sovereignty of the conventional nationalcenters allocating power to peripheral units, although this trend only sustained until late
1990s, again partially with limited impact, given most of nation-states have carved out
paths to create setbacks for decentralization, notably on issues regarding immigration and
security. European regionalism has attracted the attention of different regions because (1)
it eroded the distinction between internal and external policy, and (2) it has created
numerous institutions and spheres of governance (Cornago, 1999), however, despite this
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wave of supranational decentralization, substate entities decisive power in continental
politics was limited by central states.
Paradiplomacy also constitutes a basis for plurinational diplomacy as a means of
managing the national conflicts in multiethnic societies (Aldecoa, 1999). Cornago (2013)
explained plural diplomacy in his redefinition of diplomacy as a raison de système in
contemporary settings, which means much more than a world of states, along with its
singular and plural forms. He unfolded “diplomacy within states” and its relation with the
political community, along with the forms it takes, such as the various “diplomatic
teratologies,” paradiplomacy of resilience and diplomacies of agonistic respect (pp.93125). While this typology of the levels of diplomacy is largely convincing because it
thoroughly explains the actors and various functions of diplomacy in contemporary
political systems, the inclusion of various actors besides the substantial regional
government plays a very significant role in the redefinition of paradiplomacy.
While there may be a factor of territoriality in today’s contested cases of
paradiplomacy – or, more accurately, protodiplomacy – other actors have emerged in
contemporary politics which have become extremely significant in political analysis.
Sovereignty does not necessarily mean engaging in “solid” and “hard” forms of
[physical] territorial sovereignty; it can also be represented virtually or through networks
instead of regions, such as international networks of terrorism, transnational corporations,
and organized crime syndicates, while none of these forms of actors truly fit into the
concept of paradiplomacy. It is notably important to emphasize some units that emerge in
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contemporary conflicts and represent themselves as if they are substate entities, such as
the terror networks which possess territorial sovereignty in various regions, such as the
so-called Islamic State in Syria or Iraq, or others elsewhere, however, these units, despite
having interconnections with some state actors, cannot be represented as paradiplomatic
units, since they lack the very essential legitimacy in international law, as well as the very
grassroots support and any form of legitimate representation of the societies they target.
In that sense, the lowest common denominator administrative units with capacity to
conduct paradiplomacy are international or global cities, but more commonly the substate
entities mostly constituted of urban centers with rural hinterlands, again jurisdictionally
and formally defined and recognized by national and international actors, rather than the
simple practice of territorial sovereignty.
Protodiplomacy vs. Paradiplomacy: Secessionist Regions in World Politics
One of the most central issues in paradiplomacy debate is centered around the
underlying motives and outcomes of regional foreign policy actions, which depend on the
conflictive or cooperative nature of the substate entities (Bursens & Deforche, 2010).
Inherent in both unitary13 and federative settings of governance, substate entities may be

13

I argue that substate entities may be inherent in unitary settings although many may
find this statement irrational at first glance. One can easily see the existence, weight and
influence of substate entities in unitary state settings although they may be non-state
actors. In China, Iran, Turkey, Russia, these units may not necessarily take the form of
state actors yet, but it does not mean that they don’t exist. In Turkey, for instance, the
criminalization of Kurdish regional formations most notably through the oppression of
political parties, or in Iran and elsewhere, does not mean that Kurdish regional formations
do not exist. Although it is in the form of a quasi-federal state, it is also possible to see

30
driven by either cooperative motives, tending to support or complement the traditional
central state structures, or conflictive ones, which may contest the centralized
government, possibly promoting secessionism. This latter conflictive situation is termed
“protodiplomacy” by scholars such as Vengroff and Rich (2004), Allan and Vengroff
(2012), Neumann and Weaver (2005), McHugh (2015), Kuznetsov (2014), and Duran
(2015). Unlike Lecours and Moreno (2001) and Magone (2006), who define
paradiplomacy as a feature of stateless nations which makes the concept less useful in
explaining contrasting motives of non-central units, protodiplomacy corresponds to a
clear distinction in the unit of analysis in terms of political behavior, commonly
emphasized as cooperative vs. conflictive, or centripetal vs. centrifugal types of noncentral units by various scholars (Wolff, 2007; Nganje, 2013; Setzer, 2013; Reuchamps,
2013; Wolff and Yakinthou, 2013; Harper, 2013; Duran, 2013).
To clarify, a region may be conflictive without being antagonistic. There are
indeed regions with centripetal tendencies promoting more decentralized government
structures, or at least defending the preservation of peripheral state power, without
advancing any claim for independent state formation. In a sense, paradiplomacy and
protodiplomacy represent two intersecting subsets which are purely dynamic and may
take different forms in different cases. While in some cases, protodiplomacy may be
minimized depending on the integrative steps taken by national contenders or simply due

that Madrid has a strong unitary tendency towards its own regions that are state actors
since the constitutional ambiguity over authority and sovereignty creates a de facto case
of Unitarianism.
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to demographic, economic, political or sociocultural settings, in others, decades-long
practices inflate protodiplomacy that it no more functions as a subset of paradiplomacy,
but simply constitutes its own secessionist cluster, even contrasting with paradiplomacy
in many areas.
Overall, there are many actors who practice paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy at
the same time, and both internal and external political developments and paradigmatic
changes determines the structure of this dynamic interrelation between the two. Catalonia
and Kurdistan Region in Iraq can be given solid as examples of NCGs that practice
protodiplomacy publicly and internationally, while they don’t secede their status within
their national contexts, and are simply conducting their international policy within the
authority drawn by their national-jurisdictional contexts, in the form of paradiplomacy.
Therefore, together they represent a dynamic compound that may change characteristics
depending on the political and economic context one way or the other.
Brian Hocking (1993) notably pays attention to the conflict between central and
non-central governments presented in paradiplomacy scholarship, and elaborates on what
he calls “multilayered” diplomacy, representing a more complex scene of international
affairs where NCGs can act not only as rivals, but also as helpers and allies. German
landër, Australian states, and US regions [states] were given as federative examples,
along with Quebec, a widely debated antagonistic case from North America, which
Hocking (1993) unlike most mainstream political scientists, does not necessarily view
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negatively,14. Hocking (1995) also argues that polyarchy, polyocracy, multilevel
governance, and multilayered diplomacy each convey images of a growing phenomenon:
the intersectionality between the subnational, national, and international political spheres
(Hocking, 1995, p. 37). He generally views paradiplomacy as a useful process for filling
the gap of traditional central state diplomacy, a complementary support mechanism,
helping states to adapt to contemporary changes and challenges.
Protodiplomacy, on the other hand, occurs mainly in multiethnic [or
multireligious or multisectarian] societies, most notably in cases where stateless nations
advance their cause of state formation transnationally as an essential constituent political
motive to global representation. Many examples can be given, such as the Basque
Country, Catalonia, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, the Baluchistan Region of Iran, and –
to a certain extent – Quebec. In some cases of protodiplomacy, there is a situation of
central domination over peripheral units, and even an inherently violent15 protracted

There is indeed a negative view of regions’ antagonism in mainstream political science
since state-centrism has eventually dominated almost all spheres of political debates. The
underestimation of substate units, therefore, is a pure product of this lack of vision, and
simply the ignorance that does not look at the very historical facts about the incomplete
and unjust process of state formation in the 20th century’s imperialist era. Although
initiated by the realists, liberals and even constructivists have been obedient to this
fallacy which I argue is also contributing to contemporary conflict. Cross-national
datasets do not provide any form of scientific insight, therefore, to the civil war cases, or
the key violent conflicts since they do not care at all about the internal dynamics of
societies.
15
Most of the protodiplomacy cases have historical roots of violence or civil war, since
these units have already tried to become independent throughout history, opposing their
national contenders as can be seen in the cases of Colombia, Basque Country, Kurdistan
(Southern, Northern, Western and Eastern), Baluchistan, Catalonia, Tatarstan) and many
14
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conflict. Protodiplomacy may also be seen in instances of massive state dissolution, such
as the collapse of the former Yugoslavia, resulting in the emergence of numerous new
regions in the Balkans, or the Soviet and Ottoman collapses that gave birth to dozens of
new states, along with non-state groups that struggled for self-determination throughout
the last century. The recent referendum16 for Scottish independence, the public vote for
the recognition of Catalonia as an independent state entity in 2014, and the continuous
statements of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) of Iraq for Kurdish
independence are substantial cases of contemporary protodiplomacy, along with Xin
Xiang of China and Baluchistan in Iran, or the intense conflict zones of Africa: South
Sudan, Eritrea and numerous other substate entitites.
The Rise of Paradiplomacy and Protodiplomacy in Global Governance
Keating (1999) explains the rise of paradiplomacy by various underlying reasons,
such as globalization and the rise of transnational/international regimes, international
political economic transformations, cultural globalization that promotes regions’
internationalization, and the declining importance of territorial politics within states. He

others around the world. Today’s state and non-state actors in these conflicts, therefore,
are best understood as the product of these historically evolved contestations.
16
The Scottish Referendum for independence was held in 18 September 2014, following
The Scottish Independence Referendum Bill passed by Scottish Parliament, after an
agreement between governments of the UK and Scotland, and resulted with 55.3% “no”
against 44.7% “yes” votes with a record turnout of 84.6%. Despite the presence of
centuries long Scottish resistance to British imperialism and dominance, the results
reflect how the recent recognition of collective rights including self-rule, economic
commons and interdependence, demographic structures of changing societies and also the
“warmer” and more progressive policies of London towards recognition of Scotland’s
rights minimized secessionism.
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notably compares and contrasts Quebec, Catalonia, the Basque Country, Flanders, and
Wallonia in regard to their different motives for going international (Keating, 1999, pp.
3-5), and he emphasizes the unique opportunity structures that have emerged as an
outcome of the global transformations of the inter-state political system in which regions
have found opportunities to act internationally for various reasons. The transnational
bodies constituted by regional structures, such as the European institutions and
organizations in which regions are represented (e.g., The Committee of the Regions,
Council of Local Authorities and Regions of Europe, Assembly of European Regions
(AER), EU Council, EU Commission, INTERREG I-II, and Four Motors of Europe),
NAFTA, OECD and UNESCO, have all played significant roles in the reiteration of the
regions’ internationalization (Keating, 1999, pp. 6-11).
Global Governance and the Re-invention of the State: An Emerging System of
Opportunities and Threats
Overall systemic transformations in political, economic and social structures have
been conceptualized differently by globalization scholars from diverse ideological camps,
representing orthodox-conservative, neoliberal or neo-Marxist accounts among others.
While scholars like Ohmae (1995) view globalization as an era of the emergence of a
global market place, more critical scholars argue that the international economy is
segmented into major regional blocks within which national economies remain powerful
(see e.g. Hirst & Thompson, 1996); still others view globalization as a deep change in
state structures and societies that are strongly interconnected in a highly uncertain world
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(Giddens, 1996; Rosenau, 1997). Neoliberal accounts define globalization as a new epoch
in which traditional nation states have become “unnatural” business units in a global
economy (Ohmae, 1995; Held, McGrew, Goldblatt and Perraton, 1999); these accounts
privilege the economic logic of neoliberal thought based on a single global market and
competition as the locomotive of human progress, although left-leaning scholars view
globalization as “market civilization”. Held et. al. (1999) also point to the global
economy, emergence of global governance institutions, and hybrid and globally-diffused
cultures as evidence of a radically new order (p. 4), signifying the demise of the nation
state (Ohmae, 1995; Held et al., 1999 Albrow, 1996).
History constitutes a significant empirical foundation for the abovementioned
systemic global transformations, since from the Westphalia gatherings until today, there
has been a continuous development and expansion in the international relations system.
Globalization, in that sense, is a centuries long transformation, which eventually
impacted the regime emerged from the system of world politics and international
relations, which in its contemporary may be called “global multilayered governance”.
The birth of the International Human Rights Regime in the post-World War II era,
notably starting with the Nuremberg Trials, evolved towards the formation of a
multilateral legal order that ended with the 1948 Declaration of Universal Human Rights.
Later, these types of legal orders would come to be called liberal regimes or Bretton
Woods Regimes, representing, for instance specific eras in which the intergovernmental
structures of justice, economy and political practice of diplomacy were managed by the
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sovereign global powers that have followed heavily militarized and industrialized
politics.
Before the abovementioned intergovernmental formations and reformations, the
early 19th and 20th century have been dominated by Pax-Brittanica and Pax-Americana,
and in fact before that, French, Spanish, Austrian, Ottoman, Chinese have all played
significant roles in the formation of contemporary intergovernmental structures
(Wallerstein, 1974, 1980, 1988). While until now the most dominant actor in this realm
has been the nation state notably since 17th century, today, the world has a much complex
structure of governance than ever.
Scholars of paradiplomacy emphasize the drastic global transformations in the
post-World War II era, notably starting with the global conditions of the Cold War and
later the changing structures of governance, security, development and international
relations in the 1970s and 1980s around the world, along with economic, social and
cultural characteristics of societies. They commonly refer to Keohane and Nye (1973,
1987, 1998, and 2002) as a basis for their power and interdependence theory. This view
offers an explanation for the new federalism and newly-emerging foreign policy actors
such as MNCs, notably delineating the centralization, decentralization and fragmentation
processes among states, and the neoliberal institutionalism which represents the framing
of the international policy making scene (Kuznetsov, 2014; Aldecoa & Keating, 1999;
Sharafutdinova, 2003).
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Globalization is definitely a catalyst for paradiplomacy, since it has created a new
system of world politics with new actors, challenges and institutions, and a new global
regime of political economy. Two distinct trends emerge as the central determinants of
the transformation in global governance structures, which Rosenau (2004) notably
defines as “governance in the absence of a global government” (p. 36): fragmentation and
integration (Rosenau, 2004; Zürn, 2002; Magone, 2006). This process is also
characterized by “denationalization” and the birth of a new constituency system, in which
non-central units, NGOs, IGOs, MNCs, and interest groups all represent the new actor
structure, collectively shrinking the size of state-centric systems, as well as their
influence on politics and the economy. The actors, however, are not limited to those
enumerated above; transnational crime organizations, terror networks, informal
organizations, and other non-state actors have also become part of this complex web.
The rise of global cities, international local fora, competing multilateral
organizations and alliance formations, and interest groups with significant power over
institutions and policymaking, represent the multilayered formation of this emerging
realm as well. However, still much of these formations have focused on nation-state
actors as their constituents, similar to what was expressed in the debates of IR by
realists/neorealists, liberals, neoliberals and partially constructivists although substate
governments and regions have emerged as new trending and increasingly promising
actors. Despite the emerging and expanding potential for substate entities to deal and
tackle with most challenging contemporary issues, somehow, the overall systemic trends
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was towards minimizing the weight and voice of substate constituents, again at different
levels and scopes in different cases. Much of the abovementioned international
organizations and institutions have expanded around the nation-centric view of global
governance, therefore, also with a systemic tendency or pressure to limit the involvement
of substate entities.
European Integration and Paradiplomacy: The Rise of Knowledge Regions
and Stateless Nations
Paradiplomacy was mostly debated in the context of post-World War II (liberal)
settings until and after the 1980s, and mostly in federative contexts. These debates later
expanded significantly in response to the outcomes of European integration, which came
to be understood as a supranational system of governance that has developed around the
idea of neo-functionalism and the spill-over hypothesis. Regional integration has been
frequently described as an element that can give political-legal and economic bargaining
power to regions under the Treaty on the European Union in 1992 (Maastricht), which
applied subsidiarity as a major principle of governance, decentralizing –or recentralizingstate power17.

17

A great problem in context of European integration, first the new features of substate
entities were ratified in early 1990s, which symbolically empowered region’s foreign
policy actions, but this trend was somehow carved out as a path to recentralize in many
countries, turning subsidiarity into a recentralization and regime-enforcing tool. Various
states have developed their own agents to manage funds for decentralized development
and European integration, which in fact opposes to the essence of the Treaty and the
principle of subsidiarity, again enforcing central state’s hand in controlling the sources of
state power from substate entities.
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Federative, quasi-federative and unitary state structures have experienced
European integration in various ways. For instance, Germany has become a major
European power, with its well-integrated and competent federal system, while the end of
Spain’s unitary dictatorship quasi-federalized the state, creating ambiguities over
authority and sovereignty. This gave birth to Madrid’s problematic relations with the
Basque and Catalan regions, which have still not been overcome decades later. Another
important regional achievement was the space that regional entities carved out to
represent themselves internationally. This eventually resulted in regional institutionalism
at the supranational level. Through these, dominated regions have found assistance in
overcoming their national [state] contenders. Even in Turkey, an EU candidate country
with strict18 unitary national settings, it was observed, for example, that Kurds gained an
important voice and increased local institutional strength due to the European framework
of integration in the early 2000s when Turkey adopted significant constitutional, political,
economic and social reforms, albeit temporarily, however, this slight wave of

I use ‘strict’ because the Turkish state clearly opposes any form of constitutional
change in response to the increasing demands from substate entities, notably in response
to its very significant Kurdish population. Although political conflicts could be managed
better or at least minimized through structural reforms in Turkey, which was raised
repeatedly especially in the recently collapsed peace process, no substantial steps were
taken formally or constitutionally by Turkish Government and state institutions towards
the recognition of Kurdish and other minority rights. What has been achieved in the
European harmonization process –which one can call a wave of reforms that improved
the level of democracy slightly- has not been completed, but rather was destroyed since
2007. Instead, the peace process was suffocated through the marriage of political-Islam
and Turkish nationalism at the governmental level, heavily leaning toward securitymilitary policies. Therefore, Kurdish local and regional formations were delegitimized
and criminalized leading to the re-emergence of armed conflict.
18
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decentralization policy was drastically transformed into a state and regime-enforcing
trend especially when regional “development agencies” were created by Ankara to
control EU and other multilateral development funds, therefore, limiting the space and
sovereignty of possible substate formations, and enforcing central state’s hand in
controlling the sources (Rumelili and Keyman, 2011; Bingol, 2013; Isin and Saward,
2013; Tocci, 2005; Patton, 2007; Rumford, 2002; Mousseau, 2012).
In a recent study, Tatham (2013) presented a new data set to 100 official paradiplomats from Brussels to demonstrate the conflict between subnational and national
representations in the European political capital. In his analysis, rather than focusing on
cases of paradiplomacy which would enhance the understanding of the cooperative or
bypassing (sensu lato) nature of the regions, he focused on those cases that underpinned
the conflict. He argues that these contested cases are very different than others, and that
resource richness and diplomatic accreditation significantly influence the frequency and
course of conflict, while devolution and party political incongruence do not have a
significant impact. This study also concludes that para-diplomats oppose the nation state,
which can be seen as a significant finding informing the partially contested interrelation
between traditional central state diplomacy and paradiplomacy.
Criekemans (2008) specifically addressed this very question of whether the
“boundaries” between paradiplomacy and diplomacy are “watering down” or not, by
testing a series of hypotheses in a comparative study of some regions with legislative
power and small states (Flanders, Quebec, Catalonia, Bavaria, Scotland, Wallonia
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Regions and Luxemburg and Slovenia as two small states). He also looks at the best and
most innovative practices the regions undertake in bilateral and multilateral levels. He
identifies concrete dimensions (legislative power, institutional context, utilized
“diplomatic instruments,” organizational structure and operation) in which regions
conduct their own foreign policy actions for his analysis in which he concludes: (1) that
regions’ diplomacy often intersects with state diplomacy and even surpasses or becomes
more complex in time; (2) state diplomacy has a more consulting and agreement-making
nature, while substate diplomacy is mostly cooperation based; (3) paradiplomacy has
become diverse and lively, supported by “extra” representations abroad (political and
other) breaking the monopoly of international relations between nation states, and notably
the regions with legislative powers are very active in signing new agreements and
collaborative projects as well as formal and informal networks of investment and
advocacy; (4) regions tend to develop their foreign affairs management through further
professionalization, and a focus-policy for innovation and structural motives to represent
their competencies, and (5) regions have various characters in terms of international
representations while the ones with legislative powers have political, economic, cultural,
social and even “hard” forms of policies such as immigration, although they are still
modest compared to their respective central governments.
Criekemans (2006) has also focused on the development of paradiplomacy in subnational units in Belgium over time (1993-2005) and investigated the historical
institutionalism along with several challenges experienced by the regions. He aptly
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described these challenges, local responses, and the ways the central-regional institutions
dealt with issues; thus, he delineated paradiplomacy in Belgium as a means of systemic
redesign in which the institutions of regional governance developed over time through
their experiences and resolutions. These challenges were mostly about the regions’
administrative and authority problems along with the issues related to regions’ ability to
adapt their governmental structures to fulfill the requirements of foreign policy making
since Belgium’s constitutional reform in 1993 required the principle of “in foro interno,
in foro externo,” meaning that the regions must now conduct their own foreign policies.
The outcomes, for instance, in specific cases with secessionist tendencies emerged
more clearly under supranational settings, such as the intense19 paradiplomacies of the
Basque Country and Catalonia in Spain, Northern Ireland and Scotland in the UK, and
Flanders in Belgium, as well as some less antagonistic regions in Italy, France and
Germany. Lecours and Moreno (2008) argue that paradiplomacy is a function of stateless
nationalism, and this is seen clearly in certain antagonist cases – the Basque Country in
his research – as it is used as a substitute for traditional state diplomacy. Processes of
nationalism (e.g., identity construction, interest definition/articulation, and politicalterritorial mobilization) motivate these regional or subnational units to functionally
advance paradiplomacy as a means for state and national identity building.

The word “intense” here means an intensified use and frequency of paradiplomacy,
which mostly is also associated with protodiplomacy, tending to go beyond simple trade,
development and representational functions, but also using it as a means of nation-, or
independent state-capacity-building.
19
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As discussed previously, informing the conflictive and cooperative motives of the
regions, Bursens and Deforche (2010) proposed their analysis as a complement to the
comparative method used by Lecours and Moreno (2008) who investigated
paradiplomacy in the so-called “developed” world, looking at Flanders, Catalonia,
Wallonia, Quebec and Basque Country. Using these cases, he concludes that: (1)
Paradiplomacy serves many different purposes including economic development, cultural
diffusion, technological advancement and political affirmation; (2) paradiplomacy is
involved in domestic adjustments and creates structures to give directions to the substate
units to undertake international action and administer programs, and at the state level it
creates channels; (3) it presents pitfalls as well as great opportunities for democratic
development since there is inherent antagonism in these cases. Moreover, Lecours and
Moreno (2008) propose paradiplomacy as a useful tool for democracy, deliberation and
representation in these highly industrialized countries.
Beyond what is predominantly described in the study of paradiplomacy from
Europe, particularly regarding regions with distinct centripetal motives like those
discussed above, the foundation, enlargement and integration of the European Union is
closely linked with a new regionalism in which interregional relations are the major
determinant of supranational governance. Börzel and Risse (2009) argue that the EU
perceives itself as a model of regional integration, promoting the development of genuine
intra-regional and interregional political and economic cooperation.
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The adoption of decentralization and subsidiarity as a foundational principle has
shaped the process of regional integration throughout Europe formally; thus, Article 5(3)
of the Treaty on the European Union and Protocol (No. 2) substantially defined the
subsidiarity and proportionality incorporated into the Lisbon Treaty and later enshrined it
formally in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 (European Parliament, 2015). The practical
implications of such an endorsement allow for inter-institutional frameworks and
agreements, along with an increase in the ease with which regions can construct formal
relations with each other and with other political units and actors. However, despite the
formal-jurisdictional expansion in the definition of the space for authority of substate
entities and NCGs, on various key issues, notably immigration and security, the limits of
such cooperation becomes more visible.
Even if an important share of policy-making authority and sovereignty shifted
from national governments to Brussels, which visibly felt by Europeans, substate entities’
hand remained weaker and less institutionalized, therefore, not being able to develop
neither sovereignty practice nor influential state power on many issues including
immigration, security and even fiscal and economic policy in various Southern European
contexts.
Although theoretically neofunctionalism has been the primary champion in the
discussion about regional integration, which places a major emphasis on the role of noncentral units and non-state actors, it has nevertheless remained nation-state-centric to a
certain extent. Neofunctionalism concludes that regional relations are determined by new
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layers and levels of governance, such as the supranational, which emerged on the basis of
intergovernmental relations, and significantly shaped by the dominant nation-state
system, although it proposes new layers below and above the state.
The fostering of regional organizations in the welfare state, which were mostly
peripheral before, has not been subject to significant development; therefore, the
promotion of exporting social-economic integration continentally,20 which is called the
“spillover” hypothesis, is a foundational idea for European integration (Haas, 2004;
Moravcsik, 2005). It is a must to acknowledge that the European paradiplomacy is not
unique to the abovementioned cases of multiethnic societies. Global political-economic
transformations have led to the development of certain regions within federative
frameworks, or even under unitary settings, as can be seen in the formation of the Four
Motors of Europe or many other interregional formations under supranational motives. In
fact, German länders have enormous production power compared to many nation states
around the world. Yet, these most often reconstructed themselves as “knowledge
regions,” have significant input into global research and development, and enjoy a high
level of technology production, along with their significant industrial output. In this
context, regions emerge as competitive political-economic units, not with antagonistic
tendencies, but rather promoting inter-regional collaboration and competition.

20

There is another great debate about the nature of this spill-over beyond the discussion
in this paper, which mostly is about the structural nature of it, claiming either the
formation of a continental central government (EU) with concrete division of
governmental affairs, or imagining a more plural form of Europe with major power
centers in Central Europe constituting an ensemble of actors.
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Federal/Confederal Paradiplomacy of North American Units
Complementary studies on European paradiplomacy reveal different variables to
consider and test, as well as various conceptual and theoretical designs, which allow for a
comparative perspective on paradiplomacy across Europe. While these case studies
construct validity for case-specific issues, some of them successfully used comparative
method, thereby contributing to the sequential build-up of a foundational basis for further
research since the multiplication of cases improved the validity of findings. Moreover,
federalism and federal/confederate settings of governance – mostly shaped in North
American political systems – are found to be catalysts for regional paradiplomacy
(Vengroff and Rich, 2004). This is a necessary consideration, since the conditions there
are different than the supranational framing/framework of paradiplomacy in Europe. It is
notably important that governors or premiers of federal states and provinces of the US,
Canada and Mexico gathered in a conference in Denver, pointing out to the expanding
new directions of policy collaboration between substate entities in North America. Not
only in frame of NGA (National Governors Association), but also in various contexts
such as the states of New England, or conference of Western States’ Governors and
various interregional collaboration settings and organizations have been influential in the
recent progress of increasing paradiplomacy actions of North American states. The major
fields of collaboration are: economic development and commerce, education and
workforce, health and human services, security and safety as well as natural resources
and environment, all of which also represent the committees of NGA.
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Quebec probably represents the most institutionalized paradiplomacy (Allan and
Vengroff, 2012; Lecours, 2008; Vengroff and Rich, 2004), even if Bursens & Deforche
(2010) argued that Belgium has a much clearer and better defined case, framed by
binding official agreements and statements from both the nationally constituent21
Kingdom of Belgium and also from the supranational European Parliament. Balthazar
(1999) investigated the Quebec Government, as a national entity functioning overseas,
which resulted in contestation within Canada. The Quebec case is significant, because, in
the aftermath of the colonial period, Quebec remained the only entity in Canada to
recognize French identity in its national foundation; although its jurisdictional
recognition within Canada was set by Anglophone rule and the provincial economy was
dominated by Anglophone businesses. Following the years of Quiet Revolution during
which Quebec has passed through a significant modernization and societal
transformation, starting with 1960s, a definitive sovereignty movement emerged in
Quebec based on the linguistic-national differences, and the prominent role of Catholic
church has declined along with the conservative rule, while pro-sovereignty movement
and liberal political movements have emerged as main actors. This political-economic
transformation also created a new system of balance between provincial and national
level politics and economics. Quebec, therefore, found the chance of completing various

21

Regionalism has long historical roots in Belgium, but its contemporary form reemerged in the second half of the 20th century, and was formally/constitutionally
endorsed in 1993, in what can be defined as a top-to-down approach pushing regions to
become internationalized.
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key infrastructure and international development projects, strengthening its provincial
economic production, and creating its niche industries around the idea of provincial selfcompetence which also enriched the international agreement regime of the provincial
government.
Quebec’s deviant construction of national identity, which notably emerged with
Francophone and pro-sovereignty movements, contributed to the motives of political and
economic development at provincial level. Although French departure from North
America [given the colonizer status was left after the defeat by British] is important in
Quebec’s political-historical status, Quebec’s contemporary internationalization is
significantly rooted in the world of Francophonie. Francophonie is a main infrastructure
in French foreign policy remaining from its colonial cultural-political and economic
heritage, and Quebec is definitely a developed major actor within this context despite its
substate jurisdiction, although France pays specific attention to not initiate antagonism in
its relationship with Canada. Still, Francophone infrastructure sets the groundwork for
relationships between its members, keeping at least a minimal institutional
interconnection on the basis of French politics, economy and culture.
Quebec’s preservation of its deviant national identity has also helped establish a sociocultural foundation to support a consociationalist system based on market nationalism
that, in accordance with its elite institutionalism, acted to develop its own niche
competences.
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The industrial advancement and significant wealth generated by the Quebecois
economy has found significant space in newly emerging markets around the world and
strengthened the hand of Quebec in world politics and economy. However, while
significantly contributing to the development of state power and capacity at provincial
level, the expanding and developing business environment of Quebec did not occur
independent from the rest of the Canada, and in fact, created a much larger requirement
of cooperation and dependency between Quebec and the rest of Canada. This shared
commons are also reflected to the development of liberal political cluster, which
eventually balanced and even surpassed the pro-sovereignty movements.
Paradiplomacy in North America is not limited to the case of Quebec. Various
states – such as New York, Washington, Michigan, Nebraska, Alberta, and Alaska – are
also involved in paradiplomacy, mostly based on cooperation in environmental matters
and trade. Similarly, the paradiplomacy experience of the United States – and possibly
Brazil and Australia – represent attempts at fostering regional integration and trade, as
well as collaboration for environmental or other border-related issues (Ravenhill, 1999)
to which recently Mexico is also added since federal states of Mexico are permitted to
become active in international policy making. However, in the case of Quebec, the
regional government and institutions openly act as a sovereign force with their own
distinct policy formation mechanisms – even in crucial fields, such as immigration or
education – maintaining important technological, industrial and political strength. This
keeps Quebec’s markets and institutions thriving, allowing for self-rule and the ability to
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act as an almost sovereign state overseas. Other Canadian regions are also involved in
paradiplomacy, especially in the context of the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), and mostly concerning border-related issues, such as security, environmental,
and trade issues. However, Quebec is obviously more than a collaborative region, and is
in fact the leader of paradiplomacy in North America (Vengroff and Rich, 2004), which
may underpin the push by separatists for greater independence.
In their insightful analysis, Vengroff and Rich (2004) describe the unique
paradiplomacy of Quebec. The province has a ministry dedicated to international
relations, comprised of 700 qualified employees, and has signed 550 international
agreements since 1964, more than 300 of which are still in effect with 79 different
countries. Quebec also had22 28 separate representation offices in 17 countries. The
bilateral and multilateral agreements are mostly on important collaborative projects in the
fields of education, science, and technology (Vengroff and Rich, 2004, pp. 22-24).
Similar to most antagonistic cases, in Quebec people are divided as to the role of
paradiplomacy, mostly deferring to domestic politics which Vengroff and Rich (2004)
describe as “protodiplomacy,” in which the transregional activity has evolved into an
effort to achieve international recognition and statehood. In the Quebec case, the role of
paradiplomacy is understood and addressed differently by the political parties – the Parti
Quebecois (PQ) advances its cause for sovereignty, while the Liberal Party of Quebec
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The number of foreign representations is dynamic, and while increases in prosovereignty rules, it decreases in liberal government periods which is the case in the
recent government as well.
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acts somewhat collaboratively with other Canadian provinces. However, regardless of
which political party is in power, the international activity of Quebec is ruled by
economic self-interest rather than political independence (Vengroff and Rich, 2004, p.
25). Furthermore, Allan and Vengroff (2012) investigated the foreign agreements made
by Canadian provinces over time to see whether the global economic stagnation or the
post-9/11 crisis influenced regions’ economic collaboration. They found that an
important determinant of Quebec’s foreign agreements was political party preferences
and programs (Allan and Vengroff, 2012). In addition to Quebec, Australia, the UK,
Germany, Belgium, China, Russia and Brazil have also implemented regional
frameworks of decentralization processes mostly under federative motives. However,
these occur in completely different political contexts which eventually are underpinned
by different reasons and motives behind the internationalization of regions yielding to
different outcomes.
Bad Governance and Paradiplomacy: Coping Internationally with
Authoritarian Central State
The use of paradiplomacy in a region’s search for international recognition and statehood
has frequently been investigated in various policy settings. Another significant case of
deviation from other examples in the Global North has been the Tatarstan Region, which
is part of Russia and which has been a significant cause of international contestation
throughout its history. Sharafutdinova (2003) explored and described Tatarstan’s use of
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paradiplomacy to bypass the “overlord” Russian state,23 and to build statehood and
national identity. While Tatarstanian paradiplomacy is similar to the cases previously
described from the Global North, since it has similar motives and functions, it is
important to acknowledge its unique political setting under Russia’s dominance, which is
inherently different from the democracy and representation norms of most of the Global
North. Tatarstan is not alone, however; numerous regions have similar stories under
Russia’s authoritarian and possessive statehood, built over the remnants of the Soviet
Empire. Yet, regions, such as Chechnya, Dagestan, Abkhazia, Ossetia, and Crimea are
not simply non-central units subject to Russian dominance, but are also the very softbelly24 of Russia’s authoritarianism.
While the years between 1990s and 2000s have been a period of turmoil for Russia since
the systemic crisis in politics and economy in the aftermath of Soviet collapse required
significant effort for recovery, Putin possessed the state power and set his authoritarian
rule, notably through the use of Chechnya war to restructure Russian military power.

I use overlord since Moscow’s periphery of influence is not limited to its own regions,
but as well as its neighbor states, continents, and quite comprehensively a large number
of actors around the world. Yet, it is a must to remember that Russia’s recent annexation
of Crimea, war with Chechnya, or the support it provides to the Syrian regime, or many
African, Asian and even Latin American states can simply be supporting evidence of this
claim.
24
Although Russia plays the “big brother” in keeping these numerous regions under its
control, which makes one of the larger landscapes of sovereignty around the world, one
must remember that there has always been war and conflict with these units, which
diminished in the Soviet Era, and some of which re-emerged in the aftermath of Cold
War again. Chechnya, Karabagh-Nagorno, Ossetia, Abkhazia and many others reveal the
weakness of Russia’s dominance although they seem militarily marginal to Russia’s
power.
23
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Although many Eastern European state members of former Iron Curtain were now
independent from Russia, one must remember that there are also numerous states in
Russian federal territory that could not have the opportunity for independence, but partial
autonomy at their best. Tatarstan, and other Turkic or Muslim communities within Russia
lost their possible sovereignty chances notably in the era of Stalin and its aftermath, since
they were dispersed in vast Soviet territories with strict resettlement policies of Moscow.
Crimea, for instance, which until the recent few years was an autonomous region in
Ukraine, was annexed by Russian forces following which a political leadership was
assigned by Moscow that also happened in Chechnya and in other regions. The declined
Tatar population in Crimea was both due to the forced migration of them to Northern
(Arctic) regions, and also was both Hitler’s and Stalin’s destructive policies on Crimea,
and later Soviet resettlement plans that changed the demographic structures of Crimea
enabling Soviet rule.
Many other countries are also subject to conflictive relations within their regions, some of
which have already reached the level of civil war, mass destruction or at least severe
oppression as can be seen in various Asian, African and Middle Eastern examples. Not
every region has dealt with the same type of center. Likewise, not all [national] centers
construct their national identity and determine citizenship in the same way. Eventually,
what may begin with a demand for recognition may unfortunately end in civil war, one of
the most atrocious forms of violent conflict, as can be seen in the examples of Iraq, Syria,
China, Iran, Turkey and elsewhere. Decentralization has not been managed well in the
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multiethnic settings of such conflicts, and attempts toward this were often criminalized in
the authoritarian contexts of these examples, leading to the expansion of protracted social
conflicts. Out of brutal oppression, regional insurgency movements often emerge. Not
only the national central states, but a much broader web of actors play significant roles in
management of these conflicts, which have increased/intensified in the contemporary era.
It would be naïve to think of paradiplomacy as an extension of the state system, but in a
dynamically re-territorializing world, paradiplomacy is very much about the core unit of
constituency. Different than the evolution of sovereignty in Global Northern regions,
there is a broad deconstruction of the nation state in the Middle East, Africa and Asia.
One example comes from the horrendous Syrian Civil War experienced recently which
resulted with multiple millions25 of displaced, oppressed, and massacred victims, and
which is no longer intrastate, but rather a proxy war between a web of contesting actors
and newly emerged non-state units. The young area of Rojava (the Western Kurdistan
region in Northern Syria) has declared autonomy under three administrative substate
units called “Rojava Cantons”: Afrin, Kobane and Cizire. Kurds have claimed autonomy
based on diversity and pluralism; these regions were subsequently attacked by Islamic
extremist groups (IS, ISIL/ISIS, the Al-Qaeda linked Al-Nusra Front, and the Army of
Conquest), which is now a widely-known story. The region’s defensive struggle has
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A recent UN report states that over 9 million people were displaced while a
considerable share of them are simply trapped in regions that are under heavy fire of
contested militarized parties, and over 4 million Syrian citizens have taken refuge in
neighboring countries where they are not comfortable or under humane conditions.
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attracted worldwide attention including considerable international military aid, and
although Rojava is still viewed as a non-state actor, most of the European states, the US,
Canada, China, Japan and Australia have demonstrated support. The French government
has welcomed official commanders and administrators of the Rojava Region in Paris at
Élysée Palace at the presidential level, and the US and other allied forces have provided
important military support to the Kurds’ fight against these terrorist/extremist groups.
Russia also has opened a highest level representation of Rojava administration in
Moscow, declaring direct relationship with Syria’s Kurds notably in the aftermath of the
crisis emerged between Turkey and Russia. While Russia clearly supported Syrian
regime politically, economically and militarily along with Iran, the prior motive was to
protect Russian interests in Eastern Mediterranean coast. However, given the sudden
escalation of crisis with Turkey, Russia left its cautious stance towards Kurds of Turkey
and Syria, and created a much higher level diplomatic communication with them.
Similar to the Iraqi Kurdistan region, Rojava has received significant diplomatic and
political welcome and attention; therefore, this new development also highlights the
extent and scope of paradiplomacy, along with other highly contested cases that are
almost entirely avoided in public and political debate in the West, such as Xin Xiang, or
the Crimea region which was forcibly annexed by Russia in 2014. The Rojava Region
represents one side of the coin in paradiplomacy debates; on the other side, it is
remarkable to see the recent increase in the threat and horror spread by terror groups in
the region, and their very visible and substantial linkages to some major powers.
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Prominent scholar of Human Rights from Columbia University, David Phillips, has
published a comprehensive study26 on the official and institutional linkages between ISIS
and Turkey, notably paying attention to how these ties were endorsed by individuals and
political groups. Therefore, in the context of Rojava, it is not only Kurds who benefit
from the transnational relations with the outside world, but the very enemy27 they are
fighting against also gains advantage in the context of developing territorial and military
organization. One must also remember that in such a world, the actors are no longer
solely the conventional states or their intergovernmental organizations, but very much
individuals, groups, parties, and others. The famous actress Angelina Jolie has made
more frequent visits to Kurdish regions as an ambassador of the UN than the
representatives of international institutions. Sometimes world famous or influential
individuals have great impact on events as well as corporations, or other previously
“unconsidered” actors. There is also an overall ambiguity regarding the sovereignty,
authority and representation of international actors, which makes paradiplomacy an even
more complex and significant phenomenon to investigate.

26

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-l-phillips/research-paper-isisturke_b_6128950.html
27
ISIS, Al-Nusra and other violent extremist groups that benefit from the significant
military-financial aid received by international actors that view them as so-called
moderates. The US, Qatar, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and many others have provided help to
some of these organization directly or indirectly since detecting where the “trainedarmed” unit belongs was not a simple and easy task, but were later founded to take part in
terror attacks.
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Possible Frontiers in Paradiplomacy:
Systemic Constituency in Contemporary World Politics
Magone (2006) divides the transformations of the world’s state structures into two
periods: First were the Cold War years between 1945 and 1989, during which the state
was the sovereign unit, promoting welfare provisions under a Keynesian Welfare
National State as defined by Jessop (1993, 1995). National structures were the dominant
and central political and economic units of governance, while subnational governments
were considered insignificant. Second were the Post-1989 years, during which the state
had evolved to be the post-sovereign state described by Wallace, functioning under the
Schumpeterian Workfare Post-National Regime (Jessop, 1993), wherein subnational
governments were on the rise, along with de-nationalized substate units. Some of these
units were non-state actors, which did not quite evolve as sovereign units but were
instead redefined as contenders with the nation-states. In this period, national society had
evolved into what is called a “world society,” with global citizenship and a tendency
toward denationalization; the national economy had also evolved into a global economy.
The future of paradiplomacy study lies in between these two perspectives, since most of
the scholarship has dealt with paradiplomacy as a phenomenon of the industrialized postnational state and a form of neoliberal state devolution which has its own limits.
Neofunctionlism28 only underpinned a political-economic infrastructure for neoliberal

28

See next chapter for a discussion of the relation between neofunctionalism and
neoliberalism
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institutionalism, which Haas confessed was obsolete29 in the European context; however,
neoliberalism remained alive notably with the push of the Washington Consensus and
Thatcher-Reagan style governance. It was an era in which contemporary challenges have
become more visible than ever, but were tackled in a way that only deepened conflicts,
rather than bringing real solutions. Thus, in the last decade, we have seen the reemergence of conflict, with tremendously increased volume, environmental degradation,
and other concomitant elements. Not all paradiplomacy cases are similar to what has been
debated in the literature, most of which represents the neoliberal, “soft” foreign politics
of the regions viewing it as simply an extension of the state. Paradiplomacy as a concept
still remains incomplete because of this limitation30 to its framework. What if regions
self-organize as sovereign political units with their own territorial sovereignty and
institutions? What if they could be a remedy in many conflict zones, although being
strictly opposed by their respective nation-state contenders because they were not
necessarily guaranteed territorial sovereignty?31 What if we debate regions’

Although this claim was supported with the French and Dutch “no” vote for a
European Constitution, there are many other elements to support this statements as can be
seen in the differing foreign policy decisions of European states in the Iraq War or for
many other policy issues recently.
30
Paradiplomacy cannot be described a little favor provided by the “peaceful” Global
Northern states to their regions, but must be seen as a system of re-constituency in order
to address already ongoing or potential conflict cases.
31
Although this may seem simplistic or optimistic, since nation-states do not show
significant will to lose their powers, this optimism may initiate good will as a basis for
peaceful negotiations and constructive peacebuilding. In some settings, states may easily
show small gestures to their sub-state entities rather than oppressing them; yet, avoiding
protracted conflicts can ease peace processes significantly.
29
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internationalization within the framework of the global security environment? This is a
very crucial debate, and must definitely have a legitimacy and rational basis since it also
represents one of the most urgent threats within the system of world politics. One needs
to simply avoid including terror networks or criminal transnational organizations from
this regional [state] formation process such as the so called Islamic State (ISIL/ISIS), Al
Nusra Front, or many other terror networks which despite having armed territorial
sovereignty practices but lacks the very essential capacity to build healthy and productive
societies, but instead target the very indigenous people in territories they control. Again,
although these units have been clearly receiving help and support from state-actors as
was seen in the recent violence in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and elsewhere, this interrelation
definitely does not fit to paradiplomacy, but more represent the proximity war lords
deserving no attempt of legitimization or recognition.
Still, not all of the emerging substate entities are “bad”. There are also the ones, which
suffered from long-term assimilation, oppression and denial of the nation state system,
but today they emerge as promising actors for global governance. In a realm of war,
violence and destruction where state failure is a great catalyst, some substate entities
emerge as life savers, such as the Kurdish regions. Although some scholars (El-Dessouki,
2010; Wolff, 2010; Romano, 2004) have discussed the paradiplomacy of Iraqi Kurdistan,
the concept remains largely neglected/underrepresented. The increasing reach of civil war
in Syria and the newly emerging territorialities all over the Middle East and Africa need
to be taken into account when developing a comprehensive framework. What criteria will
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determine which regions should be recognized formally as political actors and which not?
Therefore, the territorial sovereignty practices in Iraq, Syria, Turkey, Libya, Yemen and
many others in the contemporary sphere are all subject to the vital question of whether or
not their own power, the support they receive from other actors and multilateral groups,
or their rightful cause will help them to be recognized as sovereign entities in the realm of
international institutions. As can be seen in the expanding literature and theory of
paradiplomacy, even regions with antagonist/secessionist motives may develop symbiotic
relationships with their national contenders, such as the Scotland, Quebec, Catalan cases.
The increasing interactions between economic production units of substate and state
levels simply create an accommodate-collaborate situation, in which polarized parties
gets closer, therefore construct ties that make secession a more difficult decision.
However, still self-competence and the development of self-ruling practice does not
disappear, but in fact contributes to the balanced and shared state power between political
actors of substate and state level. In context of state failure or violent conflict, substate
entities may even emerge as “guardian” units of territorial defense as can be seen in
Kurdish regions.
The concluding remark of this chapter returns to the argument above about extending the
scope and level of paradiplomacy and moving toward a more comprehensive framework
by developing a better typology for approaching these regions. In a world of
deconstructing nation states, regions will play a very significant constituent role, and as
can be seen from recent lessons, these regions will not necessarily be the usual or
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conventional players, but may rather be young emerging units with significant promise
for territorial sovereignty, the protection of society and minorities, and even armed
defense. It is evident that not only in the cases I have emphasized, but almost in any
geography, paradiplomacy can be used to address and analyze the changing power status
quo and the means and ways of self-rule. A great deal of research and study reveals how
substate units increasingly become key constituents of conflict resolution, transformation
and management, as well as the practice of international development, which in Africa,
Middle East and Asia is now one of the major focuses of global governance institutions.
While there is an increasingly apparent practice of the engagement of substate entities in
good global governance, the political systems of the world still are impacted by the statecentric view, therefore, challenging the space opened up by substate entities. This study,
therefore, aimed at challenging the state-centric view, which eventually also opens up
new venues of discussion notably in context of international development and conflict
transformation in which substate entities may carry more weight than they are portrayed,
not necessarily challenging the state system, but in fact bringing a minimal level of
security through creating interconnections between the local in an increasingly
internationalized and intergovernmental world of nation-state politics.
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CHAPTER 3: PARADIPLOMACY AND PROTODIPLOMACY IN THEORY:
TOWARD A NEW CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

In this chapter, I elaborate and assess the concept of paradiplomacy in relation to
several significant theoretical debates in political science. I examine/explore
paradiplomacy in the context of three sets of theories that are: (1) the debates and their
criticism within international relations in which paradiplomacy has been primarily
evaluated as a neoliberal concept according to either federalism or the devolution of the
unitary nation-state. This chapter expands the theoretical analysis to include the newlyemerging Schumpeterian32 form of state deconstruction and the formation of a new
system of constituency explained with the “new debate” below; (2) theories of the nation,

Schumpeterian here refers to the notion of “creative destruction” emphasized by Joseph
Schumpeter for economic development and growth (Schumpeter, 1942; Aghion and
Howitt, 1990), but instead of the business and innovation cycles, states and the political
system are subject to this process as I elaborate further in this chapter. To summarize,
Schumpeterian state deconstruction, devolution and formation in the specific context of
this thesis represents those highly promising regions, substate entities, NCGs or even
non-state actors at regional/peripheral level, which in cases of the collapse or decline of
highly authoritarian/oppressive regimes through international interventions or conflict
reproduce progressive outcomes. The emergence of Kurdistan Region in the aftermath of
Saddam’s collapse, or the emergence of Kurdish region in Syria against the weakened
Assad regime both represent the substantial example for this process. In a chain of events,
the intervention to Baghdad has created a domino effect which created a violent vacuum
where hard power becomes the primary characteristics of diplomacy, but also has created
a substantial outcome: the emergence of more stable and developed Kurdish region.
Although new challenges have emerged such as ISIS and Al Qaeda linked terrorism,
Kurdish regions’ momentum did not decline but only increased and strengthened.
32
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nationalism and identity are revisited, notably those dealing with collective identity
construction and representation in non-central or substate situations; (3) theories of
modern state formation – and deformation – and state capacity building, dependency and
modernization notably in the context of changing means and ways of sovereignty
practices, legitimacy building and maintenance of authority. Finally, I conclude with a
holistic reading of regionalism/new regionalism, regionalization, decentralization and
subsidiarity in relation to the theoretical discussions of this chapter.
The central scientific inquiry about paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy in this
dissertation research requires a new understanding of the phenomenon of emerging noncentral units and actors, notably in the context of intrastate conflict and civil war.
Therefore, it is necessary to induce the “big picture” from the theories of conflict and
peacebuilding, a central argument in my thesis. Although prominent names in the IR
debate have recently declared the end of theory, emphasizing the short lifespan of many
theoretical perspectives that have since been declared dead (see e.g., Schweller, 2014;
Szarejko, 2014; Dunne, Hansen and Wight, 2013; Mearsheimer and Walt, 2013), I argue
that theorization is still crucial in contributing to explanations of complex contemporary
issues. The process of theoretical debate has not truly ended, since there are procedural
and structural fallacies to be fixed in previous theoretical claims, which have led all
together to the widespread misconceptualizations that I discuss further throughout this
chapter..
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Reviewing the abovementioned blend of theoretical perspectives thoughtfully and
critically, and considering the new directions that point to the emergence of a “new
debate”, this chapter attempts to reconceptualize paradiplomacy as a complex political
phenomenon. I argue that not only previous theoretical stances but also contemporary
events and developments underpin the timeliness of a new debate. In such a realm,
mainstream scholars of the IR theory –most of whom are from the Global North- must
stop simply attempting to determine33 the level of theoretical inclusivity, plurality and
diversity in order to preserve their legitimate voices in the new debate since the truth is
quite far away from their ivory towers watching news and data; instead the promising
new directions must be embraced with a genuine representation of the web of actors
under a visionary system of governance.
In this new stage, what we have dismissed, avoided or been indoctrinated against
appears to be the sole option, and the best among the others: a collective will for higher
standards of ethics, rule of law and equality and a new system of constituency in which
the underrepresented ones are represented. Revolution in this phase occurs in micro-level
eventually transforming the global society, therefore, everything about the local gains
significance. Eventually, systemically excluded ones, such as Kurds, Baloch, Tamils or
Uighurs gain geopolitical priority for recognition in the pre-existing state system which

33

I mean here the poststructuralist relation between power and discourse. Even if there is
need for plurality and diversity, the duty of the Global North to recognize this fact does
not mean that it should speak on behalf of the Global South, but instead to give voice and
representation to the underrepresented, and to demonstrate there is a form of sincerity in
such a proposal.
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has developed quite ossified structures of resistance against change at the same time. I
argue that only progressive moves towards recognition and resolution of the issues that
keep at least decreasing the heavy weight of the global political agenda may serve for a
smooth and less violent change. Insisting on the previous mistakes, however, simply
increasing the pressure on masses and following a violent agenda, will eventually return
with high cost to next generations.
One must understand that theory does not just exist abstractly but has real-world
implications. It practically represents the object of intervention. I am not referring to
Albert Einstein’s letter to Truman here informing the state about the potential dangers of
nuclear research, but to Samuel Huntington’s theory of the Clash of Civilizations.
Emerging from Harvard, this theory was well-marketed and has been promoted and
internalized by masses of individuals, statesmen34 and key decision makers and also was
severely criticized for promoting a sectarian security state (Ozkan, 2015; Salter, 2003;
Harvey, 2000; Sen, 1999; Berman, 2003; Said, 2001; 2004; Chomsky, 2001). It has
worked well in “conceptualizing” new models for warfare, security apparatus and

34

Former General in Command (Head) of the Turkish Armed Forces, Ilker Basbug,
quoted Huntington’s theory to attempt to legitimize his speech at the annual Military
Academy meeting, describing “the threat” thusly: “The Kurds, and other potential
enemies of the nation.” Meanwhile, sales of Huntington’s book have peaked in Turkey.
In many contexts, including the “remaking of the world order,” Huntington’s false theory
was shown to be a foundational basis in assuming a direct relation between identity and
politics. Not only in Turkey, but in numerous countries and contexts, Huntington’s theory
was used as a so-called legitimacy/empiricist basis for reactivation of violent state
security apparatus, a post-modern Leviathan, which day by day grows with inaccurate
policies.
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intelligence; and in providing a foundational basis35 to the very creation of “enmity”. Yet,
one must also remember Aleppo, or many other cities of Mesopotamia throughout
history, where human civilizations have emerged with observable pluralism and diversity
being practiced for centuries, and which Khalidi (2004) emphasizes has been damaged in
the era of Franco-British colonization of the Middle East.
While war and violence have been prevalent in many periods and in many places,
cultures of co-existence also deserve attention. What has happened in the last decade and
more broadly in the last century following the imperialism and colonization policies of
the Western world, however, has almost erased this entire facet of Mesopotamian
heritage from the map, changing the genealogies of communities and various identity
groups. Adopted by a large number of hostile imperial actors as a central doctrine notably
in the era of Pax-Brittanica and Pax-Americana, Clash of Civilizations was quite warmly
welcomed in the corridors of the Western imperialism, but not as an informative theory
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Among all of the theories of IR, Huntington has probably been the most criticized one
(North, 2014; Brooks, 2011). His portraying of the “Islamic World” to be troublesome
based on Bernard Lewis’s purely hypocritical historical analysis endorsing Western
Judaeo-Christianism against Islam is inaccurate, since this perspective dismisses the truly
horrendous relationship between Jewry and Christianity until the late 20th century, and
also the multiple millennia old culture of coexistence in the Near East. Also, Islam is far
from a monolithic force, but instead is internally contested. Kurds, for instance, who
ruled the world of Islam in the 12th and 13th centuries, notably in the era of Saladin, are
quite clearly documented to have close collaborative relations with Jewry and
Christianity. Saladin helped Jews to rebuild Jerusalem, and also sent significant help to
the Georgian Queen in her battle against Mongolians, and Northern invaders. Aleppo,
Baghdad, Damascus, Jerusalem, Mardin, Diyarbakir, Erbil (Hewler), Basra, Tripoli,
Alexandria represent urban crossroads of different civilizations, and all of them have a
unique heritage of coexistence culture remaining from Saladin’s period and earlier.
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on patterns, more to say as a pretext or legitimizing cover for ongoing offenses that
increasingly indicate escalation of human destruction in the Near East. One cannot
exclude the Washington Consensus, nor the subsequent emergence of the
neoconservative and neoliberal accounts of offensive, rather than defensive, politics from
this process of deepened violence, which indeed has served as the primary sphere of
international policy making.
Intergovernmentalism constitutes the most dominant form of relation building in
the continuously growing and increasingly prominent international regime, and most
institutionalism has occurred by framing nation states as the central political units and
actors throughout the history, which sometimes is incorrectly dated as initiating with the
Westphalian model, but in fact has many historical roots back to ancient times. What we
deal with today in terms of the institutions and organizations of global governance, UN,
World Bank, IMF, OECD, OPEC, GATT, European Union, the Organization of Islamic
Cooperation, NATO, MERCOSUR and BRINGS may represent different political,
economic, military and regional affiliations, but their institutionalizations are part of the
liberal and latter neoliberal context, therefore, purely a product of worldwide imperialism
and notably the Global Northern domination which has grown on the basis of nation-state
system. Today, it is more than apparent that this nation-state system is rigid, unable to
deal with the most challenging contemporary issues and even contributes to the
deepening of the problems that regions, communities, societies and global citizens are
suffering from.
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Mainstream political science tends to focus too heavily on nation states as the
constituent units of world politics for obvious reasons: this is the world of nation-states.
However, it is also a must to acknowledge that conflicts up the degree of civil war
emerge in most of the multiethnic societies in Asia, Africa, Middle East and elsewhere
within the settings of intergroup rivalry. Many nations in these regions are just on the
map, but there is no physical integrity of their territorial sovereignties; yet, conflicts in
the last decade have created a new scheme of actors and their territorialities, some of
which are still passing through severe land grabbing practices. Paradiplomacy becomes
relevant and significant most notably in this realm of conflict, not necessarily as a
Western concept of liberal federalist decentralization, but also a very central foundation
for constituency building and pluralist representation. In a sense, the substate unit is the
central actor in the newly emerging regime in the world, perhaps the only one that has the
capacity to challenge and solve, or at least to slow some of the most severe problems
associated with neoliberal institutionalism.36 However, despite the importance of substate
entities, the space of sovereignty dedicated to these units are still significantly narrow, at
least kept this way by nation-state actors.
Given this critical perspective, a primary assessment of the previous theoretical
debates, along with an emerging new debate, together comprise the central objects of
investigation in this research: the concepts of paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy, taking
conflict into account at all levels along with the possibility of developing a procedure on
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This statement is elaborated and discussed in the next chapter.
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how to treat the newly emerging regional formations. In that sense, one must not hide
behind the conformist patterns of “politics of jouissance” in Lacanian way, and just watch
how national contenders suppress the increasing demands rising from the regions or how
potentially promising substate formations are suffocated by authoritarian and rigid
regimes, but instead must take pro-active stance towards a new international regime
formation since some of these small substate units have potentially key roles in today’s
most violent conflicts. This stance represents a significant expansion of the concept of
paradiplomacy and its interlinked theoretical periphery, adding new spatiotemporal
dimensions and actors/units of investigation, therefore theoretically contributing to the
description of paradiplomacy with a great promise of securing its possible use in
peacebuilding and global governance. It simply enlarges the subset of paradiplomacy
research into these contested regions that are the pioneers of contemporary conflict. It
also opens up the definition of paradiplomacy introducing a new episteme into the
concept, the previously denied engagement of substate entities in “hard politics” which
many assume is only a feature of nation-state.
Re-conceptualizing Paradiplomacy in World Politics
There is now a great deal of literature and research conceptualizing
paradiplomacy in various ways; however, the concept still lacks both a solid theoretical
foundation and a strong empirical framework with descriptive and explanatory variables.
I argue that this is partially the outcome of the lack of agreement among the scholars of
paradiplomacy regarding a general conceptual framework, although descriptive empirical
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models of Filho (2013), Tatham (2013), Allan and Vengroff (2012), and Lecours and
Moreno (2006) have been all successful in conceptualization and empirical assessment of
paradiplomacy. Even if these contributions –and many previous ones- represent all
together a significant empirical endorsement to the study, there are still other empirical
gaps to fill and to construct a general framework of investigation. This lacuna can be
overcome by a holistic and comprehensive assessment of the related theories and factors
that play roles in describing paradiplomacy concepts and by expanding the sample size of
the selected units of analysis. Before proceeding into the discussion, it is important to
briefly list a few shortcomings of the paradiplomacy concept which can provide insight
into why and how we need to re-conceptualize paradiplomacy.
First, the definition of paradiplomacy has been subject to disagreements among
scholars since the concept first emerged, but later, as meanings and characteristics were
incorporated into the definition, it evolved in order to maintain distinction from
protodiplomacy. Moreover, various concepts have subsequently appeared, such as
constituent diplomacy, pluralist diplomacy or multilayered diplomacy, which all have
significant conceptual intersections with paradiplomacy besides differences depending on
different descriptions, requiring further conceptual clarification and integration in order
to construct a general conceptual framework.
Second, paradiplomacy was somehow conceptually/theoretically underdeveloped
and incomplete, since non-central units were often underestimated or avoided by a
significant portion of political science scholarship, which dominantly focused on cross-

71
national datasets when it came to make empirical arguments in comparative politics,
therefore centering the majority of studies on nation-states. In this context, neither
regions nor paradiplomacy were not given enough priority in research. Consequently,
most of the research has evolved around single case studies or a small number of cases,
while until recently strong empirical explanatory models have been generally lacking.
Third, despite the strong promise of paradiplomacy as a concept, notably in the
study of comparative politics and global governance, previous research focused mostly
on the Global Northern cases with a few exceptions, and paradiplomacy has rarely gone
beyond descriptive neoliberal models which mostly deal with units of federative noncentral cases or devolved units under unitary settings. Still, paradiplomacy has been well
conceptualized in certain cases, notably within the context of institutionalization of
foreign policy making in North America and the European Union, as well as in Australia,
China and Brazil, although there is still a great space to stretch the concept towards the
very needed substate entities of contemporary world, especially the ones that play key
role in contemporary armed conflict and violence.
Finally, the preexisting literature on paradiplomacy overwhelmingly dismisses
certain types of units that may have more significant impact on world politics than many
conventional national governments. Although paradiplomacy scholars have dealt with
different types of political units, such as non-central (substate, subnational or peripheral)
governments, federative regional administrations (e.g. North American provinces or
states, or Belgian federations, or federal states under Russia’s dominance), or islands, a
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great deal of newly emerging actors and units have neither been carefully investigated
nor taken into account. Among all, non-state units have been the most dismissed by
scholars of paradiplomacy, although some NSUs have more impact on world politics than
many conventional states, and some of these act almost similar to a state actor despite the
lack of international recognition.
Given the specific focus of this research project, and taking into account conflict
at all levels of governance and representation, the concept of paradiplomacy encompasses
much more than was previously described. The recent work of Manuel Duran (2013)
investigates a large sample of Mediterranean substate units through a rigorous historical
and archeological analysis that emphasizes how paradiplomacy has been the motor of
territorialization, deterritorialization and reterritorialization, so a key factor in state and
nation building. Paradiplomacy researchers must understand that the concept as presently
defined may be new, but it had been in place for centuries as an important –and even
crucial – political practice37 in the making of nation states which now dominate world
politics. It would be naïve to think about state formation and deformation processes
throughout the centuries without considering the crucial role of paradiplomacy in
territorialization, sovereignty building and representation. In that sense, the most
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Many scholars initiate the history of nation-state with the Westphalian era which
represents an era of continental diplomacy in Europe amongst the major state powers that
were mostly monarchs. Although numerous regional entities were still in place such as
Catalan, Basque, Bretton, Occitan, Ireland, Scotland and many others, the 17th century
signifies the slow and stepwise annihilation of these entities, and assimilation of these
into nation-states, notably led by France and Spain that implied strictly centralizedmilitarized policy towards domestic governance.
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significant role and function of paradiplomacy in today’s world politics is that it creates a
basis for legitimacy by claiming a global constituency, or at least a constituency on the
global stage. This specifically is a strong case for historically contested units with deviant
ethnic nationalism most of which represent “unresolved” cases such as Scotland,
Catalonia, Ireland, Basque Country and many others. Today, some of these cases still
remains contested, since the historical causes of these entities were transmitted through
generations making of the contemporary construction of deviant ethnic/collective
identities.
Paradiplomacy in Theoretical Context of Global Governance
Most of the previous work on paradiplomacy centered on the neo-liberal
paradigm as a frame for interpreting the foreign policy actions of the regions, mostly
following the principles and traditions of the complex interdependence approach
(Sharafutdinova, 2003, p. 614). As conceptualized by Keohane and Nye (1997), this
critical analytical approach to political realism posits that interdependence plays a
significant role in transformation of world politics through various and complex
transnational connections and interdependencies between states and communities (Crane
and Amawi, 1997, pp. 107-109). Keohane and Nye (1997) note the difference between
dependence and interdependence in relation to power in politics and relations between
international actors (pp. 122-132). They define three characteristics of interdependence,
(1) multiple channels of action connecting societies, including the informal ties between
governmental and non-governmental elites which form interstate, transgovernmental and
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transnational relations; (2) the non-hierarchical status of the issues/problems to solve or
to manage –such as conflict, violence, migration, terrorism, environmental challengesthat have dynamic agendas and linkages, which requires prioritization of adequate policy
coordination; (3) a decline in the prominence of military use in the field of international
relations, which is accompanied by an increase of coercive power generated by
international law and institutionalism. Critical to the traditional political realist approach
in international relations, Keohane and Nye provide a foundational basis for the rise of
neoliberalism and liberal institutionalism in international politics and development in
international political economy.
Regions have eventually become the complementary units of analysis in regards
to neoliberal theories of development. However, this view dismisses the emerging
centrality of regions/non-central actors in contemporary world politics, rather viewing
them as complementary to nation state which is the case in most of the Global Northern
regions. In prominent cases of contemporary violence and conflict, mostly in MENA and
Asian regions, and a few Global Northern cases one may define secessionist, there is a
much broader subset of investigation for the systemic political characteristics. In these
regions, a few factors underlie how central is the political genealogy of the unit in regards
to its repositioning in contemporary world politics. The first concerns the “constituency”
of the non-central units and regions, as direct representations of grassroots communities,
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and is therefore perhaps most significant38 level of analysis for description of the
contested regional formations. The second political factor is the interrelation between this
regional/non-central unit and the rest of the world, including its surrounding non-central
units, the national center, and other neighbor [transborder] regions and [transnational]
units that are supranational, intergovernmental and international organizations and
institutions. The third political factor is the way the behavior and competence of these
accumulated geopolitical interrelations evolve, which eventually informs the role of such
regionalization in global governance. The fourth and last political factor is the crucial
force and the outcome of previous factors towards the repositioning of the region/noncentral unit within the world order and international political context, since the global
response will eventually determine the reaction, intervention and/or collaborative
approach taken toward such a formation. Economic and social integration at grassroots
levels are key for this process, since an ensemble of factors lay the groundwork for
cooperation and collaboration, and help the unit to compete with national or other
regional political contenders.
The two most dominant spheres within the theoretical debates of IR, realists and
liberals, have both overemphasized the primacy of nation-states in world politics.
Neoliberals began to recognize that there may be important political actors other than
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The grassroots level is significant since the new regional formations in the realm of
violent conflict are all dependent to the challenges that require to figure out how to
organize the grassroots communities to ensure an optimal level of self-sufficiency,
defense and economic production that are means for state capacity building and state
formation.
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states as early as the 1970s; this view has been more strongly emphasized by
constructivists since the early 1990s. Still, states have remained the predominant unit of
political analysis in the world of political science according to its three main schools39 of
thought, all of which were quite powerfully challenged in the last decade. Scholars of IR
have been late in acknowledging that there is a new world with a new actor structure, in
which some “exceptional” non-state actors or non-central units/governments40 have
simply more power or weight in determination of world politics than many conventional
nation states.
The multiplicity of newly emerging actors has been the topic of many scholarly
debates. Although transnational civil society was present in almost all ages of recorded
history, in various forms and ways, this contemporary multiplicity was first described
with the corporatist41 take-over of state power. Defined by Keohane and Nye in 1970s as
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Realism, Liberalism and Constructivism have been three major schools of thought in
IR debates, although there is still a much broader theoretical periphery towards the
analysis of states.
40
To clarify, some units are non-state actors (such as KCK/PKK, Hezbollah, ISIS,
Hamas) with physical/virtual territorial sovereignties, while some units are quasi-state
actors (such as the Rojava cantons in Syria) that are not yet recognized internationally
sovereign units while there is still significant progress towards state formation, and some
non-central units have already become state actors such as the Kurdistan Regional
Government, Catalan Government or others.
41
Keohane and Nye do not explicitly use the term “corporatocratic,” but I use it to
convey a context in which MNCs have created sufficient synergies for direct domestic
and transnational political interventions. This can be seen in Europe, where a great
ensemble of regional industrialists (represented by a think-tank called Friends of Europe)
secretly carved out the plan toward the formation of the European Union. , Further details
emerged and revealed details such as the design on the political infrastructure being
directly advanced by these industrialists, although they organized a significant public
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the multinational corporations (MNCs) in their Transnational Relations and World
Politics, this view inspired a long-wave of scholarship that represents all together the
neoliberal accounts of international relations in response to the neorealists. Markets and
institutions have become the ultimate focus of the series of new debates that followed,
and were often treated as the primary units of analysis for the states and their roles and
impact in global governance. This view has also expanded in various ways, such as
neofunctionalism giving birth to real world implications of the theory in substantial
forms, as was seen in European integration and foundation of the EU as a supranational
government. Common markets, monetary union and the supranational frameworks
regulating state affairs have all been applied in the context of this historic new creation,
which was based on the key concept of “spill-over” hypothesis positing that the
integration in one “functional” area leads to spill over into other areas. Creation of
common market in a specific area, which was the European Community of Steel and
Coal (ECSC) in the aftermath42 of World War II, has led to the development of European
Economic Community (EEC) in 1957.
Other new actors have also emerged as contenders for national authority and
sovereignty in international politics, such as International Organizations (IOs), iNGOs,
NCGs, non-state actors, various interest groups, lobbies, collectivities and individuals.

sector as their face, in the phase of enlargement and integration (The documentary film,
“Brussels Business”, 2012 which comprehensively reviews this story. Similar agendas
may be found in the Bilderberg meetings, the Davos gatherings, or many others.
42
Regulation of Steel and Coal purely represents the common European fear against
another German domination.
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The centrality and predominance of the nation-state has waned, day by day, in such a
realm; constructivists have recognized the challenge to authority and sovereignty of states
by these new emerged actors. Some non-central units have taken steps towards
internationalization, in the context of federalized commonwealth countries, especially
European regions that have all benefited from the strong regionalism movement of
European politics, and the broader legal/juridical progress in recognizing regions’
capacities to self-govern, develop and conduct their own foreign policies, and, most
importantly, form interregional collaborations and alliances.
Although the mastermind of neofunctionalism, Ernst Haas has declared the
neofunctionalist theory obsolete when the European integration has become
dysfunctional in 1960s with de Gaulle’s “empty chair” politics paralyzing the institutions
of Europe. French and Dutch rejections of the EU constitution may also be given
example to declare neofunctionalism literally dead, and it is not difficult to observe the
overall European picture in the last few decades moving towards a union of nation-states
with significant intergovernmentalist tendencies such as German-French alliance, or
increasing national power within the constituencies of Europe in the aftermath of the
massive enlargement of 2004. The industrialized European North has integrated its
regions around the idea of a common market and increased transactions between
European capitalists and industrialists, funding not only economic but also social and
regulatory development processes. The plan has not been truly the same for Southern
Mediterranean partners, nor for the numerous small states of Eastern Europe which did
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not find enough time to develop their private sectors in the aftermath of Soviet collapse,
that eventually all fell into the hands of the dominant Central/Western European powers
economically. The union of 27 member countries – and the establishment of a welldefined periphery elaborated in the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) – have worked
in such a way that it has created an inner circle of highly industrialized powers in the
North creating a “new centralization” and “new regionalism” in Europe in the last decade
(Telo, 2014; Keating, 2000; Warleigh-Lack, Robinson and Rosamond, 2011)
Even if there is important progress on regionalism which unleashed – or at least
helped to empower – regions’ centripetal dynamics, most notably in Spain, Belgium and
the UK, whereas multiethnic differences have worked in favor of this process, time to
time extending to secessionism for a few regions. Other regions such as the German
Landers of Baden-Württemberg and Bavaria, or Sao Paolo in Brazil, and Hong Kong and
Guangzhou (Pearl River Delta) in China have emerged as important global economic
powers having more impact on global politics than many conventional nation states.
Regionalism has also expanded in other commonwealth countries and within the US
states, notably promoting paradiplomacy between neighboring regions or between
regions (states) and the world. Meanwhile, the last few decades have seen a succession of
debates that followed each other, still somehow remaining disconnected, fragmented and
mostly within the confines of the nation-state conceptualization. These debates need to be
remembered since they have accumulated a body of knowledge that is today subject to
the intervention of scholarship eager to end the theory.
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Recalling the Series of Great Debates and IR Theory
Theory is important since it informs practice and a set of integrated interrelational
patterns that form a complex conceptual-empirical model. In the context of IR and
political science, theory gains importance in comparison to practice, but so too might the
gap between them, which makes the process of theorization a rigorous but necessary task
to fill this gap. There is much theory reflecting various explanatory stances on state, war
and international relations generally with points made on how realist, liberal and
constructivist accounts explain the formation of social, political, economic and cultural
infrastructures. The structure of these debates – called International Relations (IR)
Theory – needs to be the focus of paradiplomacy analysis, as Foucault (1969) once
proposed, to reveal the genealogy of things in “Les mots et les choses” pointing out a
sequential architecture of formation. Yet, the historical path dependency and structural
nature of the debate itself also reveals the systemic characteristics of state formation
throughout a comprehensive history of state and nation making. Realism dominated a
great number of political debates throughout the centuries, and states are the most
dominant rational and unitary political actors in late modernity. The dominance of
realism was ultimately complemented with liberalism, which worked well in
peacebuilding efforts pushing agendas for trade and market development of post-war
Europe leading to the formation of various intergovernmental orders of politics. This
system never represented a perpetual Kantian form of peace. The growth of structural
inequality and economic power was explained by Marxists, while dependency theory,
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globalization and political ecologists have made important critical contributions. The
emergence of these various theoretical stances created an inter-paradigmatic debate
which has created a – partially competitive – ground for intellectual pluralism (Dunne,
Kurki and Smith, 2010, p. 4).
There are two major questions that are of foundational importance in scientific
inquiry: epistemology and ontology. The first regards what constitutes valid knowledge
and how one obtains it, while the second looks at what constitutes reality and how one
can understand existence. Two major camps emerged in these vital debates representing
two different positions: positivism and interpretivism. The positivist approach is probably
the most dominant form of perspective in the world of science and recognizes the natural
sciences as a model. In this approach, the researcher’s legitimacy as a scientist is based
on their quest for objective knowledge and mostly follows a deductive or theory-testing
approach. Positivist ontology views facts from a realist perspective and typically involves
empirical research design dealing with surveys, questionnaires or other means of
measurement to test hypotheses (Raddon, 2010). Interpretivists, on the other hand, view
the researcher as a detective, often critical of using natural sciences as a model for social
research; yet, there is a clear quest for subjective knowledge – unlike the positivist
objectivism -which serves for building inductive or grounded theory. Interpretivists do
not presume facts alone to be ruling the context, but people, social interactions and
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vectors of power43 are also the main focus. Accordingly, in order to understand how and
why things are happening, one needs to look at the various forms of meaning, which
often results with the requirement of lending from ethnographic studies, in-depth
interviews and other analytical approaches.
Both views reproduce their specific advantages and disadvantages while dealing
with complex social phenomena. Yet, positivism has a clear advantage in the making of
empirical arguments commonly accepted as foundational by the mainstream scientists,
since it involves the collection of a large amount of data focusing on quantifiable items,
which provides the researcher with the opportunity to maintain control44 over the research
and observation processes, and to functionalize various tools of quantitative data
visualization tools to monitor, model or map interrelations between variables45. The main
problem associated with a positivist approach is the inflexible nature of the research
inquiry, in which a researcher does not have enough space to intervene once the data
collection has started. Also, the positivist approach remains weak when dealing with
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Relative construction and means of power were more comprehensively accounted by
poststructuralists that emphasized the interrelation between power and discourse, and the
primacy of this interrelation in the making of arguments.
44
I am aware that the researcher also maintains control with ethnography and interview
methods.
45
While I am describing the nature of a debate here, I do not argue that positivism/postpositivism is stronger. Contrarily, I argue that hyperfactualization, overmethodization
significantly limits one’s ability to develop a comprehensive explanatory perspective.
Intellectual thought and interpretation are both a must for a researcher to stay on track in
describing the reality. On the other hand, good interpretations may also require
quantitative/qualitative methods with accurate measurement and modeling capabilities to
develop strong explanatory arguments. Therefore, there is definitely an interplay between
two approaches.
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complex social processes, since it does not engage in any form of analysis about
describing the meanings and root causes of things and how they interact, or even the
impact of the scientist and their data collection procedures. Interpretivists, on the other
hand, also have to deal with their own disadvantages, such as the time-consuming nature
of data collection methods, which are often challenging and complex. Furthermore, the
researcher has the ultimate problem of dealing with uncertainty, since the interpretivist
approach does not lead to a clear pattern easily, which probably plays a role in its
perception as a less credible approach by more positivist scholars. This is a truly
subjective description about the overall description of these contrasting approaches, and I
still agree with many sociologists and anthropologists about the fallacies, and structural
issues that arise from positivist approaches, making them non-credible. Similarly, any
sort of conclusion one can draw from quantitative data are necessarily lacking without
engagement into an intellectual interpretation.
While realism/neorealism has been influential in the development and expansion
of positivist approaches, liberal thought has also contributed to the sovereign view of
positivism, which is severely criticized by many interpretivists claiming that the social
world cannot be studied in a value-free or objective way. When dealing with power, and
why and how it is exercised, causal explanations described by realists/neorealists may
correspond to the positivist category. Post-positivists instead follow a sequence of
questions, for example on how to describe the meaning of power, or what comprises it,
and how it is reproduced. Moreover, post-positivists often explicitly promote normative
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forms and perspectives in the study of IR, underlining the importance of ethics in
scholarship, which is usually ignored by traditional IR positivists.
It is also important to recall that the series of theoretical debates in international
relations is not independent or isolated, but very much interrelated with the historical
context. As I summarized in the first section of this chapter, a long-term history of war
has been foundational to scholarly thinking in political science and international relations.
Classical realism has arised from millennia old histories of war and invasion, while it also
has emerged in late 19th and 20th centuries. The first “Great Debate” was between realists
and idealists, the former of which challenged the “unsystematic” and value driven idealist
approach to IR (Dunne et al, 2010). Both the Great War and also the interwar period
between two world wars have been quite impactful in challenging the realist views. Carr
(1946) and Morgenthau (1947) accused idealists of focusing their own attention on how
the world “ought” to be rather than recognizing the objective reality in place (Dunne et al,
2010, p.17). Liberalism46 was promoted by many in the aftermath of the Interwar period,
notably with the emergence of intergovernmental regimes such as the League of Nations,
or latter United Nations. The second debate was about “behaviorist” advances in the
social sciences, which were seen as revolutionary and filled the gaps the realist theories
reproduced. The “measurement” priority of Chicago School predominantly gained
popularity in this era.

46
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The third debate, also called the “interparadigm” debate by many (Schmidt, 1998;
Waver, 1996; Lapid, 1989), reflects recognition of the premise of data analysis and tools
along with theoretical diversity, while the importance of international issues emerged to
have priority over national politics. Thomas Kuhn’s (1962) history of science and
paradigmatic introduction were recognized in the field as a scientific development, since
his model was based on accumulated knowledge surrounding international processes
(Dunne et al, 2010, p. 20). This period also reflects the predominance of three theoretical
perspectives: realism, Marxism and pluralism. Going back to the Foucauldian perspective
on how the genealogy of a great accumulated debate was constructed, it is important to
remember another scholarly camp, an addendum to the Great Debate, often dismissed by
neoliberals, the Frankfurt School that brought about the challenges on identity and
linguistics in the scholarship of social research.
Often referred to as interdisciplinary new Marxists, the Frankfurt School emerged
as a champion of critical social theory, remaining distant –partially critical- from both
Marxism (Soviet socialism) and capitalism. Attempting to fill the gap of traditional
Marxism in explaining the roots of social inequality only focusing on class warfare, the
Frankfurt school focused on antipositivist sociology and psychoanalysis, later shifting
their critique from capitalism to Western civilization. Furthermore, this debate became
central in discussions of political philosophy, particularly those pertaining to “human
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nature” such as the notable discussion took place as a famous debate47 between Foucault
and Chomsky, in which they revealed a series of diverging positions on their view of
human nature, which Chomsky views as rooted in universal grammar claiming that
humans are genetically compelled to learn language, while Foucault disagreed as usual
proposing a set of other variables such as the evolution, environmental conditions and
others, latter criticized by Chomsky (2001) of over exaggerating issues.
Contemporary IR Theory: The Fourth Debate
In the mid-1980s, IR theorists began to engage with the Weberian distinction
between explaining and understanding and applying it to the IR context (Hollis and
Smith, 1990). While explanatory theorists do not disagree with interpretivists who
advocate social meanings, language, norms, values, beliefs and understandings, they do
claim that scientific knowledge requires empirical justification (Dunne et al, 2010, p. 20).
Positivists emphasize the instrumental function of knowledge which has to be useful but
not necessarily truthful (Waltz, 1979). King, Keohane, and Verba (1994), for example,
attempted to integrate qualitative and quantitative logics into an inference model, in
which they proposed to “rescue” social science from speculative or unsystematic social
inquiry (p. 3) enabling valid assumptions about social and political life (Dunne et. al.,
2010, p. 23). Finally, Keohane (1988) addressed the “rationalism versus reflectivism”
debate at the International Studies Association (ISA) meeting in (1988) in which he used
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The debate between Chomsky and Foucault in 1971 was mediated by Fons Elders,
appeared on Dutch television, and was later published in 2006 as a book.
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rationalism, taken from rational choice theory, but recognized the limitations of this
perspective. He also emphasized the emergence of the criticism most notably from the
post-positivist/interpretivist camp, constituted of constructivists, critical theorists,
poststructuralists and feminists, suggesting that these approaches may contribute to the
discipline.
Although the positivist versus interpretivist debate has expanded and further
become the basis of a broad theoretical literature forming a dichotomous framework
around the idea of what science is and is not, the contemporary complexity of these issues
necessitates a progressive approach which focuses on prior issues to properly fix us in the
present time, under the conditions and protection of rule of law, legitimacy and high
ethics. Scholarship is, or indeed should be, a place for science, where human civilization
seeks responses to central questions that are needed to be addressed of collective good –
such as conflict, violence, environmental destruction, terrorism, organized crime and
immigration- rather than simply seeking pragmatic outcomes. Besides the ethical and
humane role of the scientist, intellectual thought as a process remains central to any kind
of scholarly contribution that must include a form of interpretation. This interpretation,
however, is simply a subjective process in which self-reflection is the core of intellectual
production. That being said, the last point of scientific inquiry is about empiricism.
Although the process of interpretation is creative, building new paths of thought,
theory building needs to be validated through empirical accounts – which can be seen as
an institutional or organizational characteristic of scholarship. Scientific realists, for
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instance, moved beyond the positivist versus interpretivist debate, rejecting any attempt
to clearly define procedures that fixed the content of scientific method (Dunne et al,
2010; p.25). According to scientific realists, each science must construct its own agenda
of operation (Bhaskar, 1979). Scientific realists are also very much influenced by
advances in quantum physics and relativity theory, which further fostered relativist
approaches. In sum, IR theory debates have provided insights into different
spatiotemporal contexts, and have also been challenged in related cross-disciplinary
scholarship. Moreover, new methods and empirical concepts were introduced into the
world of science, contributing to the importance of both positivist/post-positivist and also
interpretivist spheres of scientific inquiry.
To summarize, various perspectives have provided new insight to IR theory, and
among all of these, the longest-standing one is realism, which has played a significant
role in shaping the mindsets of statesmen and the ruling elite for centuries, therefore
giving shape to the evolution of state governance. From Thucydides to Machiavelli and
Thomas Hobbes, classical realism has been a pioneer in the formation of the nation-state,
mostly under the conditions of the use of power in various ways ranging between the
poles of war and peace. Although the Inter-War period has been influential in the reemergence of modern realism, it is important to remember Kenneth Waltz (1979), who
reintegrated realist theory into a structural model under the influence of the Cold War.
Waltz posited that the actions of states could be explained by the structure of the
international system and the power distributed within it. In such cases, a central factor is
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that the system has inherent anarchy, which limits the determination of sovereign power.
Therefore, states act differently depending on the distribution of the power within the
international system. In a bipolar system, such as the Cold War, one can talk about a
relatively stable arrangement. A multipolar system, on the other hand, has more than two
great powers, while a unipolar system has a single hegemon (Waltz, 1979). Another
modern contribution was made by Jervis (1978) who opened up debates over the
“security dilemma”, focusing on the Cold War powers and their possible interactions
around the ideas of information asymmetry and policy decisions.
Another contribution in this post-War era emerged from liberals, notably with
Doyle’s (1983) theory of democratic peace, which posited that there is a relationship
between democracy and peace: Democracies never go to war against other democracies,
although they often go to war. He explains various internal factors that shape democratic
regime’s decisions, while also arguing that authoritarianism eventually leads to war since
there is not a truly functional system of checks and balances for the leadership (whereas
democracies hold their leaders accountable). It is important to remember that liberals also
hold underlying thought structures about the anarchic structure of international relations,
while they disagree on human nature, therefore promoting trade as a means of peace.
Sharing this foundational anarchy of the system with realists, liberals mostly focus on
collaborative intent of the states rather than the security-centered construction of power
by realists which mostly leads to a negative zero-sum perception of states.
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Paradiplomacy splits into two main spheres in the context of theoretical debates in
IR, since federative units with no ethnic deviance or form of micronationalism or
regionalism are simply units that emerged in the last few decades, mostly out of
increasingly globalized political economies such as Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, or
Guangdong. These cases point out how regional capacity may expand drastically within
the context of global financial-industrial flows. However, non-state units with
secessionist motives, ethnic deviance, and national aspirations are also historically
important cases in need of interpretation and explanation. Therefore, modernization,
conflict and war can be explanatory factors, along with the history of imperialism, when
describing the evolution of these units. Before proceeding into a theoretical discussion, it
is useful to take a brief look at the units themselves, most notably the conflictive ones,
and their significance in the literature of paradiplomacy.
The Rise of Non-Central/Substate Units in World Politics
Mainstream political scientists – mostly realists – have remained distant –partially
critical- from the idea of paradiplomacy, mostly because of the state-centered views
prevalent in international relations, and the predominantly nationalist aspirations of
national state actors and an increasingly visible emphasis on security in national
governance. Most contemporary armed conflicts, ethnic and civil wars, and instances of
intrastate violence and crime are closely related to the mismanagement of intrastate
conflicts. Neoliberal and neofunctionalist frameworks have worked well to a certain
extent in the formation and reformation of political structures, such as the European
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Union, or the increasingly internationalized regions of North America, Brazil and
Australia, which have provided space for non-central or substate units to represent
themselves internationally. Generally, each case has its own particularities and settings
and arrangements of subsidiarity between the center and periphery.
Constructivists have dealt with significant cases of conflict in multiethnic – or
interreligious – societies where ethnic/political deviance/devolution in the region has not
been welcomed by the central governance. This has fueled the escalation of two-sided
nationalist aspirations in “secessionist” cases. Some of the cases have turned into
intractable or protracted conflicts that have lasted for decades or even centuries such as
Ireland, Scotland, Kurdistan, Basque Country and Catalonia. In most of these cases,
paradiplomacy was conceptualized or at least described as a potential threat to national
integrity by the central powers, and even a source of terror or ethnic separatism,
consequently pushing these contested regions towards protodiplomacy.
In context of conflict and power politics, it is necessary to keep looking at
paradiplomacy holistically, which may reveal a much larger subset of actors and units
than previously thought. Paradiplomacy has been somewhat examined in Global
Northern societies, mostly focusing on economic or environmental cooperation, or the
historical cases of secessionism. Most of these studies focused on describing a set of
actions that may be defined as “complementary” to state diplomacy, representing the
“soft” foreign policy rather than engaging in “hard politics”, such as cultural preservation
and plurality, partial self-governance through local administrations or decentralized
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administrative authority with limited subsidiarity from the national center. Some cases of
conflict have been also studied, such as the Basque Country and Northern Ireland, where
state sovereignty was challenged at its best by the secessionist intents advanced by
regions. In sum, these perspectives on substate regions have significant limitations. Not
only these non-central units, but numerous others play an important role in politics and
governance in today’s world.
There are many examples to be given to support the claim that some non-central
or small units may be more central than conventional states. One could claim that these
substate units may have the weight required to engage transnational or super powers in
“hard” politics, such as military or security engagements, opposing arguments expressed
by the prominent scholars of paradiplomacy such as Ivo Duchacek (1990) who stated
that: “[…] they –NCGs- can hardly compete for public attention with wars, arms talks,
international terror and other forms of conflict or cooperation among sovereign nations.
Their impact on national foreign policy has remained modest” (p. 2) or Keating (2000)
who argues that “[…] unlike the foreign policy of states, regional diplomacy does not
seek to represent broad general interests or to be comprehensive in coverage. Regions do
not have sovereign governments able to lay down their definition of “national interest”
and to pursue it in a unified and coherent manner”. However, this conceptualization of
paradiplomacy can be challenged by evidence around the world which suggest a “hard”
engagement of non-central units and actors in world.
A Small Sample of Evidence for Substate/Non-central and Non-state “Hard”
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Politics:
To empirically support the argument that regions, non-central governments, and
even peripheral non-state units may have much greater weight in world politics than
previously supposed, and to show that these may not necessarily follow “soft” politics in
the shadow of the central nation-state, one can look at a number of examples in a variety
of settings (see the list below). These examples are provided to demonstrate the
differences between these units, but also to illustrate/examine how they commonly
represent new type of actors and units that may play important role in world politics. The
strength, level of institutionalization, and magnitude in the sense territorial power of these
units all vary, since each of them are reproductions of different contexts, ranging from the
official government and non-state illegal terror networks.
There are various reasons and explanations of/for why and how these units may
have more significant weight in world politics than many conventional nation states.
Take, for instance, the first example: Quebec, which is almost a quasi-state under
Canadian federalism, conducting its own foreign policy actions, and has fully
institutionalized its internationalization through the creation of various mechanisms of
foreign policy making. Quebec is more productive than many countries: the region
represents one of the largest administrations in the world in terms of the aeronautical
industry or research and development expenditures. Catalonia, being one of the Four
Motors of Europe (EU), is definitely the powerhouse of Spain, [hosting largest
international port of Southern Europe and interconnections between France and Spain],
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and the region increasingly acts with secessionist motives, notably as a response to fiscal
and governmental/constitutional conflict with central government in Madrid.
The Catalan Government held a referendum in 2014, asking Catalans their views
on the possible independence of Catalonia, which indicated a high rate of support.
Independence becomes more and more a daily reality of Catalan politics against Spain’s
highly unitarianist governance. The Basque Country and Catalonia’s sovereignty
practices are the outcomes of the institutional ambiguity of Spain, which is quasi-federal
in nature, but unitary by the will of Madrid. It is simply rooted throughout a long history
of war and dominance, but most importantly the non-reconciled Spanish Civil War, and
the problematic constitution making in the aftermath of Franco dictatorship, which did
not eliminate offensive Spanish right-wing. Therefore, these regions increasingly engage
in hard politics at international level through advancing their claims on state sovereignty.
Other examples to support the abovementioned thesis are the Kurdish regions
which, taken together, constitute perhaps the most unique form of paradiplomacy and
protodiplomacy found in the world as they span multiple national borders. Divided into
four areas in Syria, Iraq, Turkey and Iran, the Kurdish regions represent a territoriallydivided ensemble of paradiplomacy cases, each of which is impacted and determined by
the context of the respective country. First, the Kurdistan Region (KR) in Northern Iraq,
ruled by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), is the most substantially evolved
Kurdish region in terms of decentralized state formation, notably in the aftermath of the
First and Second Gulf War that led to today’s collapsing Iraqi Federation. The KRG
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offers perhaps the strongest example of a non-central – but state-level actor. It is a
Kurdish region receiving global political attention, direct military support, and a
substantial degree of external recognition which makes it look more like a nation-state.
The KRG has its own flag, army, constitution and parliament, and conducts its own
foreign policy.
Another Kurdish region which is rapidly moving from non-state to state, the
Rojava Administration in Syria, was established a few years ago in the wake of Syrian
Civil War, and comprised three ruling cantons: Afrin, Kobane and Cizire. Although the
region remained neutral and stood as a “third party” in the civil war between the Assad
Regime and Syrian opposition, the emergence of IS (the Islamic State) led to great
turmoil in both Iraq and Syria. The region has successfully conducted a defensive war
against IS, and has been recognized by many major powers who have provided military
and economic support from the highest [governmental] level. Testing the limits of this
non-state paradiplomacy, are the complex ways in which many of these activities move
back and forth from above-board politics to underground and plausibly denied covert
activities, particularly in relation to Western allies such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia and
Qatar.
The third regional formation is the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK) in
Turkey, often affiliated with PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party), which was criminalized by
the state, but has been founded on the basis of unifying the Kurdish local administrations.
Seen as an illegal-political wing of PKK by Turkey, the KCK was defined as a terrorist
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organization and was criminalized by the Turkish Government, even though it initiated
official peace talks with them. Thousands of political prisoners in Turkey include not
only sympathizers of Kurdish nationalism, but also elected MPs, mayors, academicians,
artists and political activists. This, in turn, attracted criticism from international spheres
towards the Turkish Government. This also led to the growth of, and increased grassroots
support for, the armed PKK/KCK, which had been perceived by Turkey as an enemy for
35 years. Official negotiations between Turkey and PKK/KCK are still in place, despite a
volatile and increasingly contested timeline. The fourth Kurdish region, “Rojhelat,”
meaning “The East,” and broadly known as Iranian Kurdistan, also represents a case of
contestation and long term struggle strictly opposed by the Iranian Regime. Both Turkey
and Iran apply a policy of harshly confronting Kurdish attempts at decentralization. IN
both cases, this has involved the endorsement and sponsorship of – mostly religious or
fundamentalist – anti-Kurdish, pro-state political formations intended to divide Kurds and
weaken national aspirations.
Recent conflicts in the Near East have created moments of very positive
perception of the Kurds globally, and all of the Kurdish actors have been impacted by this
popular support which, from time to time, has turned into substantial diplomatic support
and military cooperation. There has been a long ongoing peace process and set of
negotiations in Turkey, which was recently cut off by the Turkish government under
President Erdogan. Notably, some of this is caused by the emergence of the Kurdish
region of Rojava in Syria, which awakened Turkey’s latent paranoia of losing its own
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Kurds. Therefore, a return to low-intensity civil war seems increasingly to be coming to
fruition in the region. At the same time, partial sovereignty practices are employed by
grassroots communal actors and PKK organizational structures, clearly promoting and
exemplifying self-rule in the face of violent interventions to eradicate possible Kurdish
state formations by Turkey and other regional actors.
Table 1: A Sample of Non-Central Units Engaging in “Hard” Politics
Unit Name

Quebec (Canada)
Basque Country
(Spain)
Catalonia (Spain)
KRG (Iraq)

Rojava (Syria)
PKK/KCK*
(Turkey)
Gulen Society
(Turkey)
ISIS/ISIL/IS (Iraq
and Syria)

48

Unit Description

Federal Government
Devolved Substate
Government
Devolved Substate
Government
Federal Government

Quasi-Federal
Administration
Informal (Criminalized)
Organization of
Governance
Informal (Criminalized)
Organization of
Governance
Fundamentalist Terror
Network, Informal
Quasi-Administration

U
nit
Type
State
NCG
NCG
NCG

QuasiNCG48
NonState
NonState
NonState

“Hard” Policy
Engagement
Immigration Policy
Territorial Sovereignty
Attempts
Territorial Sovereignty
Attempts
Territorial Sovereignty,
Military Independence,
Separate Transnational Oil
Agreements
Military Engagement,
Constitution making
Territorial Sovereignty,
Foreign Policy Actions
Foreign Policy Making,
Parallel Institutional
Authority Building
Territorial Sovereignty, Arms
Trade, Oil Trade, Global
Terror Cells

Although the region has been recognized a broad range of international actors
including the presidents and leaderships of major powers, and international institutions,
there is still not an official settlement in Syria, and the war is in place, therefore, I use
Quasi-NCG since the Rojava regional administration is young and still awaits the
determination of its legal international status.
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Hezbollah**
Fundamentalist Armed
NonTerritorial Sovereignty,
(Iran, Syria,
Organization of Shia
State
Armed Fractions
Lebanon)
Militia
Al Qaeda (Al
Fundamentalist Terror
NonTerritorial Sovereignty,
Nusra and other
Network
State
Armed Fractions, Global
affiliates)
Terror Cells
*KCK is defined as a terror organization by Turkey while non-criminal/legal
Kurdish politicians, activists and elected leaders were tried and prosecuted unlawfully.
This organization is defined as the major umbrella organization of Kurdish politics,
leaning toward PKK/HDP, illegal and legal Kurdish political formations.
**Hezbollah was also declared a terror organization by Israel and pro-Israeli
Western governments, although some claim that the organization has a respectable
grassroots base in Lebanon.
Besides the non-central units discussed above, there are other “problematic” units
comprised of informal or so called illegitimate actors, which also undertake various types
of foreign policy actions. First, the Gulen Society, a religious society with numerous
institutions and organization, known to be ruled by Fetullah Gulen a Turkish religious
leader in exile in Pennsylvania who has created one of the largest Islamic conglomerates
in the world. This organization has promoted a pacifist form of Islam, generally focusing
on education and raising cadres for important state and private sector institutions, which
in the last decade has contributed significantly to the military, intelligence, judiciary,
academic and private sectors. It is important to remember that at its core, the organization
significantly tends to contain Turkic-Islamic tendencies, despite its appearance of
inclusivity. Recently, Turkey’s president and government have declared Gulen and his
followers “criminals”, calling them a “parallel state”, referring to this organizations’
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power to operate independently from the will of the state.49 This organization has
numerous types of foreign representation – schools, companies and other institutions –
which help it to remain strong and hold on to power. While the ruling JDP has come to
power through collaboration with the Gulen Society, matters of disagreement have
escalated, and led to the isolation of the group by the use of state power: primarily by
means of claiming the society leaks information and important intelligence, endangering
Turkish state sovereignty, and clearly labeling them as “traitors” at the highest level of
politics and government.
A final but important example is the Islamic State (IS) which has emerged during
the Syrian Civil War, not only in Syria but also in Iraq, commonly described as a
neoliberal or neoconservative reproduction of “big” mistakes made in the aftermath of
9/11, or the “cancer of modern capitalism” by many (Ahmed, 2015; Khalil, 2014; AlJaberi, 2014; Giroux, 2014; Tirman, 2015). In fact, the fundamentalist50 schools of

Another very important example is from the Cold War years. NATO’s “secret” armies
were revealed in many documents and on many occasions, for undertaking parallel illegal
state activity through the use of extreme right-wing violence. Although these were
revealed earlier in Italy (ended with “Operation Clean Hands”) and in France (confessed
by French officials later called “Gladio”); in Turkey, the criminal organization remained
intact, in fact, creating its own political cluster, a heavily ossified societal organization of
extreme-nationalists [also protofascists] with strong economic and political power.
Individuals of these organizations, such as the “Grey Wolves,” are still important players
in the violent political game of Eurasian geopolitics. It seems that the Western
encouragement of Turkey’s conservatives over decades and wrongdoings of Cold War
years led to the birth of Neo-Ottomanism, due to the merge of religious/conservative
sects and extreme-right / ultranationalists.
50
These schools do not represent a tiny bit of the civilization of Islam which has
thousands of sects, internal philosophies and various theories and practices, however,
49

100
Wahhabiya, Salafiya and Ismailiya have significantly contributed51 to the emergence of
this type of violent extremism, with support from extreme Sunni fundamentalism which
has quite well-rooted structures of collaboration with Western imperialism52. IS simply
followed similar but better organized tactics to declare territorial sovereignty in a vast
area of lands in the Middle East, and has already perpetrated numerous terrorist attacks,
abductions and massacres around the world. The organization is quite new, but has
received significant media attention, notably focusing on how the organization received
international support from individuals, groups and even states, and how it uses social
media and its international connections for propaganda and recruitment. Both ISIS and
also Al-Qaeda linked organizations can be clearly defined as “bad units” which must not
be yielded territorial sovereignty; however, reports indicate that oil trade and other
regional state support contribute to the advances of IS.

they gained too much significance since 19th century simply because they have been
allied by Western imperials. On many occasions, it is rightful to say that Western
imperialists have reactivated these schools then they were needed to exercise deliberate
violent on masses such as 1839-1841 war, or the Great War, or the war with Al-Qaeda or
Al-Nusra.
51
The ISIS very bluntly publishes a propaganda magazine called “Konstantiniye” in
Turkey accessible online to gather members, and clearly states on these publications that
Ibn Tavmiyyah, a fundamentalist Islamic clerk from Hanbeli sect of Islam is their
inspiring guide in their policies. Tavmiyyah is no more different than what ISIS does in
general, and promotes violence in the name of a perverted form of Jihad and dark
fundamentalism that leads to human destruction in various places of the World.
52
I explain this in detail in the Kurdish chapter. There are various Islamic Clerics, such as
the Ibn Tavmiyyah, who founded this fundamentalist school which was reactivated by
British during the Ottoman decline and collapse. Ibn Tavmiyyah was followed by
numerous other Islamic clerics, who have been hardliners and simply ruthless on
exercising violence on non-Sunni or non-Muslim communities for centuries.
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Another fundamentalist non-state actor conducting transnational political actions
is Hezbollah, an opponent of the IS, backed by Iran and Syria, possessing armed factions
of Shia militias in parts of the Near East. Since Hezbollah is opposed by both Israel and
Sunni groups, it was declared to be a terror organization, which in a way can be
confirmed with examples of numerous cases of violence and brutality. However, the
Lebanese Hezbollah is different than the Iranian hardliners, or the Turkish Hezbollah
which was created as a horrendous criminal organizations to be used against Kurdish
politics in Turkey in 1990s, clearly documented to be an organization with state support.
Different than these criminal organizations, the Lebanese Hezbollah mostly represents
the Shiite political formation with a respected community grassroots, which again makes
the decision over whether Hezbollah is good or bad a difficult one, however, Hezbollah
clearly follows violent means of fundamentalism since decades, therefore its territorial
gains cannot be defined “good” amongst the newly emerging regional actors of the Near
East although may represent a semi-systemic one opposed to the Al Qaeda and ISIL.
As can be seen in this list of actors, there are “good” units with historically
inherent causes that often arise from local factors caused by imperialism and colonization
representing communities such as Kurds, Palestinians, Druze, Baloch or others, and also
there are “bad” units that simply use terror tactics to declare and maintain their ruling
powers. Both types represent various sovereignty practices that are subject to the
intervention of global governance actors from a realist/neoliberal perspective. Here, the
key questions are how to assess these various units, how to understand and approach
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them, and how to treat them. It is quite clear that they are very different in nature, with
different motives and interests, and gain importance considering the given outcomes of
their contemporary actions. First is that all of these units represent cases of different types
of conflict; therefore, a thorough analysis of each can help to develop a typology to
distinguish them. Hence, some of these units are emerging actors with great potential for
integrating into the international political economy with help from international actors
having humane and constructive agendas for sustainable and healthy community
development, while others require intervention from the international community to end
their brutality and violence against humans, the environment and cultural heritage. In that
sense, it is important to limit or declare a natural border to the definition of
paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy. Not every single unit declaring territorial
sovereignty or conducting diplomacy with other states are natural constituents of a given
society. In that sense, some of the units listed in the table of units conducting hard policy
actions must be excluded from the discussion of paradiplomacy, including the armed and
terror groups in Iraq and Syria, while Kurdish regions clearly develop capacity of
paradiplomacy.
Paradiplomacy, Conflict and Peace: Intrastate, Ethnic and Civil Wars in Question
Given the previously mentioned examples and many others supporting the claim
that there is a new model of constituency emerging, there are still crucial questions to
answer about the significance of paradiplomacy in conflict management and
peacebuilding. First, not all of the non-central or substate units are similar, but frequently
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acting for different purposes and for different interests. There must be a distinction
between them, since some of them represent historically “unresolved” cases of
nationalism, mostly under multiethnic national settings, while some of them simply serve
destructive agendas determined by extremism diffused in the form of proxy wars or
interventions. Remember, for example, the case of Tamils, which has “ended” in
tremendous violence, destruction, and a genocide-alike bloody intervention of Sri Lankan
security apparatus endorsed by British supremacy53. The cases of FARC, PKK, IRA and
ETA also offer similar examples, although not all of them have ended in the same way.
The conceptual strength of paradiplomacy remains insufficient to deal with these
types of units, which are most likely to turn into intrastate or ethno-nationalist conflicts
and civil wars. Paradiplomacy becomes a crucial factor, the “soft-belly” of the
authoritarian nationalist/centrist regimes that can be seen to have an enormous potential
for initiating violent intrastate and interstate conflicts and even civil wars. Mostly
dismissed by the mainstream perspectives of political science, non-central units in
authoritarian settings obviously did not end their paradiplomatic actions just because they
were excluded from the scene of international relations by national actors; Tibet, for
example, was [re]presented in Hollywood movies, and news on the peripheral conflict
zones in MENA, Asian, Latin American and African regions were present on global

53

Neither British Royal Family nor British security apparatus attempted to avoid giving
positive images with increasingly authoritarian Sri Lankan regime that represent a
commonwealth member. Same applies to Qatar and Saudi Arabia since both of them
receive significant Western endorsement in world politics despite their clear support for
violence and terror in Iraq, Syria and elsewhere.
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media and press. Russia’s – or the Soviet – management of the world’s largest territorial
periphery is also very relevant to the context of this type of paradiplomacy, since under
Russia’s “iron-handed” style of governance, the status and management of the diplomatic
relations of these regions became obscure but crucial for their survival. Moreover, it is
difficult to observe the Russian political scene, so it is also difficult to predict the
potential of paradiplomacy in Russia’s substate entities. Still, some of these regions, such
as Tatarstan, Chechnya, Ossetia and Abkhazia, view paradiplomacy as a means to bypass
the Russian state, which they believe is the only way to overcome Russia’s total control,
which also seems less and less possible in context of Russia’s strong authoritarian takeover of the security apparatus to enforce its dominance. But, still these regions constitute
the “soft belly” of Russian politics often portrayed as a strong bear, as do China’s Uyghur
[Xin Xiang] region for China, or Kurdistan for Turkey and Iran.
In 2005, 20 major armed conflicts were waged around the globe, with 40 percent
of intrastate armed conflicts having lasted for 10 years or more and 25 percent of wars
having lasted for more than 25 years (see Marshall and Gurr, 2005; Smith, 1998). These
conflicts are often immune to concerted intervention attempts and therefore called
intractable (Coleman, 2003) or protracted in different spatiotemporal contexts. Northern
Ireland, Palestine, Kurdistan, Basque Country, Catalonia, Abkhazia, Ossetia, Tamil
Nadu, the historical case of Scotland and many others from all around the world can be
given as substantial support for opposing the conceptualization of paradiplomacy only as
a “soft” form of foreign policy making. These conflicts are not only about self-
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determination, but also very much about how these units have experienced loss of status
and how they have evolved. Therefore, paradiplomacy becomes significant in managing
and determining the contemporary status quo of these regional formations which are keen
to perform as future political actors in world politics.
Intractable and protracted conflicts are common, since most of them result from
civil wars or intergroup violence in multiethnic or interreligious settings. Most of these
conflicts emerged at the end of the Cold War, notably in the late 1980s and 1990s while
many of them have historical roots. The MAR (Minorities at Risk) Dataset has identified
275 minority groups at risk in the context of ethnopolitical conflict in 116 nations,
constituting 17.4 percent of the world’s population in contexts in which disadvantaged
groups experienced and were affected by discriminatory practices (Gurr, 2000). In 2001,
there were 34 armed conflicts worldwide, mostly intrastate, each of which resulted in
over one thousand deaths (Gleditsch, Wallenstein, Eriksson, Sollenberg and Strand,
2002). These conflicts often end with dire consequences, such as high economic costs,
the destruction of essential infrastructure, trauma, divisions among families and
communities, structural violence, and the intergenerational perpetuation of trauma and
violence (Coleman, 2003; Lederach, 1997; Kriesberg, 1999; Coleman, 2000). According
to Harris and Reilly (1998), there were about 17 million refugees and another 20 million
internally displaced persons as the outcome of armed conflict and intrastate violence in
1997.
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Figure 2: Armed Conflict in the World by Conflict Type 1946-2014

Source: Pettersson, Therése & Peter Wallensteen (2015) Armed Conflicts, 19462014. Journal of Peace Research 52(4)
There are also some who claim that the world is more peaceful than before, such
as scholars of PRIO (2014), and Pinker (2011), from Harvard, who look at armed conflict
onset data at the cross-national level. However, their framing of the problem at the international level does not reflect the broader reality of violence and conflict at the intra-state
level, as shown in the figure above. It dismisses the millions of refugees, displaced
victims of violent conflicts, and the destruction of civilian human livelihoods at the
intrastate level. Beyond questions of death tolls and direct victims of violent conflicts,
there is a much broader scene of collective losses, including political, economic, social
and cultural assets. In the context of Mesopotamian conflicts, only the examples of Syria
and Iraq are sufficient to observe the most extreme destructive outcomes of this kind of
violence.
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Figure 3: Syrian Civil War Outcomes (UNHCR/SOHR Data by 06/2016)

Casualties of Syria Civil War (2011-2016)
80000
70000
60000
50000
40000
30000
20000
10000
0
2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Numerous precious cultural heritage sites of Mesopotamia were brutally
destroyed, such as the unique ancient City of Palmyra in Syria which was demolished
completely, including its jewel pieces such as the Lion of al-Lāt, and the ancient temple
of Baalshamin, together with the famous Syrian scholar shielding it, the 83-years old
historian known as “Mr. Palmyra”, Khalid al-Asaad, who was brutally and publicly
executed by the so called IS/ISIL/ISIS. Although Palmyra’s destruction is a recent
example, the list is extensive, and includes the ancient city of Nimrud, another jewel
representing an enormous loss of global cultural heritage, and Khorsabad, Library of
Mosul, Mosul Museum, Jonah’s Tomb, Hatra, The Crac des Chevaliers, the Saint Simeon
Church, and the beautiful Aleppo Citadels most of which were millennia-old monuments
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that belonged to humanity as a whole. Destruction of the already extinct minorities, their
cultural representations, and their livelihoods in such a way is clear evidence of
contemporary violence; and this occurs in a broader global content of intensifying urban
conflicts all around the world, including the U.S. and Europe, increasing racism among
communities, and increasing practices of organized crime, cybercrime and other newly
emerged forms of criminality and crimes against humanity.
Only the single Syrian case of violent conflict has given such drastic outcomes
that one can no more look at the death toll at cross-national level, since the outcomes of
the single case impact not only the nation, or the Middle Eastern regions, but increasingly
the entire world (see figure below). The estimated death toll is between 220,000 to
350,000 casualties (UN, 2015; Syrian Network for Human Righs, 2015). UNHCR
documented 4,290,332 registered refugees who have fled their country in the course of
war, and this number does not reflect the unregistered refugees. OCHA estimated that
10.8 million of Syria’s 22 million population was affected by the conflict with 6.5 million
internally displaced, and the toll is expected to grow in 2015 (UNHCR, 2015). Therefore,
I argue that it is not appropriate or accurate to state that the world is more peaceful while
there is tremendous violence experienced at a single unit that is more than enough to have
globally significant outcomes. Second, within this one single conflict, a small unexpected
unit may create enormous impact, maybe a shelter of stability that will further avoid the
country from collapse, as do Kurds in both Syria and Iraq with their regional formations.
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It is also possible to add other countries such as Iran, Turkey, Lebanon, and many
other MENA countries to the list of increased density of violent conflicts, which will just
constitute a more-than-adequate pile of evidence to point out a humanitarian crisis of
great magnitude, as the outcome of violence and discrimination. From the perspective of
substate entities, a small or peripheral unit, indeed, may initiate a series of events that are
catalysts for others. Cross-national datasets do not truly reflect the violent subset of
greatest importance for scientific investigation of the study of peace and conflict, unless
they also deal with civil and intrastate war, violence, discrimination and injustice, and
from which many of the larger issues often emerged in the first place.
Most intrastate conflicts are structural and complex phenomena, requiring a
thorough understanding of different societal dynamics and underlying structures. In order
to address these conflicts, ethnicity, identity, nationality and nationalism must be
thoroughly understood; yet, there is a much more complex scene of politics than is often
represented in the mainstream media. The following section discusses a collection of
several theories unpacking the notions of collective identity and nationalism that may
expose many of the roots of contemporary conflict.
Paradiplomacy emerges in a completely different form in the new era: as a “lifesaver” in a collapsing intergovernmental system of world politics, bringing with it
optimism regarding the prospects for minimizing violence and triggering peaceful
“reconstruction”. I argue that some small political entities, or key regional units may play
the neutral role of intermediate between major powers which may eventually lead to
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collaborative learnings54 and agreements55. It is no longer construed as a long-term and
ugly game of bargaining between a dominant center and submissive periphery over
sharing authority and sovereignty. Beyond this proposed shift under the obvious
blundering of the various perspectives (Kuznetsov, 2014; Michelmann, 2009;
Sharafutdinova, 2003), paradiplomacy appears as a very core structure of an emerging
system of rule of law and representation, holding promise for people without states and
rights, and a central role for constituency in which pluralism is the key factor for
changing the system without breaking it completely.
Nationalism, Identity and the State: A Constructivist Inquiry of Politics
Although paradiplomacy debates have expanded mostly around federative
political units around the world – and in the regional frame of European integration –
there have been challenges to such conceptualizations. Indeed, as Lecours and Moreno
(2001) have observed, many regions have strong nationalist patterns while intensely
conducting paradiplomacy for international representation, such as Quebec, Flanders,
Wallonia, Catalonia, Basque Country, Ireland and Kurdistan. These cases of
paradiplomacy represent multiethnic societies, whereas regions represent more than just
administrative units, and often encompass divided societies with their own cultural and
historical roots of political identity. Therefore, we can describe the paradiplomacy of
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I specifically refer to Bennett and Howlett (1992), May (1992), Stone (2004), Mytelka
and Smith (2002), Jenkins-Smith (1988) and Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier (1993) with the
overall theory over policy learning, formation, transformation and management.
55
The agreements here refer to both intracommunity agreements that promote a rule of
law, and intercommunity agreements that are collaborative and solidarity-based.
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these cases as an increasingly popular means or infrastructure for overcoming the
limitations of statelessness, or statelessness itself.
It is important to remember that, although in these cases significant secessionist or
at least centripetal political motives have endorsed the will for regions’
internationalization, some of the substate entities have been subject to long-term
protracted conflicts while others have tension which have not escalated into armed
conflict. However, even in these currently non-violent conflicts, there is definitely tension
between the periphery and the center, such as in Catalonia, which gained its autonomy in
the aftermath of Spain’s Civil War in 1977. Therefore, one cannot think that there is no
possibility of violence emerging in these cases, since the dynamics of negotiations
eventually determine the will to fight. It is, therefore, important to look at the historical
evolution and institutionalism of these cases since “nation,” “state” and “nationalism” are
concepts that have changed substantially over time.
Constructivists view war as a cultural phenomenon and state behavior as a
product of collective identity that impacts the assumptions made by individual decisionmakers. According to the constructivist perspectives, the systemic anarchy discussed
above is in fact socially a constructed process, and is “what the state makes out of it”
(Wendt, 1992). Yet, constructivists focus on internal factors rather than external ones,
positing that issues such as the international interdependence of global security are
determined by the national foreign policy choices. State-actors are no more the only
determinants of the foreign policy; rather, both substate entities and transnational actors
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also influence policy making. Constructivists also emphasize the important role of
cultural theories (Finnemore and Sikking, 2001; Green, 2002; Anderson, 1991). They
argue that human interaction is shaped by ideational factors, in addition to material ones,
which are widely shared and “intersubjective” that later construct the interests and
identities of purposive actors (Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001, p. 393). In his Imagined
Communities, Benedict Anderson’s (1991) views nations as imagined communities
which is inherently limited and sovereign. He writes:
“[T]he concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were
destroying the legitimacy of the divinely-ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm. Coming
to maturity at a stage of human history when even the most devout adherents of any
universal religion were inescapably confronted with the living pluralism of such
religions, and the allomorphism [incongruence, divide] between each faith's ontological
claims and territorial stretch, nations dream of being free, and, if under God, directly so.
The gage and emblem of this freedom is the sovereign state.” (Anderson, 1991, pp. 6-7)
There are many theories of nationalism, and much of the content and specific
orientation is determined by historically distinct cultural traditions, the creative actions of
leaders, and contingent situations within the international world order (Calhoun, 1997, p.
123). O’Leary (1997) defines nationalism as “the most potent principle of political
legitimacy in the modern world, holding that the nation should be collectively and freely
institutionally expressed and ruled by its co-nationalists” (p.191), and discusses Gellner’s
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modernist explanatory theory, perhaps the most well-known and foundational theory
within the study of nationalism.
Gellner (2008) argued that nationalism became a social necessity in modern
times, since in early history, rulers did not have much incentive to impose cultural
homogeneity through their rule. Although Gellner’s theory was seen as a strong
systematic approach bringing a modernist perspective to the study of nations (O’Leary,
1997; Jaffrelot, 2003), various critiques have subsequently arisen from scholars asserting
that it was a functionalist misreading of the relation between nationalism and
industrialization (Tambini, 1996; Smith, 1998); that it failed to account for nationalism in
non-industrial societies (Smith, 1998); and that it dismissed instances of war and the
military pushing for cultural homogenization, and misconstrued or underestimated the
relation between the military and official education (Conversi, 2007).
It is important to note another prominent theory, which developed in the context
of France in the late 1800s. Max Weber (1922) emphasized that there was not yet a
common language or a common civic culture at that time, despite it then being
considered the most modern society, so it would still considered “backwards” by
contemporary criteria. The creation of a common identity occurred as a process through
which French countryside people “Peasants” were turned into “Frenchmen” through the
modernization of rural France between 1870s and 1914, as state policies (1) expanded the
educational system which contributed to political socialization process; (2) improved
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logistics with transportation and railroads; and (3) collectively mobilized the citizenry
(Weber, 1976).
Supporting the Weberian thesis on the role of state in nation making, Greenfield
(1992) posits that political institutions play an important role in spreading and preserving
national identity, whereas nationalism is fundamentally cultural and is an imaginary – but
very real – response to social conditions, as the idea of nation is socially constructed. The
key preconditions proposed by Greenfield (1992) for the development of national identity
arise from “stratification systems” through which communities organize themselves
under a certain hierarchy and “status-inconsistency” (Lenski, 1956; Berger, Norman,
Balkwell and Smith, 1992; Geschwender, 1967) – which means a group facing
contradictory public claims over their status position within society – of elites are no
more sure of their status leading an overall transformation of national identity.
The work of British ethnographer Anthony Smith has been influential in the study
of nations and nationalism, and many others have followed his typology of
“perennialism”, “primordialism”, and “modernism” (Smith, 1986). While recognizing the
modern construction of nationalism, Smith (1995) emphasized the historical roots of
nation building as being determinants of today’s nations (p. 57). Primordialists view
national identity as a continuous element within pre-historical (primordial) forms of
identity, and they view the collective identity as a necessity for societies to function
which they view as a universal feature of human communities. Perennialists see national
identity as neither a modern product of continuous with pre-historic forms of identity, but
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instead they define an ethno-cultural community as a nation when there is a state
corresponding to a given group’s own territory and language which identifies it as a
nation. Modernist approaches, on the other hand, view the process of national identity as
a product of 17th and 18th centuries in which several factors, such as the [rise of the]
working class, ruling elite, and forms of media -which Anderson (1991) calls a “print
capitalism”- made individuals further imagine themselves as “homogenous communities”
which he views as central to the experience of nationhood. Other scholars also proposed
terms such as “civic nationalism”, “ethnic nationalism” or “territorial nationalism” to
refer to different settings of nationalism in places some of which successfully
conceptualize contemporary settings of national identity building in world practice.
Scholars often observe the construction of important interdependencies between
“identity” and “nationalism”. According to social identity theorists, our personal
identities are constructed on the basis of social relationships (Tajfel, 1981; Stets and
Burke, 2000, p.225; Greenfeld and Eastwood, 2007). In some social psychology, identity
was defined as a “self-concept” of an individual attributed to “perceived membership” in
a given social group (Turner and Oakes, 1986), while in political science, the most dealt
form of it is “group identity” at collective level representing the behavior of the political
unit whether for a group, organization, institution, community or nation. Each group
identity has historical, political and social background that makes of its boundaries
(Lamont and Molnar, 2002), meaning that they are created by human experiences and
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expressed symbolically56. Interpretation is subject to the power distribution within a
given community. National identity is the sign of group membership which makes
“nations” that think of themselves “equal” [in the sense of group membership] and
“sovereign” (Anderson, 1991).
Nations in modern societies are thought of as the source of state legitimacy, which
can be seen in modern politics, as the modern governments – even the worst ones – claim
to speak on behalf of a community or “nation”. Although historical institutionalism,
especially path-dependence, plays a significant role in of the accumulation of collective
memory, contemporary nationhood and statehood need to be assessed in light of both
modernization and the specific development and conflict processes that have occurred
over the last two centuries, which have largely determined today’s political structures.
Modernization is not independent from the past; rather, it is a represents the practice of
community development throughout the history of human civilization.
Modernization and Dependency in Postcolonial Era: State and Substate in Theory
A common typology of political history is about the modernization of political
processes that define the pre-modern, early modern and late modern periods that have
played crucial role in determining today’s modern states and substate entities. Although
mostly seen as an outcome of enlightenment, modernization is not disconnected from
earlier times. It is not only about the technological advances and innovations that played
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Symbolism is an important concept in the analysis of nations and nationalism; and is
expressed in different ways by different groups, nations and cultures.
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significant role in the economic variables; it also represents an overall change in
sociocultural, political and moral values and norms.
Durkheim (1997) described the concept of “functionalism” in the making of
modern state that posits a strong interdependence and interactions between institutions in
a society, maintaining cohesive cultural and social unity. In his famous work, Division of
Labor in Society, he describes the management of the social order through a division of
the workforce that creates advanced industrial societies. According to Weber (1918), this
process is purely based on a/the rationalization of production processes in a given society,
which ultimately keeps a capitalist nation alive economically. Although some scholars
interpreted the process of modernization as strongly correlated with democracy (see e.g.,
Lipset, 1959), who view the aspects of economic developments as an ensemble of
industrialization, urbanization, wealth and education that correlate with democracy, there
has been dissent among other scholars (see e.g., Inglehart and Welzel, 2009; Przeworksi,
1991). Contributing to this dissent, democracy is not necessarily a prerequisite for
modernization and not all forms of democracy are the same. Chinese, North Korean
forms of modernization quite well illustrate this stance, along with other examples, such
as Stalin’s Russia, or Turkey and Iran. Nazi Germany can be also given as an example for
this, since the drastic modernization was not about democracy at all but militarily
motivated.
Rostow (1960) describes the economic system as a central feature of
modernization which describes the stages of modernization for a given society’s
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economic production. The modernization, urbanization and industrialization of certain
societies, notably of those in Western Europe, created a new structure of political order,
which further became polarized and caused a series of global wars. It is necessary to
understand that the modern is not a simply positive term for many since it also represents
an era of human destruction along with its positive outcomes that facilitated human life.
Dependency theorists, for example, have dissented with modernists, positing that power
status is primarily determined by the colonization and industrialization processes by
which capitalist societies seek ways to maximize their power. In a sense, laissez faire is
not about a liberal view of exchange, but is rather about the deliberation of colonial
intentions in which a new system of order is constructed through mercantilism and
exploitation. Dependency theorists were split into Marxist and non-Marxist camps;
Marxist dependency theorists view the military-industry complex of so-called
“developed” countries, and their colonial policies, as being the center of development
problems, while non-Marxist dependency theorists view this core as coming from the
inequality in the nature of the center-periphery status of countries. This view, in parallel
to the modernization theorists viewing the urban sphere and urbanization as the source of
industrialization, focuses on the complex interdependences between the center and
peripheral regions of a given economy.
Modernization and dependency both gain significance in the discussion of noncentral units and their paradiplomatic activities, since most of these cases have passed
through different processes of modernization, which eventually shaped their
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interdependencies in regards to their national contenders and transnational linkages. Most
of the contested paradiplomacy cases have a strong variable of dependency in the centerperiphery relationships, often arising from the historically-evolved cases of
institutionalism. These cases have been subject to imperialist policies over decades or
even centuries, whereas more dominant centers have kept their peripheries in line through
war and assimilation. The borders of countries were drawn in different spatiotemporal
contexts under different conditions, each of which has stories of its own.
Although modernization theorists and dependency scholars seem to split into subcamps, there is still the possibility for merging two views into a theory. One significant
concept to do so is the imperial legacies that have formed the skeleton of the
contemporary political economic structures. While most of the innovations that have led
to modernization were about military progress and the changing means of production
(Durham, 2015; Zenker and Kumoll, 2013; Gilman, 2007), the manufacturing power
possessed by industrialized Global North was required to find new markets and resources
to expand and grow. For a long time, economic development was perceived in terms of
expanded capacity and increased production volume. Colonization, therefore, along with
military superiority of the imperial or industrialized powers, has worked together with
this imperialist zeitgeist, providing colonial powers with human and economic resources.
What best explains the scattered modernization processes is the following act: the
industrialized powers continued to grow, while the peripheral countries – their potential
client states – were exploited and controlled through the dependent nature of the trade. In
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contemporary era, this dependency is based on a sectoral/industrial segmentation in
which high-yielding clusters of industry requiring advanced technology belong imperial
powers, while peripheral or client countries have limited industrial capacity, and the
exploited –or so called “underdeveloped”- countries only have basic primary sectors such
as agriculture, mining and other resource based production economies. The key for the
dependency debate is the structural-systemic nature of the relationship between center
and periphery. While one may claim that there is “positive dependency” as liberal
dependency theorists posit, there is also “negative” dependency mostly forming a
structure of exploitation and unfair trade, which expands into political intervention and
even war.
According to So (1997), American scientists were encouraged to work on the socalled underdeveloped world in the aftermath of World War II with the aim of promoting
economic development and political stability (p.17). Although it emerged in the Global
North, dependency theory was significantly challenged by scholars from these
“peripheral” countries being researched. Therefore, numerous critical views have
emerged from Latin America, Southeastern and Eastern Europe and Asia, all together
forming New-Marxist accounts of dependency theory. Martinussen (1997) emphasized
the undeveloped industrial structures in the so-called “backwards” countries”, citing the
large agricultural sectors versus weak industrial ones, and promoting intervention into the
industrialization processes. He pointed to state intervention, which eventually has led to
the advocacy for strict policies of urbanization, internal displacement and rapid
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industrialization to escape dependency (p.87); he argues that each of these implications
can be seen in neoliberal and neoconservative policy actions. Another prominent name in
this discussion is Wallerstein, who theoretically followed Marx’s position regarding
underlying economic factors and their dominance over ideology in world politics
(Wallerstein, 2011) [1974].
Wallerstein (1974) has described the “core” and “periphery” in terms of
dependency theory, which has had a great influence on its development. In his “world
systems theory”, he fits each cluster of power into a role within the global economy,
where “core”, “semi-periphery” and “periphery” serve as the essential three types of
economic units. This model’s strength lays in its similarity to reality, since the core
undertakes administrative actions and technology production, while “poor” peripheries
only supply basic inputs into the economy; the semi-periphery represents “middle”
income countries that primarily engage in limited industrial production. In their historical
analysis, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2001) explain economic development
through consecutive periods of colonialism and post-colonialism. The authors first
describe the colonies as economic agents used to generate resources and income, then
explain how they turned into colonial states in 19th and 20th centuries, with most going on
to become independent countries. The colonies designed for extracting resources were the
ones that experienced negative consequences today, while the colonies that were settled
by colonizers are productive systems that are capable of governing industrial economies
today (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001, pp. 1369-1401).
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Another view in the abovementioned debate is from Kohli (2004) who attempts to
overcome the state-market divide by explaining successful economic development as a
function of both the state (public) sector and private capitalist enterprise. He emphasizes
the importance of understanding state capacity and constructive state intervention in
regard to private actors. Giving the metaphor of two horses pulling a chariot –
representing private and public sectors – he emphasizes that if they pull in the same
direction economic development will occur. Through this, he compares Korea (as a
success), Brazil (as moderate), and Nigeria (as a failure). Wallerstein (2011) also relates
the modern world system to the nature of global political economy, and argues that core
countries represent “capital” while those on the periphery represent low-skilled laborers,
agricultural products and minerals that are ready to be exploited; this discrepancy
eventually triggers the capitalist expansionism. He notes that this expansion also occurs
through political conquest, as capitalism wants it to happen, not individuals and groups
(Wallerstein, 2011). While most of the theoretical debates discussed so far in this chapter
represent the common body of literature of the political science and IR, the next sections
will expand these debates into further and more specific directions.
Global Deconstruction and Reconstruction of Governance: A Critical New Debate
[High-stage] “Capitalism57 is no longer possible to be managed by democratic
liberalism,” confirms the oft-repeated thesis of Slovenian intellectual Slavoj Žižek
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In G-20 Meeting in Ankara, Turkey just in the aftermath of bloody Diyarbakir, Ankara
and Paris Attacks by ISIS, an interesting comment was made by someone specifically
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(2015).58 Besides the increasingly imposed “crowded market fundamentalism”,
segmented depropertization and polarized intrastate autocracies that eventually led to the
growth of a badly-designed gridlock type of global economy, a system of “universal
misrepresentation” emerges. A system in which the sources of contestations are simply
injustice and violence caused by the non-sustainable and “destructive” forms of
development policies and social exclusion of people.
The insistence on so called democratic liberalism by most contemporary scholars
specifically corresponds to the needs of its neoliberal proponents that have accumulated
institutional power almost everywhere in the Global North – and consequently in the
Global South – since the Thatcher-Reagan era. This has substantially contributed to the
reproduction of legitimacy for a system of “abnormal” actors and cycles that exercise
deliberate violence. Violence and the security apparatus are two complementary factors
that make these actors “abnormal”, and therefore, impactful on society, its norms and
values in politics, and its principles of governance. These actors have evolved over the
past decades in a world of dramatic changes, and have all developed their own conflict
and power mechanisms and sovereignty practices. This evolution must be thoroughly
investigated, focusing on its roots, or more specifically its archeology of knowledge as

interesting, the leading industrialist/capitalist of Turkey, Ali Koc, who manages Koc
Group. His comment was: “Capitalism is a root cause of the violence and decline we are
experiencing today”, although later was interpreted as “high/wild” form of capitalism.
58
Žižek (2015) goes further and says that religious fundamentalism is created by
liberalism and that those who avoid criticizing the liberal democracy must remain silent
about religious fundamentalism. He also argues that only a radical left can save Europe
from the collapse and adds that what we need today is a “Thatcher of Left”.
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Foucault (2002) put it, dealing with an intensely complex history of thought. Thus, I
further elaborate on the continuity and determinism problem of this evolution, keeping
the long series of debates in mind throughout this chapter, focusing on the dynamics of
conflict and peace.
Conflict, in such a system, is the outcome of decades-long imperialist policies that
eventually led to the overdevelopment of the security apparatus. This latter integrated
itself effectively into the neoliberal policies of privatization, urbanization, discrimination
and war, mostly under the disguise of freedom and democracy discourses in various
settings in the Global North (Chomsky, 2004; Harvey, 2003; Žižek, 2010; Davis, 2011).
Institutionalism in this neoliberal sense has only served to create a more “insufficient”
and “explosive” form of state capacity building under the influence of military-industrial
Keynesianism. It kept trying to sustain problematic politics, notably of inflating states
with inutile security sectors instead of developing systemic competencies to deal with the
serious issues and challenges that kept the state ‘underdeveloped’, thereby reproducing its
incompetence (Fukuyama, 2004).
New behaviorists and specifically scholars of political psychoanalysis have been
influential in the development of behaviorist perspective of political theory, notably
drawing from Jung (1930) to Freud (Turkle & Freud, 1979; Lacan & Miller, 1988;
Altemeyer, 1988) and Lacan (Lacan and Miller, 1988; Stavrokakis, 2007; Glynos and
Stavrakakis, 2008; De Vries, 2007; Robinson, 2004). Despite the existence of voices
pointing in the direction of accumulating issues and problems to resolve and challenges
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to deal, mainstream scholarship has enjoyed its ability to dismiss most of these,
frequently declaring them to be the voices of “radicals” and often taking shelter under the
protection of the status quo, what Lacanians call the “politics of jouissance”. However,
what the so-called “radicals” said became something that can no longer be easily
dismissed. That is what caught the global society “helpless” in an era59 of changes and
challenges; yet, although there is a will for “change” – remember the electoral campaign
mottos of Obama in USA, Wade in Senegal, Erdogan in Turkey60 and others in many
places, and the millions cheering them – it is not enough, because, in a world of violence
and discrimination, change won’t occur on its own with the support of a collective will,
but requires dealing with a much larger scene of conflict – the past (often representing an
enormous agenda of accumulated problems to solve); so that the present and the future
can properly and accurately be engaged. This is a monumental task to achieve at almost
all levels requiring more than “the will”, but also a strong determination as Žižek (2014)
emphasizes.
In line with this, the problem of collective obeisance is acutely felt in an
atmosphere that no longer encourages critical thought over the issues and cases that were
once debated and concluded, eventually suffocating the will and motivation for change
and even to enact laws, since the system of justice does not act accordingly with the
collective will. As a result, escalating feelings of futility are common among individuals,

While I use “era” here, I refer to a general contemporary period in the aftermath of the
Cold War.
60
Not to compare one with another since the contexts are far too different.
59
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mostly those from younger generations or impoverished classes. This may eventually
reproduce masses of individuals who feel restricted and powerless to make a change
against an improperly working system. That can be explained better with the help of the
thesis of various scholars as can be seen in Althusser’s definition of the “ideological state
apparatuses” (Althusser, 1971), or “social engineering” of the state (Popper, 1971)
aligned and complemented an informative body of knowledge with Michel Foucault’s
definition of biopolitics and biopower (Foucault, 1997). The sovereign classes have
reproduced ossified structures of state – bureaucracy, security apparatus and judicial
system – with strong tendencies of dominance over masses. Tools of economic
production, policy making and wealth distribution all have become gridlocked systems of
social stratification.
It is important to remember the Aristotelian story of the Athenaion Politeia [the
Constitution of Athens] in which a picture similar to today is drawn. During the transition
from monarchy to oligarchy, Aristotle (1891) explains how Drakon and Solon attempt to
fix the dysfunctional system, but instead make the tyrannos emerge. After overthrowing
tyranny, Athens ends up with a system of demokhratia, reaching its peak, before finally
being challenged by the oligarchic changes imposed, and eventually the people’s
reaction. Democracy does not represent development without the primacy of education of
a society, yet, there are numerous examples of democratic systems reproducing nondemocratic outcomes. One can clearly construct similarities between the story of
Aristotle and today’s contemporary world. However, the question of how many times this
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must be repeated throughout history for people to learn and understand this simple
tendency of “democracy,” which in the contemporary era constitutes only a system of
stratification that remains central to the phenomena of conflict.
Tickner (1997) emphasized this as a part of the fourth debate; yet, the political
inclusion of today’s world is still much different than before what was pointed out as a
“critical engagement” between feminists and IR theorists. Angela Davis (2011a; 2011b),
for instance, has on many occasions represented a prominent voice for this engagement,
successfully expressing concern over numerous issues related to
unrepresented/underrepresented masses. An analogy of this “critical engagement” also
took place in other spheres of the scientific world mostly referred to as action research.
The role of the scientist is no [more] independent than the process of research, nor the
object of inquiry, but constitutes the very central act of rule or norm making. Noam
Chomsky can be given as an example, since he has stood for numerous issues, most
notably regarding the Western/Global North [mostly USA] security apparatus that
endangered and still endangers civilian human life, and many other cases of crime,
violence and injustice (Chomsky, 2013; 2010; 2003), even in times of general outrage
such as 9/11 and the Iraq War.
Moreover, there are increasing spaces of criticism over military-security
apparatuses and their interventions in human life, and other issues related to hard politics
such as the expanding reach of violence, increasing funding to robotics technologies and
military technologies, such as drones, thermonuclear bombs and other asymmetrical
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warfare divisions; environmental catastrophes; weapons of mass destruction, possession
of mass destruction by terror groups are all emerging questions and challenges of the
contemporary world. The list goes on with a truly expanded record of worldwide human
rights abuses, migration crises and human destruction in various regions of the world,
some of which I described above.
The courageous ensemble of “critical engagements” I emphasized eventually
spreads out forming or at least encouraging a transnational advocacy coalition of
networks at the global level (Keck and Sikkink, 1999; Carpenter, 2007) and becomes
popular, even strong enough for norm making in certain public and academic spheres,
and in the scene of international political action. This becomes significant because the
cultural and political exchanges between similar groups become a key factor of policy
learning which reactivates a social organization at grassroots level on the basis of what
many call “collective memory” (Lawson and Lorrenz, 1999; Olick, 2013; Rothstein,
2000; Misztal, 2010; Schaffer and Smith, 2004) which may eventually reproduce
promising and unexpected actors that emerge on the basis of legitimacy gaining. The
grassroots re-organize themselves in the light of the new thoughts and knowledge. Syriza
in Greece, CUP in Catalonia or HDP in Turkey have shown clear cases of “small political
groups” that have created enormous electoral outcomes not only because they disrupted
the dysfunctional status quo, but also because they gave hope to masses that were long
oppressed under right-wing authoritarian regimes. What was banned or avoided for many
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decades, has reemerged in multiple places in multiple ways, as a kind of new New Left61,
potentially signifying a new period of international political formation.
Discussion: Paradiplomacy and State Formation/Capacity Building in Context of
International Development and Conflict Management
There is the central question to ask in the realm of the various theoretical stances I
described in relation to paradiplomacy and state formation/ state capacity building: What
comes next? Before proceeding into this discussion, it can be useful to summarize again
the general typology of the regions and their motives and interests in undertaking their
own foreign policy actions. Regions became productive units in contexts of political
economy, parallel to the eroding nation state system and rapidly globalizing structures of
politics, economy and culture. These may be regions in North America that increasingly
imply trade, development and environmental policy making at substate levels, or
European regions that are increasingly becoming self-sufficient units in terms of foreign
policy making under supranational frameworks. They may also be the newly emerging
powerful substate units in decentralized/federalized cases such as Sao Paolo in Brazil, or
Hong-Kong in China. Some of these regions constitute themselves as international power
houses with advanced industrial complexes and knowledge production capabilities.

61

The new New Left here has been a collectively updated theoretical debate, and in sum
my specific understanding of it has been a synthesis of the European left –which emerges
from Germany and Southeastern Europe – and North Americans form of libertarian
anarchism. At least the debate over the creation of Rojava region shows the substantial
practice of this integrative and accumulated debate.
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Regions that are under authoritarian regimes, some of which apply to the
unresolved cases of “self-determination” in the aftermath of the collapse of great states or
empires (Ottoman, Yugoslavian, Soviet). As a practically unapplied concept of PaxBrittanica and subsequent Pax-Americana, self-determination is more than a century old
today, not representing any form of practical or progressive agenda for the recognition of
nations without states. Instead, the intergovernmental system which rises on the basis of
these imperialist legacies kept benefiting from the chaos and violence elsewhere, or at
least acted by not acting properly. The authoritarianism in these post-colonial, or postimperial cases is fed by centralist/oligarchic tendencies, notably in multiethnic settings
viewing regions’ demands of self-governance as an act of crime or terror.
One can expect that emerging regions within the borders of these states will keep
constituting the ‘soft belly’ of these countries under conflictive conditions. China, Iran,
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, India, Pakistan, Russia, Lebanon, Sri
Lanka are all subject to this systemic weakness to a certain extent which eventually will
increase the key role of regions in conflict and peace settlements. Eventually some of
these regions, notably the ones that were approached violently by their national
contenders and colonizers, such as the Kurdish regions will even hold a much greater
space and impact in world politics depending on their key position in global governance
and security. These key regions represent a new type of opening to world politics at the
substate level, substantially revealing how neighboring regional units do integrate in
[hard] world politics at least constituting a new dimension of politics between regional
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and supranational/transnational/international actors and institutions. This type of
paradiplomacy/protodiplomacy was not previously defined. Although there are groups
that fall into more than one region, there is not a nation constituted of – or divided into –
four major neighboring regions at the geopolitical crossroads of world politics. Kurdish
regions today represent themselves as increasingly gender-equal, democratic, plural
communities that are under various forms of regionalization. Their practices of
governance are, in many instances, respected worldwide, as is their struggle against
significant challenges, terror and violence.
Still, there is no clear cut typology for the emerging regional units, and some of
them may also be present at grey areas according to the abovementioned classification.
Examples would include Catalonia, which both represents a competent knowledge region
under European governance, and also a secessionist case of self-determination; or many
other similar cases, such as Basque Country, Scotland, Northern Ireland, all examples of
historical contestation. Major schools of regionalism, such as neorealism,
intergovernmentalism, neoliberal institutionalism, neofunctionalism and regional
economic integration and others have significant input in the study of regions (Telò,
2013, p.186; Preusse, 2004; Mansfield and Milner, 1997; Mattli, 1999; Ethier, 1998;
Fawcett, 1996; Haas, 1958; Haas, 1970; Nye, 1968). There is a subsequent split in two
major theoretical sub-camps of the overall discussion of regionalism: Old Regionalism
vs. New Regionalism. These camps contrasts in terms of actors, areas of cooperation and
policy orientation since the proponents of old regionalism view the scene as dominated
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by states and intergovernmental regional organizations that cooperate in clearly delimited
sectors (especially trade and security) with a visibly introverted and often protectionist
policy orientation; while the proponents of new regionalism describe actors as an
ensemble of state and non-state units, markets, civil society and external actors that
cooperate on a variety of fronts with strong sectoral linkages, and often with an
extroverted attitude and globalized policy orientation (Söderbaum, 2013, p.187).
Another important detail in these debates is the difference between regionalism
and regionalization raised by Söderbaum, (2013, p.188) and Fawcett, (2005, p.25).
Regionalism is described as a policy and object “whereby state and non-state actors
cooperate and coordinate strategy within a particular region or as a type of world order. It
is usually associated with a formal programme, and often leads to institution-building,
while regionalization refers to the process of cooperation, integration, cohesion and
identity creating a specific or general regional space. “At its most basic it means no more
than a concentration of activity of trade, peoples, ideas even conflict – at regional level
and this interaction may give rise to the formations of regions, and in turn to the
emergence of regional actors, networks and organizations” (in Telo, 2013; Fawcett, 2005,
p.25). In his comparative study, Söderbaum (2013) also conceptualized three distinct
types of regionalization that are the ‘project’ of market integration, regime boosting
regionalism and shadow regionalism three of which represent significant distinct
implications of regionalism.

133
Söderbaum (2013) particularly criticizes this mainstream theorization and its
underlying assumptions and conceptualizations since most of them look at European
integration from what they are influenced in describing the regionalism which is
problematic since it deduces regionalism to an ambiguous unit of investigation that is
often positivistic and hyperfactualist in terms of methodology rather than having a
systemic concern to investigate historical and socioeconomic facts. Other reflectivist and
constructivist approaches to regionalism were also proposed besides Telo (2013), such as
Hettne et al., 1999; Söderbaum and Shaw, 2003) challenging the conventional views that
regionalism is primarily driven through supranational and intergovernmental regional
frameworks.
The overall scene of regions clearly indicates an expectation in the increase of the
role and participation of substate entities in foreign policy making, and
improved/strengthened profiles of the foreign policy making institutions and
competences of these entities. But, what about the ‘other’ regions that are under
authoritarian, conflictive or even genocidal conditions? These regions specifically need to
be addressed since they also constitute geopolitically key cases for future course of
peacebuilding and conflict. Some of these regions have already proved themselves to be
highly promising pioneers of future world politics as I described throughout this chapter.
However, the same units are also subject to severe violent conflicts and terror, also
surrounded by overlord militarist regimes that are the national contenders of these
emerging units forming a solid barrier on these regions’ path towards internationalization.
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Underestimating or misreading these key [conflictive/oppressed] regional cases
purely implies a risk of catastrophe as was seen in many recent stories of violence which
tends to spillover when the source of conflict is not carefully assessed and intervened62.
Besides, when carefully and healthily approached, these cases also may emerge highly
effective pillars for conflict resolution and human capacity development. In cases of
terror, violence and armed conflict, regions’ capabilities and human capacity become key
factors for humanitarian assistance and international intervention63. Strengthening the
region does not necessarily mean to initiate conflict with the center, but in some cases,
the emergence of substate entities have also significantly contributed to the national
integrity.
There are various factors for a preliminary assessment of regions, their
capabilities and geopolitical/geostrategic significances such as the geographic location,
conditions of resources, international openness, self-sufficiency and the means of
economic production, a foundational social organization that keeps the local and regional
infrastructures and institutions improving, inwards and outwards diplomatic interactions,
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It is important to clearly indicate that the notion of intervention I use in this context
does not mean at all the deliberate Western bombardment of cities, towns and villages
that fall under the territory of the so-called “enemy”, but to intervene the source of
conflict by peaceful means yielding peaceful outcomes. Intervention must not be
perceived as the exercise of transnational violence, but to support, relocate and boost
promising local constituents (after a careful initial assessment looking on suitability in
terms of sustainable community development) to set up human livelihoods and shelters
which eventually have the premise of marginalizing violent networks.
63
In both Iraq and Syria cases, Kurdish regions have become the key actors of postconflict development and humanitarian assistance which is represented in detail in the 5th
chapter.
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representations and the overall formal recognition of the region at international level.
Many other factors can be added to this list such as the presence of international regional
infrastructures (international cities, international local fora) and structures (institutions
and markets), and all of them have key explanations about the foreign policy competence
of the region. These factors can be found in the next chapter when explaining the prompt
for methodology.
Decentralization: A Key Factor for Paradiplomacy
The studies and discussions over regions, regionalism, nation-region relations,
new regionalism, paradiplomacy and state formation/state capacity building throughout
this chapter have a key common element in context of regionalization in global
governance: decentralization. Decentralization eventually represents a central key process
of investigation in the study of paradiplomacy along with the concept of subsidiarity
since both determine the legal-structural formation of regional governance institutions
and the state power and authority to be shared and delegated with the substate entity. It is
specifically important to remember the historical context of the concept of
decentralization since it in fact has arisen as an outcome of centralization in 18th century
France.
The Post-revolutionary French Administration of 1794 has used centralization to
describe the new government structure which at the same time must be seen as the root
structure of today’s France that has delegated most of the state power in Paris creating a
highly centralized republic. Although there are claims that centralization is much older
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than the revolution in France (Young, 1898, p.24) mostly referring to the Charlemagne
Period earlier and latter post-Westhphalian period of 17th century; the post-revolution
period of 18th century has ossified the constituent structures of the modern French nationstate in the form of republic. The names generalité or province were replaced with
department during the revolution, and the rulers of the regions of the ancient régime,
intendant, was replaced with préfet, the ruler of the department which in fact represents
the high-level centralization since préfet represents the governor assigned by the central
state in this system64 instead of region’s elected leader.
The regions and provinces conquered and acquired during Charlemagne period,
Aquitaine, Burgundy, Provence, Septimania, Gascony, eastern coast of Austrasia,
Swabia, Languedoc, Languedoïl, Norman and Bretagne were all absorbed within the
Charlemagne territories centered at Neustria, which later has collapsed and gave birth to
numerous small principalities in a mass area of the Western Europe. For centuries, the
supremacy battle between monarchs and nobles has reproduced conflict and progress of
the central and local powers, which later have become more substantial constituents of
the Council of Peers (Young, 1898, p.25) that later have established state institutions

64

Turkish governmental structures and constitution has been quite closely influenced by
the French system along with numerous other countries. Préfet, or governor/viceroy, in
many context means an official assigned by the center to rule the regions, while in some
contexts there are regional electoral processes to determine the leadership. The question
here is the status of such assignment in level of people and constituencies in the region.
For instance, there is a great dispute over the roles of elected regional/municipal leaders
and préfet/governor assigned by the central state where there is center-region
contestation.
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under the influence of Roman law, and gradually abolished the états provinciaux,
replacing the power of these with the new consolidated state of France, the état unitaire
[unitary state] which not only centralized the state structures but also has given birth to an
enforced absolutism until the French Revolution.
It is important to acknowledge that during the revolution there was an overall
expectation to revive the previously abolished provinces and regions, while limited ruling
powers were given to non-central communities and municipalities to a certain extent in
the 1789 Constituent Assembly for a short period. With the newly created departments
which did not have more power than previous regions, however, more power was
assigned to the local administration including tax collection, fund management, industryagriculture management, healthcare management, and regulation in many fields such as
education, transport and even military affairs. Thus, the concept of decentralization was
used in 1820s first time in France (Schmidt, 2007). The centralization, collapsefragmentation and decentralization cycle is not unique to France, but also plays key role
in many cases of state formation especially when looked at from a holistic and
longitudinal perspective. Besides the French and British accounts, decentralization was
mentioned by Alexis de Tocqueville in mid 1800s who wrote that French Revolution was
initiated with a push towards decentralization, but has become, at the end, an extent of
centralization (Schmidt, 2007, p.10).
The idea of decentralization has developed around the notion of liberty in 19th and
20th centuries mostly by libertarian, anarchist and even decentralist political activists who
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opposed to archaic nation state. Influential Anarchist French theorist Proudhon65 (1863)
says: “All my economic ideas as developed over twenty-five years can be summed up in
the words: agricultural-industrial federation. All my political ideas boil down to a
similar formula: political federation or decentralization”. Alexis de Tocqueville can be
seen among one of the most influential pillars of this wave, and he writes in his
Democracy in America:
“Decentralization has, not only an administrative value, but also a civic
dimension, since it increases the opportunities for citizens to take interest in public
affairs; it makes them get accustomed to using freedom. And from the accumulation of
these local, active, persnickety freedoms, is born the most efficient counterweight against
the claims of central government, even if it were supported by an impersonal, collective
will” (Alexis de Tocqueville, 2000)”
Various objectives were presented by the proponents of decentralization which
was defined as a response to the problems of centralized systems. First, the principle of
subsidiarity is often invoked in decentralization processes positing that the lowest level or
least centralized units must undertake their own initiatives when they are capable of
addressing the issues. Beyond Alexis de Tocqueville and many others, the most popular
contemporary use of subsidiarity is from the European Union law, as a “general
principle” stating that the EU may only act where action of individual countries is

Close friend of Marx, and a notable intellect, Pierre-Joseph Proudhon’s ideas and
observations constitute an important body of debate which remains underappreciated.
65
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insufficient established in the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht. Before that, subsidiarity was
already a key element in European Charter of Local Self-Government which is a strong
instrument of Council of Europe since 1985 (see Article 4, Paragraph 3 of the Charter)
which states that the exercise of public responsibilities should be decentralized. The
strong emphasis on subsidiarity in European Union kept even increasing since the Treaty
on European Union (see Article 5[3]) consolidated with the Treaty of Lisbon (2009)
stating that:
“Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its
exclusive competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central
level or regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the
proposed action, be better achieved at union level”.
The economic boom and decline in the beginning of the 20th century, notably in
America has reproduced many other proponents of decentralization beyond de
Tocqueville. As a reaction to the centralized wealth, economics and politics, a group of
intellectuals have constituted a group of decentralists, mostly representing new left,
agrarians or libertarians such as Bill Kauffman, Mildred Loomis, Mark Hatfield, Murray
Bookchin, Karl Hess, Donald Livingston, Kirkpatrick Sale, Robert Penn Warren and
others, and they were promoting to oppose to large scale national industries blamed for
destroying small and middle businesses and local industries. Since then the criticism over
centralization or centralized governance keeps accumulating in 20th and 21st century,
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today constituting one of the key issues to many violent conflicts and other governance
practices.
Although I attempted to describe the historical context of the thought of
decentralization only in its modern and pre-modern sense, numerous scholars go
centuries back in their analysis of the decentralization and centralization of governance.
Lodge (1910) wrote that the Achaemeneid66 Emperor Darius I was a mastermind of
political centralization through organization, and he contrasts this example with the
ancient Greece which was invaded by Darius I (p.164). Sanderson (1995) is another
prominent name who reviews a history of 4000 years during which chiefdoms have gone
through waves of centralization and decentralization in terms of political, economic and
social power (pp.118-119). Atasoy (2009) stretches this date back to the Stone Age and
argues that not only chiefdoms but also today’s hegemonic states are reproduce of these
long term processes (pp.65-67). Other scholars have proposed the concept of intra-ruling
class competition and the elite core that is rival to state’s wealth accumulation as a factor
for the rise and fall of states notably through phases of centralization and decentralization
throughout the political history (Chase-Dunn and Hall, 1997, pp.20-33).
In many contexts –mostly of the industrialized/developing- decentralization was
seen as an escape from the rising central government expenditures of contemporary era,

Although Western historians use “Persian” empire; that is wrong since Achaemeneid
Empire was located in today’s Western Persia-Zagros region, and was a Zoroastrian
civilization with no clear ethnic connection with Persian [Parthian], Safavid or Pahlavi
dynasty which played role in the creation of today’s Iran.
66
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since the increasingly gridlock centralized economic models are ineffective and
inefficient in competition with others. Free-market ideas have also influenced these
thoughts in convincing central governments to push for structural change notably
decentralizing their services and structures through contracting out with private sector
and privatizing their functions which can be seen as a neoliberal implication of
decentralization often seen as an extent or new form of public governance and
administration (Mishra et al., 2003;) therefore inducing decentralization to an
administrative development.
Various structural/systemic proposals were made over decentralization from
different fields. Kohr (1957) first stated “Whenever something is wrong, something is too
big” in his famous book: The Breakdown of Nations. Influenced by Kohr, Schumacher
(1973) argued how modern economy suffers from unsustainable practices of production,
and proposed what later was known as sustainable development, an ensemble of
collective choices towards decentralized production, technology transfer, and selfsufficient local units in his bestseller titled “Small is beautiful: a study of economics as if
people mattered”. Decentralization has been quite influential on contemporary
scholarship, such as Bell (2008) who emphasized the central need for decentralization
and “a comprehensive overhaul of government structure to find appropriate size and
scope of units, and for detachment of state power from actual state boundaries creating
regions based on functions like water, transport, education and economics” (p.321).
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While emerging as a popular trend in 1970s and 1980s, decentralization has
attracted even more attention defined as a “revolutionary megatrend” (Cummings, 2002,
p.157), or a “latest fashion” of development of new public administration (Conyers, 1983,
p.109), or a “global trend” of devolving responsibilities to regional and local
governments (Warner, 2015), or a new “post-welfare” policy of intergovernmental and
market-based trend in the aftermath of the centralized “welfarist” states of post second
world war (Bennett, 1990). Most of the studies of decentralization correspond to
systemic/structural approaches and uses systems theory, thus, the United Nations
Development Programme has adopted a strong emphasis on decentralization both
supporting in-depth program evaluations, other studies and also institutionalizing
decentralization through the creation of specifically designed organizations and agendas.
UNDP report defines decentralization of governance as a “restructuring and
reorganization of authority so that there is a system of co-responsibility between
institutions of governance at central, regional and local levels according to the principle
of subsidiarity, thus increasing the overall quality and effectiveness of the system of
governance, while increasing the authority and capacities of sub-national levels”
(UNDP, 1999, p.3).
In a prominent study of decentralization, Cohen and Peterson (1999) have
investigated the evolution of the concept and its impact on development, and identified
six major forms of decentralization that are; (1) historical decentralization such as
English, Soviet, Traditional and French patterns of decentralization throughout the
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history; (2) territorial and functional decentralization which mostly represents functions
and hierarchies in various governance structures; (3) problem and value-centered forms
of decentralization which focus on specific challenges due to hyper-centralization or
other pre-existing problems that makes decentralization a solution defined in eight forms
by Berkeley Decentralization Project as: devolution, functional devolution, interest
organization, prefectoral deconcentration, ministerial deconcentration, delegation to
autonomous agencies, philanthropy and marketization; (4) service delivery forms of
decentralization looking at patterns of administrative structures and functions responsible
for production and provision of collective goods and services mostly in local
governments, partnership systems, dual systems and integrated administrative systems,
(5) single country experience form of decentralization focusing on a narrow definition
based on experience in a specific context in which legal establishment of local units and
constituents, jurisdictional definitions, governance of locally elected officials and bodies
and authorization for the engagement in tax, revenue and other financial functions; (6)
objectives based forms of decentralization that looks into economic and market-related
forms of delegation, deconcentration, devolution and administrative decentralization on
the basis of political, spatial, market and administrative objectives (Cohen and Peterson,
1999, pp.15-19).
Expanded from the study of Cohen and Peterson (1999), UNDP has also defined
its major forms of decentralization as devolution, delegation, deconcentration and
divestment/privatization (UNDP, 1999, pp.7-8).
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Table 2: Forms of Decentralization defined by UNDP
Type of unit to
Aspect of Governance transferred or shared
Generic name
which authority is Political (policy Economic or
Administration
transferred
or decision
financial
and service
making)
resource
delivery
management
Autonomous
Devolution
Devolution
Devolution
Devolution
lower-level units
Semi-autonomous Delegation
Delegation
Delegation
Delegation
lower-level units
Sub-ordinate
Directing
Allocating
Tasking
Deconcentration
lower-level units
or sub-units
External (nonDeregulation Privatization
Contracting
Divestment
governmental)
units at any level
Source: UNDP, Decentralized Governance Programme: Strengthening Capacity
for People-Centered Development, Management Development and Governance Division,
Bureau for Development Policy, September 1997, Annex #, Box 2, p. 33

Before proceeding to the discussion of the interconnections between
paradiplomacy and decentralization, a key conceptual issue is about the intended
outcomes of decentralization processes in governance structures. It is emphasized by any
scholar of decentralization that the process yields successful outcomes when the
emerging peripheral unit, its organizations and institutional quality is sufficient.
Decentralization can only be successful when the non-central unit to which the power or
authority is transferred, devolved or delegated is sufficient enough in undertaking the
activities related to the new functions. In such cases, decentralization can cure a great
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ensemble of accumulated problems and challenges that are often resulted by the
centralized systemic structures.
Various outcomes can be accounted for the promise of decentralization when
accurately implied which explains its increasing popularity and applications as a global
trend. A prominent scholar of decentralization from Cornell’s Restructuring Local
Government Project, Mildred Warner (2015) defines the promise of decentralization as
the enhanced efficiency through inter-governmental competition and fiscal discipline,
providing a basis of democratic –and enhanced- local voice over service provision. Fiscal
federalism/decentralization specifically implies a lower level institutionalization of tax
and expenditure authority creating discipline, market features that ensure productive
efficiency. However, Warner (2015) also notes that decentralization works best in
settings where there are strong traditions of democracy, accountability, professionalism in
subnational government. She adds:
“It does not provide a short cut to governmental capacity in situations where
these preconditions are absent. Decentralization may enhance productive efficiency but
will undermine allocative efficiency by making redistribution more difficult, especially in
areas with regional inequality. Thus decentralization should be used with caution in
situations where there are concerns with inequality, corruption and weak managerial
capacity or weak democratic traditions”. (Warner, 2015)
It is important to note that the intent and motive of both the regional/peripheral
and also central authorities are of key importance in design and implementation of
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decentralization policies, and the procedural characteristics also may be of key
importance notably in situations where there is risk of conflict between parties.
Ambiguities may initiate further conflicts in poorly planned, designed contexts of
decentralization. Take for instance, Catalonia, which has finally constructed its regional
authority again in the aftermath of fascist Franco Regime of Spain. The region has lost its
sovereignty in 1714 war, and since then experienced oppression. Despite crimes of
Francoist regime, and the lack of reconciliation which was avoided by Spanish rightwingers, remnants of the regime have also set on the table when making the new
constitution of 1978 which recognized the status of autonomy of Catalonia and Basque
Country, but in such an ambiguous way that did not make it clear to determine the ruling
and law making state authority. Therefore, many accuse the ambiguity of state
sovereignty and authority of this process in today’s conflict, which at the same time
represents the highest level rule of law in Spain that implies a form of decentralization.
The same applies to Kurdistan region which is now recognized by the Federal Iraqi
Constitution, but still struggles with Baghdad over the right of international agreement
signing.
Subsidiarity is another key component of a system that is subject to imply
decentralization, since it eventually represent the core principle that promote
decentralization as a healthy and progressive process, but not necessarily a secessionist or
sectarian one. Centripetal units do not necessarily constitute danger to national unity, but
mostly serve for governance efficiency, however, there are also cases of multiethnic
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societies, which my thesis mainly focus, and which are subject to center-region conflicts
based on different collective identity constructions. These cases are not necessarily about
the neoliberal perspective of decentralization which implies privatization, limited
government devolution or controlled centralized distribution of wealth which can be even
seen as a “regime boosting” decentralization in many centralist contexts. Fiscal processes
and decentralization, for instance, have been such a central issue in the conflictive regioncenter cases. What eventually fueled the increasingly secessionist Catalan and Kurdish
protodiplomacy is the “provocative” fiscal measures implied in national politics, that has
endorsed the already existing Catalan or Kurdish national will. In sum, the unity then
becomes just a choice for a region, when the center implies rules that banishes the
advantages of national membership. This is specifically case if the region has a vibrant
economy, productive capacity or potential or resource endorsement.
In federal/confederal cases, however, such as the regions of Canada or USA,
decentralization is an already existing systemic characteristic that is implied through
highly decentralized states. Although the overall political system may have its own
internal conflicts mostly depending on legislative procedures and fiscal policies, it is less
expected these regions (states or provinces) to become secessionist, perhaps with the
exception of Quebec which still is less secessionist than Catalonia or Kurdistan. Another
takeover from the decentralization readings is about the systemic potency of the process,
viewing it purely different than the neoliberal perspective, but approaching it as a
libertarian principle for sustainable community development. Self-sufficient, ecological,
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democratic and peaceful local communities are increasingly popular trends in any field of
sciences nowadays, notably with the increasing global political, economic, social, cultural
and environmental challenges.
I argue that rather than the neoliberal approach to decentralization, which reduces
the entire concept into a new form of public management organization with strong
emphasis of the private sector, it is more fruitful to view it as a whole system
transformation, something that most libertarian socialists and some anarchists do. Freemarket decentralization has been long applied as a principle in industrial and postindustrial societies, however, there is no such thing as a free-market in a world dominated
by nation-states that have organizations, institutions and abilities making them capable
actors of intervention. In such a world, states act as guardians of their merchants
domestically and international if they can. Strong states are capable of protecting their oil
extracting companies in even hostile regions, and poor states are not even able to manage
the security on their own streets. In a sense, free market decentralization does not
represent a whole system transformation, but is proposed as an extent to the existing
system which keeps reproducing problems, therefore making the transformational process
a symptomatic treatment rather than substantial and progressive change.
In many contexts, the imposed decentralization by the centralist system represents
large scale investments that may even be destructive for regional economies, as once
proposed by Jacob (1961) who criticized large-scale development projects in suburbs that
destroyed the urban culture and economics creating impoverished residents. According to
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libertarian socialists67 who oppose the system of wild capitalism which probably
represents the highest level of a centralized system, there is still the possibility of a nonhierarchical, non-bureaucratic social organization without – or with limited – private
property in the means of production. They promote direct democracy, libertarian
municipalism, citizens’ assemblies and councils at grassroots levels (Rocker, 2004, p.65),
criticizing coercive state organs and promoting the decentralization of political and
economic power, and socializing private property and enterprise (Spiegel, 1991, p.446).
Although many proponents of these views were described as marginal, or even “utopian”
(such as Noam Chomsky and Proudhon), some of that may be shifting recently.
Emergence of numerous promising local actors and units simply indicates the era of
glocalization (Robertson, 1995; Wellman, 2001; Roudometof, 2005) an era of greater
interconnection of local units as the key constituents of emerging new world politics.
Rojava region, rural communities of Africa, South America, and many other regions can
be given as new examples of community building in this libertarian socialist sense.
Subsidiarity is especially significant since it pushes the system to delegate power,
capability and function to the local communities in undertaking essential production
functions, which is the core unit representing the societal grassroots. It is probably the
most significant and powerful element of any system; yet, productive organized
communities makes strong societies. The Kibbutz experience, for example, represents the
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Anarchist syndicalist, or some use new left as an umbrella term in the overwhelming
world of the fragmented left.
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strength of productive local communities that function as components of a whole-system
production based on voluntarism, education and social organization. The agricultural
progress was strong enough to make Israel a global player in world agricultural markets
which also has provided funds for technologic and industrial advances. The development
of decentralized communities that are self-sufficient also has founded a militarily
defensive system which in the later decades led to the centralization of Israel along with
shift of the preliminary form from left-wing solidarity of the aftermath of Shoah into
something more apartheid-alike, more of a right-wing state. Another example is the push
of subsidiarity in the European Union’s support of local units developing their
international competencies, eventually giving access to countless local and regional
institutions and organizations a jurisdictional identity that is able to sign binding
agreements with other regions. Regions have also founded various assemblies and
alliances within the context of supranational governance which contributed to their
sovereignty practices at the substate level.
Conclusion: The Interplay between Paradiplomacy, Regionalization,
Decentralization and State Formation
Throughout this chapter, I attempted to map a blend of theories that have
explanatory power in relation to the concept of paradiplomacy, state formation and
capacity building, regionalism/new regionalism, regionalization, and decentralization.
Overall, the extent of decentralization can be a dynamic process itself, notably in terms of
conflictive regions. Paradiplomacy in this context constitutes a major question since it
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represents the foreign policy action of the decentralized – decentralizing, or
decentralization-willing – unit which is highly dependent on the formal governmental
structures of the substate level and their capacity to conduct their own foreign policy
making and implementation. The level of capacity to be able to sign binding international
agreements, participate in local international for a, or to engage in representation at the
transnational level all depends on internal center-region relations and the broader global
political environment.
In some cases, paradiplomacy emerges as an outcome of decentralization imposed
by national or transnational/supranational contexts, such as the regionalism policy of the
European Union which applies to many regions which were not necessarily strong
substate units, but were limited actors that are supportive or complementary to central
state structures. However, some regions that had previous histories of conflict,
secessionism, or nation-building, such as Catalonia, Ireland, Kurdistan, Scotland, the
Basque Country, all have a much stronger bargain in the game of negotiations. While the
centralist system tends to avoid sharing power, possibly as a result of the fear of
secessionism, or territorial loss or authority erosion, they tend to limit the process of
decentralization.
While this game is about rivalry, competition and opportunity seeking for the
region which already seeks a way to bypass the dominant center, the enforcement of a
supranational/international binding authority purely endorses the unit. Therefore,
European regionalism has been a different type of endorsement for those units that were,
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for long time, looking for a way to internationalize. In these cases, paradiplomacy
becomes both the input and also the output for decentralization, which represents a
longitudinal centripetal process of regionalization. In these cases, the more flexible and
cooperative a central state becomes in undertaking regionalization, the more its operative
decisions will encounter diminished conflict from the region. Scotland’s decision in a
recent referendum, for instance, may represent an instance where long term struggle for
freedom was not preferred over coexistence, possibly also due to the increasingly tolerant
and recognizing policies of London towards its regional constituents.
Another example, the key case of this thesis, the Kurdish case is also a strong
example to demonstrate how paradiplomacy may become the ultimate cause68 or outcome
of decentralization, since Kurds have never developed stronger relations with the central
government in Baghdad, or at least stronger than the relations they have with some other
countries. Therefore, paradiplomacy gives some regions a strong element of bargaining
power, which eventually pushes the center to recognize decentralization in its
governance, which of course in the Iraqi case transpired only after a military intervention.
In sum, regions may emerge as pioneers of state formation and state capacity
building, they may also emerge as rivals to centralist state system eroding its power, and
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It is important to note that there is an issue of endogeneity in any form of hypothesis
testing of this relationship as do many other concepts of social sciences. Therefore, to
overcome this, the comparative method helps distinction of unique conditions and
courses of evolution in different cases. While in Spain’s Catalan and Basque case,
paradiplomacy is the outcome of decentralization, in the Kurdish case, it simply appears
to be a cause in the Kurdish case which I describe in detail in the final chapter.
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they may have different capacities and characteristics, as well as different – sometimes
contrasting or competing/conflicting motives and intentions. There are a few regions that
emerge as new global political actors with great geostrategic capacities, and some of
these regions already undertake hard policy decisions, decentralizing their state structures
in a way that is becoming a key element in newly emerging broader regional breakdown.
It is important to be context specific, spatiotemporally accurate and also to be aware of
longitudinal cyclical processes while investigating the great transformation in regions’
capabilities and achievements.
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CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

In this chapter, I first review a series of paradigmatic debates over scientific
inquiry in the social sciences. Describing the frames extracted from these debates (i.e.,
positivism/post-positivism, interpretivism, critical research and poststructuralism, and the
qualitative/quantitative continuum), I explain the scientific rationale for my research
methodology: the comparative case study. I then explain the research design, case and
sample selections, data collection methods, and analytical processes of this study. Finally,
I elaborate on the methodological problems at times arising from the study of
paradiplomacy, as well as their possible solutions I proposed.
Philosophical Underpinnings of an Interparadigmatic Approach
to Paradiplomacy Methodology
The expanding literature, theoretical frame and empirical research on
paradiplomacy indicated a definite characteristic of fragmentation, constituted of various
conceptualizations of paradiplomacy and its underlying motives, processes and outcomes
(See chapter 2 and 3). What especially was visible in the expanding literature was the
timeline of research in relation to framing paradiplomacy, yet, while it was expanding
into new directions, new features and characteristics of paradiplomacy were also revealed
from the debates.
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Before proceeding, “paradigm change” is a major component of this thesis, and
deserves scholarly attention since its introduction to the world of science represents a
major contribution. The concept of scientific paradigm was introduced by Kuhn’s work
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions in 1962, which later become a great debate
among scholars of political science and international affairs. A quantum physicist at
Harvard, Kuhn capitalized on studying and teaching history of science. During this
period, he analyzed the scientific texts of Aristotle, Galileo and Newton, and introduced
the concept of paradigms in the disciplines of science. According to Kuhn’s central
claim, a careful analysis of the history of science reveals that the development in any
scientific field occurs in phases.
Kuhn argues that “normal” science is initiated by a community of researchers
around a common intellectual framework called the “paradigm” – or “disciplinary
matrix” – representing a body of complex contextual and conceptual knowledge that
makes up the context of the research problem to investigate. He describes the paradigm
as an ensemble of “concepts, variables, and problems attached with corresponding
methodological approaches and tools” (Kuhn, 1962, p.23; Case, 2012, p.167). The
researcher engages in scientific inquiry into a research question, thus attempting to solve
a “puzzle” in which anomalies or discrepancies often emerge and are resolved through
incremental changes in variables or by the recognition of an experimental—or standard—
error (Kuhn, 1962; 1970).
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Hacking (1983) writes, “Normal science does not aim at novelty but at clearing up
the status quo. It tends to discover what it expects to discover” (Kuhn, 2012, p.xxvi).
Anomalies, however, accumulate over time until they reach a level where researchers
question the paradigm, which causes the discipline to enter a crisis period, defined by
Kuhn as "a proliferation of compelling articulations, the willingness to try anything, the
expression of explicit discontent, the recourse to philosophy and to debate over
fundamentals” (Kuhn, 2012, p. 91). This crisis ends when the deficient paradigm is
replaced with a new one, representing a revolutionary process. In the social sciences,
however, paradigms are frequently/usually not completely dismissed, despite being
replaced with new ones, since they are generally understood to represent different
frameworks reflecting different points of view (Babbie, 2008).
Karl Popper (1963) once posited that “real” science aims to refute a theory rather
than to confirm it; Kuhn’s view of “normal” science, on the other hand, claims that
scientists are not ordinarily predisposed to refute or to challenge the paradigm under
which they work. The Kuhnian perspective can also be supported with Hegel’s point on
“zeitgeist”,69 given spatiotemporal observations reflect the spirit of their ages or eras,
therefore, there are significant deviations in the timelines with the introduction of new
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Hegel did not use the word zeitgeist, but in Lectures on the Philosophy of History, he
used the phrase der Geist seiner Zeit (the spirit of his time), reflecting the unique concept
of spatial and temporal—and collective—spirit for which Magee (2011) quoted Hegel’s
phrase: “No man can surpass his own time for the spirit of his time is also his own spirit”
(p.262).
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knowledge, events and developments. What makes Kuhn’s claim more interesting is the
so-called “Kuhn’s Cycle” that initiates the process of science from pre-science that later
gives birth to the normal science, and then forms the model drift, which eventually comes
into crisis and is challenged. The cycle ends with the “model revolution,” which
subsequently creates a paradigm shift.
A major debate of science is about the various theoretical approaches to
empiricism from which various stances have emerged. The first stance in the
abovementioned debate is positivism, which many relate to Auguste Comte, Francis
Bacon, John Locke, or Immanuel Kant (Mertens, 2005; Graham, 1994; Sullivan, 1989)
and which has been a predominant view in the sciences. This view asserts a deterministic
and empiricist philosophy of science, assuming that there are directly observable and
quantitatively measurable causes and effects. Therefore, one can predict relationships
between variables (Mackenzie and Knipe, 2006; Creswell, 2003; O’Leary, 2004).
Replaced by post-positivism in the aftermath of World War II, this perspective evolved to
encompass the idea that any piece of research is influenced by a number of welldeveloped theories including the one revealed, grounded, and tested by the researcher
(Cook and Campbell, 1979, p. 24). Another scholar, O’Leary (2004), suggested that
postpositivism is intuitive, holistic, inductive and exploratory, entailing qualitative
findings and views of the world as ambiguous, variable, and multiple in its realities (pp.67). Under this theoretical framework, what might be the truth for one group or culture
may not be the truth for another. Postpositivism is also mostly aligned with quantitative

158
data analysis (in Mackenzie and Knipe, 2006) and represents a metatheoretical stance that
both criticizes and amends positivism.
The second influential perspective is the interpretivist, or hermeneutic, paradigm,
which emphasizes the difference between social and natural sciences, based on the idea
that in the social sciences the subject investigated is human beings who have the capacity
to interpret their environment and themselves (Ownuegbuzie, 2000). This ability is
crucial because social sciences often deals with highly complex issues which are not easy
to observe through positivist approaches, but requires a much rigorous process of
interpretation. This view argues that scientific inquiry is subjective which eventually has
an impact in contemporary research practice (Cousin, 2005; Elliott & Lukes, 2008).
According to Cohen and Manion (1994), hermeneutics intends to understand the “world
of human experience” through the idea that “reality is socially constructed” (Mertens,
2005, p.12). Creswell (2003) expands on this view by claiming that researcher relies on
participants’ view of the investigated situation (p.8) which eventually represents the
influence of their background and experiences.
A great deal of researchers following that approach recognize that their
assumptions reflect subjective stances (Mackenzie and Knipe, 2006). Interpretivist
paradigm was expanded upon Husserl’s phenomenology (Husserl, 1962, p.163) and
Dilthey’s study of interpretative understanding called “hermeneutics”, and was also
influenced by various scholars (Mertens, 2005; Mackenzie and Knipe, 2006;
Eichelberger, 1989). They do not necessarily begin with theory to test but rather generate
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or inductively develop a theory through a pattern of meanings (Creswell, 2003, p.9).
They tend to rely on qualitative data or mixed methods, in which quantitative data is used
to expand upon the qualitative findings or solidify them with the aim of deepening the
description (Mackenzie and Knipe, 2006).
Interpretivists have proposed numerous qualitative methods, such as
ethnographies, focus groups, interviews, diaries, narratives, and case studies (Elliott and
Lukes, 2008), which allow for in-depth and detailed analysis and offer the advantage of
encouraging the researcher to expand and include individual experiences. However,
interpretivism is often criticized since it does not truly allow for generalizable theory
building and also because of the smaller number of cases used. Even if the positivistversus-interpretivist debate has been dominant in philosophical discussions about the
social sciences, it is important to acknowledge another foundational perspective
representing a major school of thought relating to critical theory. Often called “critical
research” or the “transformative paradigm,” this school proliferated a systemic critique in
the last century and has been quite influential although often represented as an extension
of the positivist versus interpretivist debates. Critical research or the “transformative
paradigm” was born out of the debates over revolutionary70 practices in philosophy71.
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First, Hegel categorizes the reality into subject and object, and constructs a dialectics
between two. He, however, uses this dialectic to praise the modern state and its role in
regulating human life and making things work. He states that human history has reached
to its ultimate objective within the modern state. Marx cites him for this and also the
permanence of capital in the political economy, positing that capitalism forms a gridlock
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Marx, especially, focused on the issue of injustice at the societal level and was later
followed by a group of scientists who formed the “transformative” camp, which
expanded over the next century and made tremendous theoretical contributions to
recognizing “marginalized” elements of society. Scholars of transformative or critical
theory acknowledge that research is not value free, as do interpretivists. However, unlike
interpretivists, they move beyond the paradigm of the status quo and challenge
interpretations, perspectives, and values in order to bring about change.
Although criticized by postpositivists for having a political agenda, scholars of
critical theory over various spatiotemporal contexts have contributed to an expansion of
the transformative framework, which is interested in accurately diagnosing not only
social or societal issues, but also the means of addressing them. Action research, for
instance, is a productive example of the critical paradigm, along with an ensemble of
methods such as interviews, group discussions, and other forms of data collection.
Studies of discourse and critical discourse analysis can also be given as major methods of
analysis. Various schools of thought can be described as the critical school of thought
such as Marxists, New Marxists, Feminists and Gender/Queer Theorists, and Anarchist

structure that becomes permanent within the political economic system of the modern
state (Marx, 1844, p.141).
71
Marxism was also criticized for creating a mighty instrument for the acquisition and
maintenance of political power (Sowell, 2007) and for suppressing individual rights as
posited by liberals who claim that redistribution of wealth is a form of coercion and that
socialism will lead to an authoritarian state (Friedman, 1974; Wilson, 2007; Keynes,
1991). Anarchists also argue that Marxism will lead to despotic control of the populace
by a new and not at all numerous aristocracy (Bakunin, 1873)
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factions. A global collective of critical scholars in various periods of time made great
contributions to the field from which social sciences research have expanded into new
directions, even if most of the intellectual debates were exchanges between Global
Northern scholars, not necessarily representing the Global South by any means. Still,
these scholars have been quite impactful in global proliferation of human rights,
progressive policy actions, power relations, questions of identity and ideology as well as
the facts of the political economy as well as gender and class issues. This critical and
transformative scientific perspective becomes especially significant in context of the
investigation of paradiplomacy in this study which represents a challenge to the
mainstream nation-state centric view of substate or non-central units. They also are quite
significant for each of the three individual cases of this study, and many other similar
cases with conflictive motives.
Last but not least, one final key paradigm is poststructuralism, which dates to the
1960s and 1970s and is mostly found within continental scholarship. Interrelated with
postmodernism, poststructualism deals with individuals and the social relations between
them, focusing on the self as the subject of social construction, and looking at how selves
are constituted through semantics and gain meaning in specific contexts of power
(Macdonald et al., 2000). The relation between power and meaning, therefore, constitutes
the very discourse that not only accounts for what is said but looks at who has the
authority (power) to speak (Newman, 2005; Ball, 1990). Poststructuralism also implies
quite significantly to the cases of paradiplomacy studied in this research, since the major
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factor in all of the conflictive interrelations of paradiplomacy are based on the poweridentity relationships. The official status quo in Kurdish key case study for example is
terrifically subject to the non-scientific construction of the discourse, which with a great
impact shaped the formation of the Kurdish scholarship, referring to an ensemble of
global citizens72 rather than solely Kurdish academics. Therefore, official data is always
contested between rivals, each inflating it for their own, and not only the scene of
observation, but institutions, organizations, politics and individuals are contested almost
on anything, therefore, making the discussion of power-identity relationship more
important.
Besides the abovementioned epistemological and ontological perspectives all of
which contribute to pluralism in scientific inquiry, they are not necessarily opposing to
each other, but even may complement a body of knowledge. What becomes important is
finding a way to accurately and optimally address a research question and to choose the
appropriate methodology/ies and methods. There is, in short, no “right” paradigm
(Niglas, 2007; Onwuegbuzie, 2000).
Popper (1959) writes, “It must be possible for an empirical scientific system to be
refuted by experience (p.18) [….] those among us who are unwilling to expose their ideas
to the hazard of refutation do not take part in the game of science” (p.280). While
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The most solid evidence of this is the Kurdish Studies Network which has thousands of
professional, academic and intellectual members all over the world dynamically
exchanging ideas and cooperating/collaborating around Kurdish language, communities
and regions.
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considering all of the paradigmatic approaches to the epistemological and ontological
construction of scientific inquiry valuable, I did not necessarily adopted one and excluded
others from my perspective and experience. I adopted measures of empiricism to
construct scientific reliability and validity while also avoiding a hyperfactualist and
consequently unrepresentative stance. Still, the empiricism required a rigorous process of
interpretation in order to reveal policy-relevant and conceptual findings that were aimed
to be explored. While the empirical methodology helped me to describe the facts and
status over the observed units’ representative interactions through an ensemble of
observation tools, the latter part was to analyze and interpret what was empirically
observed. Beyond this relationship between the empirical observation and interpretation
processes, there is also the importance of the policy-relevance of the observed issues,
notably in context of conflictive cases where the level of sufferance by communities
simply initiate a faster and more complex but genuine process of thought, criticism,
which many argue is a product of idealism.
Critical and transformative school of thought gains significance in context of
studying paradiplomacy and notably its protodiplomatic forms, since one of the major
issues is the center-region conflicts over sovereignty and authority, and there is a system
of global governance shaped by the conditions set by nation-state system which emerged
and expanded on the basis of militarism, imperialism and colonization. Finally, the
poststructuralist school definitely also has a great deal of input in this research, including
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the very involvement of some poststructuralist phenomenal names73 to engage in the
politics of the case studies in this research, especially the Kurdish key case. In a sense, it
is impossible for one to exclude one of the abovementioned perspectives, while dealing
with genuine research, since an empirically strong discourse means the ability of being
able to have supportable arguments that represent the facts, causes and the outcomes of
the investigated subject.
Qualitative Dominance over Quantitative Methods in Paradiplomacy Research
There is a common recognition among paradiplomacy scholars of the loose,
unclear, and incomplete74 definition of the concept. Most of the existing literature
remains theoretical with a visible lack of empirical substantiation. There are, however, a
handful of single case studies or comparative studies that play a foundational role in the
development of the empirical body of knowledge pertaining to paradiplomacy, and most
of these empirical studies are constituted by qualitative research. Thus, quantitative
insights are quite limited in this field. Kuznetsov (2014) highlights the qualitative
dominance over quantitative research in the study of paradiplomacy.
In their study, Allan and Vengroff (2012) mapped the paradiplomacy used by
North American states and their respective interregional formations of governance. The
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Noam Chomsky, Angela Davis, Judith Butler, Immanuel Wallerstein, Slavoj Zizek,
David Harvey, Etienne Balibar and hundreds of others have actively engaged in the
global discourse over Kurdish regions and politics, some of which even turned into
disputes with national governments Kurds are subject to.
74
The previous literature on paradiplomacy remains eclectic since new studies introduced
new descriptions of the concept.
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authors described the various foreign policy action types and levels of these political
units (states or provinces) in a comparative study looking at comparable and quantifiable
factors such as the number of agreements, and foreign representations. As a multiple case
model of North American paradiplomacy, this study shows the increasing engagement of
regions (provinces and federal states) in foreign policy making.75 Another significant
contribution is the recent studies by Tatham (2013; 2015) and Callanan and Tatham
(2014) in which he benefits from the large and representative sample in Brussels, the
capital of the European Union, where the combination of substate, subnational, and
regional offices, representations, and diplomatic presence make for an excellent
investigation into paradiplomacy practices.
Tatham (2015) hypothesized lobbying success as a function of a region’s capacity
and size, individual lobbying alliances, national and supranational embeddedness. Using
each as explanatory (dependent) variables, he tested numerous hypotheses (N=330) using
different models that had four specific findings: (a) the population size of the region
matters – with a positive correlation – in the weight of influence in Brussels; (b) the
greater the supranational embeddedness of a region the greater the influence it has in
Brussels; (c) commission (EU) helpfulness76 also contributes to regional influence in

Richard Vengroff (2015) has also recently informed me about Mexico’s decision to
endorse its federal states to become competent units in terms of foreign policy, which
will be a significant development toward new regionalism in North America. US,
Canadian and Mexican states are gathering an assembly in Denver, a notable event.
76
Commission helpfulness was also used along with positivity, timeliness and also
commission empowerment.
75
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Brussels; and (d) the level of decentralization has a conditional role but not a direct one;
thus decentralization substantively increases the effects of population size and
supranational embeddedness (Tatham, 2015, p. 398). His empirical approach is quite
significant since it provides a foundational quantitative basis for paradiplomacy study
with possibly the largest sample size to date.
In another study, Tatham (2013) used more than 100 Brussels offices of substate
representations to investigate the cooperative and conflictive motives of the regions. He
found that conflicting interest representation occurs rarely and is determined by factors
other than bypassing (sensu lato) and cooperation. While resource richness and
diplomatic accreditation were find to play significant role in paradiplomacy of examined
substate entities, devolution level and party political incongruence were found to hardly
affect paradiplomacy. He views this as “good news” for member states, he adds that it
means that empowering territories with further competences will not weaken the member
states in the EU, although the newly empowered substate entities are governed by
opposition, nationalist, or regionalist parties (Tatham, 2013, p.83). He concludes:
The absence of such a relationship therefore has important policy implications in
terms of the territorial structure of the state and the distribution of powers within it
(Hooghe & Marks, 2009). It also highlights that such processes are not governed by zerosum logics. Previous research had indicated that devolution increased rather than
decreased cooperation on the Brussels scene. (Jeffery, 2007; Tatham, 2010a) This
research shows that it does not affect levels of conflict within such an arena. Hence,
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devolved and nondevolved states are equally unlikely to be undermined by their SSEs,
even in the context of party political incongruence. Finally, from a conceptual point of
view, this research allows us to take a step down from Sartori’s (1970) ladder of
abstraction and to further disentangle paradiplomacy from bypassing and bypassing from
conflicting interest representation. Analysis of the latter reveals that conflicting
paradiplomacy is not only rare in its occurrence but also shaped by a different data
generating process to that of its bypassing or cooperative equivalents. As Criekemans and
Duran (2010) have recently pointed out, one of the challenges in the academic study of
sub-state diplomacy is to gather comparable data on the institutional mechanisms, the
diplomatic instruments and the organizational structures which non-central governments
utilize so as to develop a foreign policy, parallel, complementary or conflictual to those
of their central state colleagues (pp. 35-36). (Tatham, 2013, p.83)
Paradiplomacy research initially expanded on qualitative and theoretical studies,
with less emphasis on empiricism. Studies are mostly in the form of individual case
studies, comparative analysis of a few cases, or very few quantitative analysis with larger
sample sizes. Tatham’s study is notably valuable in terms of proposing a possible new
direction for the study of paradiplomacy with a larger sample size, however, still there is
the issue of the absence of a generic large sampled dataset for investigating substate
entities, despite the significant increase of substate/subnational focus in various areas of
research such as international development. As a consequence of the nation-centric
institutionalization of the global datasets of political and economic indicators notably in
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large datasets of prominent international institutions and organizations, substate entities
did not receive sufficient attention in terms of being observed globally and crosssectionally, at least as much as they deserved. While Tatham’s study has a premise in
quantifying paradiplomacy research, the general frameworks and literature still represent
qualitative and theoretical dominance of the previous research.
Description of the Research Problem
Despite the underrepresentation of paradiplomacy and substate entity study in
mainstream political science and economics, there is definitely an expanding structure of
research putting emphasis on substate entities as the main unit of analysis, notably in
studies of conflict, international development and human capacity building. First, as the
units of analysis and focus, substate entities enable a genuine reach to local, on many
issues such as water, infrastructure building, rural/urban development, humanitarian aid
and support, security and environmental issues, given they are constituents of both
economic production and eventually the general political/institutional environment.
Therefore, interactions of substate units with the outside world becomes significant.
There are many examples to be given to support the claim that some non-central
or small units may be more central than conventional states in certain contexts. Opposing
the arguments expressed by the prominent scholars of paradiplomacy such as Ivo
Duchacek (1990) who stated that: “[…] they –NCGs- can hardly compete for public
attention with wars, arms talks, international terror and other forms of conflict or
cooperation among sovereign nations. Their impact on national foreign policy has
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remained modest” (p. 2) or Keating (2000) who argues that “[…] unlike the foreign
policy of states, regional diplomacy does not seek to represent broad general interests or
to be comprehensive in coverage. Regions do not have sovereign governments able to lay
down their definition of “national interest” and to pursue it in a unified and coherent
manner”, this thesis proposes a new direction of research in which substate entities
emerge as not complementary units but the very global pioneers and constituents of
conflict transformation and human capacity building, even engaging in hard policy
actions surpassing the level of many nation-state actors.
A primary component of the research problem in thesis is the cases of intrastate
conflict where substate entities have conflictive political histories with their national
contenders, and where societies represent multilingual, multiethnic and interreligious
settings. Especially the increasing weight and role of the Kurdish regions in global
political agenda has been a motive to deal with these regions empirically, since their
foreign policy actions physically surpassed many nation-state actors, therefore, even
opening a new direction of discussion in contemporary IR theory. While Kurdish substate
entities have expanding their roles, functions and overall contributions to global security,
especially dealing with the outcomes of the collapse of Baathism in Iraq and Syria and
also a drastic political transformation in Turkey and Iran, much of their foreign policy
actions remained outside of what the mainstream paradiplomacy framework defined in
the scope.
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A second important component of the research problem is again another
incompatibility of Kurdish paradiplomatic framework with other prominent well-studied
cases from the Global North, given Kurdish paradiplomacy refers to the ensemble of
policy actions of four Kurdish substate entities rather than one, therefore, giving birth to a
purely new and complex form of paradiplomacy model, something that was never
described in the literature and theory. Kurdish landlockedness, and the recent regional
formations in the form of federal administrations in Syria, and increasing broader
instability in MENA regions all together constitute the major issues within the discussion
of Kurdish paradiplomacy. The vital question is: in such a realm, how can Kurdish
regions survive and sustain their role in peacebuilding, conflict transformation and
democratization? Yet, this question is especially asked in a context in which Kurds are
globally presented as “heroes” and “model revolutionaries” on various western audiences
on daily basis, while they do not receive proportional aid, support or endorsement
institutionally, or their demands for international development are often remained
unheard, or excluded, given their status of statelessness.
In order to describe the Kurdish regions’ paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy,
there is a third component of the research problem: to find an optimal setting of power
sharing that can enable the coexistence of Kurdish substate entities without engaging in
hard policy while having sufficient authority and sovereignty to foster their self-rule and
international development. In order to predict a model, and explore possibilities to
support Kurdish regions’ progressive advances in terms of self-ruling, humanitarian,
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gender-equal and development practices, a benchmark is needed, especially to assess and
examine if such possibilities exist. In sum, the research problem in this thesis was to
examine the relationship between paradiplomacy and international development in
conflictive substate entities, and to observe whether these units are future’s constituent
units in political, economic and sociocultural development of communities and societies,
and have genuine promises of overcoming various challenges faced by contemporary
society in which nation-state centric models remain inefficient and questionable.
Especially focusing on the role between substate entities and their national contenders
and transnational interrelations, the frontiers of sovereignty and authority, the level and
scope of decentralization and the overall structural organization of the governance
institutions are some major questions required to be addressed in this context.
Conceptualization and Operationalization of Paradiplomacy and Protodiplomacy in
relation to International Development and Conflict Transformation
A scholar of paradiplomacy, Kuznetsov (2014) quotes Mark Bevir, a prominent
contemporary expert of social science methodology: “[…] Many political scientists have
long worried about hyperfactualism [,] the collection of data without proper theoretical
reflection. Today we might also worry about hypermethodologism – the application of
methodological techniques without proper philosophical reflection” (p.8). Therefore, an
extensive reading and direct observation of the investigated unit is required as a
preliminary process based on which one can derive a policy-relevant and prior question
to address. In this research, paradiplomacy is conceptualized loosely when summarizing
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previous literature and theory, and in this context, substate entities were included whether
they are federal, confederal units or are under unitary settings and simply their essential
characteristics and typologies of power-sharing and sovereignty.
While the least institutionalized substate entity may be a landlocked region with
no proper infrastructure for self-rule, the highest level substate entity is a global region
which has at least one global city, numerous urban centers and a sufficient rural
hinterland. A global region may be a good unit when one seeks ways to benchmark the
investigated substate entities, which is the case in this thesis. Second is the
complementary analytical function of a substate entity which needs to be investigated: the
way and means it uses to interact with the outside world. In order to simplify the complex
relationship between paradiplomacy [and protodiplomacy], international development
and conflict transformation, there must be a form of research model in which all of them
are possible to be observed. In order to be able to analyze the abovementioned complex
web of interrelations, from which emerges the process of international development (or
the capacity building tendencies of substate entities) according to my argument, I
determined seven criteria for examination derived from the theoretical and empirical
readings of literature: (1) Territorialization and Reterritorialization, (2) Sovereignty
Practices, (3) Communality, (4) Markets and Institutions, (5) Constitutionality/Political
Representation, (6) Economic Development/Innovation, and (7) Global Governance and
Security Environment.
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Table 3: A Framework for Paradiplomacy Research
Foreign Policy Actions of Non-Central Units
(Paradiplomacy/Protodiplomacy)
Actors

Types of Action

The Nature of
Action

Level of
Action

(a) NCGs,
Regional
Governance
Formations,
Assemblies,
Representative
Councils
(b) Institutions,
Parties, Local
Administrations,
Regional/Local
Organizations
(c) Economic
Organizations,
Businesses
(d) Social
Organizations,
NGOs, lobbies,
interest groups
(e) Public and
Diaspora Groups,
Intercommunity
Cooperation
(f) Transnational
and Transregional
Bodies of
Governance
(g)International
Organizations and
Institutions

(a)International
Agreements,
Bilateral and
Multilateral
Agreements
with other
regions
(b) Foreign
representations
abroad, foreign
representations
in the region
(c) Official
diplomatic
visits, sending
and receiving
delegations,
exchange
programs
(e) Diaspora
and public
activism
(f) Self-Rule
Practices
(g) Foreign
affairs of
regional
(substate)
institutions and
organizations

(1)Intraregion
Conflictive
al
vs.
(2)Interregion
Cooperative
al
(within
Or
nation)
(3)Interregion
Centripetal vs. al
Centrifugal
(neighboring,
Riparian)
(4)Interregion
al (within
supranation)
(5)RegionNation
(6)RegionTransnational
(7)RegionalGlobal

State Formation
/ State Capacity
Building
Conceptual
Factors of
Analysis
(1)Territorializa
tion/Reterritoria
lization (2)
Sovereignty
Practices
(3)
Communality
(4) Markets and
Institutions
(5)
Constitutional
Status
(6) Economic
Development/In
novation
(7) Global
Governance
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Comparative Case Study as Research Method
In order to address the research problem of this dissertation project, I decided to
apply a comparative case study methodology. While this method helps the researcher to
focus on single cases with enough depth, they also permit the use of multiple cases in
comparison and contrast, constructing a significant empirical validity. Yin (1994) noted
three points about the case of inquiry: (1) it copes with the technically distinctive
situation in which there will be many more variables of interest than data points, (2) it
relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulation
fashion, and (3) it benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions that
guide data collection and analysis (p.13). Supporting this view, I dealt with a distinctive
situation in which I expected to reveal a relationship between paradiplomacy and state
formation. Not all of the paradiplomacy cases have the same nature or motives, but I
specifically focus on the ones that are conflictive in nature as I previously discussed, and
notably the ones that substantially undertake policy actions toward state or nation
building, or at least demanding or seeking more autonomy or power.
Yin (1994) described three principles of data collection for case study research:
(1) using multiple sources of evidence, (2) creating a case study database, and (3)
maintaining a chain of evidence (pp. 90-99). He cited Patton (1987) for the description of
four different types of triangulation, which he also describes as the rationale for using
multiple sources of evidence. These are triangulation of data sources, triangulation
among different evaluators (investigator), triangulation of perspectives on the same data
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set (theory triangulation), and triangulation of methods (methodological triangulation), all
of which contribute to addressing issues related to validity construction (Yin, 1994, p.
92).
Table 4: Empirical Strength and Robustness in Case Study Research
Tests
Construct
Validity

Case Study Tactic

Phase of Research in Which
Tactic Occurs
Data collection
Data Collection
Composition

use multiple source of evidence
establish chain of evidence
have key informant review draft case
study report
Internal
do pattern matching
Data analysis
Validity
do explanation building
Data Analysis
do time series analysis
Data Analysis
External
use replication logic in multiple
Research Design
Validity
cases
Reliability
use case study protocol
Data Collection
develop case study database
Data Collection
Source: Yin (1994) p.33: Case Study Tactics for Four Design Tests, figure 2.3.

Yin also distinguished the convergence of multiple sources of evidence from nonconvergence that are structurally contrasting. While convergence leads to assessing the
overall data around a particular fact, non-convergence takes the form of sub-studies that
are processed separately, yielding different conclusions (Yin, 1994, p. 93). Second, he
proposed to construct a case study database in which diverse methods and tools of data
recording were used; for Yin, this diversity made an important contribution to the validity
of his overall research. These tools include case study notes, case study documents,
tabular materials from various sources, and narratives (Yin, 1994, pp. 94-97). Finally, he
compare the “chain of evidence” to a criminal case of investigation, charging the
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researcher with being a detective while conducting case study research. The researcher in
that sense deals with a complex puzzle to put together (Yin, 1994, p. 98).
The Use of Comparative Method in Political Research
As an essential tool of scientific analysis, the comparative method plays an
important and significant role in “sharpening our power of description”; forming
concepts by engaging with the differences and similarities in certain cases; and building
theories and hypotheses and testing them (Collier, 1993, p.106). The work of Mill (1843)
has been foundational to the development of this method and has contributed two distinct
designs: the method of agreement, which looks at similar cases in order to find the
causes, and the method of differences which looks at contrasting characteristics. Lijphart
(1971) proposed the comparative method to overcome small-N problems in political
studies, and the method has significantly improved over the subsequent decades, as many
innovations have been proposed to improve their scientific validity (Collier, 1993). This
was most notably the case in qualitative settings, such as the use of thick and thin
descriptions, improving the sample77 to increase validity, and focusing on limiting
variables for reliability. The comparative method was also recommended and proposed as
a possible prominent tool of analysis in cases of regions or subnational units (Snyder,
2001; Wilson and Bell, 2004; and Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003). Although it
leaves some room for an interpretivist discussion of scientific analysis, the comparative

77

Improvement here refers to the development of sample size or cases.
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method often used in the study of international relations is associated with positivist
epistemology.
Comparative method has a similar motive compared to the probabilistic methods
with its attempts to control for other explanations in experimental and statistical analysis,
but it is used when the sample size of cases is insufficient for statistical methods. Lijphart
(1971) promotes comparative method for the first stage of research in which there is an
inductive formulation of hypotheses, which can later help to move research focus towards
a statistical analysis. Comparative method can be applied under synchronic forms that
look at countries, groups, or individuals from the same spatiotemporal settings, or,
alternatively, a single case can be looked at from a longitudinal (diachronic) perspective.
This latter is often referred as the “within-case” method (Yin, 1981; Eisenhardt, 1989).
There is a debate among scholars regarding the selection and the use of various
methodologies for political and social science research. Lijphart (1971) compared the
weaknesses, merits, and potential solutions of a few important major methods such as
case study, comparative, experimental, and statistical methods. He distinguished the
comparative method, defining it as “systematic analysis of [a] small number (small-N) of
cases, as having this merit: “Given inevitable scarcity of time, energy, and financial
resources, the intensive analysis of a few cases may be more promising than the
superficial statistical analysis of many cases” (Lijphart, 1971, p. 685). Lijphart (1971)
also identified inherent problems with this method, such as its “weak capacity to sort out
rival explanations, specifically, the problem of many variables and few cases” (pp.682-
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693). He also proposed potential solutions, such as (1) to increase number of cases, (2) to
focus on comparable cases, and (3) to reduce number of variables by (a) combining them
and (b) employing more parsimonious theory.
Lijphart (1971) also identified six ideal forms of case study methods: atheoretical
case studies engaging in descriptive analysis; interpretative case studies looking at
selected particular cases with a specific interest; hypothesis-generating case studies based
on inductive investigation to generate theoretical frameworks for testing; theoryconfirming case studies testing the preexisting theories; theory-infirming case studies
proposing update to preexisting theories; and deviant case studies looking at the cases
that cut against prior generalizations. Comparative methods have become popular among
researchers, and many innovations have been made in their use. As Collier (1993)
explains, these innovations and resulting improvements have been interconnected. For
instance, advances in statistical methods also have contributed78 to the improvement of
the comparative method and case study method. Overall, innovations in the comparative
method have promoted a broadened understanding of types of comparative studies with
an emphasis on interpretation.
Collier (1993) summarized the justifications for these innovations, stating they
aimed “(1) to pursue a disciplined configurative approach (Verba, 1967; reinforced by
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Various technological tools of quantitative and qualitative analysis were introduced in
the world of science with specific purposes. Among many others, cross-sectional datasets
(large-N) include all countries in the comparative method, and constitute one of the most
dominant data structures in the social sciences.
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Almond and Genco, 1977), (2) to avoid the problem of conceptual stretching (Sartori,
1991), (3) to facilitate thick description and other forms of interpretative understanding
(Geertz, 1973), and (4) to achieve analytic depth in a case oriented approach” (in Collier,
1993, pp. 107-109). The use of comparative method advanced further, notably when
Kaarbo and Beasley (1999) proposed to use case studies at the individual level rather than
using groups for each case, in which they define comparative case study as the systematic
comparison of two or more data points (cases) obtained through case study method
(Kaarbo and Beasley, 1999, p.372). They also argue that case studies can be very
quantitative and analytical or very qualitative and narrative in form (p. 373). The authors
further emphasize that comparison needs to be structured, since the research is guided by
general questions, and it also needs to be focused, since it deals with specific issues.
Kaarbo and Beasley (1999) defines steps of comparative research with: (1) the
identification of specific research question for focused comparison involving “how” and
“why” questions into the processes of investigation, and which further identify the
phenomenon informing the case; (2) the identification of variables from existing theory in
which one determines the factors (variables) and conditions that rule the hypothesizing
process and also involving in some prediction or explanation; (3) case selection based on
the overall research inquiry and the intent to control effects through avoiding selection
bias; (4) operationalization of variables and construction of a case codebook, which
involves describing thoroughly the means/methods of data collection and coding, as well
as the points of evidence that are described in advance; (5) code-write cases, which
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involve narrative case study that tells a story based on variables (Yin, 1994); and (6)
comparison and the implications for theory, in which the researcher looks at patterns
within and across cases (Yin, 1994, p.108).
Sampling and Its Impact on Comparative Method
Yin (1994) says, “a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (p.13). The inquiry of this
research exactly fits this description; thus I specifically look at the role of paradiplomacy
in relation to international development and conflict while defining a series of potential
factors and variables that can further become parts of an explanatory framework for the
investigation of conflictive substate entities and their significance in making of the future
constituents of global governance.
According to Yin (2014) the ground for extracting generalizations such as
proposing new theory or policy from studies with non-probability samples are based on
the notion of “theoretical saturation” and “analytical generalization” rather than statistical
propositions. Thus, purposive sampling of a few cases is suitable for an in-depth analysis
of a complex social phenomenon (Marshall, 1996; Small, 2009; Patton, 2005). This level
of depth in the analysis of a purposive small-N sample makes possible the identification
and description of patterns, causal mechanisms, and discoveries that take spatiotemporal
context into account as well.
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Table 5: Sampling Data Structure
N=3

Quebec

Primary
Data

Key Expert Reviews 11 Interviews (Leaders,
MPs, Party Members
(local), Mayors, Union
and NGO leaders, key
experts), 5 focus group
meetings (key institutions
and organizations of
Catalan foreign policy), 4
field visits in Catalan
Region, 1 field visit in
Basque Country Region

Secondary Official Data
Data
Sources (Canada
and Quebec
Government),
Scholarly Books,
Peer Reviewed
Articles, Chapters,
Official and Private
Surveys,
Newspapers, Online
News Articles,
Institutional
Archives

Catalonia

Official Data Sources
(Catalan Government),
Scholarly Books, Peer
Reviewed Articles,
Chapters, Official
Surveys, Institutional
Archives and Data,
Online News, Campaign
and Communications
Material

Kurdistan (Key Case)
34 In-depth interviews
[Leaders, MPs, Party
Members (local), Political
(NCG and Party Group)
Representation in USA
(Nashville, Atlanta, DC,
NYC), and EU (Brussels,
Paris)], 13 focus group
meetings, 8 field visits
[notes, observations] in
Diyarbakir, Cizre, Mardin,
Nusaybin, Hasankeyf,
Batman, Istanbul, Barcelona
Official Data Sources
(KRG, Rojava), Press
Releases, Key interviews by
third party, Scholarly
Books, Peer Reviewed
Articles, Chapters, Official
Surveys, Institutional
Archives and Data, Online
News, Campaign and
Communications Material

As can be seen in all of the previous three chapters, the very first and most solid
evidences and examples are given from the Kurdish case to support the arguments of this
thesis. Kurdish case is what most substantially defines the theoretical expansion proposed
in this study of paradiplomacy, as well as the new direction of research I undertook.
Given the long term statelessness and inability, due to many reasons, to carve out a
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[nation] state of their own, Kurds’ highest formal jurisdictional status are substate
entities, at best, with the presence of non-central government, as can be seen in Kurdistan
Region of Iraq, and also in Rojava Federal Government in Northern Syria.
Kurdish regions and political constituencies in Turkey and Iran are
overwhelmingly interrelated with the developments in the Kurdish regions of Iraq and
Syria, although each region has its own patterns of conflict with its national contender.
Kurdish regions’ paradiplomacy, therefore, is the key case study of this research, which I
focus on defining and exploring in-depth in this thesis. Besides the Kurdish key case, the
sample selection of this thesis has two other prominent paradiplomacy cases both of
which are well studied and research representing contrasting political settings from North
America and Europe: Quebec and Catalonia. Both Quebec and also Catalonia are good
comparable cases when discussing the Kurdish key case, since they have the
multilingual/multiethnic settings as well as a history of political contestation between the
center and region notably over sharing state power and sovereignty. Also, what makes
Quebec and Catalonia excellent selection of cases to compare with key Kurdish case is
the different political, economic and cultural settings they are subject to. In Quebec case,
there is the unique Canadian confederalism [or asymmetric federalism] and North
American regionalism setting the groundwork for Quebec’s provincial governance and
internationalization. In Catalan case, there is also the unique post-dicta Spain’s political
transformations which both includes the settlement of quasi-federalism and also the
European integration which eventually represents a force for Spain’s democratic
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transition since its EU membership process. In all of the three cases of paradiplomacy,
international development and conflict are quite visibly observable fields of observation,
permitting the foundation of the comparative case analysis in this thesis.
Data Collection
The data in this research are constituted of a plural ensemble of sources in the
form of both primary and secondary data. For this research, I compiled three comparable
case studies. Given that the research frame I presented previously was the initial point of
my investigation, I have followed a systematic method designing the data collection
process with categories and aiming to create a substantial chain of evidence for the case
studies, much as Yin (1994) proposed. Because the sample selection was made
purposively for this study and represented three non-random cases, I attempt to build a
thick description for the key case study of this research, the Kurdish case, while also
compiling two other cases of comparison, more in the form of thin description. Since I
investigate a complex and sophisticated process, a critical focal point is the importance of
longitudinal observation, which reveals the outcomes of political transformation
processes.
For the Quebec case study of this research project, I did not collect original
[primary] data, but relied on the extensive extant secondary data sources. Representing
one of the well-institutionalized cases of paradiplomacy in the world, Quebec has a
unique structure of paradiplomacy for potential observation. Due to limitations in time
and resources, and also the existence of strong data sources for the purpose of analysis in
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this research, I built up the Quebec case study using only secondary data. Moreover, I
was fortunate to work directly with Dr. Richard Vengroff, a prominent expert on North
American and Quebecois paradiplomacy. His work (Allan and Vengroff, 2012; Vengroff
and Rich, 2004) on North American and especially Quebec and other Canadian cases has
been foundational in the Quebec case study analysis I present in this research, particularly
when coupled with other significant research in this area, such as Lecours (2008),
Balthazar (1999), Belanger (2002), Huijgh (2010), Lachappelle and Paquin (2003; 2005),
and Dunton and Kitchen (2014). Furthermore, the institutional strength and quality in
Quebec, and the ease and availability of data through the official websites, publications,
and databases of prominent Quebec institutions and organizations, notably focusing on
foreign policy actions, have significantly contributed to the Quebec case study.
For the Catalan case study, I conducted an extended field research during which I
found the chance of observing closely the Catalan political system and constituents. I was
invited to the Catalan Parliament officially by Catalan MP Quim Arrufat, who is also a
political science professor in Barcelona and one of the leaders of CUP, a proindependence left-wing party group with key role in processes, which functions more or
less similar to HDP in Turkey. During my visit to Catalonia, most of which was in
capital-urban Barcelona, I also found the chance of observing other urban and rural units,
(Tarragona, Villanova). I conducted 11 interviews with political party leaders, MPs,
Mayors, Union and NGO leaders, and I conducted 5 focus group meetings with key
institutions and organizations in making of Catalan foreign policy actions. I also visited
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prominent Catalan academic institutions and held key expert meetings and discussions
with Catalan political scientists and economists.
Besides this month-long extensive field research, during which I found the chance
of closely observing Catalan autonomous governance and foreign policy scene, I was
particularly lucky with a unique coincidence, which helped me to have a 2-day long
observation with a tremendous added value. The ruling president of Rojava Region in
Syria, Salih Muslim and HDP EU Representative Faruk Doru visited Barcelona to
advance relations with Catalan constituency, and this single observation eventually
become a key evidence to my thesis, while it was not planned at all. Given the war
situation in Rojava, on its peak in 2014, that was more like a gem I found. I simply joined
the president of Rojava, followed him, conducted an in-depth two day long interview,
joined his meetings with the most important Catalan individuals and political actors,
institutions and groups. Not only I added a significant piece of primary data for Catalan
paradiplomacy, I also found the chance of asking dozens of key questions about Rojava
Revolution, declaration of federation, Syria War and the Kurdish regions paradiplomacy
actions.
The third and last case study of this research project is the Kurdish case of
paradiplomacy, which is the key case study I intended to describe and model for this
research. For the purpose of this dissertation, I have conducted 34 in-depth interviews
with prominent Kurdish politicians, elected MPs, mayors, political party representatives
in the US and European Union (Brussels, Paris, Amsterdam, Barcelona), community
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leaders of Kurdish and Mesopotamian diaspora in the US (Nashville, Atlanta, DC, New
York), and local leaders and NGO representatives in Diyarbakir, Cizre, Mardin,
Nusaybin, Batman, Istanbul, as well as the diplomatic representation of Rojava Region in
Syria and KRG in Iraq to the U.S. and EU. 13 of these in-depth interviews represent the
highest level sample of Kurdish politics including presidents, leaders, MPs and major
metropolitan mayors, 7 of them are in the form of focus groups with key institutions, and
the rest represent key individuals, community leaders and representatives of NGOs.
I have the advantage of having spent an entire decade focusing on Kurdish foreign
policy and political actors; and more than the empirical foundation of the primary data,
what solidified the analysis of this research is this longitudinal observation and analysis.
In various field visits in Brussels, Washington DC, Paris, Atlanta, Tennessee, New York,
and Istanbul, I have met with numerous diplomatic representatives, community leaders,
and activists, mostly in the form of focus group meetings and participant and direct
observations. Further, the various previous Kurdish studies I have conducted prior to this
research have contributed to the design of this research. I have closely observed not only
Kurdish politicians, groups, communities, and individuals, but also a multitude of
international actors and the ways in which they interact with the Kurds. In that sense,
these key individuals—American, French, Belgian, Turkish, Catalan, etc.—also gain
significance, since they’ve played roles in the design and execution of Kurdish
paradiplomacy in the international arena.
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Besides the primary data, secondary data play a tremendously important role in
the Kurdish case analysis since the ultimate intention of this study is to describe
thoroughly this key case. Given the context of war, lack of institutionalization compared
to Quebec and Catalonia, and its formal lack of national status, Kurdish paradiplomacy is
hard to observe empirically although it is rapidly becoming more visible in world media.
The most important endorsement to Kurdish paradiplomacy has been the declaration and
development of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI), which has quite significantly
internationalized in the last decade. While this has contributed greatly to the proliferation
of a Kurdish diplomatic network and institutional formations, it still lacks the
infrastructure either Quebec or Catalonia have. The regional formation in Syria has also
attracted significant international attention. However, the war there is still active, with
almost totally-destroyed livelihoods; thus, institutionalization there is a far away dream at
the moment, and the first focus of the Rojava region is to hold its defensive positions in
the ongoing war. Still, there is more information available on Rojava than there was five
years ago, and there is a significant international solidarity, including official
communications and agreements, and support and visits at the international level.
Furthermore, Kurdish politics within Turkey have long been my primary focus among the
Kurdish regional formations. Although the Kurdish substate formations are highly
contested, with alternating waves of peace talks and conflicts, and there is not yet
(sufficient) legal ground on which to be able to isolate and analyze a substate entity in
Turkey, it is important to remember that among all of the Kurdish political formations,
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the configuration in Turkey has probably one of the strongest organizational bases,
although still lacking formal institutional endorsement at the regional level.
The following questions guided the data collection procedure of this research:
what factors best explain the intensification of paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy in the
examined region, and in world politics? How is paradiplomacy and/or protodiplomacy
interrelated with state capacity building and global security? How can one describe the
interplay between paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy, notably in highly contested
scenarios and cases involving intensified armed conflict? What are the legal grounds for
constituent diplomacy in the country of an examined subnational case? How has
paradiplomacy been institutionalized in a particular examined region? What are the levels
and units of paradiplomacy and/or protodiplomacy? How can one model paradiplomacy
and/or protodiplomacy in the different levels of governance? How can one describe the
nature of these relationships and develop a typology? What are the varying responses to
the emergence and progress of paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy in
conflictive/secessionist regions? What are the responses from subnational units? What are
the responses of national centers to substate formations? What are the responses of the
international community to substate formations? What are the potential outcomes of the
use of paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy in today’s armed conflicts and peacebuilding
efforts? What is the relationship between the newly emerging structures of
paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy and the preexisting state structures, particularly their
higher level institutions?
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Data Analysis
The steps followed in the data analysis of this research are as follows: First, each
of the three cases were developed in the forms of mixed-methods-based case narratives.
In order to build these case studies, various methods were used including historical
analysis, narrative analysis, process-tracking, content and discourse analysis, critical
discourse analysis, and inductive reasoning, the last being used in the process of coding
and categorizing primary data. While this first step represents the in-depth analysis of
each of the selected cases of study, its thick description provides unique-to-the-case
conditions and findings. Each of the case studies conclude with analytical discussions
that simply summarize and discuss the case findings, which then play a further role in the
making of comparable case studies. The second step of this research is a comparative
case analysis based on the findings of the three case studies. Through the comparing and
contrasting of the findings of three cases in the form of thick and thin descriptions, this
step simply applied MSS and MDS designs for the comparative case analysis. While the
first step represents the interpretative stage, the second step provides the empirical basis
of this study.
In conclusion, the narratives built for each of the cases in this study have
ethnographic, interpretative, critical and also grounded [postpositivist] encounters all of
which contributes to the arguments of this thesis. Given the long-term political conflict
histories, geopolitical transformations and political economic developments in the case
studies of this project, the decision of comparative analysis of three cases both served
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well in terms of enabling an empirical insight to the further transformation of Kurdish
substate entities, and also to elaborate on various directions of substate governance all of
which represent different outcomes and motives.
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CHAPTER 5: PARADIPLOMACY AND PROTODIPLOMACY IN QUEBEC:
A BACKGROUND CASE STUDY OF PROVINCIAL STATE CAPACITY BUILDING
THROUGH NICHE DEVELOPMENT COMPETENCIES UNDER
CONSOCIATIONALIST FEDERAL ASYMMETRY

This case study investigates the paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy of Quebec,
which represents a unique setting of governance among North American substate entities
(provinces and federal states) of Canada, USA and Mexico. Quebec is the very place that
best represents the North American rivalry between British and French imperialisms in
the 17th and 18th centuries, notably over territories their colonial projects secured. British,
French and other European powers landed in what is now referred to as North America,
and this was followed by centuries long practices of warfare, invasion, and settlement,
accompanied by significant demographic, political, economic and social transformations
in the subsequent states, provinces and nations of the continent. However, the two major
imperial formations in North America (and elsewhere during this period), the French and
the British, were definitely the most important for this study, because their legacies
represent the colonial state formations that have since remained intact, and constitute the
basis of the predominant contemporary governance structures. Further, examining the
deep socio-historical roots of this conflict lays a foundation for appreciating the nature of
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the political conflicts expressed today in Quebec’s paradiplomacy, and its tensions with
the Canadian central state.
In this chapter I describe the role, significance, outcomes, and possible frontiers
of Quebec’s paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy in relation to state capacity building
notably in context of international development and global governance. In order to
describe Quebec’s contemporary governance structures and community characteristics,
which eventually shape and guide its contemporary paradiplomatic actions, I first explain
the genealogical developments in the colonial-imperial legacies of state formation in
North America, notably focusing on how British and French accounts of political
philosophy impacted their colonial settlements and their political, economic, and social
transformations. Second, I discuss the evolution of contemporary federal and confederal
state structures in North America and describe the distinct forms of regionalism on which
the states and provinces of North America have reconstructed their practices of territorial
governance and sovereignty, especially focusing on Quebec and its unique situation
within Canada. Finally, I conclude with the factors that explain the internationalization of
Quebec’s contemporary governance structures in the context of its membership in
Francophonie; its deviant construction of “excellence” in its collective [national and
ethnolingual] identity; as well as the self-rule and sovereignty practices it has developed
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around the centripetal movement (whether called ‘Quebec Sovereignty’, or Quebecois79
national protectionism) in its consociationalist practices.
While benefiting from extensive readings on paradiplomacy, nations, nationalism
and national identity, regionalism and new regionalism, and the theories of international
relations and global governance for the theoretical frame of this case study, I conducted
within-case study research based on secondary sources that include: journal articles,
academic book chapters, conference papers, and other scholarly pieces and projects,
official government websites, datasets, and institutional data sources. As in the following
two case studies, the main methods used here are: historical analysis, content and
discourse analysis, and process-tracking and path-dependence analysis.
Background: Quebec’s Internationalization and Independence Question
Quebec is the largest provincial territory and second largest administrative
division in Canada80, and is governed by the National Assembly of Quebec [Assemblée
Nationale du Québec].Quebec has experienced British dominance in politics and
economics during most of its history, but also a more recent takeover of provincial state

When it comes to the identity of Quebec, various uses of terms such as “Quebecois”,
“Quebecer” or “Quebecker” are used in the literature. The first is French, and the latter
two are English, all being used interchangeably in the literature, and also by the people of
Canada and Quebec. Quebecois also may refer to the distinct French spoken in Quebec,
which has many differences from the French spoken in European mainland. I use
Quebecois throughout this chapter.
80
Canada is the second largest country in the world by territoriality, and its borders with
the US represent the longest line of borders between two countries in the world. Its
territories are divided into ten provinces most of which are at the border with USA and
three territories in the North.
79
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power by French speaking communities, thus creating two distinct communities in situ:
the English-speaking and French speaking communities, their institutions, and
corresponding political/economic elites. Although the assembly represents a British-type
parliamentary system of politics, and the province is still ultimately included in the
British Commonwealth, making it part of the constitutional monarchy, Quebec’s
independence and sovereignty debates have played a significant role in the contemporary
politics of the province.
The political history of Quebec represents a relatively continuous power transfer
from Anglophone to Francophone communities over time, although sovereignty demands
and dreams have not yet been fully recognized or realized. This decades-long
transformation known as the Quiet Revolution has gained significant momentum since
the 1960s, and the creation of Parti Quebecois has played a major role in the substantive
foundation of the pro-sovereignty movement, since it has been the leading pioneer of
secessionism. However, the Parti Quebecois is not the only party; there are many other
political groups and organizations gathered around the cause of sovereignty. Following
the sovereignty referendums of 1980 and 1995, which were advanced by the Parti
Québécois, both of which were voted down and lost81, the House of Commons of Canada
passed a historical motion in 2006, recognizing the Québécois as a nation within united
Canada. However, similar to many cases of power transfer and substate decentralization,
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The 1980 referendum was voted down by 59.6% against 40.44% with a voter turnout
of 85.6% while 1995 referendum had a much smaller margin: 50.58% against 49.42 with
over 93% of historical voter turnout.
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there are still ambiguities and disputes over the definition of provincial authority and
sovereignty under Canadian confederalism82. This can be supported with instances such
as the Clarity Act of 199983. There is definitely interplay between the liberal political
movements of both Canada and Quebec, as well as the conservatives emerged from the
merging between PC (Parti Progressiste-Conservateur) and Reform Party84 to form the
Conservative Party of Canada and pro-sovereignty Quebecois, who largely set the
political agenda of Quebec and its movement between Canadian confederalism and
Quebec sovereignty.
Quebec has more recently transformed itself into an increasingly productive
knowledge economy, investing in various industries such as information and
communication technologies, aerospace, biotechnology and health industry. Ranked
second among the provinces in Canada in terms of economic output, Quebec undeniably
holds more economic and scientific power than many other nation states in the world.
While the Francophone presence in Quebec definitely plays a role in the making of
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Given the significant reterritorialization and official-jurisdictional recognition of the
sovereignty of various communities within Canadian constituency over decades with
numerous declarations, agreements and acts, I use confederalism, however, scholars
argue that Canada represents “asymmetric federalism” which from a realist perspective is
true, since the state power is mostly possessed by Anglophones, and partially
Francophones, notably with dominance of Ontario and Quebec. For more details over this
debate, see Resnick (1994), Seidle (1994), Laforest (2005) and Brock (2008).
83
Passed as a legislation by the Parliament of Canada, this act established the negotiation
conditions for the Canadian Government in case of the secession of the provinces. While
it can be applied to any province in theory, the act was created in response to the 1995
Quebec referendum and independence movement of that province.
84
Later became Canadian Alliance
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Quebec’s contemporary identity under the conditions of new regionalism in its unique
provincial context, it is also important to acknowledge that the political, economic, and
social system of Quebec was also shaped by the historical processes in which diverse
actors and events have played significant roles, and which together experienced drastic
transformations over the last half of the 20th century.
Among all other substate entities in North America, Europe, and Asia, Quebec is
potentially the most institutionalized in terms of foreign policy making, and is thus
referred to as the “master” of paradiplomacy in the world (Vengroff, 2010, p.2; Belanger,
1993; Balthazar, 1999). Quebec is distinct with a unique ethno lingual construction of its
national identity amongst the other North American states and provinces. Even if
numerous indigenous communities and various migrants have brought about a great
collective of cultural-linguistic plurality, English dominance has played a role in North
American states’ cultural, political and economic development. Northern European
communities mostly were Anglophones, rapidly integrating themselves into the American
culture, contributing to it to an important extent. Communities such as Spanish, Italian
and French have also followed different policies both to preserve their cultural
characteristics and traditions, and church has definitely played a central role in keeping
the community culture alive.
Certain communities, such as the Hispanic community has grew larger in the
more recent decades, and eventually Spanish was also treated as a second language in the
U.S. states. In Quebec, the issue is historically significant. There was a great British-
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French-Spanish rivalry in the conquest of Americas. Although there were many dispersed
French colonies in North America, Francophone grew dense in the Quebec region.
Cultural differences emerged as a root source of nationalism and nation building efforts
since colonization – which notably grew along with the long rivalry between Anglophone
and Francophone communities, as well as contemporary transformations and
modernization – Canadian confederalism and liberalism have definitely contributed to
what can be referred to as the rise of Quebecois governance within Canada.
Modernization has played a key role in creating a political, economic and sociocultural
leverage in this context, thus, there are various important components to Quebecois
modernization, notably economy, class and institutions.
First, as a formal substate entity with a provincial government and assembly,
Quebec is a member of the North American club of substate entities that include states
and provinces of the US, Canada, and Mexico, and which provide great access to
economic and international relations. In this context, Quebec benefits from agreements
made to collaborate on issues such as trade, industry, security, and environment. This can
be seen as an outcome of liberal North American context of federal/confederal
interregional relations which especially gained a recent momentum. Second, Quebec’s
largely Francophone population base automatically makes it a member of the
Francophone world, and an especially important one among all other French speaking
communities and colonies around the world, since it eventually represents the largest
substantive heritage of the French post-colonial legacy in North America. Third, even if
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Quebec has a pro-sovereignty movement historically contested with the Canadian
confederation over the issue of independence, the formal distinct jurisdictional status of
the province grants it the right of legislation, its self-rule, and international agreement
making. Therefore, among all of the other paradiplomacy cases of the Global North,
Quebec has the most formally developed capacity for foreign policy actions, including
hundreds of international agreements, bilateral and multilateral representations even if its
jurisdictional status is still bound by Canadian Government.
Quebec diversified its role in paradiplomacy dependent on domestic politics,
particularly the controversial question of Quebec sovereignty. Under pro-sovereignty
Parti Quebecois Governments in Quebec City, international activity has often crossed the
line from paradiplomacy to protodiplomacy, based on efforts to lay the groundwork for
international recognition and to gain support for statehood while under federalist liberal
governments in which intergovernmental cooperation has nonetheless remained greater
(Allan and Vengroff, 2012). Moreover, Quebec, among all of the cases of paradiplomacy,
is probably the single most developed case, since its capacity reaches far beyond the
sphere of cultural and business affairs, to hard policy issues such as security and
immigration policy. In his comparative study of two North American subnational units,
Quebec from Canada and Georgia from the US, Richard Vengroff (2013) assessed the
variations of subnational immigration policy at meso level governmental institutions, and
described patterns and indicators.
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Quebec is the leader of immigration among all of the Canadian provinces, and its
leadership in immigration is motivated by nationalist, cultural, linguistic, and economic
considerations, and a population that tends to support immigration and integration of
immigrants into Quebec society (Vengroff, 2013, p.142). Moreover, the findings of this
comparative study provide substantial evidence clearly demonstrating the disparities
between the two regions in immigration, Quebec being a highly involved actor, while
Georgia has only a minor federal role. Looking at the variables of this study, including
recruitment efforts and criteria, support infrastructures for immigration (language, health,
family services, integration), and institutionalization at the levels of subnational
governance, it is possible to conclude that Quebec has a strong hand in influencing85 the
entire process of immigration, organizing its governmental and non-governmental
institutions taking an active role in the process, while Georgia’s role in the federal levels
of immigration policy is relatively minor, and therefore less formally institutionalized,
with NGOs and churches providing the bulk of support (Vengroff, 2013, p.161). There
have been very significant changes and transformation in Canada’s politics, notably with
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The extent of this influence is significant since Quebec has its own immigration
mechanism, with its own communication, procedures and criteria, in which Francophonie
is embraced. The Quebec immigration process has its own online portal and institutions
framing the process to keep the Francophone intact and at least “preserved”. This can be
seen in various institutional settings of Quebec as well. Still, the frontiers of the exercised
authority and sovereignty of Quebec is dependent to Canadian Government politically
and jurisdictionally.
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the new Trudeau86 Government representing a historic moment of liberal plural
government that most importantly capitalized on new reforms and improvements of the
immigration process. Canada is one of those places where immigration is not only a vital
issue for the country’s existence and development, but also topic to a public debate.
Plurality and diversity was promoted while taking active stance towards urgent
humanitarian issues such as accepting Syrian refugees have been worldwide presented.
The revision of the immigration policies, notably which were severely impacted in the
aftermath of 9/11, represents an important change. On these matters, there is a system of
checks and balances between Quebec and Canada Government, and parties tend to follow
each other, which can be seen in the immigration policy example.
When Lecours (2008) defines various layers of paradiplomacy, he categorizes
Quebec in a layer with Flanders, Catalonia and Basque Country, all of which have the
prominent feature of the international expression of an identity distinct from the one
projected by the central state (Lecours, 2008, p.3). While Quebec definitely benefits from
the liberal intergovernmental structures of the North American states and provinces under
federal and confederal motives, this categorization is accurate, since in Quebec, the
identity and pro-sovereignty political cluster built on it, gains significance. Lecours
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I argue that a new global wave of political transformation is notably important to
mention. Trudeau in Canada, Bernie in the US, Corbyn in UK, Tsipras in Greece, and
Demirtas in Turkey are all reproduce of a global public response, notably with the
merging of various components of the new left: feminists, syndicalists, anarchists,
libertarians, social activists, ecologists, ethnic/ideologic urban movements and
collectivities.
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(2008) wrote, “They tend to be very ambitious which is not always manifested in the
scope of their networks (some are fairly specifically targeted) but in the logic driving the
international ventures. Here, sub-state governments seek to develop a set of international
relations that will affirm the cultural distinctiveness, political autonomy and the national
character of the community they represent” (p.3). Moreover, he expounds on the idea that
developing regions may benefit from developing relations with substate government
partners from advanced industrialized countries. The cooperation assistance opportunity
is often a central argument used by regional officials in developed countries to justify the
existence of paradiplomacy to which Quebec can be used as an example, since its ties
with Basque Country, Catalonia and French speaking regions are quite significant
(Lecours, 2008, p.6).
Another point advanced by Lecours (2008) and many other scholars of
paradiplomacy is on the boundaries between traditional nation-state and newly emerging
substate actors, which in Quebec’s case is also quite significant. Thus, the common
arguments often emphasize the state’s international coherence and its potential to be
undermined by paradiplomacy, leading to a multiplicity of voices from a given country
on the international stage (Lecours, 2008, p.9). Center-region contestations in such
contexts are not simple, but represent a complex web of interactions. A primary factor in
secessionist cases, as well as in Quebec, is that of identity and its eventual reconstruction
toward nationalism, and state-capacity building. Belanger (2002) discusses Quebec’s
distinctness compared to Wallonia and Catalonia, where he describes the motivation for
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nation-building becoming the dominant function of paradiplomacy. He especially points
out the distinct national identity of Quebec, more precisely referring to the concept of
“external distinctiveness” defined by Paul Kowert. Here political identity establishes a
political entity distinguishing itself from others, “not only by its relative independence
but also the way in which it expresses its preferences, interests, goals and so on by its
external behavior” (Belanger, 2002, p.198). Another prominent scholar of
paradiplomacy, Keating (1999) says:
In those cases where regions encapsulate a sense of distinct national identity and
nation-building project, external projection is qualitatively different from those cases
where it is motivated only by functional considerations. In the former, paradiplomacy is
used in a highly political manner, either to prepare the ground for eventual independence,
or as an element in stateless nation-building, a strategy to acquire as much as possible of
the substance of national independence, without worrying too much about the formal
status (2013, p.13).
While emphasizing the issue of identity in Quebec paradiplomacy, it is important
to acknowledge that it is not the only factor to consider, but is only a component of a
sensitive equation of sovereignty between the substate and central political actors. Thus,
this process is also entirely defined by the legal jurisdictional processes that allocates
power or adjusts it depending on the political context. In a sense, domestic politics and
the opportunity structure provided by various perspectives and stances, all together play a
role in the foreign policy direction of the region, which in this case is the Quebec
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province. Lecours (2008) mentions that as a result of the discussion over this power
sharing, and authority/sovereignty political discourse in Canada, it has impacted
Quebec’s international policy. Canadian governments have permitted Quebec to develop
its self-ruling competence in foreign affairs [with limitations] to secure the commitment
of Quebecois to Canada. He says:
“[…] the idea of constantly challenging Quebec’s paradiplomacy suggests a level
of conflict that would be considered detrimental to national unity. This being said, the
Canadian government rejects the idea, promoted [by] the Quebec government that the
province’s constitutionally-specified powers is, à la Belgium, extend to the international
area. It is also careful to circumscribe formal relationships that the Quebec government
may have with heads of governments or heads of state. This is especially the case when
the Parti québécois (PQ) is in power because the federal government is then suspicious
that the secessionist party will seek international support for an eventual declaration of
independence, particularly when it comes to Quebec’s relationship with France”
(Lecours, 2008, p.11)
Most literature on Quebec’s paradiplomacy emphasizes the national
distinctiveness and the deviance of national/ethnolingual Quebecois identity of the
province in the making of international relations and politics. In this scene, party politics
both at provincial and national levels undoubtedly play a role in determining the
framework to be followed by government, institutions, and organizations (Belanger,
2002; Lecours, 2008; Allan and Vengroff, 2012). Moreover, scholars of paradiplomacy
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also recognize the liberal political-economic infrastructure of Canada, and North America
in general, under federal and confederal institutional designs, which eventually
emphasizes more the trade agreements and other areas of cooperation, targeting mostly
the fields of trade, education, health and transport. However, more than all of these, a
contemporary trend, or more a clear, well-designed reengineering of governance
structures, Quebec’s paradiplomacy goes beyond all of the abovementioned facts, and
acts as a mechanism to preserve non-central governmental and jurisdictional power,
culture, and eventually state-like capacity in the making of an international actor.
To put it simply, Quebec has reengineered itself as a global knowledge region,
developing certain capabilities that many nation-states do not have. There are various
factors that determine and shape this productivity process. First, Quebec’s geographic
location, the vast territoriality it possesses and the natural resources, rivers, lakes, and ice
lands of the North all together create great diversity for the region, which has played a
significant role in its development. Chaloux and Paquin (2013) explain how water
resource management has eventually contributed to the development of a unique foreign
policy formation among North American states and provinces (at the substate level),
which they call “green paradiplomacy”, and can also be seen in the case of Brazil, or
even in many other regions where transborder relationships have significance, or regions
that are simply riparian to the same river basins. The province quickly adapted itself to
the challenges of the last few decades, and transformation of its institutional framework
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into a global knowledge region definitely contributed to its international policy, notably
providing a grand strategy and an end-state.
Quebec’s industrial strength is clear, and the region is a world leader in
hydropower and hydraulics sciences. Furthermore, the creation and development of the
Bombardier, which is one of the top three aeronautics industries in the world, is solid
evidence of the industrial organizational capacity the province possesses, since such
industries require extensive effort, human resources, and organizational capacity to
develop complex production systems. Academic institutions of Quebec have also turned
into global institutions with cutting-edge research, and the investments in research and
development are a key part of this process of development.
The following sections of this chapter are constituted by two parts: an historical
analysis of Quebec’s politics and institutionalization of self-government, which
eventually leads to its competence and capacity of foreign policy making in the
contemporary era; and then a discussion in which the paradiplomacy of Quebec is
elaborated through an investigation of its ensemble of mechanisms in conducting foreign
policy actions, the direction and outcome of these actions, notably state capacity building,
and potential for sovereignty and independence.
Political History of Quebec: From Colonial Settlement to Global Knowledge Region
The substantial endowment of Quebec with natural resource reserves has been a
primary source of economic development in the province throughout its history. In the
early 16th century, King Francis I of France was persuaded by Giovanni da Verrazzano,
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an Italian navigator, to complete a mission to discover a western path to China. The
Gaspé Peninsula of today’s Quebec was claimed by Jacques Cartier who was part of the
expeditionary unit charged by King Francis I. These newly claimed lands became known
as New France. Although Riendeau (2007) claims that the first settlers’ attempts were at
first failures (p.36), sources agree on the establishment of the regional center in Quebec
to control fisheries in the Atlantic, and to control the fur trade, which in the 16th and 17th
century were vital international economic activities (Innis, 1999; Dickinson and Young,
2008; Axtell, Oberg, Rabasa and Blackhawk, 1988). The French had a colony extending
from the Gulf of Mexico, up the Mississippi River, to present day St. Louis, called
Habitation de Québec. This settlement was created by Samuel de Champlain who was
part of the above mentioned 1603 expedition, and is seen as the founding father of New
France (Fischer, 2008) He returned to the region in 1608 to found Quebec City with
intentions of making the region a part of the French colonial empire (Grenon, 2000;
Liebel, 1999; Binot, 2004; Lea, Milward and Rowe, 2001; Chartrand, 2013; Pickett and
Pickett, 2011).
The first Quebec outpost was built as a fur trade center where deals were made
with the indigenous nations of Algonquin and Huron, and these First Nations peoples
traded their furs and animals for French goods such as guns, alcohol, clothing, and metal.
This relationship later became a military alliance that included further recognition and
agreements with the indigenous communities. New France followed peaceful relations
with the indigenous communities, such as Hurons, with whom they built a strong
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alliance. They were later defeated by the Iroquois, another indigenous nation and a
common enemy, which led to the migration of Hurons from Ontario to Quebec. It is clear
that the colonial settlers and the military technology they brought also inflicted intercommunity conflicts between the already contested indigenous communities87.
Fur trading even expanded into the North American continent with the inflows of
Catholic missionaries, ‘voyageurs’ who were French settled in Canada and were
transporting fur and facilitating trade, and the coureur des bois who were FrenchCanadian lumbers and woodsmen entrepreneurs traveling to New France to make their
new lives (Hardy and Ruddel, 1977; Lafleur, 1973; Rumilly, 1958; Morisseneau, 1983;
Hamelin, 1980; Duval, Georgeault and Plourde, 2000). Furthermore, New France
settlement’s trading activities were managed by an organization called Compagnie de la
Nouvelle France [also known as ‘Compagnie des Cent-Associes’] which held a
monopoly on the fur trade and was created especially with the intent to support and
expand French colonies in the regions controlled by French settlers (Trudel, 1968;
Creighton, 1944). The company played a prominent role in the community development
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For a detailed analysis of the relationships and the means of production possessed by
various communities, “Europe and the People Without History,” written by Eric Wolf
(1982) is a great work, notably looking at goods and commodities, their production,
trade, as well as the movements of communities and their interactions with indigenous
and other colonial powers where he describes both the evolution of global powers, and
the emergence of new ones, and also the genealogy of global capitalism from a colonial
history perspective that is inclusive of anthropological perspectives and attentive to issues
of identity and identity formation in those contexts.
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of the French settlers in New France, comprised of the regions then known as Acadia,
Canada, Quebec, Newfoundland, and Louisiana (Schlarman, 1929; Eccles, 1971).
In 1627, King Louis XIII of France declared the seigneurial system which can be
seen as a comprehensive system of tenure-based land ownership, permitting only Roman
Catholics to settle in New France, determining a framework for land distribution, and
notably aiming to ease commerce, transportation and logistics through the use of
waterways. It is important to mention the role of religion in the creation and governance
of New France, where strong Catholic content plays an essential role in the French
colonization and settler community building processes, which were promoted and
endorsed by the French imperials and Catholic institutions (Dickinson and Young, 2008;
Mary, 1936; Fay, 2002) and can be seen as the source of Quebec’s overwhelmingly
Catholic population today. Various accounts indicate the practice of religious conversion
in New France, both among the French Huguenots88 and other European migrants that
were Protestants, as well as the Amerindians. The role of missionaries is especially
evident in these conversions, while the objective was to target the natives of the land
rather than the Protestants (Choquette, 2005). Along with the religious conversion and
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Inspired by Calvinism, Huguenots were Protestants of France emerged in 16th century
who were severely opposed by the dominant Catholics. While at first they were banned
and even persecuted, and eventually took refuge in various countries, including North
America, later they were permitted to freely practice in late 18th century. And gained
equal citizen rights in France. Since they were not permitted to settle in New France, they
settled in Dutch colonies in various North American colonies while also preserving their
community culture.
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evangelism, Amerindians also passed through a severe ‘Frenchification’ in the 17th
century (Cornelius, 1969).
War and Conquest in the Context of Colonization and Imperialism: British
vs. French
The major question faced by the French settlers and their communities was the
problem of community growth – the migration rate was quite low, as was the population
growth rate. It is important to note that Louis XIV sponsored the travel of a group of
young French women known as “les filles du roi” to the colony to promote population
growth and balance gender parity in the settlement. While immigration did not contribute
to the growth of the population, settlers’ birth rate was quite high, due in large part to a
land distribution system that gave significant incentives to settlers that were farmers
(Preston, 2009; Powell, 2009).
It is important to remember that the interactions between French and other
colonial settlers, especially the British, were predominantly determined by and can be
seen as reflecting the extent of broader French-British relations. The rivalry was more
than substantial, and can be characterized as a full-scale war between two imperial
powers. First, Protestantism in Europe has challenged by the Catholic legacy, gradually
leading to a fragmentation in the Holy Roman Empire, and therefore constituting a source
of conflict among the major powers of Europe. Although religion was a main source of
conflict at first, interstate rivalry and subsequent engagement of major European powers
led to the famous Thirty Years’ War between 1618 and 1648, known to be one of the
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most destructive conflicts of European political history. In this realm, French and
Habsburg-ruled Austria were contested, while countries such as Sweden, Spain, and
Holland also played roles in the continent-wide war.
While being continuous for thirty years, a specific part of the Thirty Years’ War,
the Anglo-French War (1627-1629) between the emerging French and British Kingdoms,
mostly represented a war over sea power. Defeated in the series of battles against the
French, the British were obliged to end intervention in the continental politics of Europe,
also negotiating a treaty of peace with France in 1629, and with Spain in 1630. Moreover,
the conflict between the Monarchy and Parliament continued to grow, eventually leading
to the English Civil Wars in the 1640s, while France kept getting stronger with a more
powerful Navy (Andrews, 1991; Cogswell, 1986; Groenveld, 1987; Kleinman, 1975). In
the 16th century, Spain was the dominant force of Europe, and Britain was teaming up
with France against Spain, constituting a new balance of power. However, Spain’s power
declined after the Peace of Westphalia (1648) which eventually unleashed French
expansionism. In 1663, the Sovereign Council of New France [Conseil Souverain de la
Nouvelle-France] was established by Louis XIV of France, which became the ruling
government body acting both as Supreme Court and also a policy-making mechanism.
The council evolved later, with three members in 1647 and five in 1648, which in 1703
became the Superior Council. The Council served until the collapse of New France in
1760, when the British defeated the French (Wenzel, 2012; Cahall, 1915; Dickinson,
1995; Brittanica, 2016).
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In order to understand the unique British-French interaction, which included both
rivalry and partial collaboration throughout modern times, one also needs to realize the
differences between French and British constructions of consciousness, which are
reflected in the different philosophies of Descartes and John Locke in the 18th century,
the period of Enlightenment. The French represent continental rationalism, following the
school of Rene Descartes, reflecting an era in which intellectuals have become
overconfident about the reason of human rationality and committing the fallacy of
argumentum and ignorantiam, they89 argued that anything that cannot be understood by
rational knowledge is meaningless and superstitious. During the 17th and 18th centuries,
most of the French and British philosophers were under the influence of Descartes’
philosophy: Cartesian rationalism. John Locke, on the other hand, founded the distinct
British empiricism that challenged Descartes’ Cartesian continental philosophy, notably
convincing two important people: Voltaire (1694-1778), who was significantly
influenced by Locke’s empiricism and eventually challenged Descartes’ physics, and also
adopted Newton’s physics to attack Descartes’ physics; and Montesquieu, who was also
significantly influenced by Locke’s theories on government, notably his theory of three
divisions which inspired him in his work of “L'esprit des lois (1748), which also
discussed in detail concepts of monarchy, republic, constitution, aristocracy, and
democracy. It is of vital importance to recognize the exchange of debates that have
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People such as Fontenelle (1657-1757) and Bayle (1647-1706).
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continued since then, and on the other hand they have contributed to the formation of two
distinct political-historical traditions in Britain and France, and their colonies.
The French and British have a long history of warfare, that was especially intense
in the 11th century with episodes like the Norman Conquest, Breton War, Vexin War, and
also the Anglo-Norman and Anglo-French Wars of the 12th century. While these wars can
explain the historical significance of the British-French rivalry over imperial power, the
famous Hundred Years’ War (1337-1453) represents one of the most contested periods,
changing both societies entirely. The French and British have fought five major wars
since then, culminating with the Battle of Waterloo in 1815, which resulted in the defeat
of Napoleon and of French expansionism. Though centered in continental Europe, the
French-British rivalry was also fierce in North America. The French hand was strong in
North America in terms of colonization; however, the British eventually became more
dispersed and populous. In the middle of the 18th century, British-controlled zones in
North America had grown into a full scale state, with over a million inhabitants, while
New France had only 60,000 inhabitants in territories larger than the British-controlled
zones. Thus, the centuries long contestation between Britain and France provides deep
context for the cultural and political rivalries expressed in contemporary Quebec
paradiplomacy, as discussed below.
From British Rule to the American Revolution: The Quebec Act
With the engagement of indigenous tribes and communities, British-French wars
intensified in 1754, especially in Ohio where the French were rather aggressive with the
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British, and expanded into a global war known as the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763),
fought in Europe, India, and America. In the beginning, the Canadian militia and
Aboriginal allies helped the French and eventually defeated the British; however, the
situation changed when Britain captured Louisburg in 1758, Quebec City in 1759, and
Montreal in 1760. The war was driven by commercial and imperial rivalry between
France and Britain, both of which respectively built alliances with Austria, Sweden,
Saxony, Russia, Spain, Prussia, and Hannover.
The series of battles ended in favor of the British who benefited largely from their
strong naval forces, which eventually determined their victory against Spain and France.
Moreover, the military victory of Britain was not without cost, as Britain was under a
heavy burden of national debt by 1760. The war minister William Pitt was driven out of
office in 1761 by Britain’s new king, George III, who later initiated peace talks with the
French Government, which was in turn contested with Spain over West Indies territories
and fishing islands of the North Atlantic. Eventually, the French left Canada to Britain,
and later in 1763, the Treaty of Paris (1763) was signed by Britain and France. When the
English defeated the French during the Seven Years War, the French lost control of
Canada and other colonies. Some French-speakers went south to Louisiana and others
remained in Montreal and Quebec in the two largest cities in the former French colonies.
It is important to consider the series of events that acted as a chain of causation:
the British-French Wars, the rivalry and wars over colonies and notably North America,
which shaped the new structure of the continent. While the French largely left North
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America in 1763, Anglo-American colonists gained greater confidence, as they no longer
needed British military protection, thus opening the way to the American Revolution in
1775. Unlike the path that the French followed in Ohio, British rulers were not aggressive
toward French communities in the region they seized from the French. The Royal
Governor of Britain, James Murray, guaranteed the Quebecois their traditional rights and
customs, and the British Royal Proclamation of 1763 united three Quebec districts into
the Province of Quebec. Furthermore, the British were tolerant of the Catholic Church
and protected its social and economic presence90. While French culture was still alive, it
remained mostly under British rule.
There was a popular Catholic community in Quebec, which came with Roman
Catholic nuns to the continent, who were quite active in the 16th and 17th centuries,
playing roles throughout social and economic life. The British were also benefiting from
their service, and therefore offered their institutions and communities significant
protection. Most of the British communities settled around the Great Lakes area, birthing
Toronto and the province of Ontario; and all the meanwhile, the French in Quebec were
allowed to retain their own language, some of them maintaining their own civil laws, and
of course continued to practice Catholicism and allow the bishops and priests to actively
rule.
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This policy was the outcome of the deal that allowed the church to dominate in
exchange for political loyalty and peace towards Anglophones.
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In 1774, the Parliament of Great Britain issued an act known as The Quebec Act
of 1774, determining91 the procedures of governance in the Province of Quebec and
restoring the use of French civil law for private matters, while also maintaining the use of
English common law for public administration and judiciary processes. Another feature
of the act was that it replaced the oath of allegiance, so it no longer attributed any
meaning to Protestantism, thus providing the freedom to practice the Catholic faith. It is
important to acknowledge that the Quebec Act is quite significant in world political
history, since to some extent the treatment of the French made the English colonists of
the South suspicious, and contributed to the American Revolution. Numerous scholars
view the Quebec Act as a primary cause for the American Revolution (Metzger, 1936;
Lanctot and Cameron, 1967; Morison, 1965; Alden, 1954; Sieminski, 1990; Lawson,
1989). The purpose of the act was to secure the allegiance of French settlers, in the
context of the growing unrest in the American colonies to the South.
The American Revolutionary War (1775-1783) broke out when thirteen North
American colonies encountered conflict with Great Britain, later declaring themselves to
be the independent United States of America. Since the French were seeking revenge
against the British for the defeat of the Seven Years’ War, they rapidly signed an alliance
with the new nation in 1778 that played a substantial role in the colonies’ victory. The
war later expanded into a world war between Britain and France, and also Spain and the
Netherlands. While Massachusetts was the primary place where the revolution started,
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Quebec was second, after the siege of Boston. Thus, Quebec was a primary target for the
American colonists, since liberating the French who were unhappy under British rule was
a strategic opportunity.
The invasion was initiated by the Continental Army in September 1775, with two
armies sent into Montreal and to the outskirts of Quebec City. However, they were
defeated in the Battle of Quebec where American General Richard Montgomery was also
killed in 1775. Both American’s common anti-Catholicism and also the loyalty paid to
British by Francophones in exchange for British recognition of Catholic church played a
role in this defeat With the help of newly arrived German and British troops, Americans
were driven back into New York. At the end of the war, the loyalist population in the
United States fled and resettled around Lake Ontario, many settling in an area at
Southeastern Quebec that is today called “eastern townships” forming a new community,
with separate self-rule from the French-speaking Quebec population in 1791 (Courville,
2008; Dickinson, 2008).
The Constitutional Act, Special Council and the Union Act
The Constitutional Act (1791-1840) divided Quebec into Upper and Lower
Canada. Since the English-speaking communities of loyalists that settled in the region
refused to adopt Quebec’s seigneurial land tenure system and French civil law, the
British separated these settlements from the French-speaking communities and created
separate administrative jurisdictions (Courville, 2008, p.7). The Constitutional Act both
contributed to the creation of a unique condition in Upper Canada with the first capital at
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Newark, and then York [today’s Toronto], while also aiming to fulfill the demands of the
Loyalists in Lower Canada. Moreover, the legislative and executive branches appointed
by the governor were not on good terms with the only elected body, the Legislative
Assembly, eventually leading to the emergence of Parti Canadien as a nationalist,
partially liberal and reformist political actor initiating a long-struggle between the
colonial government and the elected representatives of Lower Canada. These
representatives were French-speaking “lawyers, notaries, doctors, innkeepers or small
merchants who comprised more than 77% of the assembly between 1792 and 1836”
(Dickinson and Young, 2008, p.158; Quellet, 1980, p.188).
The above mentioned contestation further expanded into the armed rebellions of
1837 and 1838, representing the conflict between French and English speaking
communities in which the French majority sought to liberate themselves from the
dominance of the English minority, notably with the encouragement of the Parti
Canadien.92 The rebellion of 1837 also resulted in the declaration of martial law and
suspension of Canada’s Constitution, while a second rebellion in 1838 had even more
impactful outcomes. Meanwhile, Lord Durham was appointed as the governor of British
North America, arriving to Canada as High Commissioner. Subsequently, the British
suppressed the rebellion of 1838, and rebels were severely punished, with 850 rebels
imprisoned, 12 hanged, and 58 exiled to Australia (Dickinson and Young, 2008, p.167).
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Louis-Joseph Papineau was a key leader in the rebel movement called the Patriote
movement, acted as the leader of the 1837 rebellion, and was a politician, lawyer and
landlord.
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In 1838, the Special Council was the authority governing the colony following the
martial law of 1838, and a series of reforms took place aiming to better economic and
bureaucratic affairs, as well as land ownership, new school and health systems, and
transport until 1841. Representing institutional improvement imposed by the British, this
era also saw an increase in immigrant population from England, Scotland, and Ireland.
Lord Durham went beyond his previous policies and promoted the unification of Upper
and Lower Canada, aiming to turn the French-speaking community into a minority within
united territory, and thus weaken their political power. Upper Canada was named
“Canada West”, while Lower Canada was referred to as “Canada East”, and the new
government was in Montreal. The Act of Union in 1840 simply constituted the Province
of Canada, though it remained quite contested. Rebellion continued and reached a
destructive level when the Parliament in Montreal was burnt in 1849. This eventually led
to its relocation to Toronto, and French-communities remained significantly concerned
with unification, notably in regard to their collective rights.
It is also important to acknowledge that since British dominance in Canada, in the
aftermath of the Seven Years’ War, the Francophone community was in decline. Thus,
French-speaking communities remained mostly farmers and a broadly rural population;
while industrial advances of the British-led colonies were highly impactful in the
economic sphere, creating a newly emergent urban class. However, unemployment was a
common challenge, even in Montreal, and French immigrants remained mostly lower
level workers. In the 1850s, the emigration steadily grew in Quebec, at first not being
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paid attention to by local administrations. However, this soon began to increase and
threaten the economy of the province, in which population growth had been key, and
eventually an economic depression emerged. It is notable that institutions attempted to
avoid or inverse the emigration, but between 1879 and 1901, 200,000 people left (Brault,
1986, pp.50-56; Roby, 2004, pp.40-42; Dickinson and Young, 2008, Harrison and
Friesen, 2015). While more than 40.000 Quebec residents move to the US between 1840
and 1850, around 500.000 residents followed between 1850 and 1900. Belanger and
Belanger (2000) says93 that between 1840 and 1930, around 900.000 French Canadians
left to the US. Most of the Quebec emigration was towards the US, with mostly economic
reasons.
It is also important to add that starting from 18th century, and becoming
significant until before the World War I (notably between 1870-1940), Francophone
population94 in rural areas grew rapidly known as “the revenge of the cradle” [la revanche
de barceaux], an époque during which church encouraged high birth rates (Bourhis, 2001,
p.133; Heller, 1978; Henchey, 1972). Indeed, Quebec had a much higher fertility rate
than elsewhere in Canada in this period, with an average 14 children per family.
However, in 20th century, the birth rates sharply declined.
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French Institutionalism under British Rule in Quebec, from late 19th to early
20th Centuries
In 1867, the British Parliament adopted the British North America Acts that
integrated the Province of Canada, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia into the Dominion
of Canada, and Canada East became the Province of Quebec. While representing the
recognition of self-rule in Canada, British control over foreign affairs remained intact. In
this era, confederalism was a popular political movement promoting the confederative
model for Quebec. The consecutive population movements within Quebec, mostly from
rural to urban areas, and the industrialization and urban development at the time of
Confederation can be seen in the history of Montreal, which at that time was the largest
city in the region, and remains the second largest in Canada today. While Montreal’s
population95 was around 9,000 in 1800, it grew to 58,000 in 1852, and 528,000 in 1911,
and the City of Montreal annexed many surrounding communities that enlarged its
territories drastically from 1876 to 1918 (Ville de Montreal, 2016). Between 1851 and
1861, around 75% of the Canadian population were Quebecois (Francophone) and around
20% were British (English Speaking), and this rate did not change drastically, as it
peaked to 80% in 1881, while British communities fell from 20% to 15% in 1931
(Linteau, Durocher and Rober, 1983, pp.36-40).
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The Catholic Church has played a crucial role in the institutionalization of French
speaking communities, at least providing a basis for community integration and
development, and also acting as a mechanism of central administration. This role has
been continuous since it started early in the colonial period, and kept growing and settling
as a backbone for later community development, and as a primary component of societal
cohesiveness or cement. The church was controlling most of the key institutions in
Quebec province, such as schools educating in French, hospitals, and charitable
organizations. It is notable that the power of the church was most likely derived from its
agreements with the Anglophone community that kept Canadian state power in their
hand. Church simply aimed to cut off the historical linkage to France, and kept to ensure
Quebec’s isolation from social movements which were at peak in early 20th century in all
over the world. This situation was maintained until the years of social, economic and
political transformation in 1960s.
While religion has played a primary role of social cement in Quebec, particularly
in leveraging the French-speaking community and its institutionalization, there are
various incidents and events that played a significant role in the course of the political
conflict in Quebec; incidents such as the execution of famous rebel Louis Riel,96 in 1885.
Riel was the political leader of the Metis people of the Canadian prairies, and led two
resistance movements against the Canadian government. In the beginning, he headed a
provisional government (1869-1870) which eventually negotiated the Manitoba Act with
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the Canadian Government, establishing the Manitoba region as a province and providing
protection for French language and cultural rights. However, his further actions, notably
executing the protestant Canadian, Thomas Scott, initiated outrage in Ontario against the
French and Catholics. Furthermore, he was elected three times to the Canadian House of
Commons, yet remained in exile in the U.S. and unable to take his seat in the House. Riel
returned to the Metis community on several occasions, upon calls for promoting rights
that were ignored by the Canadian Government, which eventually led to the 1885
Rebellion. Riel was defeated and surrendered, and was found guilty by a jury of six
English-speaking Protestants, and later sentenced to death. After Riel’s hanging, there
was significant public outrage in Quebec. An interesting feature of Riel’s legacy in
Quebec’s politics was that Francophones, the Catholic nationalists, the native rights
movements, and a group of New Left student movements have all portrayed him as a
hero. There is an immense anthology of debate over Riel’s legacy among political
scientists, historians and intellectuals, mostly over whether to portray Riel as a hero or a
rebel (Stanley, 1974; Reid, 2008; Braz, 2003; Bumsted, 2001; Flanagan, 1996;
Granatstein, 1998).
Following Riel’s death, the antagonism among French-speaking communities was
even further fueled. Since the cabinet members of the Quebec Conservative Party
supported the execution, the support for conservatism melted away, and later the
dissident conservatives joined liberals to form Parti National, which won a majority of
the seats in the provincial elections of Quebec in 1886 under Honore Mercier’s
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leadership.97 Mercier later collaborated with Ontario Premier Oliver Mowat to push back
Canada’s federal centralism, notably promoting provincial autonomy which had
significant grassroots support from Quebec nationalists (Assemblée Nationale du Québec,
2016; Linteau et al, 1983). Later, in 1896, another prominent name from Quebec, Wilfrid
Laurier, became the first Quebecois Prime Minister of Canada. Educated in French and
English, Laurier can be seen as one of the most prominent pioneers of liberals in Canada,
yet he gained Quebec votes against the powerful Catholic clergy.
Canadian Confederation was joined by a number of new provinces, and in 1898
the Canada Parliament adopted the Quebec Boundary Extension Act expanding Quebec’s
territories, and once again in 1912, with the Quebec Boundaries Extension Act, that set
today’s frontiers of Quebec. Although the conflict between French and British cultural
spheres did not subside, it is possible to say that most of the Canadian regions were
established and settled within the frame of confederalism, which emerged as the least
contested political model, and probably the only one in which provinces could agree to
collaborate on matters, although conflict remained inherently present.
Paradigmatic changes both in North American economy and politics as well as in
the world have led to a series of consequences not only for Quebec and other Canadian
provinces, but the entire world. First, with Great Britain declaring its participation in
World War I, Canada was consequently drawn into the war as a dominion of the
commonwealth, and thousands of volunteers from Canada joined the war effort, mostly
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from English speaking communities, since the conscription was unpopular in Quebec.
Known as the Conscription Crisis of 1917, this issue also indicates the ongoing
disagreements and conflict between English and French speaking communities of
Canada.
Another conscription crisis occurred during the course of the Second World War,
again as a result of one the disagreements between French and English speaking
communities; however, the 1917 episode had the greater impact in terms of Canadian
politics. Here, the issue was not necessarily the lack of will to fight, as thousands of
Quebecois joined both wars. On the contrary, the issue was the conflict that arose from
the perspective of Quebecois who viewed the conscription as another attempt at British
dominance, thus making them feel isolated within English-speaking Canada. The
substantial divisions between communities peaked in this era; partially as an outcome of
politics being divided into nationalist and imperialist camps.
In 1918, the Unionist government began to enforce the Military Service Act,
even though conservatives had previously promised not to enforce it. French-speaking
nationalists were outraged since the act caused thousands of men to be liable, but
exemptions were so broad that too many men benefited from them. Anti-war attitudes
from French nationalists peaked and turned into riots in Quebec especially after FrenchCanadians were arrested by Dominion Police under the pretext of not having exemption
documents on their person. Thousands of rioters joined the protests known as Quebec
Easter riots in 1918, leaving 150 dead in the end (Auger, 2008, pp.9-17).
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Quebec in Transformation: From Quiet Revolution to Sovereignty
Movement
There are two distinct trends to consider in regard to Quebec’s political history
and development throughout the narrative above. First, the British dominated Montreal
and kept the financial and trade sectors in their hands, thereby constituting a power center
in Quebec that is also interconnected with the rest of British-speaking Canada. Yet, the
dominant population consisted of French settlers, as they strongly organized in rural
Quebec, and also developed relations with other (numerically insignificant) French
populations in Canada and the United States, as well as with indigenous communities.
This dichotomous structure, that also reveals the conflict I described above, has been
subjected to further, significant changes in the 20th century. At the end of the Second
World War, conservatives took back the government under Maurice Duplessis,98 who
served as a Premier from 1936 to 1939, and came to power once again in 1944, ruling
Quebec for the next fifteen years. His years are known as “La Grande Noirceur” [The
Great Darkness] since Duplessis regime refused investment in education, health and
social programs (Bouchard, 2005; Bourque, Duchastel and Beauchemin, 1994).
Duplessis simply targeted rural areas of Quebec, since they constituted his
grassroots support, promoted provincial rights, and anti-Communism in the Cold War
Years, and opposed liberal movements, intellectuals, modernists, and trade unions
(Belanger, 2004). He also collaborated with Anglo businessmen, while significantly
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investing in church-state relations. It was very significant that Quebec’s institutions,
schools, hospitals and politics remained Church-controlled during Duplessis’ years, as
opposed to the rest of the rapidly industrializing and modernizing North America.
Opposition to this general arrangement was largely insignificant in each manifestation,
which mostly stemmed from liberals; however, a collection of artists called, “Les
Automatistes” published Le Refus global, meaning “total refusal,” promoting a new
perspective that focused around anti-religious, anti-establishment, and social values
(Belanger, 2004; Linteau, 1991; Paulin, 2005).
It may be useful to recall the metaphor of the pressure cooker to refer the political
entropy when explaining the transformation Quebec went through in the 1960s, as prior
to these years of drastic change and transformation in Quebec’s politics, economy and
society, Duplessis’ years acted as a catalyst for the change. The failed opposition
attempts from liberals, as well as the hardliner conservatism under the rule of churchstate dominion, eventually led to an unexpected outcome, the steady growth and change
of the grassroots society which increasingly demanded structural reform and change.
“Total Refusal” was an expression of the long-term, deep, popular discontent in Quebec,
while numerous issues, scandals, and challenges contributed to it, such as the case of
Duplessis’ Orphans, in which as many as 20,000 orphans were abused as a result of the
collaboration of church and state (Stein, 2006; Cozza, 2006; Boucher, Paré, Perry, Sigal
and Ouimet, 2007). Similarly, the Asbestos Strike of 1949, which lasted four months and
eventually turned into a violent riot, had a significant impact on the emergence of social
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security and employee rights in the long term (Trudeau, 1974). All together these
circumstances led to the transformation of the liberal opposition into a much stronger
player against the conservatives in Quebec.
Known as La Révolution tranquille [The Quiet Revolution], Quebec passed
through years of intense socio-political and socio-cultural changes (McRoberts, 1988;
Thomson, 1984; Behiels, 1985; Gauvreau, 2005) which can be characterized by the
secularization of society, the creation of the welfare state, as well as the birth of
federalist/confederalist and sovereignty-centered political clusters which eventually led to
the growth of the pro-sovereignty movement and provincial government. Although prior
decades were influential in the making of The Quiet Revolution, provincial government
under Jean Lesage’s Liberal Party was elected in the 1960 elections, and played a crucial
role in the initiation of the movement.
These years may represent the rise of liberals against conservatives, in which
church influence declined in Quebec politics; however, there was also a decline of Anglo
businesses and their weight in Quebec’s economy, the rise of the so-called “Quebec Inc.”,
and another very important development: the emergence and development of the prosovereignty movement, with neo-nationalist tendencies (Behiels, 1985). An important
figure under Lesage’s government was René Lévesque, the young minister of Hydraulic
Resources, who was portrayed as a star in the liberal government, notably because of his
plan of action for Quebec’s endowed hydraulic resources (Desbiens, 2004). Since
the1940s there were numerous large infrastructure projects in Quebec that were
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separately managed, and with the comprehensive plan that Lévesque advocated in his
campaign, which also found significant grassroots support, 11 companies were merged
into a public enterprise called Hydro-Québec. As for the nationalization and
centralization of Quebec’s numerous companies and dams, this action was consequential
for Quebec’s further economic development, since regulations were made to stabilize
energy production and prices, and also created an immense self-sufficiency and reliance
on renewable energy that has played a key role in Quebec’s economy. This impact was
defined as “mythical” by many (Bolduc, Hogue and Larouche, 1979, p.193), since the
enterprise is the largest electricity generator in Canada and the world’s largest
hydroelectric producer, sustaining numerous capital investments, and creating significant
know-how and engineering expertise in the region. Today, the company is still one of the
largest of its kind, generating billions of dollars each year and contributing significantly
to Quebec’s economy.
Hydro-Quebec can be seen as the seed of a strong Quebec industry and economy
of the future, since it eventually created the province with lowest cost of energy
production, and one of the largest clean energy producers in the world making Quebec
especially a strategic player in North American and global markets. Hydro-Quebec can
also be seen as the seed of the so-called “Quebec Inc” since it created a significant
economic input to Quebec’s provincial economy, which eventually only grew since then.
This large key infrastructure project has played a quite key role in contributing to
Quebec’s political, economic and social transformation since it coincided with an époque
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in which Francophone Quebecois were now being urbanized, modernized and creating
industries which eventually hired newly educated residents.
Moreover, during these years, the government increased its control99 over the
entire education system that eventually represented the secularization of Quebec identity,
unionized the civil service, and also adopted a comprehensive policy for the management
of pensions. In this period of transformation, the support for the Francophone businesses
and organizations promoting French-speaking management were endorsed especially
aiming to fill the gap between Francophone and Anglo communities and their impact in
politics and economics. Given the political and economic context of Quebec since the
1960s, the pro-sovereignty movement gained both depth and advantage in Quebec’s
politics, and in 1968 Parti Quebecois was created by René Lévesque as a major
proponent of sovereignty and Quebec independence, advocating the recognition of
Quebec as an equal and sovereign nation, while not cutting off its economic ties with the
rest of Canada, but instead forming an economic association (Fraser, 2001; McRoberts,
1988; Quinn, 1979; Clarke, 1983).
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Although not representing a drastic change, since education system still remained
under the influence of Catholic and Protestant school boards until recently, still the
efforts and policies indicate a transformation in this era, or at least the beginning of it.
The Constitution Act of 1867 was regulating the state power between central state and the
provinces from which both Quebec and Ontario received their jurisdictional authorities.
While before 1960 Quiet Revolution, the education was controlled by the church, the
government started to have a control in 1964. Constitution Act of 1982 once again
included the state power attributed to the provinces to administer the school system, and
in 1998 the confessional school boards were abolished by the Government of Quebec
signifying secularization of the school system.
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Sovereignty Movement, ‘Statut Particulière’ and the Independence
Movement of Quebec
It is also critical to recognize the group that emerged during these years,
beginning in 1963, called Front de libération du Québec (FLQ), launching propaganda
and violent attacks including robberies and bombings of Anglo institutions. These acts
peaked in 1970, especially when the British trade commissioner to Canada, James Cross
was kidnapped with Pierre Laporte, a provincial minister and Vice-Premier who was
assassinated during the incident. Known as the October Crisis, this moment was so
impactful that Prime Minister Trudeau invoked the War Measures Act (Clement, 2008;
Whitaker, 2011; Ballard, 1983). Although in 1966, the conservative Union Nationale
came to power again and remained in government until 1970, the modernization and
secularization brought by the Quiet Revolution did not succeed, and both conservatives
and liberals opposed federal intervention in provincial administration, again indicating
the strengthened pro-sovereignty characteristics of Quebec politics. After all, the Quiet
Revolution’s major outcome was the encouragement and building of self-confidence for
Francophone pro-sovereignty movements.
Trudeau was an especially significant actor in Quebec and broader Canadian
politics, with his political/academic career since the 1950s, and his role in the forging of
the [Canadian] liberal political cluster. Bilingualism and biculturalism were perhaps
Trudeau’s major work. After being elected in 1968, he institutionalized Official
Bilingualism with the Official Languages Act, guaranteeing the protection of linguistic
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minorities in Francophone and Anglophone regions in Canada, and implementing the
policy of multiculturalism, including the indigenous minorities and their communities.
Trudeau’s legacy is immensely significant in Canada’s politics, as his efforts set the
groundwork for bilingualism and biculturalism, which have become such an integral part
of contemporary Canadian identity. However, despite all these efforts, the prosovereignty movements later gained momentum, notably after the October Crisis of 1970
(McRoberts, 1997; Esman, 1982; Fenwich, 1981). Trudeau was first a left-wing activist,
a student with international affiliations, and was a proponent of Quebec sovereignty when
he was young. Year later, he was elected from the Liberal Party of Canada, for instance,
signifying a shift in his views. To highlight an important point, Liberal Party of Canada
and Quebec’s Liberal Party must not be confused: Canada’s Liberal Party is one of the
largest liberal political party group’s in the world also representing the most frequently
governing party of Canada, representing liberal policies and ideas while Quebec’s Liberal
Party is a provincial political party group mixing ideas of liberalism [mostly economy]
with some conservatism. Although during the years of Quiet Revolution, socialdemocracy was sovereign in Liberal Party of Quebec, most of the times it represented
centre-right.
In the 1976 provincial elections, Parti Quebecois (PQ) was elected for the first
time, and formed the government under Levesque’s leadership, who would later became
the Premier of Quebec. It was a moment representing celebration within the Francophone
community (McRoberts, 1988; Fraser, 2001; Pinard and Hamilton, 1978), while also
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sparking increased migration of Anglophones from Quebec to Toronto. While the right of
self-determination for the aboriginal communities was among the first progressive steps
of PQ government, its major work was Bill 101, the Charter of the French Language,
setting French as the primary and common public language of Quebec. English had
previously been the medium of communication in institutions and businesses, and French
was now enforced as the official language, thereby permitting the Francophone
community membership in the business world. The exodus of English speaking
communities toward Toronto created a substantial boost in the population of Toronto (Lo
and Teixeira, 1998; Sherrill, 1980; Stevenson, 2000; Howard, 1991). The Supreme Court
of Canada found the act unconstitutional under the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedom, and the act was later revised in 1988, and Anglophone businesses were forced
to adopt measures to ensure the preservation of French language and culture.
In 1980, Quebec went to a referendum upon the proposal of Premier René
Lévesque, asking a mandate to negotiate for his “sovereignty” plan with the federal
government. The referendum did not represent a final decision, but promised a second
referendum would be held once a deal was achieved and ratified. Prime Minister Pierre
Trudeau campaigned against the vote, advocating the renewal of the Canadian
Constitution and federalism. In May 1980, the referendum was held and around 60% of
the votes were against secession, while pro-sovereignty votes only represented 40.44%
(LeDuc, 2003; McRoberts, 1988; Courchene, 2004; Charland, 1987). Here, the most
important conflict was between Trudeau’s liberals and the pro-sovereignty PQ. Since the
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referendum was definitely a victory for Trudeau, he rapidly capitalized on his campaign
theme, the renewal of the constitution, calling all of the Premiers of the provinces to
coalesce. In 1982, as the Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982 (UK), the Constitution Act
was signed by Elizabeth II, constituted of thirty-five sections, and representing an
ensemble of amendments, including the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms
(McWhinney, 1982; Banting and Simeon, 1983; Russell, 1982).
Trudeau’s government adopted the constitution without approval from the Quebec
government, ironically bringing a so-called pluralist and inclusive framework of
governance to all Canadian provinces, including Quebec (Egerton, 2000; Hurley, 1996).
It is notably important to recognize the sense of betrayal which by prominent names was
expressed as “treason” and even turned into a heated dispute between Canadian and
Quebecois politicians (see Bouchard100, 1996). Trudeau simply shifted significantly from
his left-wing position which in his youth even was affiliated with pro-sovereignty
movements, and he endorsed Canadian liberalism as opposed to Quebec’s demands,
simply overinflating his “bilingualism” policy by presenting it as if it would settle
Quebec issue. He simply opposed to Quebecois with unilateral policy actions that left
Quebecois out of the process.
The Liberal Party of Quebec under the leadership of Robert Bourassa remained in
government from 1985 to 1994, while the Progressive Conservatives replaced the
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Liberals federally from 1984 to 1993. Progressive conservatives’ leader Brian Mulroney
carved out a plan to gather all provincial premiers as well as Robert Bourassa, to
convince Quebec to sign the constitution, known as The Meech Lake Accord of 1987,
which recognized Quebec as a “distinct society,” and transferred to Quebec considerable
power over immigration, taxation, and commerce. The agreement garnered opposition
from the Parti Quebecois, led by proponent of sovereignty Jacques Parizeau, since it did
not grant sovereignty to Quebec. The accord later collapsed in 1990, when liberal
governments in Manitoba and Newfoundland did not ratify the agreement (Monahan,
1991; Behiels, 1989; Cairns, 1991; Mandel, 1994). The heated debate over the collapse of
Meech process is also significant, notably between prominent names such as Trudeau,
Lesage, Levesque, Bourassa and Chretien. Bouchard (1996) notably accuses101 Trudeau
for blaming everyone on the collapse of the process although his role is much significant
in it.
The collapse of Meech process is a major turning point in Canadian politics,
because it gave rise to the pro-sovereignty Bloc Quebecois, eventually leading to the
collapse of the Progressive Conservative Party in the 1993 election. Bloc Quebecois was
informally formed by Progressive Conservative and Liberal Party members under Lucien
Bouchard in Canada’s House of Commons to represent Quebec’s interests, often referred
as a “social democratic” and “separatist” political group. From 1990s to 2011 elections
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Bloc Quebecois was one of the leading political parties of Canada, and has been the
largest many times in Quebec, it even became the opposition party group of Canada until
1997 elections.
The Parti Quebecois won the 1994 provincial elections under Jacques Parizeau’s
leadership, quickly organizing a referendum to bring the sovereignty question to public
vote in 1995. Parizeau was promoting a unilateral declaration of independence followed
by negotiations with the federal government if sovereignty was approved by public vote
in the referendum. The question was whether to hold negotiations with the federal
government first, or to declare independence (Gauthier, 1994; Parizeau, 1997). Although,
toward the end of the pro-sovereignty campaign under Parizeau the support for
sovereignty was above 50%, the results of the referendum showed 49.42% “Yes” votes,
and 50.58% “No” votes, thus representing the loss of the pro-sovereignty movement by a
small margin, in lieu of those supporting unity (Fan, 1997; Clarke and Kornberg, 1996;
Nedeau, Martin and Blais, 1999).
Canada has a comprehensive102 and diverse sector and regulation of public
opinion research and polls. They are numerous which was mentioned by various analysts,
yet, although their findings may indicate differences and variances, scholarly study of
these polls’ accuracy was examined in different studies investigating the relationship
between the polls and public decision making (Fox, Andersen and DuBonnet, 1998;
LeDuc, 2003; Fan, 1997; Pammett and LeDuc, 2001; Nadeau, Martin and Blais, 1999;
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Mendersohn, 2007; Mendelsohn, Parkin and Pinard, 2007; CROP, 2016; Leger, 2016;
Durant, 2014). First, there is a recent and sharp decline of sovereignty movement in
alignment with the rise of Liberal (Canada unity or federalist) votes in Quebec, which
even was referred as an “epic collapse” (Patriquin, 2014) in which various factors such as
the leadership of PQ, economic factors and separatist actors were seen to play a role,
most importantly along with the changing demographics of the voters.
In 1995 vote, contrasting to the 1980 referendum, there was a much smaller
margin between “Yes” and “No” voters. Women, elderly population and nonFrancophone population said no (Leger and Leger, 1995). While the urban Montreal
voters largely said “No” in three consecutive polls of Leger and Leger (1995) just before
1995 voting, with respective rates of 42%, 46% and 39%, in the rest of Quebec, “Yes”
votes dominated with respective rates of 52%, 55%, and 63%, showing a contrasting vote
between rural and urban Quebec. Still, the biggest split was between Francophones and
Non-Francophones in the polls, 55% of Francophones saying that they will vote “Yes”
while only 7% of Non-Francophones said they would vote “Yes” opposed to 33%
Francophones said they would vote for “No” while 83% of Non-Francophones said they
would vote “No” (Leger and Leger, 1995). Another important contrast was about the age
groups, while younger tend to have a much higher rates of “yes” votes, elderly population
was mostly for “No” vote.
In a study examining 23 voter polls reported in the media for two months before
the 1995 referendum, Fox, Andersen and DuBonnet (1998) argue that unlike the claims,
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the course of referendum campaign was smoothly representing the increase in the
sovereignty option. They also add that exaggeration towards separatism was in place in
the polls but with only a slight margin, while the variation in the indecision votes have
significantly changed during the campaign period (Fox, Andersen and DuBonnet, 1998).
LeDuc (2003) argues that in referendums there is a much greater volatility compared to
normal elections, since voter’s information about the referendum topic may eventually
represent a learning process during the campaign, and contrasting motives, moves and
stances of parties may eventually impact voter’s behavior (LeDuc, 2003, pp.711-732).
Looking at both 1980 and 1995 referendums, Pammett and LeDuc (2001) says that long
and short-term factors both play a role in voting in referendums, while in Quebec,
sovereignty, parties’ and leader’ positions significantly affected voter’decision making,
notably during the referendum campaigns, and the important referendum campaign
period definitely is a major and difficult-to-predict process in voter’s decision making
(Pammett and LeDuc, 2001, pp.265-280).
In another study, Mendelsohn (2007) examined all publicly available survey
research on Quebecois identity and attachment over three last decades, and he argues
that French Canadian identity has been gradually replaced by a Quebecois identity, a
transformation process far from complete, representing a serious problem for nationalist
mobilization. Besides the strong attachment to Canada, Quebecois are divided into two
overlapping national communities: Canadian and Quebecois, rejecting calls from
intellectuals and nationalist leaders to choose between two identities (Mendelsohn, 2007,
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pp.72-94). Moreover, Mendelson, Parkin and Pinard (2007) investigates a variety of
survey research data form 1996 to 2003, notably on sovereignty and national decision.
This study is significant since it looked beyond 1995 referendum, and observed the public
opinion variation since then. Using three main data sources: CROP, CRIC and IpsosReid, they first emphasize the depolitization and demobilization of the national Quebec
question (pp.28-30). While only 29% of participants supported another referendum,
around 65% of participants were opposed to another referendum based on CRIC data.
Figure 4: Quebec Polls since 2012 Elections (Leger Marketing and CROP, 2016)

Between 1998 and 2002, the question of “Will Quebec become independent?”
was asked, and 51% of participants decided “stay with Canada” opposed to 39% deciding
“independence” in 1998, while this gap continuously increased between two contrasting
groups. Canadian unity was around 61% in 2000, 69% in 2001 and 75% in 2002, while
pro-independence rate was 30% in 2000, 23% in 2001 and 21% in 2002. Based on CROP
data, participants were also asked whether they support “sovereignty partnership” or
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“independence”, again indicating similar trends, yet, sovereignty partnership received
more than 41% of responses between 1996 and 2003, while independent supporters were
first 43% in 1996, but then declined below 40% over years.
As can be seen in the abovementioned studies, survey research and various
indicators emphasized in the literature, there is a significant variation in public decision
making, notably in the referendums concerning vital questions, such as a collective
national decision over the future of the province and country. Various factors play a role
in this variation, thus, although from 1980 to 1995, there has been an increase in the prosovereignty votes, this rate has declined, gaining momentum in the aftermath of 2000s.
Various factors were stated to play role in this complex variation, but, importantly, the
demographic change of both Canada and Quebec, notably the arrival of new immigrants
who are now voters (around 40% of the population) and are not truly aligned with
Quebec’s sovereignty movement, the cut-off of the new generations from previous
Quebec politics and national history, and also the changing expectations and interests of
age, gender and other identity groups over time have played a role. The vote of PQ
literraly declined to a level that many argued it as an end to Quebec’s sovereignty
movement, or at least a trouble, while Liberal Party significantly gained momentum and
vote in the last decade (see Figure below).
Discussion and Redefinition of Quebec’s Paradiplomacy and Protodiplomacy
As can be seen above in the historical review of Quebec’s politics, the province
first developed its state-like capacity as a colony under contested French and British
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colonial rules in various time periods; and while the Anglophone state emerged,
expanded, and developed in various regions of Canada, most notably weighted in Toronto
and Ottawa in our contemporary era, Quebec’s provincial government was born out of
these long-term contestations.
In the multiethnic, multireligious, multilingual or multiregional context of
Canada, the implication of liberal confederalism [or asymmetric federalism] did
somehow work cohesively with the consociationalist neo-nationalism of Quebec. After
all, even if France did end its North American colonization and leave Quebec, there was
the signally important French constituency factor, since the dominant Francophone
population consisted of settlers from the world of Francophonie and indigenous
communities, accordingly setting and pushing for the groundwork for Quebec’s
Francophone institutionalization. In this process, the historical departure of France, and
Quebec’s isolation from France under the total and profound control of the Church was
significant. Still, this long-term cut-off and its significant impact did not secede
Quebecois’ use of French language or cultural heritage which eventually make of the
distinct national identity construction in Quebec, as well as the community and state
capacity development efforts of the Quebecois population. Church’s involvement in
provincial governance definitely played a role in politics and economy as well as in
shaping social classes and institutions of Quebec, however, despite church’s agreement
with British to keep French away from the bay, Quebecois still followed the policy of
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preserving their French cultural heritage when organizing and modernizing their
institutions.
Quebec’s history reveals the steps and the overall progress of the provincial
administration in terms of sovereignty and authority within Canadian constitutional
jurisdiction. Various acts, agreements and processes [both out of conflict and peace] led
to the creation of today’s Canadian asymmetrical federalism [or confederalism] in which
Quebec has a distinct status being one of the two centers of Canadian state power. Most
notably the modernization and transformation in Quebec’s contemporary political,
economic and social structures played a role in this creation. Economically speaking,
Francophones were a rural community and organized around the institution of church,
and over decades, not representing a single ethnic “French” settler group, but a plural
blend of Francophones consisted of both settlers and indigenous communities. This has
changed over decades when communities were modernized, educated and urbanized,
notably in Quiet Revolution years and aftermath. Along with this significant
transformations in Quebec society, what substantially played a catalyst role in this
process was the key large infrastructure project: Hydro-Quebec.
Starting in 1940s, Hydro-Quebec has become such a significant project that
constituted a foundation for Quebec economy since the provincial government merged
lighting, heating and power generating companies, and numerous hydroelectricity plants
were built since then gradually making Quebec a leading clean energy producer over
decades. In 1963, the company acquired the private electricity distributors, and eventually
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became a monopole with the new investments of hydroelectricity and nuclear plants,
development of new technology for electricity distribution doubling the amount of energy
transportable on a line and the creation of a new research institution focusing on energy
(Hydro-Quebec, 2016). Through various new plants, innovations and institutionalization
through agreements and acquisitions, Hydro-Quebec was already the second largest of its
kind after Norway in 1984 (George, 1986, p.121).
In 1996, Quebec Government established Quebec’s energy board, an agency
responsible for regulatory supervision of the distribution and transmission of electric
power, and in 1997, Quebec has opened its energy system to North American wholesale
market, creating Hydro-Quebec TransEnergie to offer high quality energy. In 2000,
Hydro-Quebec’s net income was at record level surpassing billion-dollar threshold
($1.078 billion), and various new divisions were created in the following years. Given
such progressive steps towards the development of its niche energy industry at national
level, and preparation and planning involved, Quebec government has been successful in
creating a backbone sector for future development and bargaining. As a provincial
constituency, now with significant economic bargaining power, further agreements can
be accounted as Quebec’s baby steps for paradiplomacy.
Signature of the agreements of James Bay and Northern Quebec in 1975, historic
Paix des Brave with Grand Council of Crees for two major projects in 2002, and
commissioning of a new interconnection with Ontario in 2009 for power interchanges are
evidences of preliminary agreements made by Quebec’s provincial jurisdiction. In 2014,

243
Ontario and Quebec Governments have signed several agreements103 for electricity trade,
climate change, infrastructure investments, Energy East Pipeline, trade and cooperation
and la Francophonie and the Memorandum of Understanding signed by Couillard and
Wynne, premiers of Quebec and Ontario represents well the two major provinces’
paradiplomatic interactions.
Quebec was definitely lucky in capitalizing on the key large infrastructure
development projects, yet, Hydro-Quebec’s overall progress represents a long-term
transformation, modernization and industrialization, creating significant impact on
provincial economic development. First, Quebec clearly became a surplus energy
producer in North America where there is a great demand for energy both for household
and industrial purposes. This financial input into the provincial economy definitely
provided a strong hand to Quebec Government. To plan, imply and complete the series of
large key infrastructure projects definitely required highly-qualified human resource,
creating an important source of employment. Since energy is at the core of industry and
urban/rural development, the low cost created a significant margin of profit enabling
Quebec to provide incentives for niche industries.
Besides energy, industries such as finance, construction, machinery, aerospace,
mining, oil, forestry and fisheries all advanced in accordance to the projects. Above all,
the research and education was significantly institutionalized, notably with the creation of
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niche divisions various areas. Capabilities and technologies were added over time
including nuclear, with possibility to invest in research and institutionalization of
administrative and productive divisions important amounts, enabling Hydro-Quebec’s
rise as a global player. While Ontario is also an industrialized province having a central
share in Canada’s energy production and consumption, more recent policies, notably of
promoting green and sustainable energy production led to various searches, and capacity
sharing agreement104 between Quebec and Ontario was an important solution, since
Quebec has lots of clean energy, and both provinces represent different seasons of
supply/demand peaks making the agreement105 possible.
Overall, the conflict between Francophone and Anglophone has created a system
of checks and balances, and in a way contributed to the development of both
communities in Canada experience. Provincial governments’ bitter sweet rivalry over
small looking issues have simply created unforeseen level of institutional quality in
Canada. A plural, democratic system is exercised, and by no means is it not to say there
are no problems in Canada’s political system. Immigration plays an important role both
in Quebec and Canada’s rest, and provincial governments have developed their
competences in this area significantly as well, creating an accurate system of skills and
competencies based work force system, quite well institutionalized and inter-regionally
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accredited through agreements, such as the one between Ontario and Quebec106, or
between Quebec-US, or Quebec-France.
To summarize Quebec’s grand strategy of revival and latter survival, the
Francophone population has transformed itself through modernization, industrialization
and urbanization. Although lagging a decade compared to the neighboring or competing
Anglophone communities as a consequence of conservative government years, Quebec
has successfully completed a rapid economic development, and has created a strong
source to develop its state capacity and institutions. In this context, a step of grand
strategy was to first invest in energy and infrastructure projects turning the environmental
advantages into substantial gains. The revenue of energy sales was a quite important
input in Quebec’s economy, notably from the US, and rest of Canada, enabling
industrialization even more. In this context, the most needed sectors and industries were
prioritized, leading to the creation of niche sectors and institutions. Therefore, Quebec’s
economy can be defined as one of those small knowledge state economies in
Scandinavia. Finally, what recently became important is the survival in a drastically
changing global economy in which Quebec is doing well thanks to its visionary strategy
of investments.
In a hostile global market economy whereas takeovers, mergers and acquisitions
rule the entire markets, Quebec has also developed a mechanism of self-defense of its
commerce. Quebec acts semi-liberal in this context, keeping a form of national interest
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concept alive for certain industries. Still, some argue that there are lots of Quebec
businesses that are vulnerable107 to international takeovers, however, nationalization of
key businesses indicate the presence of a protective strategy as well.
The Primacy of American Continent in Quebec’s Internationalization
United States, among all of the others, has immense significance in Canada’s and
also Quebec’s foreign policy. In both the International Policy declared by the Quebec
Government in 2006, and also all of the subsequent publications, declarations, and
official documents, one sees clear and solid evidence of the importance attributed to
diplomatic relations with the United States by the Government of Quebec. Quebec’s
diplomatic strategy is comprehensive in the U.S. since they both represent bilateral levels
(states, federal administration, and congress) and also the multilateral level (regional
forums).
Quebec also has eight government offices, in Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Houston,
Los Angeles, New York, Silicon Valley, and Washington D.C., and make up Quebec’s
diplomatic Network in the U.S., probably representing the most institutionalized presence
of Quebec outside of Canada, and of a substate entity [non-central government]
diplomatic representation in the U.S. Besides the bilateral and multilateral ties, Quebec
and the U.S. are also parties to an ensemble of groups, forums, and agreements such as:
Southeastern United States – Canadian Provinces Alliance, Great Lakes and St. Lawrence
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Cities Initiative, American Council for Quebec Studies, Great Lakes Commission,
Council of Great Lakes Governors, Eastern Regional Conference of the Council of State
Governments, National Governors’ Association, North America’s Corridor Coalition,
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, and Western Climate Initiative, most of which
represent collectives of federated states.
Energy, environment, and culture are the primary areas of collaboration between
Quebec and the states of the US. Although recently declined, for many decades Quebec
was an important energy provider to the US states. Hydro-Quebec was issued a license to
operate in the US national markets, and this has also been a significant input to economic
development of the province. Energy sharing and interchanging agreements are of
significant importance along with numerous other issues that are mostly administered at
federal-provincial level. Although not directly and separately signed, the agreements
between Canadian and US states and provinces are substantial examples of
paradiplomacy. Quebec is bound by Canada’s jurisdiction, and most of Quebec’s
international policy actions with US states are endorsed by US-Canada agreements,
however, Quebec’s interdependence within Canadian jurisdiction does not change the
fact that Quebec is recognized as a provincial government. Therefore, Quebec
Government has found the chance of advancing economic relations and cooperation with
the US states, and was not avoided from that opportunity unlike Catalonia or Kurdish
regions.
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Quebec in Action: Green Paradiplomacy and Paradiplomacy of Knowledge Regions
While investing in a great multiplicity of bilateral and multilateral ties worldwide,
the most important feature of Quebec’s paradiplomacy is the creation of a dynamic and
evolving foreign policy mechanism, which is made quite clear and is well described in its
International Policy document (2006), and subsequent formal statements. In that sense,
Quebec’s primary bilateral and multilateral relations are about economic development
and the creation of a multiplicity of trade partners, and the easing the processes of trade,
commerce, and transport. An important previously emphasized component of Quebec’s
economy is that Quebec is located at a geostrategic location, with its vast territories in the
Arctic regions, river basins, and a great area of environmental diversity and source of
water and forests which also makes the province a prominent actor in the diplomatic
agreements reached by states to protect the sensitive environmental equilibrium and
habitat in these regions, manage resources sustainably, and develop specific expertise on
biodiversity and natural resources.
Plan Nord, the Climate Group, Great Lakes, and other similar agreements and
their multiplicity are clear evidences of an emphasis placed on environmental
paradiplomacy. First, Quebec’s main activity was to ensure economic development
through trade and industrialization, the prioritization of global environmental challenges
and policies have eventually impacted Quebec and its international policy. Given the high
levels of dependence of Quebec’s economy and human life to the environmental sources,
the emphasis of climate change, deforestation, pollution and other challenges were
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strategically approached, therefore, making Quebec a global actor in this area. This is
also because Quebec has a history of know-how and research in environmental resources
being invested in this area of expertise.
There is definitely a high level synergy between the contiguous northern states of
the U.S. and Quebec, especially those that share borders. The agreement of
environmental cooperation regarding the management of Lake Champlain, which was
signed by New York State and Vermont (2003), or the bilateral cooperation agreements
with Maine in 2004, Massachusetts in 2007, New Hampshire in 2004, and Vermont in
2004, all represent important paradiplomacy actions between North American substate
governments. There is also cooperation and collaboration over economic growth and
trade, such as the Quebec-New York summits of mutual business people in 2002, 2004,
2005, and 2008 (Government of Quebec, 2016). While decades ago these relations were
initiated with trade, cooperation and development project, the infrastructure of the
relations around “border paradiplomacy” in Quebec has expanded. Beyond the growing
share of energy, new crucial issues such as the environmental problems and climate
change have become the ultimate area of paradiplomacy given the magnitude of shared
borders, lakes, water and other natural sources.
The US has been a historically strategic partner to Quebec, and possibly the most
important source of economic growth in Canada and Quebec. With a market of over 300
million consumers, countless companies, investors and services, the US simply is the
major target of Quebec businesses. The major export of Quebec to the United States has
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been energy, notably electricity which made of Quebec’s major source of revenue. This
symbiotic relation both decreased the reliance of the US energy markets to highly
polluting energy sources, and improved air quality in North America. Given the priority
gained by the issue of environmental risks and threats, the U.S. states and Quebec [and
other Canadian provinces] collectively work together, representing a form of what is
called “green paradiplomacy”. Moreover, continental security, education, free movement
of labor108 and various scientific cooperation and collaboration can also be given as
substantial areas of paradiplomacy between Quebec and the federal states in the US.
Quebecois Paradiplomacy in Context of Emerging Regionalism of North and South
Americas
Although Quebec has developed strong bilateral and multilateral relations with
the rest of the world, the main diplomatic target is the Americas region. There is an
increasing awareness of substate governance in both North and also South America.
While Quebec employs constituent diplomacy with other Canadian provinces, and the
unique provincial status permitting Quebec to maintain its own international policy, its
relationship with the United States is defined as a priority objective by the Government of
Quebec. Therefore, Quebec’s access to the states and provinces of the U.S., Mexico, and
Brazil definitely constitute a strength and a focus for its economic development and
politics. This area of development of paradiplomacy is significant, since it represent what
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can be called as American Regionalism or New Regionalism. The recent improvements
in North American substate governance, and especially the increasing trend of
interregional collaboration and cooperation projects signifies an important
transformation. While influenced by liberal federalist/confederalist policy, which
ultimately transfers power to substate entities (provinces or states) and provides them
relative constituent sovereignty, recent developments point to the outcomes of a
burgeoning new regionalism. The North American interregional collaboration is not only
about trade, but also the development of collective responses to contemporary challenges,
such as environmental issues, transport and trade related issues, security, agriculture,
education and health.
As an increasingly important layer of continental governance, regionalism has
sought new directions and contributions in recent years. Various bilateral and multilateral
attempts were made collectively with participation of Canadian provincial governments,
US federal states and Mexico’s federal states. Most of the collaboration and cooperation
between states occur at bilateral and multilateral institutional organizations or
conferences on specific occasions. However, there are also repeated participation of
governments and even their governors. Previously, the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement
was replaced by NAFTA which framed free trade regulations between the US, Canada
and Mexico, especially transportation, agriculture, environment and intellectual property.
NAAEC (North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation) and NAALC
(North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation) were two supplements to NAFTA.
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Although the policy of North American regionalism has been subjects to debates within
Canadian and American internal politics, there is a significant synergy which can create
something similar or even better than what European regional integration has created.
However, the dissent for the trade agreements must not be underestimated, since for
Quebec, preservation also means a strategy of market survival. Still these agreements
represent the dominance of central governments, and beyond these, federal states and
provinces also have actions constituting a core layer of North American paradiplomacy.
In February 2015, The National Governors Association (NGA) of the US, the
Council of the Federation (COF) of Canada and the National Conference of Governors
(CONAGO) of Mexico gathered at the inaugural Summit of North American Governors
and Premiers in Denver, Colorado. The conference highlighted the significant continental
potential with over 475 million residents and more than $20 trillion of GDP per year, and
the focus was to promote economic development and trade through investments of
infrastructure, supply chain management, education, energy technology and culture.
Similarly, various other meetings and conferences were held such as the ones in New
England109, or in New York, as well as on other similar occasions where governors and
premiers have met to discuss potential solutions to common problems including the
endorsement for cooperation and collaboration. Although these efforts increasingly gain

The New England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers’ Annual Conference is
constituted of governors of six New England states: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Vermont and also Canadian premiers of Quebec, New
Brunswick, Newfoundland, Labrador, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island. The
conference is held since 1973, and the 38th annual meeting was in 2014.
109
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depth and significance given the requirements of global political economic
transformations, there has to be yet a continental endorsement or collective similar to the
foundation of the European Union, a consecutive series of comprehensive agreements
and treaties that set the groundwork to frame regional governance. In its North American
sense, focus still remains on trade, environment and climate, education, security, health
and labor, and there is definitely a contrasting tradition and system of law making
compared to Europe and its old and settled intergovernmental traditions.
Under the regional frame of the Americas, Quebec has (subnational) diplomatic
relations with the United States, Mexico, Haiti, and Brazil. While these relations aim to
improve continental integration and the collective response to globalization, they are
mostly focused on political, economic, institutional, and cultural policies that promote
trade, cooperation in education, and scientific and technological partnership. Among all
of these states in the Americas, Brazil has a unique place, where Quebec is especially
active since establishing the Quebec Government Office in Sao Paolo in 2008, which
now signifies a policy cornerstone. Brazil is the only South American country singled out
for high-priority status in Quebec’s International Policy. Moreover, Quebec declared its
objectives in its International Policy and 2011-2014 Strategic Plan, aiming to increase
Quebec’s ability to act, by contributing to Quebec’s wealth by creating collaborative
partnerships in order to step up relations with political and economic decision makers.
Notably, this is accomplished by strengthening the role of federated states on the
international stage, developing cooperative relations, and finally by promoting Quebec’s
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identity, culture, and its diversity of cultural expressions, which is a core principle in
Quebec’s agenda. Since 2000, Quebec ministers have carried out seven missions in Brazil
while Brazilian ministers have also visited Quebec dozens of times (Government of
Quebec, 2016). In 2004, a multisector agreement was signed between Quebec and Brazil,
while also maintaining four regions of focus, which are: Sao Paolo, Rio de Janeiro,
Parana, and Minas Gerais.
Mexico is also defined as a priority growth market in the International Policy of
the Government of Quebec. For 35 years, Quebec has had a diplomatic presence in
Mexico, notably in economic, political, cultural and educational fields, and the province
also has invested in developing diplomatic ties with the federal states of Jalisco,
Guanajuato, and Nuevo León. Mexico’s foreign policy intends to develop close relations
with other member countries of NAFTA, thus influencing Quebec and Mexico relations
and describing them as a strategic priority. Both parties’ high level representatives have
met in international audiences, conducted mutual visits, organizing joint events. In 2009,
the Government of Quebec signed two cooperation agreements with the governments of
the State of Jalisco and Guanajuato. Given the key partnership position of Mexico in
Quebec’s International Policy and its increasing capacity since the 1980s, the decades old
diplomatic representations have led to the establishment110 of the Quebec-Mexico Work
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Group111 (QMWG) which became a primary instrument for cooperation between Quebec
and Mexico functioning in various fields such as education, culture, research and
innovation, and economy (Daudelin and Dosman, 1995; Lachapelle, 1995)
Quebec’s Transcontinental Paradiplomacy Network
In 2006, the Ministère des Relations Internationales et de la Francophonie
released Quebec’s International Policy: Working in Concert,112 which was a key policy
document substantially explaining the Quebec Government’s strategic management of
international affairs. The policy was intended to provide the framework for Quebec’s
internationalization and integration into the institutions of global governance and
emerging political and economic areas. Five objectives within this framework include:
empowering Quebec’s capacity for action and influence, promoting Quebec’s prosperity
and growth, contributing to the security of Quebec and the North American continent,
promoting the identity and culture of Quebec, and contributing to the actions of
international solidarity. Within this strategic frame are also priorities of interest,
described in turn as: the two strategic countries of the United States and France; the broad
conceptualization of La Francophonie; certain international organizations (priority
countries in Europe, other than France) and institutions of the European Union; as well as
certain emerging markets in the Americas and Asia (Government of Quebec, 2016,
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p.107). Furthermore, the 2006-2009 Action Plan was released by the ministry as a part of
the new strategy, and two subsequent reports were released, the Status Reports for 20072008 and 2008-2009, respectively, monitoring the implementation of international policy
strategy. Finally, the strategy was renewed in 2009, with the 2009-2014 Action Plan,
focusing on weaknesses in the previous drafts, notably by extensively monitoring the
emerging paradiplomatic governance processes.
Quebec now has 26 diplomatic offices in 14 countries, 7 general delegations, 4
delegations, 8 bureaus, 5 trade offices and 2 areas of representation in bilateral and
multilateral affairs. The province has concluded 700 agreements with 80 countries and
federal states. Quebec’s foreign policy apparatus has grown significantly in various
periods notably with pro-sovereignty motives. Compared to other federal states and
provinces in North America most of which minimized their budget spending for
international outposts, Quebec has simply boosted its international leviathan with
Quebecois quasi-ambassadors (Woods, 2014). Although expanded continuously recent
budget cuts were made laying off workers as well.
Quebec recently experiences an economic stagnation, and significantly more jobs
are created in Ontario compared to Quebec: 100.000 vs. 30.000 by 2011, and Quebec was
projected to have the second lowest rate of economic development in Canada by 2015
(Dorval113, 2014). Consequently, recent news indicated that budget cuts114 to be made
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especially in foreign representations by 25%. To link the political institutions’ role in this
variation can be explained by the various stances of the political parties as well. PQ has
supported pro-sovereignty movements, and foreign representations play a key role,
therefore, PQ ruling periods represent expansion of Quebec paradiplomacy, while Liberal
Party periods, or decreased pro-sovereignty but increased liberal federalist times
represent policies of benefiting from Canada’s diplomatic network and keeping
Quebecois paradiplomacy mechanism limited.
Formal diplomatic interconnections of Quebec can be categorized in a few
clusters. First, are the International Agreements reached between the Government of
Quebec and a foreign government or international organizations, a total of 741 signed to
date, among which 380 are still currently in force. Second, the Agreements with
International Non-Governmental Organizations (iNGOs), which constitute a total of 62
agreements. Third, the Non-Binding Agreements that are various forms of declarations of
intent and joint statements, joint press releases and report of discussions, which number a
total of 201 agreements. Fourth, the Multilateral Conventions, which are simply
mechanisms that involve several contracting parties that are generally initiated by
international organizations whose memberships are comprised of a large number of
sovereign states including Canada. There are a total of 31 international conventions with
institutions and organizations that include the United Nations, UNESCO, UNDP,
International Labor Organization, and many others. Finally, there are the agreements
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reached by the Government of Canada with foreign actors that expressly impacted
Quebec’s constitutional jurisdiction, of which a total of 13 bilateral and multilateral such
binding agreements can be enumerated (Government of Quebec, 2016).115
Quebec’s Relations with the European Union: France, UK and Others
The European Union holds an important place in Quebec’s international politics,
since it is the second largest trading destination of Quebec after the North American
continent, and its primary cultural market. Quebec is also a formal associate member of
the Assembly of European Regions (AER). The Quebec Government carved out a
strategic plan116 for its relations with Europe in the last decade, the Canada-EU
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), the Quebec-France Agreement
on the Mutual Recognition of Professional Qualifications, and the Plan Nord are all major
pioneers of this strategy. Declared in February 2012, the European Strategy of the
Quebec Government proposes five priority objectives that are to promote economic
prosperity, cooperation in research and innovation, individual mobility, Quebec’s culture,
and to increase Quebec’s capacity to take international action and to develop expertise.
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The 2006 strategic plan is a key step for Quebec’s expanding international policy, and
the EU is definitely a strategic partner of Quebec and Canada. The creation of the
European Union Center of Excellence between McGill University and Université
Montréal can be seen as an example of an academic/institutional reflection of the
international policy. The relations have a much longer history, prior to 2006, and have
also expanded since then.
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The Strategy’s 2012-2015 Action Plan117 notably proposes 25 measures for the
representations of diplomatic networks Quebec has in Europe, who are also mandated to
implement the strategy.
Beside the comprehensive agreement between the Canadian Government and the
EU, Quebec’s Foreign Policy has a highly institutionalized and substantial European
focus. While both Quebec and EU have mutual diplomatic representations at the
multilateral level, which are again shaped by broader Canada-EU relations, countries
such as France, UK, Germany, Spain, Italy and Russia are defined as priority targets for
Quebec’s international policy strategy around which Quebec’s Government and
institutions organize their foreign policy actions. Among all of these, France
unsurprisingly has the most institutionalized diplomacy with Quebec, given their
centuries-long shared political history and cultural heritage. Although France’s departure
in late colonial history, and subsequent British dominance has created a formal cut-off or
at least a much lower profile in their bilateral ties, leaving the ruling elite and settlers to
their own instittuions, within the last 50 years,118 Quebec and France have nonetheless
maintained a continuously renewed and expanded relationship. This has been defined as
direct and special, and was born from a shared political desire that transcends partisan
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allegiances, thus their relations are supported by networks of both parties covering every
field of activity (Government of Quebec, 2016). Quebec officially describes France as a
strategic partner, and possibly the most advanced alliance it has, to such a degree that
they design joint diplomatic actions119 in third countries and/or with multilateral
audiences. The diplomatic relations between France and Quebec are represented at the
highest level of both parties in the series of Alternating Meetings120 in which the Premier
of Quebec meets with the Prime Minister of France in alternating succession, starting for
the first time in 1977 when these meetings were initially launched. This signifies a great
deal in their diplomatic relations, as most of their bilateral agreements, and common
strategic positions are debated and signed in these meetings, which have become
increasingly central for both parties.
France and Quebec have a multiplicity of diplomatic networks, which are
managed by the diplomatic channel formed by the Quebec Government Office in Paris
and the Consulate General of France in Quebec City. While representing a centuries old
relationship, the contemporary diplomacy was initiated in 1961 by Lesage, the Premier of
Quebec, and Malraux, the Minister of Cultural Affairs of France, with the creation of the
“Maison du Quebec”. This further played a key role in building modern relations between
the two parties, and became the Quebec Government Office in Paris (DGQP) in 1964;
and therefore celebrated its 50th anniversary in 2011 with the creation of a comprehensive
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political, economic, cultural, and scientific program. That being said, the French General
Consulate in Quebec is now 150 years old, representing a much older presence. Direction
France is another organizational unit of the Quebec Government, acting as a liaison
between DGQP and the Consulate General of France.
It is almost impossible to trace the development of Quebec’s international
presence without Gerin-Lajoie, who played a prominent role in carving out an
international policy mechanism of Quebec. In 1960s, while Quebec was passing through
the Quiet Revolution, and Lesage Government was in place, the minister of education,
Paul Gerin-Lajoie went to Paris to meet Malraux, the minister of education in France’s
De Gaulle Government. He was strongly recommended to increase Quebec-Paris
relations, which eventually led to the opening of La Maison du Quebec a Paris, a
foundational action. Given the sympathy from De Gaulle government towards Quebec,
and also the immense need of education in Quebec, first agreements were made with
France in 1965. The question was to carve out a jurisdictionally sound method to sustain
this path of internationalization, and the doctrine was framed in this context, deriving its
ruling force from historical acts and agreements recognizing Quebec rights, therefore
successfully legitimizing the paradiplomatic actions of Quebec within and in relation to
the Canada’s constitutional jurisdiction.
A secondary piece of evidence of the strength of the diplomatic ties between
France and Quebec is the depth of the relations, as well as the multilevel nature of them.
Besides their bilateral ties at the national level, both actors have significant subnational
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relations that promote decentralized cooperation. While this framework includes
municipalities and regional conferences of elected officials in Quebec and France, the
action plans were signed by the general delegation in Paris and the presidents of six
French regions: Alsace, Aquitaine, Ile-de-France, Midi-Pyrénées, Poitou-Charentes, and
Rhône-Alpes. There are also various other institutions and organizations representing the
solid relation between Quebec and France, such as the Permanent Commission of FrancoQuebecois Cooperation (CPCFQ), which plays a pioneer role in the creation of funds and
projects between regions; or the Franco-Quebec Office for the Youth (QFQJ); the FranceQuebec Association (AFQ); Committee of French-Quebecois Policy Action (CAP-FQ);
and the Franco-Quebecois Group of Economic Cooperation (GFQCE).
Even if France left Quebec for a long-term period, in the last few decades FrenchQuebec relations were significantly improved, reflecting to highest level diplomacy
between two parties. However, there are moments in French politics when Quebec’s prosovereignty position is supported, rejected or neutrally approached by France. The nature
of the relationship between Quebec and France was defined as “triangular”, since it
eventually represents a relation between Quebec, Ottawa and Paris, and although French
support for Quebec has been significant121 since De Gaulle government, and partial
endorsement arise from French politics, recent relations are not direct, but as I
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abovementioned, triangular. Notably between Sarkozy Government, Harper and later
Hollande, there has been an emphasis on strengthening French-Canada ties, and
conservative Harper acted quite Francophile unexpectedly presenting France a strategic
Canadian ally, notably in Afghanistan and Libya, therefore representing a normalization
of relations since 1970 (Cornut, 2014, pp.86-95). Although highest level diplomatic
meetings took place notably when Hollande visited122 Quebec and met with the Premier,
and expressed French-Quebec relations “to be more than just nostalgia”, French-Canada
relations ultimately dominate the sphere of intergovernmental interactions politically,
economically and jurisdictionally. However, still it must be remembered that Hollande
left Sarkozy’s anto-sovereignty position, and changed France’s stance to “neutral”
towards Quebec sovereignty, and expressed on many occasions advancement and
improvement of bilateral ties.
The United Kingdom is also one of the priority countries identified in Quebec’s
International policy, and somewhat substantial, as it was one of the first to build direct
ties with the Quebec government as a colonial power rival to France. The Quebec
Government Office was opened in London in 1962, and since then relations have
expanded and grown into a strong partnership in political, economic, and institutional
areas. Diplomatic relations are conducted at the highest level between parties, notably
with participation and endorsement of British royal family members and their official
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visits and meetings with Quebec and Canada Government officials. In 2011, the UK was
Quebec’s third123 largest global trade partner with a total124 of $5.8 billion, 25.4% lower
than the previous year (Government of Quebec, 2016).
Another European actor maintaining close diplomatic relations with Quebec is
Germany, increasingly so in the past decade. Beside the bilateral ties between both
parties, as well as the multilateral framework of governance (EU), there are also strong
and unique substate diplomacy examples of German landers such as Bavaria and Saxony,
both of which have bilateral ties with Quebec, and also global cities such as Munich,
Berlin, and Dusseldorf, where Quebec also maintains diplomatic presence. Spain is
another substantial actor maintaining direct diplomatic ties with Quebec; however, this
relationship is unique, since most of the diplomatic channels are weighted in Catalonia.
While the Catalan Government and Quebec maintain a higher-level collaboration
compared to other regions, the Basque Country has its own diplomatic ties, as does the
autonomous community of Madrid. In sum, there is a significant economic relationship
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See http://www.mrif.gouv.qc.ca/en/relations-du-quebec/europe/royaume-uni/secteursde-collaboration.
124
This decline was the combined result of declining imports and exports. Québec's
international exports (2011) to the United Kingdom totaled $1.2 billion, down 38.5%
from the previous year. The decrease is tied to declining exports of airplanes and other
aircraft (-$723.1 million), which had surged in 2010 (+$362.8 million). Imports from the
United Kingdom totaled $4.6 billion, down 20.9% from the previous year. This drop can
be explained by declining imports of crude petroleum oils (-$1.7 billion). Québec imports
represented 44.4% of the value of Canadian imports from the U.K. In 2011, the U.K. was
Québec’s third largest international supplier (Government of Quebec, 2016, available at:
http://www.mrif.gouv.qc.ca/en/relations-du-quebec/europe/royaume-uni/secteurs-decollaboration.

265
between Quebec and Spain, since 40% of Canada’s trade with Spain is from Quebec
(Government of Quebec, 2016). The Quebec Government notably emphasizes its strong
historical ties with Catalonia, and collaboration with the Catalan Government is strongest
on issues such as cultural diversity, identity issues, language policies and protection,
immigration integration, openness to the world, economic development, and development
and growth of the knowledge economy. As can be seen, there is a significant emphasis on
identity, language, and culture, which all together make up both Quebec and Catalonia’s
similar national interests and nation building experiences.
Similar to the relationship with Catalonia in Spain, the Belgian diplomatic ties
with Quebec also represent a decentralized level of international policy, since both
Wallonia and Flanders have their own diplomatic relations with Quebec. Belgium as a
whole has a history of diplomacy with Quebec, since the Quebec Government Office in
Brussels (DGQB) opened in 1972. This relationship, in the beginning was targeting the
Benelux area specifically, and later transformed when Brussels became the European
Capital, where the main EU institutions are located, along with a great web of
international actors and their diplomatic representations. In the 1980s, Quebec’s presence
transformed, as Wallonia and Flanders started to organize their own foreign policy
mechanisms, thus leading Quebec’s development of direct diplomatic ties with both
regions. Italy is another important actor maintaining good relations with Quebec. The
Quebec Government Office in Rome was formally recognized as a diplomatic mission in
1982, strengthening their bilateral ties. Relations with Italy were initiated in 1965 by
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Lesage who opened the Québec Trade Office in Milan, which in 1982 was moved to
Rome.
While relations are mostly based on economic development and collaboration, it
is important to emphasize the fact that Italian regions have also developed a significant
capacity for international policy in the last few decades, and as a result Quebec has
diplomatic ties with several of these federal regions, such as the Lombardy Region of
Italy, which is known as one of ‘the four motors of Europe’, and hosts the World Regions
Forum (Government of Quebec, 2016). The Government Office of Quebec in Rome both
maintains relations with the Government of Italy, and also the Vatican City area. Finally,
Russia is also a significant diplomatic actor with which Quebec is recently developing
relations, notably since the advent of trade mission visits to Moscow, St. Petersburg, and
the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (2009-2012), with all of which Quebec
participates. Again, all of these international policy relationships are Quebec’s
paradiplomacy efforts that are legitimized only within the context of its Canadian
constitutional jurisdiction, yet, Quebec is recognized as a province of Canada, not an
individual political actor or state, therefore, any provincial international agreement is
subject to Canada’s approval.
Quebec’s Global Outreach beyond North America and Europe
A prominent feature of Quebec’s contemporary paradiplomacy is about tailored
international agendas, and in this context, the province not only conducts significant
paradiplomacy with North American and European states and regions, but also many
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important actors in global governance. The Asia-Pacific region was a prior area on which
Quebec developed a focus, especially in the context of globalization and emerging
markets; and given the industrial strength of the economic ties of Quebec with the rest of
the world, the region holds key importance for Quebec businesses and economy. This
relationship is especially institutionalized in China, India, and Japan, where numerous
offices serve various functions and services. Quebec also has diplomatic ties with the
Middle East and Africa, though they are not yet as well institutionalized and advanced
compared with other regions, and partially reflecting an anticipated decline in the
outcome of increased violence and warfare. Among all of the MENA countries, the
priority is given to those with Francophone history when developing diplomatic ties.
Syria, for example, previously had an office, but it was closed after the Syrian Civil War
opened; whereas some Francophone countries, such as Morocco and Tunisia, still
conduct diplomatic relations with both Canada and directly with Quebec.
Bilateral and multilateral relations of Quebec with the above-mentioned actors of
global politics definitely represent a state-like mechanism of foreign policy and
diplomatic agreement. In a sense, the paradiplomacy of Quebec is significantly more
sophisticated, endorsed, and developed than the diplomacy of many traditional nationstates. While the above-mentioned bilateral and multilateral ties provide solid evidence of
the emphasized state-like capacity, there are also other aspects of Quebec’s
paradiplomacy, such as its relations with international organizations. The Organization
Internationale de la Francophonie (OIF) has great significance, since it serves as a basis
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for diplomatic networks of French-speaking communities outside of Quebec, providing
direct access. UNESCO is another organization in which Quebec is formally a diplomacy
actor (as part of Canadian delegations), as well as the OECD.
Although secessionism and national/ethnolingual deviance is emphasized
commonly when debating Quebec’s paradiplomacy, more important is the dynamic
diplomatic structure, and the continuous improvements, innovations, and increasing
practices of good governance. In a sense, all of the various motives and reasons of
Quebec’s internationalization and diplomatic channel formation at both bilateral and
multilateral levels constitute the parts of a whole state-like mechanism of foreign policy
making. Quebec’s provincial jurisdiction ultimately serves the requirements of its being
signatory to major international agreements, and to being recognized by other global
governance actors. Not all paradiplomacy cases are capable of such key components, and
even if they are, their recognition is not as guaranteed as Quebec, which is welcomed in
numerous diplomatic audiences that I described throughout this chapter.
Conclusion
This case study summarized Quebec’s internationalization, more specifically the
role and significance of paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy in the making of Quebec’s
provincial state-like capacity. As described in various parts of this chapter, the
paradiplomacy structure of Quebec cannot be explained with a single or even a handful of
variables, as there are various directions, motives, interests, and intentions which are all
components of a whole system mechanism that is also clearly stated by the Quebec
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Government’s International Policy documents. Quebec has both benefited from its
national distinctness, notably in the scene of global Francophonie and in its special ties
with Europe, carving out its pro-sovereignty characteristics into a grand strategy that built
up significant self-sufficiency and industrial organization. Quebec also managed to
benefit from liberal confederalism under evolving Canadian governance, although many
present this as state of a constant conflict and contestation. However, neither the
province’s relations with the rest of Canada, nor with the other North American federal
states, constituted a setback to the province’s increasing international actions.
Comparatively speaking, it is notable and worth considering the various
significant variables in the sensitive equation of center-region conflicts. As can be seen in
the cases of Catalonia, Kurdistan, Basque Country, the Tamil, or Northern Ireland,
antagonizing and marginalizing the region with ethnolingual/national deviance and
demands for self-rule succeeded in creating not only regional but also national outcomes,
which on many occasions were similarly present in the Quebec Case. Still, Canadian
confederalism and Quebec’s consociationalist ruling elite still benefit from the presence
of the virtually semi-permeable relationship in which parties accommodate strategies
depending on the political and economic context. There is definitely interplay between
the systems of governance at the provincial and central levels, but also between the
political clusters of pro-sovereignty, liberal and conservative movements.
From wherever one looks at the Quebec case, it is a master case of
paradiplomacy, Quebecois simply were opportune to capitalize on international
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development projects and focus on economic development. With the Canadian political
system which enabled a jurisdictional provincial status to Quebec, various industries,
niche economic sectors were boosted in a state-led development program, starting with
Quiet Revolution reforms and Hydro-Quebec project, and consecutive steps. The checks
and balances between Quebec’s provincial government and Canada Government is
effective in creating the political equation between two parties. In exchange of increased
transactions and opportunities within Canada, North America and the World, Quebec’s
sovereignty movement declined opposing to Liberal’s rise. If Canada acted as Turkey,
Spain, Russia or Sri Lanka, and opposed to Quebec’s provincial development, or
attempted to minimize it, then, it would be possible to estimate that Quebec’s sovereignty
movement would grow. However, that was not the case in Quebec. Despite certain
setbacks, Quebec economically benefits a great deal from its surrounding provinces and
states, all of which after all the primary target markets for Quebec’s products and
services.
A last, but no less significant example, is the British brilliance on a similar issue,
the referendum of Scotland. Different than the decades-long offensive policies of the
U.K. Government in Northern Ireland, London decided to “play nice” when Scotland
scheduled the referendum, accommodating a touching policy by respecting Scottish
decision making, and it worked well for them. It is clear that in such conflictive contexts,
as was the case in Quebec, the center’s attitude on accommodating policies to satisfy the
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will of the province definitely plays a role. The more fruitful this strategic
accommodation, the less antagonist are the broader politics of the region.
While serving as a comparable case in the study of paradiplomacy internationally,
this case study may be extended in the future by focusing on specialized subfields, and
investigating the diplomatic channels I described throughout this chapter more deeply.
What makes Quebec’s case especially important in the context of paradiplomacy research
is the sophisticated, highly .institutionalized and advanced form of international policy it
effects; therefore, constituting a potential key case against which to compare other case
studies of paradiplomacy from the industrialized and/or industrializing world. Similarly,
the specificity of its history, its strategic regional positioning, and the significance of its
unique culture in its paradiplomatic efforts all constitute elements worthy of further
comparative consideration and analysis, some of which are taken up below.
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CHAPTER 6: PARADIPLOMACY AND PROTODIPLOMACY IN CATALONIA: A
CASE STUDY OF GLOBAL REGIONALIZATION

This chapter examines the progressive, yet challenging path of a prominent region
in Southern Europe, the autonomous region of Catalonia in Spain, in designing – or at
least repeatedly attempting – its independent statecraft. The paradiplomacy and
protodiplomacy of Catalonia’s non-central government (NCG) is a substantial example of
how a region can construct itself as a sovereign state actor, increasingly undertaking its
foreign policy actions under conditions of binding transnational frameworks of
multilateral governance. In Catalonia, paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy are both rising
trends, between which there is visible interplay towards independent state capacity
building, along with an increasing and intensifying global diplomatic presence by the
Catalan region and its communities. This chapter aims to identify the frameworks and
institutional details and presence of paradiplomatic development in the Catalan case, to
explore the ways in which this infrastructure is constituted and maintained, and how a
non-state actor leverages them into the functionality of a de facto state. I will also explore
the roles of history, geography, and identity in these processes, and in the formation of
associated and embedded institutions that facilitate and sustain paradiplomatic and
protodiplomatic efforts.
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Paradiplomacy has served as a pioneer of state capacity building in Catalonia
throughout the decade-long history of Spain’s tumultuous political decentralization, most
of which has occurred in accordance with Spain’s Europeanization. Catalan’s
protodiplomacy has also steadily grown into an overwhelmingly dominant force, with
increased government action and public support for secession, This is notably occurring
in the contemporary context of Southern Europe’s economic, social, and political
downturn. Still, Catalonia includes the largest port of Southern Europe, with its strong
industrial and institutional productivity, located between France and Spain, at a critical
geopolitical crossroads.
Declared as one of the “four motors125 of Europe” along with the regions of
Baden-Württemberg of Germany, Rhône-Alpes of France, and Lombardy of Italy since
1988 (Loughlin, 1996; European Commission, 2015), the region reconstructs itself as an
innovative and productive power on the emerging periphery of central Europe. In the
confines of Europe’s new regionalism, most of the key infrastructure is expected to be
denser, and closer to the core,. Thus, Catalonia manifests new forms of state-craft in
tandem with a new model of what a core contributor to the European economy might
look like.
In this study, I describe Catalan paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy by addressing
the following questions: (1) which factors best explain the increasing foreign policy
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See: http://cordis.europa.eu/baden-wuerttemberg/int-coop-four-motorseurope_en.html and http://www.4motors.eu/?lang=en
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engagement of the Catalonia region in world politics, aiming toward independent state
capacity building?; (2) what are the means and ways used by Catalan communities,
organizations, institutions and governments when conducting paradiplomacy and
protodiplomacy; (3) what strategy is accommodated to deal with contemporary
challenges, notably in the context of Spain’s politics, the EU project, and global
multilevel governance?; and finally (4) how might we redefine Catalan paradiplomacy
and protodiplomacy in light of more recent steps taken by Catalan society and
government, in its expression of national independence.
More specifically, I address the significant role, outcomes, and possible frontiers
of Catalan paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy in relation to state formation and state
capacity building. First, I describe the up-to-date accounts of Catalonia’s foreign policy
actions, providing a representative background of the overall political conflict between
Barcelona and Madrid. Catalonia’s hard policy actions challenging Spanish state
sovereignty, and also the Catalan policy actions that reproduce significant outcomes and
transformations in Catalan foreign policy making and implementation. Then, I describe
the unique conditions of Catalan state formation and politics through historical analysis,
notably focusing on unique path-dependent patterns of institutionalism and nation
building as well as moments of interruptions in Catalan national political history. In this
context, I describe and redefine Catalan paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy by focusing
on an ensemble of political, economic, social, and cultural variables. I describe the statelike capacity developed by the Catalan Government, institutions, organizations and
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communities, especially in regard to the Catalan development of self-competence in
foreign policy making. I address the causes, processes and outcomes of the drastic shift
from Catalan paradiplomacy to protodiplomacy, and the impact of this shift on
Catalonia’s future position in the face of institutions of global governance.
For the purpose of this research, I conducted extensive ethnographic research and
case study research to observe Catalan paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy based on
primary and secondary data analysis. Besides the observations of Catalan-Spanish and
Catalan-European relations I conducted in Catalonia and Spain’s regions in June-July
2014 – Madrid and Basque Country –, I also completed additional observations during
this research, such as Catalan-Kurdish, Catalan-Palestinian, and Catalan-Israeli relations.
The primary data of this research is constituted of 7 in-depth and 4 short interviews with
Catalan MPs, government representatives and leading foreign policy officials of Catalan
Government, as well as participant and direct observations and 5 key focus meetings with
representatives of an ensemble of prominent actors in the making of Catalonia’s overall
foreign politic actions, such as political parties, formal institutions, organizations, NGOs,
and activism groups. I also rely heavily on the secondary data in the analysis of this
research, since most of the key information is provided by official data sources and
statistics of Catalan Government, academic institutions, scholarly books, journal articles
and projects, conferences and official statements of parties and actors involved in
research focusing on Catalonia.
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Background: Significance of Catalonia’s State Formation and Nation Building
The global proliferation of multilayered governance, notably in the context of
intensified globalization in the recent three decades, has impacted almost all political
actors around the world, giving birth to an international regime called “global
governance” by many, or “multilevel governance” by others (James and Soguk, 2014;
Stone, 2008; Karns and Mingst, 2009; Stiglitz, 2006; Scholte, 2007; Rosenau, 1999),
defined as the contemporary management of international affairs in the absence of a
global government, and involving a broad collective of numerous state and non-state
actors, NGOs, MNCs, interest groups, and local constituents (Held, 2004; Scholte, 2007;
Ruggie, 2014; Dutt, 2012). This ensemble of actors represents a strong set of grassroots
organizational structures which are often beyond the capacity of traditional central nation
states, and can be seen in today’s sophisticated world-making cities, local units,
corporations, non-state actors, and even individuals, all of whom comprise the central
constituents of contemporary transnational political-economic interdependences (Panara,
2015; Riedel, 2012; Jessop, 2004; Hooghe, 1996; Goldsmith, 2003; Peter, 2000; Holsti,
1978). Paradiplomacy emerges as a key issue of importance, since substate entities are
often the central units in today’s challenging world of politics and international relations.
Regions increasingly function as the “strategic brokers between global and local” (Neves,
2010), therefore they impact all levels of political processes – local, regional, national,
international – which makes their foreign policy actions the foundation of the ever
emerging and evolving global governance systems.
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European integration stands for the most progressive form of combined statesystems, while allowing for and supporting sub-autonomies; and there is substantial
evidence of this drastic transformation in the emergence of new regionalism in the
contemporary era, and in which Catalonia has carved out a way to redesign its
international presence. Acting similarly to an innovative small state, and investing in
reiterating its deviant cultural identity and historical patrimony to endorse its national
identity, Catalonia has imagined and relocated itself as a contemporary knowledge
economy (GenCAT, 2015; Neves, 2010; Cooke, 1998).
Supported by a multiparty system of its own, representing a strong liberal
democracy, Catalan institutions have collectively formed a strong international
representation and diplomatic presence worldwide, which exceeds that of many nationstates’ capacity for foreign policy making. What makes Catalan’s case important in the
study of paradiplomacy is that the formation of such a strong state structure does not
necessarily yield ruling power, or substantial state sovereignty to Catalonia; notably in
regard to foreign policy and key fiscal decisions under Spain’s unitary political system
which historically contends with its substate entities by way of central nationalism that is
discussed further below. Thus, Catalan and Basque paradiplomacy cases differ from other
multiethnic/multilingual societies in the Global North, such as Canada and Belgium, in
their shared potential for eruption of an underlying conflict and the recent history or
armed violence in Spain, and are therefore somewhat similar to the relationship of the
UK with Northern Ireland and Scotland in some ways.
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The interplay between Catalan paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy is ruled by (1)
the conditions of both the national political context of Spain in which regions are subject
to ambiguities and contestations with central state institutions over state authority and
sovereignty, and (2) the context of supranational/transnational frameworks of
governance, specifically the Catalan case within the European Union. Spain’s quasifederalist system is problematic due to its ambiguous constitutional definition, which
eventually is perceived and practiced as a semi-unitary doctrine by Madrid; therefore,
increasingly pushing the Basque and Catalan regions towards secessionism, both in part
by substantial investment in protodiplomacy. Such an accommodation eventually
underpins the Basque and Catalan secessionism within the vortex of Spain’s politics,
where Basque Country enjoys a much greater degree of autonomy and fiscal freedom in
comparison to Catalonia. (asymetircal “federalism”?)Unlike Basque Country, Catalonia
did not engage in armed conflict with Madrid, but steadily designed an agenda of selfdetermination in which paradiplomacy is a key component of the region’s international
linkages. The use of “soft” and non-conflictive diplomacy by Catalan foreign policy
actors relies on a naïve and subtle strategy, while maintaining a balance with an
economically strong model for state capacity building. It's a grand strategy in which
Catalans have sought important pay-offs by avoiding jeopardizing the economic gains of
the region (mostly in tourism, industry, and trade), and avoiding confrontation with
Madrid, in order to keep the legitimacy of the status of autonomy in place, by which the
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region derives its rights of international policy making. It has been a delicate balancing
act, not without its conflicts and explosive episodes.
Catalonia’s progressive steps towards independence have been a significant topic
of debate among scholars of political science and international affairs recently, and an
issue of conflict in Spain’s politics along with the Basque Country. Center-region conflict
in multiethnic societies is not unique to Spain, but is experienced in numerous central
nation states around the world. Following the years of horror during civil war and
dictatorship, Spain has initiated a process of political transition into democracy in 1977
with Franco’s death. This culminated with the adoption of the 1978 Constitution as the
legal outcome that established the territorial model called “Estado de las Autonomías”
[State of Autonomous Communities]. The Constitution was a pluralist liberal form of
democratic rule which was principally designed to satisfy the historical demands for
recognition and self-rule for citizens and institutions notably of Spain’s distinct minority
nations: Catalonia, Basque Country, and partially Galicia. This territorial model
represents an intermediate stance between classical federalism and regional models,
however it has more regional characteristics than federal. More than three decades later,
Catalan and Basque citizens along with their political-social representatives, expressed
deep disappointment over this territorial model distinctly in terms of collective rights,
political recognition and self-government (Requejo, 2015).
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Emergence and Development of the Contemporary Catalan Independence
Movement
A proposal for a new Statue of Autonomy was voted on by the Catalan Parliament
on 30 September 2005, with support of 120 MPs out of 135, aiming to reform the 1979
Statue of Autonomy and to finally accommodate the Catalonia region within Spain.
Socialist president Pasqual Maragall stated that Catalonia is a nation. This new Statue
was approved by the Catalan Parliament and the two chambers of Spanish Parliament,
and also ratified by the public’s support through a referendum in which 73.9% of
Catalans voted in favor. Finally, Spanish King Juan Carlos I signed it and the Statue
became an organic law in Spain’s formal state bulletin. On 13 September 2009, the town
of Arenys de Munt in Barcelona Province held a non-binding referendum on selfdetermination which was later followed by over 554 towns between 2009 and 2011
including central Barcelona (Bozonnet, 2009; Euronews, 2009). Although this movement
of public approval of self-determination has gained momentum, it has mostly occurred in
a bottom-up type of movement organized by citizens, as opposed to formal institutions.126
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The subsequent attempts of Catalan self-determination expanded even more and
gained more significance, and eventually this grassroots support turned into a full scale
campaign with the Generalitat (Catalan Government) becoming a pioneer of secession
with Catalan President’s direct lead of the secession movement. In a sense, this grassroots
support could have been taken seriously since it gave hints on further expansion of
secessionism. Although disregarded by Spain’s institutions, this was a positive
development, yet, with no accommodation from formal institutions towards this
movement, not only grassroots but also formal Catalan institutions also joined the
secessionist campaign, causing a paralysis both in Catalan and Spanish politics, and
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Working in the other direction, on 28 June 2010, the Spanish Constitutional Court
rewrote 14 articles of the Catalan Statute and reinterpreted 27 other articles. The Statute
was contested juridically, as the opposition emanated from the Spanish People’s Party, in
power since 2006, and a right-wing player in Spain’s politics. This move has created
public outrage and four years later the Statute was contested with a 6 to 4 majority vote
of the members of the court, and its articles were once again rewritten, changing the
interpretation of 41 articles, most of which are about vital factors for Catalan self-rule
such as language, justice, and fiscal policy. It was a definite intervention of Madrid in
Catalonia’s rise, mostly perceived as a centralist coup.
A mass protest took place on 10 July 2010 as a public response to the ruling of the
Spanish Constitutional Court, with the motto “We are a nation. We Decide!”, organized
by a civil society group called Omnium Cultural in Barcelona. Later, in November 2010
the elections for the Parliament of Catalonia resulted in change in the equation of Catalan
politics when the central left coalition that had served two terms was replaced with the
Convergència i Unió, and Artur Mas was the new president of Catalonia. On 11
September 2012, the Catalan National Day, more than a million people participated in a
mass demonstration in Barcelona, this time with the motto “Catalonia: Next State in
Europe” organized by the Catalan National Assembly (Burgen, 2012; Minder, 2012).
This signified a historic moment, since formal institutions were also involved with the

consequently causing a drastic shift in Spain’s politics which can be seen in more recent
political party formations and deformations.
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mass mobilization this time. The Catalan Government and President kept pushing for a
new fiscal agreement, but Spanish PM Mariano Rajoy rejected it, stating that it is against
constitutional law, even if the same rule was also implied in Basque Country and
Navarra. Catalan President Mas, however, argued that Catalans demand a better fiscal
agreement in terms of fairness.
On 25 November 2012, early elections were held when Catalan President Mas
called for them in the aftermath of his government’s fiscal agreement crisis with Madrid.
Out of the 135 MPs, 107 supported the self-determination referendum this time,
representing 80% of the Catalan Parliament. Later, on 23 January 2013, Catalan
Parliament adopted the Catalan Sovereignty Declaration, which states that Catalonia is a
sovereign entity, and its citizens will be able to decide their own political future, although
the Spanish Constitutional Court once again rejected the validity of this declaration on 25
March 2014. On 13 March 2013, the Catalan Parliament called the Catalan President to
initiate talks with Spanish Government to schedule a self-determination referendum in
Catalonia with the majority votes. Out of 135 MPs, 104 voted in support for the call for
referendum, representing a 77% majority of the parliament, while both ruling and also
four opposition parties joined, and only two parties rejected it (PP and C’s) (DiploCAT,
2015).
Significant public and grassroots support was also a major component of the
Catalan independence movement, and Catalans remained active in participating in public
events aimed toward independence. 11 September 2013, Catalan National Day became
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one of the biggest events in Catalonia’s political history, when around 2 million Catalans
linked hands, forming a human chain around 400 km long, from north to south Catalonia.
Inspired by the 1989 Baltic Way, the Catalan National Assembly organized the event,
attracting significant global attention, and small chains of support were organized in more
than one hundred other destinations worldwide. The next day, the Catalan Government
and six parties agreed on scheduling the referendum, a historical moment; setting 9
November 2014 as an official date for a public vote in which two sequential questions
were asked: (1) Do you want Catalonia to be a state? (2) If so, do you want it to be an
independent state?
On 16 January 2014, Catalan Parliament issued another official petition asking the
Spanish Government to transfer the necessary power to hold a referendum in Catalonia,
which was inspired by the UK, where Westminster recently did so with Scotland (Some,
2015; Kassam, 2014). Later, on 8 April 2014, the Spanish Parliament voted against
transferring power for a possible Catalan referendum, mostly from the vote of the two
largest Spanish parties, PKK and PSOE. Although the Spanish Government kept
rejecting the increasing emerging demands of Catalonia, Catalans did not decline their
independence movement, and around 1.8 million Catalans once again took the streets of
Catalan National Day in 2014, this time with an immense 11km long flag mosaic in the
form of a giant V symbol representing “vote.”
Meanwhile, Catalan Parliament approved the Law of Non-Binding Popular
Consultations with a vote of 79% on 19 September 2014, which aimed to serve as a legal
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basis for calling a 9 November Independence vote which was foreseen in the Catalan
Autonomy Statute of 2006. The legislation was signed by Artur Mas, the Catalan
President in the Palau de la Generalitat, the Catalan Government building in Barcelona on
27 September. The continuous steps of the Catalans have also caused stress in Madrid,
and the Spanish Government has organized an extraordinary meeting urging the
Constitutional Court to suspend Catalan self-determination voting. This call of the
Spanish Government was received positively, and the Spanish Constitutional Court
temporarily suspended the voting of 9 November, further delegitimizing Catalan actions
(DiploCAT127, 2016; Catalonia Votes128, 2016).
On 4 October 2014, 920 Catalan municipalities (out of 947) representing 97% of
local governance bodies, passed motions in favor of the independence129 voting of 9
November (Generalitat, 2014). The Mayors actively supported the Catalan Government’s
actions; however, President Mas announced a new vote given the circumstances caused
by the Spanish Constitutional Court’s decision, stating that this time it will be based on
the public’s participatory process, meaning the polling stations and ballot boxes will be
set to allow Catalans to freely and democratically express their opinion on their own
future. On 9 November, despite all attempts from Madrid to avoid this historic moment,
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See http://www.diplocat.cat/files/timelines/Timeline_EN.pdf
See http://www.cataloniavotes.eu/timeline/
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Also Catalan President Arthur Mas said: “as much as they try to silence the people of
Catalonia, they will not succeed. We will triumph”. See the official statement of Catalan
Government:
http://www.catalangovernment.eu/pres_gov/AppJava/government/news/276182/president
-mas-much-try-silence-people-catalonia-will-succeed-triumph.html
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Catalans went out to vote, with more than 2.3 million participation, and 80.76 % of the
votes were in favor of independence while 4.5% were against. Migrants were permitted
to vote in this process, although in a legal referendum that would not be possible. Catalan
President Artur Mas called the results “a great success,” telling his supporters: “we have
earned the right for referendum, once again Catalonia has shown it wants to rule itself,”
and added: “I ask the people in the world, I ask the media and I also ask the democratic
governments130 in the world to help the Catalan people decide its political future” (BBC,
2015). Thus, the Catalan National assembly formed a pressure group collecting
signatures at polling stations for a petition to be sent to the UN and European
Commission to ask to convince Spain to allow an official referendum.
The results led to reactions in Madrid, as PM Rajoy called it a “useless farce”
although the voting has found significant global attention, and Mas stated that at least it is
a progressive effort toward a definitive decision. Rajoy also argued that participation was
low which indicated the failure of the Catalan independence project. Spanish Justice
Minister Rafael Catala called the process “a sterile and useless sham” accusing Mas of
pushing the voting to hide his “failure” to hold a proper referendum, and added that the
government considers it “a day of political propaganda organized by pro-independence
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Here is the official response of the U.S. Government to Catalans by Caitlin Hayden,
Deputy Spokesperson in the White House: “Thank you for your petition regarding the
people of Catalonia. The United States recognizes the unique culture and traditions of the
Catalan region, but considers the status of Catalonia to be an internal Spanish matter. We
are confident that the Government and the people of Spain will resolve this issue in
accordance with their laws and Constitution.” Available at:
https://petitions.whitehouse.gov/response/our-response-people-catalonia
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forces” without any democratic validity. Spain’s Socialist opposition leader Pedro
Sanchez was more temperate pointing out a new era in which Catalonia was not “outside”
of Spain but “at the vanguard of change” leading to a federal Spain (BBC, 2014;
Generalitat, 2014). Furthermore, there was an attempt to criminalize the voting by the
Spanish Government’s prosecutors, who filed cases for criminal charges against
President Artur Mas, Vice President Joana Ortega, and Minister of Education Irene
Rigau, charging them with disobedience, perverting justice, abuse of power, and misuse
of public resources. Mas did not withdraw from his position despite severe reactions from
Madrid, and he kept defending Catalan’s right to hold a legal binding vote for
independence. This time, early regional elections were scheduled, and were eventually
proposed as a plebiscite on the independence issue, if the Spanish Government kept
insisting on avoiding other means and ways.
PM Rajoy visited Barcelona for the first time after 9 November voting, and
severely criticized self-determination plans, stating that he is open to discuss anything
except “Spanish Unity”, which created public reactions in Catalonia once again.
Moreover, two major pro-independence parties, CiU and ERC agreed on de facto
independence voting through the early elections scheduled for 27 September, which
found both support and grounding in the public. Numerous NGOs and civil society
organizations have also joined, since the Spanish Government blocked all possible
alternatives for the voting.
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Figure 5: Public Opinion Barometer from 2006 to 2016 (CEO131, 2015)

Catalan President Mas once again called for early elections in September;
officially signing the legislation that formally recognizes the elections as a de facto
plebiscite on independence from Spain. On 27 September 2015, Catalonia once again
voted for parliamentary elections, and this time the electoral turnout was at a record level
with 77.4% of the voters, while pro-independence parties once again gained a majority in
the assembly with 72 seats out of 135. Unionist parties have received 39% of the votes
with 52 seats compared to pro-independence parties that received 47.8% of votes
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The two figures here are snapshots from the official annual report of CEO data
analysis, the original data is also available at CEO website:
http://ceo.gencat.cat/ceop/AppJava/pages/home/fitxaEstudi.html?colId=5728&lastTitle=
Bar%F2metre+d%27Opini%F3+Pol%EDtica.+1a+onada+2016.
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(Generalitat132, 2015). Later, in January 2016, Catalan President Artur Mas left his post to
facilitate the constitution of the new pro-independence government, and Carles
Puigdemont became the 130th president of Catalonia with the support of 70 MPs out of
135.
Supporting the recent experiences above, and representing the intensified tension
in Spain’s internal politics, the comprehensive data133 (see annex) of Baròmetre d'Opinió
Política [Public Opinion Barometer] of Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió [Opinion Studies
Center] shows that 64% of Catalans think Catalonia has achieved an insufficient level of
autonomy (CEO, 2015). Based on the same dataset between the years of 2005 and 2013,
Requejo (2015) highlights the massive increase (see figure 1) in pro-independence
demands that are endorsed by a representative collective of Catalonia, which he defines
as a new phenomenon since those in favor of independence were a minority throughout
the 20th century. Support for autonomy, or federalism has significantly declined
representing a shift in Catalonia’s politics. There are various reasons that explain this
shift such as: (1) the increasing weight of Spain’s stagnating and indebted economy
which fuels the already inherent fiscal contestations between Madrid and its peripheral
regions, notably Catalonia and Basque Country, (2) the escalation of the already existing
secessionist aspirations as an outcome of the failed constitutional reform processes in the
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See http://www.parlament2015.cat/ca/inici/index.html.
See http://ceo.gencat.cat/ceop/AppJava/loadFile?fileId=23356&fileType=1.
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last decade, which increasingly made autonomous regions unhappy with Spanish
institutions like the constitutional court, and the ruling political parties.
Requejo (2015) also advances two legal-theoretical foundations to the debates
over secessionism in Catalonia and other secessionist regions in liberal democracies: (1)
the establishment of the “politics of recognition” by the United Nations as an “integral
part of human dignity struggle” (Human Development Report, 2004), wherein
plurinational societies must preserve national and cultural freedoms at individual and
collective levels as an essential feature of democratic pluralism and its quality (a more
complex issue in plurinational settings than uninational ones). (2) The establishment of
an “academic” typology constituted of two groups: a) the “remedial right theories”,
linking secessionism to a “just cause” and a “remedy” to “specific injustices”, and b) the
“primary right theories”, that views secessionism as a right to a given community which
fulfills the requirements of nationhood.
In sum, numerous substantial indicators and evidence points out an increasing
possibility of Catalan secession, or at least expressions of the determination of the
Catalan individuals, groups and institutions at all levels which can be explained through
three major factors. First, there is a monumental Catalan cultural patrimony with strong
historical roots that underpin the distinct path-dependent evolution of Catalan nationalism
and national identity that re-emerged in the contemporary era. Second, the post-dictator
political environment of Spain was re-initiated by a seven member committee that
included Catalan and Basque representatives, representatives of the democratic
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opposition of Spain, and a representative from the Spanish nationalist right that remained
from the Franco era, and first drafted the 1978 Constitution in which the Catalan entity
was given the status of autonomy along with other regions, partially restoring Catalan
state power.
Figure 6: Public Opinion Barometer: Secessionism from 2006 to 2016, Source: CEO,
2016

Spain’s liberal democratic transition coincides with its EU membership process,
which is a game changer for the Catalan Government, since European Integration has
provided an excellent atmosphere for substate entities to be represented and to benefit
from the supranational authority’s binding policies over nation-states, as illustrated by the
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Maastricht example134. Finally, the global transformation of political-economic structures
and socio-cultural representations, and the important developments of the multilevel
governance structures that have all contributed to the new means and ways of power from
the individual to collective levels, have given birth to a new regime known as global
governance, in which Catalonia has relocated itself, centered on its international city,
Barcelona.
As with the governments, institutions, societies and groups, there is a great deal of
scholarship divided over the issue which makes for a dichotomous literature. On the one
hand, people advocate Spanish national aspirations in a nation-centric manner mostly
underestimating or underrepresenting the heritages of Basque and Catalan nations,
attempting to keep these entities as local as possible, and criticizing the so-called
“ambiguity” of the 1978 Constitution and its definition of “authority”, “sovereignty”, and
ruling power attributed to various political actors of Spain, especially those of the
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Three pillars of the European Union are the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 (ratified in
1993), the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 (ratified in 1999), and the Nice Treaty of 2001
(ratified in 2003). Maastricht is especially important since it set a comprehensive frame
and others build on its legacy. All of these treaties were updated in 2007 with the Lisbon
Treaty of 2007 (ratified in 2009) known as the Treaty of European Union, setting up the
entire supranational governance framework, which also ultimately frames the regionalism
policy of the Union. Politics of regionalism dates back to many decades ago, notably
when the Assembly of European Regions (AER) was created in 1985, in a meeting in
Louvain-la-Neuve in Wallonia Region of Belgium, in which 47 regions of Europe were
represented. In 1990, AER’s “Tabula Regionum Europae” published the first map of its
kind, citing a Europe made up of regions, not countries. Shortly after, the principle of
subsidiarity became the leading AER campaign to promote the role of regions in
European and national decision making processes, which later was recognized and
ratified by Maastricht, and subsequent treaties of the foundation of European Union.
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substate entities of Catalonia and Basque Country. According to the proponents of a
unitary nation state, these regional units represent separatism that engages in so-called
“conspicuous” nation building, pushing their own political agendas, and threatening the
unity of the country. This policy leans toward a security state with internal political
turmoil, and the intensification of conflict often tends to paralyze public policy. There are
also pro-Catalan –or pro-Basque – views that show the significant economic loss of the
wealthy and productive region as a result of Spain’s “unfair” processes of fiscal
management, and an outcome of Spain’s right-wing nationalism. Spain did not manage a
good negotiation with Catalonia and the Basque Country, and this mismanagement of
unresolved issues over the constitution, authority, and sovereignty has contributed to the
growth of the problems, increasingly in regard to the economic crisis and the escalating
unemployment rate. It is imperative to acknowledge the compelling story behind the
contemporary developments in Catalonia, although history plays a prominent role in the
processes of determination of Catalan nationhood today.
From Decline to Re-emergence: Catalan Political History
Catalonia has been the crossroads for numerous civilizations, empires, and states
throughout a long history, and has gradually developed its statehood starting in the 9th
century, which has evolved under different conditions and polities up to this day. The
region was under the rule of the Roman Empire in ancient times, and has endured Muslim
conquests that spread from North Africa and into Andalucía in the era of the Umayyad
Caliphate centered in Damascus, which later was invaded by the Frankish Empire under
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the conquests of Roussillon in 760, and Barcelona in 801, forming The Count of
Barcelona. With the decline of Frank rulers and the decreasing local support, The Casal
de Barcelona [House of Barcelona] declared its self-rule in the region, integrating the
territories of what is known as today’s Catalonia. In 1137, the Crown of Aragon was
declared after the marriage of Queen Petronilla of Aragon and Ramon Berenguer IV, the
Count of Barcelona. Since then, Aragons have become an important sea power creating a
maritime empire with the construction of numerous ports and expanding their reach of
influence to Southern Italy (Glick, 2015; Payne, 2004; Bisson, 1986; McRoberts, 2001).
Although stagnated in the early 13th century with the defeat of Peter II of Aragon
in the “Reconquista”, which meant the re-conquest of the territories from Muslim
invaders, Catalonia experienced a wealthy era in late 13th and 14th centuries, and was a
major power in Southern Europe. But then an ensemble of catastrophes in the 14th
century: natural catastrophes, demographic crisis, epidemics, and the decline of the
Catalan economy, led to the rise of turmoil; which, in addition to the AragoneseCastillian Wars, created a heavy burden on the Catalan region. In 1469, Ferdinand of
Aragon married Isabella of Castille, representing a new era in which the Crowns of
Aragon and Castile were united. Following the invasion of the Navarre Kingdom in 1512,
the monarchs of the region were all united under the “Kingdom of Spain” although each
kingdom conserved their political and legal institutions as well as their economic politics.
Catalans enjoyed the momentary, yet harmonious rule of Charles V and the Roman
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Emperor in the 16th century, to recover and improve economically although their
marginalization was still in place (Kagan, 2010).
The Spanish sponsored Columbus, a Genoese merchant from Italy, who
“discovered” the Americas, and eventually shifted Europe’s trade and economic gravity
in favor of Spain, from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic Ocean, which caused the
decline of Catalonia’s significance in both politics and economics. Although Catalans
still preserved their maritime presence, they were not included in the conquest of the
Americas, with restrictions over trade that authorized only Seville until 1778 (Sweeney,
1989; North, 1989; Dauverd, 2006; Balcells, 2010; Davis, 1973). The Guerra135 dels
Segadors [The Reapers’ War], occurring between 1640 and 1652, was a result of the
Catalan institutional and economic strength being protected by a wealthy union of
kingdoms that found the power to stand against the centralist/unitarist taxation policy of
Spain under Phillip IV.
Spain was economically deteriorated from the destructive Thirty Years War that
took place throughout Europe whereas Catalonia was strong enough to carry out a social
revolt, which later turned out to be a war for Catalan independence. The Catalan Republic
was declared under the protection of Louis XIII of France, allowing the French to reach
into the Iberian Peninsula during the Franco-Spanish War. However, the French were
defeated in 1652 by the Spanish. Catalonia was once again under Spanish rule, although
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Some sources cite this as a “revolt”, and some “war”.
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the Habsburg monarchy of Spain recognized Catalonia and its rights (Guibernau, 2000;
Moreno, 2007; Arranz, 2009).
The aftermath of the discovery of the Americas, represents an economic
deterioration in which the harsh emergence of piracy and banditry reached the Ottoman
territories in the Eastern Mediterranean sea. Finally, the War of Spanish Succession
(1705-1714) under the rule of King Philip V ended in the defeat of Valencia in 1707, and
Catalonia in 1714, giving birth to modern-day Spain. Since then Spain has tried to impose
hardline policies of assimilation, like forcing the Spanish language in the region, and
using law as a tool of dominance until 1931, when Catalonia restored its national
government, Generalitat, once again. The conquest of Catalonia in 1714 represents a
catastrophe for Catalans, when the short period of economic prosperity ended, and the
ongoing agreements that had improved Catalan’s rights before 1705 were abolished,
together with Catalan institutions and privileges, and the use of the Catalan language
which was later banned from the entire education system (Kagan, 2010).
Catalonia in the 20th Century and the Spanish Civil War
In the early 19th century, France annexed Catalonia during the Napoleonic Wars,
and Catalans enjoyed a relative freedom and re-institutionalized. The late 19th century
was the era of industrialization throughout Europe, during which Catalans significantly
benefited; strategically using their resources, trade capacity, and a form of protectionism
for Catalan goods against the other regions, and specifically making the region the leader
of textile production in Europe. In this very era, there was a re-emergence of Catalan
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nationalism under the rule of the Commonwealth, which was born out of the increasingly
strong collective movements mostly representing a variety of nascent leftist views.
Catalan’s industrial strength was associated with a strong working class whereas
diffusion of political ideas of syndicalism, anarchism, and socialism were explicit since
the increasing inequality and labor exploitation were among the existing topics of social
engagement (Kagan, 2010; Boyd, 1997; Ranum, 1975).
An integration of various collective movements were achieved until 1913, mostly
representing an electoral coalition that was later named Solidaridad Catalana [Catalan
Solidarity]. The Catalan political movement advanced further in the municipal election of
1931, which led to the declaration of the Second Spanish Republic and revitalized
Catalonia’s Generalitat in 1931, as it was given self-rule authority under the statute of
autonomy. Following the electoral victory of the Left in 1936, an armed insurrection
emerged known as the Spanish Civil War (Stradling, 2007; Thomas, 2001). Although
they strongly resisted, Catalans were ruthlessly destroyed by Franco’s fascist brigades,
and thousands fled the country.
In 1938, Franco waged the Battle of Ebro, killing over 3500 Catalan separatists
(Walters, 2000; Henry, 1999; Brandes, 2009; Hughes, 2002). The outcome was a disaster
for Catalonia and Basque country, under Franco’s horrifying rule, which lasted until late
in the 1970s. Catalan rights were restored in 1979, four years after Franco’s death (1975),
and clearly repudiated the Franco Regime’s fascist right-wing political legacy, which is
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still seen, to an extent, in the asymmetrical nationalism exercised by the central
government of Spain (Preston, 1996; Brenan, 1990).
Catalonia’s Statute of Autonomy and European Integration
Spain’s membership to the EU represents a rigorous and often frustrating process
taking place between 1977 and 1985. The growth of European Communities since the
1950s has been central to world politics, given the zeitgeist, representing the will to
overcome the circumstances and consequences of two world wars and the inter-war
period. What was initiated out of fear of a possible German return to power by central
European countries and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), expanded into
an unprecedented interregional development and integration, which over decades further
consolidated and expanded its reach and became a major global power. Spain under
Franco’s dictatorship was excluded from these processes until the late 1970s (Moreno,
1998), since it represented a regime incompatible with European integration and its
foundational values. Viewed by many as a “remnant” of the war era, because it had
received significant backing from Axis powers during Civil War (1936-1939), Franco
later offered Hitler’s regime his support. Spain was also the only country besides Finland
that was excluded from the US backed Marshall Plan of European reconstruction, as well
as its extension of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (founded in
1948), and the Council of Europe (founded in 1949), and which in 1950 become the first
European institution with its own assembly to determine criteria for democratization.
Moreover, Spain was also excluded from the major defense alliance of the Western
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World, NATO, unlike its neighbor Portugal, which also had a dictatorship under Salazar,
but benefited from its close ties with Great Britain (Powell, 2011, p.22).
Franco’s death was an important relief for the majority of both the European
political actors and also most of Spain’s political actors, since he was the biggest obstacle
to Spain’s re-integration into world politics and economics. This was so, even though
Spain had somehow managed to receive partial military, economic, and political support
from the US in the late 1940s, largely as a result of a Cold War strategy that made the
French-British embargo void, resulting in Spain becoming an important trade partner for
many European and other countries. It is important to acknowledge the spatio-temporal
intersection of Spain’s democratization and its Europeanization, since both processes had
significant impact on the formation of political, economic, social, and cultural actors,
giving birth to a new dynamic of power and governance in Spain. Pertierra (2006)
mentions that both events are closely related, since the famous “Munich Conspiracy”,
following which the Parliamentary Assembly of the European Communities adopted the
Birkelbach report, framing the “democratic” criteria for the accession of Spain in the EU.
Therefore, in the aftermath of the first free elections in 1977, Spain officially applied for
membership, which initiated a rigorous process that lasted until 1986, when Spain finally
became a full member. Since then, Spain has demonstrated tremendous development,
which made it a strong political actor in the EU. Comparing 1986 to 2006, Spain’s
inflation has fallen from 10% to 3%, unemployment has decreased from 17% to below
10%, and the GDP level, which had been 71% of the European Community average, has
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increased to over 95% of the EU-25. Between 1986 and 2004, Spain has used €211
billion European Funds (ERI, 2006).
The financial relationship between Spain and the EU has been a vital source for
Spain’s European integration and economic development. Yet, from 1987 to 2005,
Spain’s receipts from the EU jumped from €1 billion to €15, to €76 billion, while its
contribution also increased, from €825 million, to €10, and €13 billion. Industry,
agriculture, education, transport, and most importantly infrastructure have been the major
fields of investment that created significant economic capacity in Spain. For instance,
tourism in Spain has doubled from 1990 to 2004, from 33 million tourists a year to 66
million tourists. While over 5 million tourists visited Catalonia in 1990, in 2004 there
received more than 11 million tourists. The population of Spain has also increased
significantly from 1986 to 2005, from 38 million inhabitants to over 44 million, while the
same period represents a 17% increase in Catalonia’s population (Eurostat, 2011; ERI,
2006). It is also important to note that most of the European funds used by Spain were
allocated for key infrastructure development, improvements in agricultural sector,
industry, education and various fields of economic, political, social and cultural
development focusing on integration. Thus, an actual decrease in local investment is
indicated in more recent decades, since these key infrastructure and integration-focused
projects are completed, and now need to be paid back, eventually pointing to the actual
financial crisis on the horizon, which is now visibly perceptible not only in Spain but all
of Southern Europe. The funds were mostly provided by the advanced industrialized
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nations of Northern Europe, notably Germany, and indebted Spain with a significant
amount of loans.
Catalonia and Basque Country both benefited from the process of European
integration, reconstructing their government structures and political economic means of
power, even as they were faced with restrictions from Madrid, which increased notably in
the past decade, with the emergence of economic crisis. The decentralization of Spain in
accordance with European regionalism, most strikingly in the aftermath of the European
Union Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, worked in favor of the “centripetal” evolution of the
substate entities, providing them the space and means for independent state capacity
building to a certain extent. This can be substantially credited for the emergence of a
Catalan national zeitgeist, distinctly in the aftermath of the 1990s, since the region
successfully and efficiently used its resources for the formation of a grand
institutionalization strategy around which a contemporary Catalan governance and
national identity developed. This process is closely interlinked with the democratic
consolidation of Spain, since decentralization was the most prominent feature of Spain’s
new regime, and has since fostered the development of regionalism even further. Subject
to a long term historical-political debate across several centuries, and promoted by
prominent intellectuals such as Alexis de Tocqueville, and many other new left, liberal,
and anarchist scholars of modern classical theory, decentralization was among the most
crucial issues of the new political sciences, which significantly expanded in late
modernity’s industrial and post-industrial contexts. Whereas “the small” is seen as more
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beautiful than “the big” in economics (Schumacher, 1973; Kohr, 1957); parallel
examples can also be seen in the realm of the political, where small and wealthy
European states have managed efficient economies without risking large debts or serious
external conflicts.
As I described in the third chapter, decentralization has been a crucial process in
the endorsement of regions actively seeking to increase their state capacity and authority.
While this process has several facets throughout the history, with different tendencies,
such as: regime-enforcing, power-distributing, or the transfer of power from center to
periphery, various historical periods present different paths of institutionalization in
regard to decentralized governance. While it was framed by the UNDP in 1999, there are
different modes of decentralization, as Cohen and Peterson (1999) pointed out when they
listed distinct historical patterns, such as: traditional, French, English, Russian, and
contemporary forms. They also described three decentralization patterns, including:
devolution, delegation, and deconcentration (Cohen and Peterson, 1999, p.16; UNDP,
1999).
Subsidiarity and decentralization have gained even more significance136 in the last
two decades, notably following European Integration and the Treaty of European Union.
Subsidiarity is a general principle of European Union law,137 first uttered in the European
Charter of Local Self-Government in 1985, formed by the Council of Europe, and later
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more substantially established in the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, which came into effect
in 1993138 as follows:
“Under the principle of subsidiarity, in areas which do not fall within its exclusive
competence, the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at
regional and local level, but can rather, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed
action, be better achieved at Union level.” (TEU, 2015)
Numerous regions in Europe have thus found themselves in a great atmosphere,
as regional synergies have become the new centers of attraction for international
development, competitiveness, and increasing presence in international policy making.
What was especially expected from European regions was that they become productive,
self-sufficient powerhouses, and develop their international competences. However, it is
vital to acknowledge that each European country has different political, economic, and
social contexts, thus, some of the regionalism was simply providing an advanced hand in
the management of economy and politics, enforcing the state mechanism by filling the
gaps. Whereas, for others, with distinct multilingual settings and specific historical cases
of secessionist regions, it provided quite a different outcome. Numerous regions such as
Catalonia, Basque Country, Flanders, Northern Ireland, Scotland, and even regions of
non-member states, such as the Kurdish region in Turkey have found a great environment
in which to operate, since their nation-states were the official parties to Maastricht
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Treaty, and thereby required as national governments to empower their regional and local
constituents. While these regions, notably with centripetal – or even secessionist –
tendencies have found greater opportunity to bypass their national contenders, they have
also benefited from the direct access to international and transnational mechanisms of
policy making and implementation. Catalonia (like the Basque Country) is one of these
very regions that invested heavily in the European frameworks of competence, and has
probably been more motivated than other regions to undertake its own foreign policy
actions and to develop foreign policy making capacity.
Although the emergence of European regionalism and its developments have been
quite significant in the context of the European project, another tendency has also
emerged and more recently become increasingly dominant in European political
discourse. This perspective has simply carved out a plan to re-enforce the national actors
by putting more emphasis on their governance compared to regions, therefore limiting the
increasing political and economic space of the regions over the last decade. While the
European project was inspired from the theories of spill-overs and the neofunctionalism,
a central theoretical foundation that promoted the creation of supranational structures of
governance (Haas, 2004), this view has declined in more recent years, leaving a great
space of ambiguity over Europe’s future, notably in an era of challenges with member
states’ antagonism and objections to the Union’s policy making, and also aggravated
economic and sociopolitical conditions. Although this tendency of re-nationalization does
not create a totally backwards movement in the context of regions’ increasing ruling
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power, it clearly creates a club of powerful nation-states in central, western, and northern
Europe, thereby leaving Southern and Eastern Europe as economic hinterlands less
integrated with the rest of the vast region. Catalonia is located just on the periphery of
this inner central union which makes its geopolitical situation even more significant.
Redefining Contemporary Catalan Nationalism and State Building
Catalan independence is now a worldwide question that invades the agendas of
the media, society, and parliaments in Catalonia, Spain, and the wider European Union.
The European Union was a project that over the decades has suffered from the free-rider
problem, not being able to carve out a supranational constitutional framework, or going
beyond common market politics. The question of nations versus the regions in the EU is
not only about Catalonia, but also Belgium, Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Basque
Country, all representing a common voice that can no longer be ignored. In these cases,
nationalism is different from the predominant nation-state form it usually takes, and
rather than a backward project, these cases place emphasis on self-rule capacity,
autonomy, fiscal decentralization, and wealth distribution questions while advancing their
nationalist agenda. The modern remaking of the Catalan national identity movement,
Catalan’s industrialization in both the 19th and 20th centuries, and the recent reemergence
of a contemporary Catalan national movement, can all be considered the sequential
pieces in a gradual move toward nation and state building. The distinct path of Catalan
nationalism can be explained through this lens, putting an emphasis on industrialization
and modernization, which Gellner (2006) once described to be a key social process that
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will likely –but not absolutely – reproduce a kind of nationalism that has certain
exceptionalisms, such as those of Switzerland, UK, Canada, and Belgium (Gellner,
2006). Therefore, industrialization has provided some of the means and ways to defend
national unity, while others were assimilated into nation-states. Catalonia’s rich historical
narrative and geopolitical location confirms this perspective, since it helps explains the
continuous re-emergence of Catalan throughout the historical narrative. Still, it is
important to remember that Catalonia was always a main hub in Southwestern Europe,
quite industrialized and modernized, even more rapidly than the rest of Spain, given the
proximity of the region to France. In that sense, it is possible to say that even if Catalonia
was under the dominance of Spain politically, there has long been a Catalan
modernization linked to Catalan nationalism and its development, notably Catalan protoindustrialization in the 18th century, after the conquest of Catalonia by Spain.
The second theoretical stance to nationalism is the “imagined” construction of
groups, communities, and nations posited by Benedict Anderson (1991), though he views
the nation-state as a product of the enlightenment era in which it received its sovereign
power from the absolutist church. He defines the media as schooling, as the
contemporary place where society imagines itself, although its members may not
necessarily know each other, but all belong to the same community. Catalans restlessly
support their national emblems, the institutions, traditions of Catalonia, its cultural
heritage, and also explicitly represent its contemporary forms, as presented by many in its
sporting events, notably its worldwide football team Barcelona Football Club, which is in
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a great competition with Real Madrid. Football is not only a mainstream sport in
Catalonia, but is clearly a way of national cultural expression as described by numerous
scholars (Hargreaves, 2000; Shobe, 2008; Duke and Crolley, 2014). Also take into
account the motto published on billboards throughout Barcelona during the World Cup in
1999, asking: “Where is Barcelona?”, with the answer written in inverse: “Barcelona is in
Catalonia.” The role of the football team, its significance in the making of collective
Catalan identity, and the primacy of fan group networks is a unique distinction of Catalan
nationalism and national identity building (García, 2012; Tuñón, 2012; Spaaij, 2006;
Guiberneau, 2004; Conversi, 2000; Xifra, 2008).
Discussion: Toward the Redefining of Catalan Paradiplomacy and Protodiplomacy
Summarizing the context and important transformations that have shaped Catalan
foreign policy actions, we can site first Catalonia’s long political history of early
statehood, which was ended after the 1714 War with the Spanish Regime, after which
Madrid has had tighter dominance over such regions of the Kingdom of Spain. In this
historical context, Catalonia has been at the crossroads of major empires in Spain and
France, playing a significant role in trade and transport. This historical timeline continues
with more conflict, until the Franco dictatorship, during which Catalonia was simply
oppressed. This political history culminates with the last three decades, in which
Catalonia gained increasing autonomy, with the statute of autonomy in 1979, and later
institutionalized quite significantly, notably in the context of Spain’s European
integration and Europeanization process. With the changing geopolitical parameters and
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deepening of European Union institutionalization, Catalonia developed its state-like
characteristics even more fully, especially with its global outreach and presence, as well
as its international interconnectedness.
None of the regional foreign policy attempts can be isolated from Spain’s politics,
however there is a clearly visible Madrid-Barcelona conflict. Current experiences
occurring today in Catalonia, the repeated massive events challenging Spain’s
sovereignty, and bringing the question of secession to public voting, thus claiming
territorial state sovereignty and engaging hard policy actions, should all be seen in light
of Catalonia having established a rather significant state capacity, while still following a
legitimate path toward its independence. Spain’s increasingly polarized politics, the
emergence of new-left wing political actors, and ossified right-wing Spanish nationalists
known for their chauvinism, together contribute to Catalonia’s increasing secessionism,
along with the worsened economic crisis and migration issues that keep the European
project stagnated. In this context, Catalan paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy as well as
the interplay between paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy through which Catalonia
attempts to carve out a path toward recognition, gains additional significance in context
of possible Catalan secessionism and the minimization of its negative outcomes.
The Development of Catalan Internationalization and Integration in World Politics
Catalonia is a coastal Mediterranean region located in Southern Europe with an
intensively functional and well-integrated transportation system within a 12 kilometer
radius of urban Barcelona, at a geostrategic point where Europe, Latin America, North
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Africa, Asia and the Middle East connect. The capital of the region, Barcelona, is both a
leading port with advanced modern handling features that processes trade consisting
largely of high added value goods. With 850 interconnected ports around the world, via
its over 100 regular lines, Barcelona is also the largest modernized port of Southern
Europe, moving 43 million metric tons a year and a cargo worth €52,000 million. Each
year, over 2.4 million passengers use this port, making it the largest cruise line
destination (Port de Barcelona, 2015). The largest cargo port, Tarragona processes 60%
of the total cargo traffic, which accounts for chemical products, and is well integrated in
the European railway system (Port Tarragona, 2015). Airports also contribute
significantly to the international interconnectedness of Catalonia and the integration of its
markets to the world. For instance, 35 million passengers are handled in Barcelona
Airport from 200 destinations around the world, placing it among some of the top
destinations for global tourism. It was also named the best European Cargo airport in
2011, since it handled 290,004 flight operations and almost 96,522 tons of cargo
(Barcelona El-Prat Airport, 2015). It is also important to mention that Catalonia has other
key European investments, such as modern roads and railways that are efficient and highspeed. During my research fieldtrips, I used the high-speed train for my Paris-Barcelona
route, which was around 6 hours, and it is one of the most efficient and popular
transportation mechanisms for Europeans and global citizens connecting Central Europe
and the Southern Mediterranean, the high-speed railway can also be seen as a solid
indicator of regional integration.
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The distinct and rich Catalan regional culture represents centuries old traditions
and political and economic history; and adds to the region’s attractiveness for various
reasons. The daring architectural and historical heritage, from medieval to gothic, from
traditional to contemporary, makes the region a jewel in the Western Mediterranean
region. Master names in art history, Gaudi and Salvador Dali are only a few examples of
artists who left a significant legacy behind. The contemporary significance of the Catalan
region in world culture and tourism today is no less significant than before. Barcelona is
undoubtedly a vital source of the vibrant Catalan economy and its internationalization.
The progressive trend of the region’s worldwide popularity peaked during several recent
World Cups in which Barcelona’s legendary team worked as a formidable instrument of
Catalan national marketing. More recently, in popular culture, Catalan has emerged in
such famous Hollywood movies as, “Vicky, Christina, Barcelona”, or the European hit
movie, “L’Auberge Espagnole”.
It is also important to note some interesting features of Catalonia in regard to its
internationalization. First, together with Hong Kong, New York, and Hamburg,
Barcelona is one of the non-state capitals of the world with the highest number of
consulates – almost 100. There are supranational institutions that are represented in
Catalonia both in the European Parliament and the European Commission. Catalonia has
its own police force and national public television, and it hosts several very important
institutions such as the Union for the Mediterranean headquarters, which is a multilateral
partnership between 43 states that aims to increase potential integration and cohesion
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among Euro-Mediterranean countries. Also, institutions such as the Institute on
Globalization, Culture and Mobility of the United Nations University, the European
Forest Institute (EFI), and numerous prominent corporations have their headquarters in
Catalonia, such as LinkedIn. Catalonia’s long-term progress toward statehood can first be
explained through historical institutionalism which not only delineates state structures,
but also by the presence of a strong national identity and a collective Catalan
imagination. Being one of the most important ports of the Western Mediterranean, the
city of Barcelona has always been a vibrant center for trade, commerce, and agriculture
for Catalonia.
The War of 1714 brought a long and major disruption in national identification
for the Catalan people that lasted several centuries, largely until the recent reemergence
and efflorescence of autonomy and self-rule movements. Their Catalonia-Aragon Crown
(Sabate, 2013; Bisson, 1986) was subordinated to the Castile Crown, notably after the
Hapsburg Ferdinand marriage. In the 18th century, their laws and administration were
replaced, and most Catalan institutions were abolished. Legal documents, books, archives
and other written materials were burned. Use of the Catalan language was severely
punished during Franco’s time. Yet, after this long slumber, the contemporary
reemergence of the Catalan nation in various fields of activity in recent decades has been
accompanied by a growing Spanish reaction of increased nationalism. Many right-wing
groups emerged or organized around the idea of protecting so-called “Spanish Unity”.
These groups are more visible than ever, together with other means and modes of
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propaganda, which seem to some extent to be a coordinated and specific national policy
developed by the Spanish state. Media, press, and daily political discourses are widely
contested arenas of debate on these issues, and Madrid has increasingly responded by
using its institutions and authorities to enact harsher and more oppressive negotiations
and policies toward Catalonia. Ultimately, Catalan unity and independence movements
foster more than just the development of a consociationalist/confederalist dialogue within
Spainish politics, and are also accompanied by aggressively nationalist responses within
Spain. Yet, this escalation of tensions simply catalyzed Catalan public opinion toward
independence; there is as yet no sign of any significant de-escalation. Finally, the entire
political-economic crisis experienced by Spain and its regions also eventually gave birth
to a drastic transformation in the political party structure, and Podemos emerged as an
important left-wing actor in Spain’s politics.
Development and Transformation of Catalonia’s State-like Economy and Markets
In the 19th century, Catalonia industrialized, as were other Central European
regions. Its deviant national identity survived as a set of traditions during a long struggle
despite long-term oppression and policies of assimilation. Moreover, this collective
identity in the form of national imagination successfully updated itself despite the
interruptions, and somehow passed through a series of exercises in authority and
autonomy throughout a long history, sufficiently enough to become a European
incumbent to those unitary nation-states in Central Europe. Its most recent version, under
the lens of unique Catalan productivity in the forms of culture, collective organization,
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institutionalization, and industrialization, indicates a self-ruling sovereign politicaleconomic power that counts as an important global actor in numerous international and
transnational spheres.
Catalonia survived the recent economic crisis, which notably was felt heavily
throughout Europe, and Catalan exports have increased since 2009. Export of consumer
goods increased in 2013 from €20.7 billion, while capital goods fell from €4.4 billion to
€3.98 billion and total exports maintained the previous years’ levels. The type of export
products also improved, and evolved towards high and medium-high level technologic
content. In 2013, France and Germany were the largest destinations for trade, and total
Catalan exports to the European Union (EU-28) were valued at €36.6 million, which
represents 63% of total exports. The largest sectors involved were chemistry and
machinery/equipment. Catalan exports represented 26% of the total exports of Spain,
which were €234.2 million. Catalonia holds 16% of Spain’s population and makes up
20% of Spain’s GDP,139 25% of Spain’s industry, and 30% of Spain’s foreign trade.
Catalonia’s GDP is higher than the average European (EU-27) GDP level (OECD, 2010).
Catalan exports were €58.3 million in 2013, accounting for 28% of Catalan GDP.
There are now in Catalonia 49,050 exporting companies, of which 30% export on a
regular basis (14,680) (IdesCAT, 2014). The main export sectors are chemicals,
automotive, food and drink, textile and fashion. Each year Catalonia’s major international
economic institution, ACCIO manages more than 1,000 projects from Catalan companies
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wanting to export and do business abroad. By 2013, 5708 foreign companies had been
created in the Catalan region. Foreign direct investment was distributed in sectors such as
real estate, which is the highest performing, followed by machinery and equipment,
financial services, and more than another dozen industries, most of which are hightechnology industries (ACCIO, 2014).
Barcelona is the locomotive of Catalonia’s development, since it first transformed
itself from an industrial zone in decline, into a global hub and European center for design
and biotechnology. It attracts students, researchers, artists, companies, and tourists, and
thus has an important impact on the regional economy. According to a study by London
based Saffron Consultants called The City Brand Barometer, Barcelona was the 3rd in
Europe in terms of city brand strength (Saffron, 2015). It was 24th in the world in the
Global Cities Index of Kearney and The Chicago Council on Global Affairs (The Global
Cities Index, 2012). The city was also the fourth economically most powerful city of
Europe in 2008 (PWC, 2009); and 12th global city for investment in KPMG’s Global
Cities Investment Monitor for 2014 (KPMG, 2014). The Catalan economy is highly
diversified, which can be seen as an advantage since it plays a significant role in selfsufficiency. Manufacturing and market-related production services account for more than
half of Catalan employment. While 66.8% of employment is in the tertiary sector, 26% is
in manufacturing, 10.2% in construction, and 2.2% in agriculture; all in the context of a
regional economy dominated by small and middle-sized enterprises (OECD, 2011).
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Productivity (GDP per worker) in Catalonia decreased from 115% of the OECD
average in 1995 to 91% by 2005, more drastic than the rest of OECD due to the
expansion of a less educated and lower skilled workforce, and the insufficient innovation
of Catalan industries which already face global competition and industrial relocation.
Since 2007, Spain has been severely affected by the global economic crisis with the
second highest unemployment rate in the EU, at 20.4% the latter half of 2010.
Unemployment of youth also reached 43.5% at the end of 2009 with an increase of 24
points since the end of 2007. Unemployment in Catalonia is approximately 16.53%,
higher among younger citizens under 24 years (41.2%). Even if Catalonia has prominent
institutions for education, there is still a significant population (9.6%) that is illiterate or
without schooling (OECD, 2011).
Figure 7: Unemployment Rate from 2001-2015 Catalonia, Spain and EU

Unemployment Rate of Catalonia, Spain and EU
28.

21.
Catalonia
Spain
EU

14.

7.

0.

2001

2003

2005

2007

2009

2011

2013

2015

315
Sources: Compiled from Data of Idescat (2015) and Eurostat (2016)
Having similar economic output to small European countries such as Portugal or
Norway, Catalonia is the most important region of Spain and has experienced significant
population growth mostly due to domestic (within-Spain) and transnational (mostly
European and international) migration. However, Catalonia’s productivity stagnated
which motivated the regional government to undertake certain measures to intervene in
the economic crisis, most notably in terms of fiscal measures and indebting decisions. A
strong regional innovation policy was supported by the Catalan government and
institutions, and also by institutions such as the EU and OECD. The primary
recommendation to the Catalan government was to strengthen its research base with
R&D investments and the integration of the higher education system.
Catalonia represents 21% of R&D investments and 34% of Spain’s patents, yet,
22.5% of Spain’s innovative firms are from Catalonia which is higher than other regions
(such as the second, Madrid), which is at 15.6%, or Andalucía (15%) (Segarra-Blasco,
Garcia-Quevedo, Teruel-Carrizosa, 2008; Segarra and Teruel, 2011). The Catalan region
is also the second largest recipient of R&D and innovation related program funds from
EU Framework Programs. The research and academic system is definitely central to
Catalonia’s innovation policies and management of its “niches”, while various
institutions serve and support research in and for Catalonia, such as ICREA, AGAUR,
CIDEM, GenCAT.
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Constituting the primary strength of the Catalan Government and institutions of
Catalonia, the economic success and strength of the region make the issue hard to bargain
with. Yet, Catalan has very real claims that Madrid has stolen, or at least inappropriately
diverted a large portion of its revenue through a problematic fiscal system, and
accompanying destructive outcomes in terms of wealth distribution and redistribution.
What makes it more important is the obvious public confirmations that are organized in
purposefully “naïve” discourse, yet transparently auto-determinist actions without the
exercise of violence, given Basque Country has chosen the latter. Catalonia manages a
well-integrated institutional system acting very much like that of a unitary state, and the
self-determination issue is scheduled140 under the rule of these cohesive institutions that
continuously redesign themselves to differentiate from the national Spanish authority. A
proto state mechanism is born out of this institutional endorsement which is fed by rich
culture and history
Catalan Institutions in the Making of Catalan Paradiplomacy and Protodiplomacy
Institutions of Catalonia play a primary role in the formation of state-like
mechanisms and capacity, and eventually shape Catalan paradiplomacy and
protodiplomacy. Recalling the work of Duran (2013), paradiplomacy has been a
millennia old practice in Catalonia, as is the case in many other Mediterranean and
Mesopotamian regions, playing a key role in territorialization and reterritorialization
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An official government website: www.cataloniavotes.eu counts the time up to the
referendum, and informs the international public about Catalonia’s decision. It was also a
major topic in other government websites.
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practices throughout its history. Catalonia’s distinct institutions, first and foremost
represent a monumental national history with a great cultural patrimony and national
heritage in the form of cultural artifacts, historical and archeological texts, objects,
distinct architecture, and historical institutionalism. Remaining from the early Catalan
history in the 11th century and its aftermath, this rich national historical presence
ultimately keeps Catalan national culture alive, even in periods of invasion, war, or
oppression. I hereby summarize the institutions and mechanisms that make up the statelike capacity of Catalonia:
Catalan Parliament (Parlament de Catalunya)
The history of the Parliament of Catalonia goes back to the 11th century, making it
one of the oldest political institutions of Europe. The institution was founded with the
aim of unifying different strata of power, such as the feudal, religious, and public forces.
Also referred to as the Assemblies of Peace and Truce, it historically provided protection
for people under the sovereign territories against wars, violent conflicts, and under the
continuous private wars between feudal lords by establishing a system of guarantees for
the clergy and civilians, and also sealing agreements over taxes. These assemblies were
integrated into the Counts of Barcelona, and King of Aragon from 1137 and is known as
the unifier or founding father of the modern political institutions of Catalonia (with
extended territories) since the earliest Catalan legislative text Usatges de Barcelona
(Barcelona Usages) was enacted by Count Ramon Berenguer I.
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The financial crisis and cost of military expansion led to a series of formalizations
of the procedures of the royal court, and later Corts General de Catalunya (Corts
Catalanes), which were endowed with a written constitution by Kind Peter III of Aragon
in 1283. Existing since the 14th century, and named Generalitat de Catalunya, the Corts
Catalanes were abolished in 1715 when Catalonia was defeated in the war against
Spanish forces. Numerous attempts were made to reconstruct the autonomous governance
of Catalonia in the 20th century, for instance, the Commonwealth of Catalonia survived
between 1914 and 1925 with provincial delegations of Barcelona, Girona, Lleida, and
Tarragona, but was later abolished by Miguel Primo de Rivera. A separate Parliament of
Catalonia was created after the dissolution of the Catalan Republic in 1931, with a new
statute of autonomy that was later suspended between 1934 and 1936, and fully removed
by the Franco dictatorship in 1938. Thus, the first legislature of the contemporary
Parliament of Catalonia was elected in 1980, and constitutes the foundation of today’s
Catalan Parliament.
The Parlament de Catalunya is the center of Catalonia’s institutional selfgoverning system, and as a directly and democratically elected body, it has supreme
power over other institutions. The single chamber of Catalan Parliament has 135
members, and the representation system of political parties is very different from the
Spanish Parliament, since there are a larger number of parties with significant
representation. Another important fact to take note of is the unique systemic condition
under which Catalan parties organize themselves, which are mostly located on a left-right
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spectrum of opinions regarding the relationship between Spain and Catalonia. In my field
research, I found the great opportunity to observe the Catalan Parliament, notably in
terms of the process of independence, in which the parliament plays a key role, and also
during a significant political transformation in Catalan politics141.
Significant recent transformations in Catalan’s political system can be seen as the
outcome of the primary agenda of promoting Catalan independence. Parties and their
positions are often ruled142 by this context. Previously, Convergència i Unió (CiU)
formed a minority government under the Stability Pact with the main opposition party
ERC. CiU is a product of a long-standing coalition itself, under a joint list of candidatures
of Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya (CDC – liberals) and a smaller partner that
is Unió Democràtica de Catalunya (UDC – Christian Democrats) since 1978. The
alliance promoted the creation of a Catalan State and the scheduling of a referendum in
Catalonia for possible Catalan self-determination. Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya
(ERC) has 21 MPs and is the top opposition party, promoting a left-wing agenda with
motives of pro-independence and campaigns for a referendum on Catalonia. This
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Throughout my field research in Catalonia, I was provided access to the Catalan
Parliament, invited by CUP’s prominent leader Quim Arrufat, who both provided
accommodation and an office for my research, and helped me to arrange numerous visits
and focus groups, easing my research process, and also adding a snowball expansion to
my observations.
142
I found the chance of meeting and interviewing with 7 MPs, and observing 4
government and political party representatives at the highest level during legislative
sessions in the parliament. Although sessions were in Catalan, I received translation
support, and most of my interviews were in English and French. I have found the chance
to meet with members of various parties to diversify my data points.
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coalition was ruled by Artur Mas, the leader of CiU, who also played a pioneering role in
undertaking progressive steps towards independence. CiU collapsed in the 2015
elections, representing a drastic change, since it was a long-standing major political group
in Catalan politics.
The Catalan agenda for independence dominates the political context in
Catalonia, and there is a crowded spectrum of political parties, although larger alliances
are built between certain party groups. The CiU breakup reproduced another alliance in
the 2015 elections when CDC, ERC, and other pro-independence entities such as ANC,
and Òmnium agreed on creating a joint list called Junts pel Sí, meaning “Together for
Yes” in the Catalan language. The alliance received the largest vote in the 2015 elections,
39.6% of votes and 62 seats. Another major development was the political party called
Ciutadans [Citizens] – Partido de la Ciudadania (Cs) which previously had 9 MPs, but
won 25 seats in the 2015 general elections, marking a dramatic increase in its
representation. This group was created in Barcelona, but promotes Spanish unity,
attracting central left and right votes claiming a post-nationalist position, and standing
against possible Catalan independence. While the group had previously been the 6th
largest group, in the 2015 elections it became the second largest in the Catalan
parliament.
Another party group, Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC) was reduced
from its prior list of 20 MPs, down to its current number of 16 seats. This party is in favor
of a constitutional reform to establish a federalist/confederalist system in Spain. PSC is
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not the only left-wing party with a stance against independence, but CSQP [Catalonia
Yes We Can] is a group under which Podemos, Initiative for Catalonia Greens (ICV),
United and Alternative Left (EUiA), and Equo stood together, and was the 4th major
group in the 2015 elections. Another anti-independence party is the Partit Popular (PP)
which is a right-wing party in favor of Spanish unity, and the constituent to the current
government in Spain who are against the idea of referendum. While this group had 19
MPs before, in the 2015 elections they won only 11 seats. Finally, Candidatura d’Unitat
Popular – Alternativa d’Esquerres (CUP) is a left-wing party143 with significant
grassroots support from the youth, which had 3 MPs before significantly increasing its
total in the 2015 elections to 10 seats.
It is important to note that the overall foreign policy actions of the Catalan
Parliament may not seem very strong; however, there is still important foreign affairs
authority within144 the rule of the parliament, such as the Foreign Affairs Committee that
increasingly engages in policy making,145 due to the Catalan independence process. For
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I especially closely observed CUP, since I was accommodated at their office, a quite
active pro-independence group with significant grassroots support notably from the
young educated class. CUP has become a key party in the most recent Catalan elections,
notably with its key decisive power in the pro-independence coalition and increasing
trend of votes/seats.
144
My observations coincided with something much greater than I had expected, when
the ruling Kurdish leader of Rojava unexpectedly visited Barcelona upon CUP’s
invitation. I was therefore fortunate to have an insider view of a very unique form of
paradiplomacy at its highest level, to observe the tendencies and stances shown by
political parties, and also the President of the Catalan Parliament, Nuria de Gispert
towards Kurds, who were globally ascendant at that time.
145
See http://www.parlament.cat/web/composicio/comissions/index.html.
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example, I observed the speech given by Salih Muslim, the ruling President of the
Kurdish Rojava Region in Syria, in front of this committee146. Although all of the parties
have had an impact on the entire scene of debates over independence, and government
parties may also be seen as especially proactive along with other major constituents, CUP
was the most proactive group during my observations, collaborating on a worldwide
network of left/new left groups, such as Kurds, Palestinians, Basques, and many others.
The Catalan regions’ political engagements with Kurdish regions have dramatically
increased over the last decade, and I have followed each step of this unique
paradiplomatic relationship, from its initial “marginal” phase to what eventually and
clearly has become a growing relationship with mutual promise in increasing public
support and electoral successes in both homelands. Although quite marginalized in the
last two decades by mainstream world politics, the solidarity and collaboration between
these actors grew in capacity, impact and competences, notably with the participation of
some prominent European regional movements and actors. While this agenda was first
pushed by left-wing groups and a limited audience a decade ago, in recent years there is

Catalonia’s highest level foreign policy mechanism is the Ministry of Transparency
and Foreign and Institutional Relations and Affairs under which specialized delegations
function, such as the Delegations of Catalonia to the EU, to Germany, to France and
Switzerland, to UK and Ireland, to US, Canada and Mexico, to Austria and to Italy.
While these are structured under the organization of Generalitat, the Foreign Affairs
Committee functions under the parliament with members not only from the ruling parties,
but all party representatives of the parliament. The speech I mention here took place on
28 July 2014, after which a series of conferences and press speeches also took place. This
is a single very solid example of bidirectional paradiplomacy between Catalan-Kurdish
actors.
146
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increased focus and attention on these unique relationships. Besides collective actions of
communities, organizations (non-governmental) and groups, various MPs, and
government officials have endorsed, supported or at least undertaken action to participate
in these movements.147
Catalan Government (Generalitat)
The Generalitat refers to the Catalan Government, which is the institutional
system in which the self-rule of Catalonia is politically organized. The powers and the
authority of the Generalitat is derived from the Spanish Constitution and the Statute of
Autonomy which can be seen as the essential constitutional law of Catalonia. Generalitat
is a complex entity composed of presidency, the government, and other institutions
established under the rule of the Statute of Autonomy that includes the Council for
Statutory Guarantees, the Ombudsman, the Public Audit Office and the Catalan
Broadcasting Authority. There are also municipal councils, consells comarcals (county
councils) and other local government bodies designed by law, which are the local and
territorial level units of government under the Catalan Government. While Generalitat
constitutes the authority of Catalonia with the Statue of Autonomy, legislative and
regulative powers and executive functions are exercised under its rule for most of the
matters that are exclusively defined as corresponding to Generalitat’s sovereignty; while
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I have also found the rare chance of closely observing these multilateral actions, both
close up during my field research, and also throughout a decade long timeline, given my
proximity to some of the prominent names, such as the Catalan MP Quim Arrufat, and
several Kurdish, Basque, Palestinian and Scottish delegates (both from national
parliaments, and representatives to the EU in Brussels).

324
some of the shared powers are determined by Catalonia’s legislation under the conditions
of a framework established by Spanish State.148
The Catalan Government, an autonomous substate entity, plays a key role in the
endorsement and sustaining of the pro-independence project, and is also an
internationally recognized political actor, which definitely constitutes the state-like
legitimacy of Catalan foreign policy actions. Besides managing the entire process of
Catalan independence, Generalitat has set up a network of delegations before other states
and especially the European Union in order to represent its interests in the international
arena. Although Spanish media uses provocative language referring to these networks as
“so-called embassies”, these diplomatic offices represent the general interests of
Catalonia vis-à-vis those States or the European Union, undertaking lobbying actions in
those legislative processes concerning Catalan interests (this is especially the case for the
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In my interviews with the members of parliament and Generalitat, the process of
independence most specifically, was the major issue, and various expressions all-together
indicated a set of motives and perspectives. A key informant in the Catalan Parliament
said “Every Catalan citizen pays 2500 Euros per year to Madrid which does not come
back, but gets lost in Spain’s highly indebted financial system”. Another said: “Catalonia
is increasingly being put on heavy fiscal deficit that becomes impossible to sustain and
manage”, and “We are sharing our wealth, contributing to Spain’s economy immensely,
we pay for high-ways, institutions, and railroads; railroads, indeed are a big problem,
since Madrid brings high speed train to low-dense populated areas with Catalan money”,
and even “Barcelona is being robbed, rents here are enormous, and you know how much
I pay for an MRI, while there are other regions of Spain with free MRI’s that we pay
from our pockets, besides”. I asked a key informant, who is a member of parliament and
a party group leader, if there is some sort of conflict resolution process for any of these
cases, or any sort of negotiation, and they told me: “They are proposing 50% sharing
between Barcelona and Madrid, which does not help Catalonia either since there is too
much debt, and too much need to save up, which is only possible with self-ruling and
being liberated from Spain’s and EU’s excessive financial loopholes”.
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Office in Brussels), paving the way for foreign investment in Catalonia and Catalan
investment in foreign countries, helping civil society organizations in their activities
there, and the offices of these networks are present in New York, Brussels, Paris, Berlin,
London, Vienna, Rome and many other destinations around the world.
Catalan Government also has a Ministry149 for Foreign Affairs, Institutional
Relations and Transparency, which basically acts as a sovereign ministry of foreign
affairs with mostly soft policy engagement, and has set up its organizational structures to
manage diplomatic relations with the EU, Germany, France, Switzerland, UK, Ireland,
USA150151, Canada, Mexico, Austria, Italy, Japan, China and elsewhere.
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See http://afersexteriors.gencat.cat/en.
Although remained less visible in the realm of European debates over the Catalan
independence, there is a great deal of US-Catalan relations. While Germany remains a
strong voice against the Catalan independence (not at the level of Landers, but the central
government only), there are various U.S. Congress members who met with Catalan
delegation in the U.S. and expressed support for the process of independence on many
occasions such as the meeting in September 2015 when Catalan Government’s Secretary
for Foreign and European Union Affairs, Roger Albinyana, and Head of the Foreign
Action Committee of the Catalan Parliament, Jordi Solé, met with U.S. Representatives
Mario Díaz Balart(R-FL), Ileana Ros Lethinen (R-FL), Albio Sires (D-NJ), Dana
Rohrabacher (R-CA), and Carlos Curbelo (R-FL) at the historic Rayburn House Office
Building just steps from the U.S. Capitol.
151
It is notably important to remember a recent progress, the Catalan-California
international agreement which also created reactions from Spain’s right-wingers.
California-Catalan diplomatic meeting was on April 6th, 2015, when a Memorandum of
Understanding was signed between governments, probably representing the first of its
kind. Although this bilateral tie is in place since 1986, getting stronger over decades,
California, the 7th largest economy of the world, is known to develop collaborative
relations in context of “strategic appeal”, and the Director of California Governor’s
Office of Business and Economic Development Kish Rajan said: “"As long as there is
support from the majority of the Catalan people, we will continue to protect Catalonia's
interests" (See:
150
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Local Governance of Catalonia152
Catalonia is territorially divided into 41 counties that are called comarques in
Catalan whereas there are also 947 municipalities functioning as the smaller units of local
governance. The four units of governance include, Barcelona, Girona, Lleida, and
Tarragona, the historically urban centers of Catalonia. The Catalan Government seems
proud of its e-participation in the local and regional governance projects it recently
invested in upgrading, as it is functioning more efficiently than traditional participation
means ever did. The transformation of the Spanish state structures from a regime of dicta
to one of democracy is important, since it reflects and represents how the local
government and territorial structures were affected. Certain regions of the EU indicate an
increased level of progressive regionalization and a stronger level and state capacity for
subnational governance (Keating, Loughlin , 1997).
The territorial model was based on 17 Comunidades Autonomas (Autonomous
Communities) which had significant legislative and executive powers over many fields
such as urban planning, housing, regional governance, agriculture, transport, health,
education, social welfare and culture. Spain has a central government in Madrid, 17
regional governments with 50 provincial councils, and 8121 municipal councils
(Generalitat, 2015). Catalonia’s Statute of Autonomy was approved in 1979, restoring the

http://www.catalangovernment.eu/pres_gov/AppJava/government/news/282118/supportmajority-catalan-people-will-continue-protect-catalonias-interests.html)
152
I visited various local districts such as the provinces of Tarragona, Girona, Lleida
besides Barcelona, and also a few small towns such as Villanova and Sabadell, and
observed organizations, communities and people who are active in local governments.
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Catalan regional government structure (Generalitat), and the four laws of territorial
organization (LOT) settled the actual administrative structure of the Catalan region, still
organized around its 41 counties (comarques), and 946 municipalities. Over 500 of these
municipalities have less than 1000 inhabitants, which causes fragmentation in
administrative units. There are also consortiums, metropolitan bodies and mancomunitats
under the county councils. This historically grounded organizational system, stretching
seamlessly from the grassroots of civil society all the way up to the structures of a fully
functioning state, is one of Catalonia’s unique strengths, and one of the reasons it has
advanced so quickly toward independence.
Security Forces
Catalonia manages its own public security system, and has its own municipal
police institution; however, has not settled the issue of military protection in terms of its
designed territoriality. There are mixed feeling in public about the necessity of a military,
with nationalists supporting independence153 seeming more eager than others to develop
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In my interview with CUP leader Quim Arrufat, who is also a scholar of political
science and prominent advocate in worldwide activism around self-rule [autodetermination] for Palestine, Kurdistan, Basque Country and various regions and stateless
nations, he clearly expressed that there is neither will nor interest in creating an
independent Catalan armed force, and that the movements that are in solidarity with each
other are non-militarist in nature. He also pointed out that the armed movements in
Kurdish regions are the outcome of a much different context. Another key individual I
interviewed, who is a young political activist and an administrator at Catalonia’s most
active NGO (focusing on foreign affairs and relations as well as human rights and
contentious movements) expressed that Catalans have the right of developing their own
armed forces, representing a more centrist view of the Catalan pro-independence
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military institutions. Some see it as the only way to declare full independence, while
others raise rigorous questions about it as having the potential154 to fuel violence in
contemporary contestations with Spain.
The Mossos d’Esquadra are the police force of Catalonia, and are one of the
oldest civil police forces of Europe, descendant of the Esquadres de Catalunya of the 18th
century. While they have historically been in the form of troops and armies at different
times, it is usually constituted of locals who had to speak Catalan. In 1950, Deputation of
Barcelona was authorized to restore Mossos d’Esquadra. While it had military motives
and features at the beginning, the current Mossos d’Esquadra was reorganized after the
law of Generalitat in 1983, transforming it into a civil urban force. By 2008, Policia
Nacional and Guardia Civil of Spain were both completely replaced with Mossos
d’Esquadra. Mossos are trained in the Institut de Seguretat Publica de Catalunya
(Catalonia Institute of Public Safety) and their headquarters are in Sabadell. Having a
history that spans three centuries, and has institutionalized in its present form for almost
70 years, this too is an area of Catalonia’s unusual institutional solidity when compared
with other para-state and para-diplomatic articulations by non-state actors.
Education and Academia

movement. Catalan views on these hot debates were often plural and diverse in my
observations.
154
Although Catalonia is significantly modernized and industrialized, the arms and
military industries are strictly controlled by Madrid.
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Education and academia is probably the most prominent institution in the Catalan
system of governance, and provides yet another critical pillar. Providing the human
resources and cadres for various Catalan institutions, the Universities in the Catalonia
region are well-developed and well-integrated within the global system, highly involved
in scientific research and teaching collaboration with other world-class institutions. The
Generalitat applies a strict and well-settled policy for the use of various services and
regulations in support of the Catalan education and academic systems. Some of the most
prominent academic institutions of Catalonia are Pompeu Fabra University, Polytechnic
University of Catalonia, University of Barcelona, Open University of Catalonia,
Barcelona Graduate School of Economics, Institute of Advanced Architecture of
Catalonia, Autonomous University of Barcelona, Escola de la Llotja, University of
Girona, University of Lleida and Centre de Recerca Matemàtica. I visited two of the
largest universities, and I had a few interviews with some of the prominent scholars who
are also key experts on Catalonia’s foreign policy actions and Catalan political economy.
I specifically asked about the position of the universities in the society in general, notably
their role in feeding the Catalan state system and institutionalism, which further
confirmed my predictions. The Catalan university system is very dynamic, dedicated to
forming generations of cadres to run its state institutions, and also the know-how to
maintain an innovative and efficient Catalan region. The recent integration and
institutional transformations also strengthened inter-institutional collaboration and
communication, which further reinforces and encourages all of the parties involved. The
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Catalan Government, and other state institutions often collaborate, and include
Catalonia’s academic institutions in the political economic equation. Further, Catalan
institutionalism owes a lot to local research promoting niches, which has in turn
contributed significantly to Catalonia’s state-like capacity development and governance.
This collaborative action also influences third party groups such as NGOs, private
sectors, and other public institutions to be included in policies and implementation, which
overall improves standards and promotes development.
Media of Catalonia
Mass media and culture industries are well-settled in Catalonia, even if there are
claims toward the assimilation of the Catalan language. The national official channel
TV3 broadcasts in Catalan as does Catalunya Radio155; which are both operated by public
Televisio de Catalunya, and there are also numerous other channels, newspapers, culture
industries, and means of communication. The daily national newspaper, “La Vanguardia”
publishes an edition in Catalan for instance, the “El Periodico de Catalunya” which is
also daily with both Catalan and Spanish editions. Moreover, there are daily Catalan
newspapers such as “Ara” and “El Punt Avui.” Besides the Televisio de Catalunya (TVC)
which operates TV3 and some other official channels, there is also 3/24 public news
channels operated by TVC. There is a high internet usage rate in Catalonia, and online
channels gained more importance in recent years. Catalonia also hosts numerous cultural
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I observed when Catalunya Radio hosted Salih Muslim during his Catalonia visit for a
2-hour interview on 7/30/2014.
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centers, cinemas, theaters, and other culture industry related institutions that are
reproducing Catalan language and culture, and keeping it alive. The Generalitat de
Catalunya functions under Act No. 1, of 7 January 1998, on linguistic policy, from
Article 25 to Article 29 that binds mass media and culture industry organizations and
institutions with law to support, publish and use Catalan language and culture. Not
surprisingly, language has a strong effect on culture, and allows cultural institutions to be
built up around it, and into the beginnings of a civil society, a precursor to the state. Here
too, Catalan has strong and deep traditions and institutions, which enable its
accomplishments in paradiplomacy and emergent statecraft.
DiploCAT (Public Diplomacy Council of Catalonia) 156
Catalan foreign policy actions gained momentum recently, and DiploCAT is
probably the most important institution of foreign and diplomacy affairs, as a publicprivate coalition designed to interconnect Catalonia to the world. Acting as a well-settled
ministry of foreign affairs in Catalonia, DiploCAT engages in public diplomacy with
national and international audiences, and it also plays a very significant role in the
building of international relation capacity for Catalan society. The administrators and
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I had a day-long focus group meeting at DiploCAT on 7/24/2014 with the
administrative team members and the Executive Director of DiploCAT, Laura Foraster i
Lloret, who relentlessly responded to all of my questions with data, empirical research
and facts, most notably on diplomatic affairs, and foreign affairs processes with bilateral
and multilateral levels. I was also provided an ensemble of sources and publications
during my visit, all of which reflects solid empirical research conducted in the last decade
on Catalonia and its international relations, economy, politics and culture, some of which
is cited in the bibliography below.
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staff working in DiploCAT were well-invested in terms of specific requirements for
diplomatic work, though they have experience in important EU projects and they play
significant roles in the development of projects such as the signing of legal-official
agreements with the UN, World Bank, or other transnational actors. DiploCAT is already
acting as a de facto ministry, multifunctioning in various fields of international relations
ranging from signing bilateral or multilateral agreements to representation of Catalonia
abroad. For instance, its President stated that the two challenges facing Catalonia are:
one, facing the same economic crisis that is faced by Europe; and two, the possible
decision of Catalans over the future status of the region, whether to be a future
independent state, or a part of decentralized Spain. In his statement, the President clearly
delivered the message that Catalonia will, no matter what, be able to undertake the
necessary steps to remain a strong European and also a global actor which is supported,
and will be represented by DiploCAT.
DiploCAT is constituted of multiple prominent Catalan institutions that are
represented by The Plenary, or the executive committee, and the Secretary General,
which is nominated by the Catalan President and elected by the Plenary for a period of
four years. The Plenary is the main governmental body of DiploCAT, constituted of the
President of Generalitat de Catalunya, the President of the Executive Committee (who
already acts as the Secreteriat for Foreign and European Union Affairs of the
Generalitat), the main representatives of the relevant local institutions, schools,
industries, chambers and associations, the secretary of the Catalan Federation of Banking
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institutions, two university chancellors that are elected by the Interuniversity Council of
Catalonia, the President of DiploCAT, and the Director General who is authorized to
conduct foreign relations of the Generalitat de Catalunya. The executive committee is a
permanent body with representatives of various prominent industries, municipalities and
their federations, representatives of federations, or unions of offices of commerce,
industry, and chambers.
The advantage and the strength of DiploCAT is the ensemble of successful
institutions that underpin a state structure to conduct foreign politics on a legal
international basis, since it is constituted of the Catalan Government (Generalitat), the
city councils of Barcelona, Girona, Lleida and Tarragona, as well as their provincial
councils, Catalan Association of Municipalities and Counties, and their Federation
(Federation of Municipalities of Catalonia). Moreover, important institutions such as
financial, economic, and entrepreneurial entities are represented beside the previous
public institutions such as the Catalan Federation of Savings Banks, General Council of
the Official Chambers of Commerce, Industry, and Navigation of Catalonia which acts as
an umbrella organization for economics and finance affairs, the Micro, Small and
Medium Enterprises of Catalonia (PIMEC), Catalan Employers’ Association, FemCAT
Private Entrepreneurs’ Foundation, and trade unions such as CCOO of Catalonia and
UGT of Catalonia. Also, internationally known sport entities, such as FC Barcelona (who
is a member of the council), along with the prominent academic institutions of Catalonia,
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all of the universities, business schools, and IBEI (Institut Barcelona d’Estudis
Internacionals).
I investigated the activities undertaken by DiploCAT in various fields and
industries, and it is crucial to acknowledge DiploCAT's funding by the government, even
if it acts as a semi-autonomous diplomacy institution with participatory motives of
various Catalan institutions. Therefore, the conferences funded or organized by
DiploCAT between June 2013 and September 2014 could give insight on the scope and
typology of foreign policy actions of the Catalonia Region.
There were 31 scheduled conferences that DiploCAT funded, or took an active
role in the organization of around the world. 29 of these were in European countries
including Switzerland and Norway, while two of them were in the Japanese cities of
Tokyo and Osaka. Almost all of these conferences had international audiences in which
they were informed about the demand, progress, legal/political and economic
environment on the issue of self-determination, and possible Catalan independence.
Although DiploCAT is a promising institution, providing significant research for Catalan
international affairs, and perhaps one of the rare pioneers of Catalan paradiplomacy and
protodiplomacy, it is also faced with certain difficulties157 in its academic and cultural
activities.

157

A key informant and interviewee mentioned that a seminar organized by Diplocat on
the Catalan Independence Process was to be held at the European Center for Policy
Studies in Brussels and was slated to have a significant international audience already in
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Furthermore, DiploCAT, despite its formal status, remains an institution with
considerable ambiguity as to its role. It can either be classified as the major Catalan
think-tank focusing on international affairs, or as an entity that undertakes policy actions
like that of a formal government institution. Whatever one’s conclusion, it definitely has
also developed a highly visible public presence.
Cultural events, conferences, and seminar organizations constitute an important
share of DiploCAT’s public image. While they are ideally supposed to undertake highlevel diplomatic activity, given the extent of conflict between Catalonia and Spain, this
action at the cultural level helps maintain a slightly lower profile, in order to maintain
systemic legitimacy and avoid harm. At the same time, this strategy was criticized by a
few key informants as being ineffective because the Spanish diplomacy applies so much
pressure on both Diplocat and their European Government counterparts that the other
diplomatic bodies gradually begin to avoid meeting with the Catalan representatives.
A key informant and member of Catalan Parliament who is quite active in
international audiences and the affairs of Catalonia put it most bluntly when he told me:
“They can’t do much more than their public activity and I think that the Catalan
President knew it since the beginning, that’s why the government discarded the idea of
creating a sort of Foreign Affairs Ministry158: it wouldn’t be worth the budget. As of

place, but was cancelled just one day before the event, allegedly because of the pressure
of the Spanish Representation in Brussels.
158
An important note here: Recently, the Secreteriat for Foreign and European Union
Affairs has incrementally attempted to transform its organizational structure into a
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today everybody is aware of the fact that other EU States will only respond to Catalan
demands following consummated facts by our side, such as holding the consultation
without the authorization of the Spanish Government, unilaterally declaring
independence, setting up state structures allowing Catalonia to effectively work as a
State, etc.”
ACCIO (Agency of Competitiveness for Companies in Catalonia)
ACCIO has 25 years of experience in operations aiming to foster internationally
collaborative programs to promote innovation, internationalization, and investment in
Catalonia and throughout the world. It acts as a point of interconnection, or even as a
ministry, providing important support free of charge to companies willing to invest in
Catalonia; as well as helping Catalan companies become better worldwide brands
through technological and related advances. Its pro-business teams maintain multiple
investments, and are involved in a straight-to-point development of a Catalan strategy to
remain an important economic power through management of foreign investment, trade,
R&D, and innovation.

ministry, which at the time of my field research was not yet fully formed. However,
although the legal term still remains ‘secretariat’, the name “ministry” was starting to be
used on formal information portals of the Generalitat: http://afersexteriors.gencat.cat/en.
Even the key individuals and informants at the highest level foreign policy institutions
(governmental and non-governmental) were quite confused about the foreign policy
organizational structure of Catalan region. It has, however, seemed to advance steadily
toward a more institutionalized structure in recent few years, increasingly becoming a
state-like mechanism of foreign policy.
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ACCIO has its headquarters in Barcelona, while also maintaining important
international offices around the world in more than 33 global locations, mostly in
important trade partner countries for Catalonia (some of which include: Washington DC,
EU, Paris, Great Britain, Beijing, Istanbul, Rome, Warsaw, Moscow, Silicon Valley,
Montreal, Mumbai, New York, Tokyo, Stuttgart, Berlin, Sydney, Santiago, Milan, etc.).
The unique organization of Catalan’s institutions and industries, under welldesigned umbrella structures such as DiploCAT or ACCIÓ, has managed to establish the
skeletal structure of Catalan Foreign Affairs. For instance, ACCIÓ acts as an expert of
know-how to find the right contacts, technologies, and sector players for Catalan
companies, while also finding new technologies, materials, or solutions by helping with
the creation of research groups, funding them and financing the support for companies in
their technological operations.
One of the most significant units of ACCIÓ is ‘Invest in Catalonia’, promoting
interconnectedness between Catalan and the wider World economy, promoting
innovation, internationalization and investments both in Catalonia for foreigners, and also
in the world for Catalans. Looking at ACCIÓ’s investment record in Catalonia from 1985
to 2013, we find 4,345 investment projects managed, 792 investment projects taken
onboard, 8.1 billion in inward investment, and 54,900 jobs maintained or created
(ACCIO, 2014).
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CIEMEN159 and Catalan Grassroots in the Context of Paradiplomacy
As a non-profit and non-governmental cultural organization, CIEMEN is one of
the most internationally active institutions of Catalonia. It began its activities in Italy,
finding there a safe enclave during the oppressive dictatorship of Franco, following
which it moved back to Catalonia in 1978. CIEMEN represents the humane face of
Catalan civil society, having roots drawing back to its founder Abat Escarre, a humanist
priest. It works to combat several fundamental and challenging issues, such as the
problems faced by European people and communities, and other people around the world
that are too often misinterpreted and misunderstood. For instance, respect for ethnic
minorities, national communities, and the struggle against xenophobia, racism, and
exclusive nationalism are among the core operation fields of CIEMEN, and play an
important role in the representation of Catalonia’s cause for legitimacy, particularly
amongst communities, people, and groups that are marginalized and excluded from
political-economic systems.
CIEMEN stands for an institution aiming for solidarity with other people around
the world, and clearly describes its task as “promoting knowledge and acknowledgement
of the rights of all ethnic minorities and nations, without exception”, and “solidarity” to
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I conducted a three day focus group discussion, accompanied and followed by
participant and direct observations at CIEMEN on 30 July 2014 to August 3rd; met with
the administrative team, members, journalists, academics, politicians in the meetings and
events. CIEMEN was also organizing Kurdish Leader Salih Muslim’s visit, and hosted
him and HDP EU Representative Faruk Doru during that period. I focused on both this
unique Catalan-Kurdish diplomatic moment, and developed an observation plan and
specific focus group meetings with CIEMEN personnel for the following week.
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achieve openness and comprehension of the resolution of the issues mentioned above. I
got the rare chance of witnessing a series of events in CIEMEN during my field research,
along with a thorough focus group interview with the administrative board. The
institution organized the visit of Mr. Salih Muslim, the president of the ruling PYD
(Democratic Union Party) of the Rojava (Western Kurdistan) Region in Northern Syria.
It was not the first action of CIEMEN160 towards Kurds, as there are in fact now wellestablished Kurdish-Catalan relations, and both parties frequently visit one another in
Catalonia and Kurdistan. However, during the visit I observed, CIEMEN scheduled a
highly public program for the visiting leader, and organized a press event in which most
of Catalonia’s domestic and international agencies, media, press, and institutions joined
to debate and ask questions about the Kurds’ progress and struggles in Rojava Region.
Two other important points about CIEMEN are that (1) it was organized between
1986 and 2007 by the so-called Conference of European Stateless Nations (CONSEU).
This international network, which aimed to become a debate forum between
organizations of all European national movements, met seven times during this period
and the most positive outcome was the Universal Declaration of the Collective Rights of
the Peoples (1998). This declaration was issued because the participants thought that
Human Rights, as recognized by the UN, are only focused on individuals. They do not
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There is a great deal of interaction and cooperation between CIEMEN and the party
group CUP, notably in undertaking significant international actions, such as the various
and dynamic Catalan-Kurdish solidarity projects, or the Catalan-Palestinian solidarity
movements, which also have strong grassroots support. CIEMEN also works with other
NGOs and communities from other regions of Spain especially Basque Country.
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take into consideration that human groups, such as peoples and nations, also have
inalienable rights (for example, self-determination), and offered this document to the UN
and other international organizations for consideration. It is also worth mentioning that in
2003 the conference debated the project of developing the Constitution for Europe, and
proposed including the right to self-determination and the creation of a Chamber of the
Peoples in order to give representatives to the stateless nations in European institutions.
Second, CIEMEN was created in collaboration with other organizations from
other stateless nations in the so-called Worldwide Network for the Collective Rights of
the Peoples. This network aimed to introduce the issue of self-determination into the
agenda of the World Social Forum (WSF), where most members belonging to recognized
nations did not at first think that recognizing such a principle should be a priority. The
network worked hard in order to explain that stateless161 nationalism is different from
state nationalism, remarking that it had nothing to do with exclusion of other human
groups or legitimation of State power; on the contrary, this highlighted the fact that the
self-determination principle was only designed to achieve equal recognition between the
peoples of the world. This intervention was relatively successful, as the WSF eventually
agreed to consider and defend this point. At a later stage, this objective having been
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Stateless democracy became an important concept, instead of stateless nationalism in
certain audiences, especially at the New World Summit, since Kurdish cantons of Rojava
rejected nationalism for a few reasons. Assyrians, Armenians, Turcomans,
Alawites/Nusairis, Yezidis and Arabs were seen as the constituents of Rojava society, in
fact aiming to ensure plurality and diversity rather than building another nation-state. See
the 5th reader of New World academy, available at: http://newworldsummit.eu/wpcontent/uploads/2015/06/NWA5-Stateless-Democracy.pdf.
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achieved, the Network decided to become a lobbyist for the collective rights of the
peoples before key European Institutions, but due to a lack of financial support, they are
currently somewhat paralyzed in this activity.
CIEMEN has also created another network, the Catalan Agreement for Foreign
Action (Acord Català d’Acció Exterior), an agreement between 120 organizations, 3
trade unions, and 4 parliamentary groups, representing 2/3 of the Catalan Parliament.
These civil society organizations have been involved in international networks for quite a
long time and the parliamentary groups acknowledge that they have developed
paradiplomatic activities in the name of Catalonia. The goal of this agreement is to
establish further coordination between these organizations in order to bring the point of
view of Catalan Civil Society to the international arena, stating that the Catalan
Government should not have a monopoly on foreign action. The agreement was signed
on 27, March 2014, and its concrete actions and results still have yet to be fully seen,
even if their intent and direction are clearly for the expansion and deepening of Catalan
foreign diplomacy and economic actions. Another important point concerning civil
society networks is that of Catalan Communities in foreign countries. There is a network
of Catalan associations around the world which gather Catalan communities in order to
organize cultural activities and political demonstrations. For example, in recent years
several mobilizations have been organized, especially preceding September 11th (Catalan
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national day), and have been held worldwide162 by these associations to support the
referendum and independence processes.
A final note on the international activities of Catalan communities, grassroots
organizations, NGOs and other humanitarian – or interest – groups, can be seen in the
manifestation of a recent event of some significance, even though it represented primarily
ensembles of participants’ respective left-wing socio-political clusters. Called the “New
World Summit,” numerous State and non-State or quasi-State entities were
represented,163 including prominently the Kurdish, Palestinian, Basque, Dutch, Scottish,
Irish, German, French and Catalan delegations.
Conclusion: The Future of Catalan Paradiplomacy and Protodiplomacy
There is undeniably a strong and dynamic Catalan national movement that clearly
expresses motivation and the will to struggle for possible Catalan independence. What
keeps Catalonia distinct is its rich national heritage, solid political history of statehood,
and also the resilient political communities that have been pro-active even in times of
oppression and conflict. Catalonia did not follow the path of armed conflict in the
aftermath of 1978, and most of its policy focus remained on economic development and
state capacity building. Europeanization or European integration, and the consequent
democratization of Spain, have also significantly contributed to Catalonia’s development.
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There are numerous websites of associations like these in many countries, for example
that of the Catalan Center in Geneva-Lausanne: www.catalansasuissa.org, or that of
Brussels: www.casal-catala.be/.
163
See http://newworldsummit.eu/.
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Given the geopolitical significance of this region between France and Spain, and also its
primacy in Southern European logistics, industry and culture, the region has definitely
benefited from decades-long stability. However, this stability may now again be called
into question, as tension between Barcelona and Madrid increases; particularly with the
added pressure of political, economic, and sociocultural crisis emerging in Catalonia,
Spain, and other Southern European countries, as part of the broader general political
economic crisis of the European Union itself. One can expect an increasing shift from
Catalonia’s paradiplomacy toward protodiplomacy, especially because the independence
project is not only a matter of the grassroots, but is also very much managed by the
government and the assembly. Among other things, this chapter has demonstrated and
delineated some of the vast extent of this emerging infrastructure, and the activities and
complex contexts they engage.
There are no doubts that Catalonia’s potential for self-rule has grown strong since
the statute of autonomy made it a legitimate regional state; however, ambiguities over
authority and sovereignty can also be seen as a source of conflict, as clearly experienced
between Spain and Catalonia. The disparity between Catalonia and other regions of
Spain, especially in terms of fiscal authority, clearly plays a role in escalating Catalonia’s
conflict with central Spain. While the independence process is ruled and managed by the
parliament and government representing executive and legislative authority in Catalonia,
with partial sovereignty; the judicial system, still an arm of the central Spanish state,
works against this process. However, Catalonia increasingly integrates its institutions and
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policies into the processes of independence, restructuring and reorganizing them, even if
these are only small steps under the shadow of the wider and heavily contested
independence process. In this equation, which has increasingly become a problem not
only in Spain but also for Europe as a whole, it is important to consider one final point: In
the case of possible Catalan independence, it has been expressed by numerous EU and
Spanish officials that Catalonia will no longer be an EU member, since as an independent
state its membership would need to be approved, which would definitely be blocked by
Spain’s delegation in the EU. While this can be seen as a certain formal path, and as a
potential set of obstacles on such a path, it also reveals the general European position,
which is that regions do not merit an equal voice to that of member state representations.
However, even if this path to statehood remains blocked, it is possible to imagine other
formal paths capable of conferring legitimacy. It will be hard to remove conferred rights,
which have been established, and which enabled the autonomy and independence
movements, especially considering the degree to which Catalonia has integrated itself
into Europe for more than three decades now; and this will continue to reflect the proindependence Catalan perspective for some time to come. As we move to the Kurdish
case study below, it is already interesting to begin to compare and contrast the Catalan
and Quebec cases, and we will return to this comparative question in depth in the
conclusion.
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CHAPTER 7: KURDISH PARADIPLOMACY AND PROTODIPLOMACY IN
WORLD PRACTICE, PART I: A HISTORICAL- POLITICAL GENEALOGY OF
KURDISH COMMUNITIES, REGIONS AND STATE FORMATION PROCESSES

This chapter represents the key case study of this thesis. Kurdish paradiplomacy
and protodiplomacy have been such significant topics at the global level that the
occurrence, complexity and magnitude of political events in Kurdish territories, and/or
those directly affecting Kurdish populations are now inevitably of great interest to major
actors of global governance such as the USA, EU, Russia, Canada, UN and many others.
Following a century of statelessness and the loss – or denial – of an internationally
recognized Kurdish status,164 and dispersed between the physical borders of four
countries (Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria) and an expanding global diaspora, Kurds emerge
as pioneers of regional politics today, increasingly countering their long exclusion. I
completed this study over the course of seven field visits to Kurdish regions, and other
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While the first division of Kurdistan took place in the 16th century during the
Ottoman-Persian wars, which also solidified today’s Turkish-Iranian borders, the ultimate
loss of Kurdish status corresponds to the early 20th century. Still, there is a long and
continuous history of Kurdish state formations and deformations along with various
territorialities, which I describe further in this chapter.
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field visits165 to places where Kurdish regional actors have engaged in bilateral and
multilateral diplomacy.
I have interviewed with major Kurdish regional/political party leaders, and their
highest-level representatives in foreign representation offices in Washington DC,
Brussels, New York and Paris, elected MPs and mayors, and other individuals and
organizations that have or may have significant impact on the formation of Kurdish
regions’ foreign policy actions. I have performed ethnographic research by conducting
participatory and direct observation at the above mentioned field sites, 34 in-depth semistructured interviews, and 13 focus group meetings and discussions, notably focusing on
Kurdish regional foreign policy actions (paradiplomacy), especially those targeting state
formation and state capacity building. Moreover, I interviewed 5 non-Kurdish foreign
policy officials, all of whom represent high-level diplomacy experts within the U.S. and
the EU. I also conducted a longitudinal discourse analysis of secondary data sources such
as conferences, academic literature, and official data from online sources and formal
institutions.
This case study represents the very first step toward a comprehensive study
modeling Kurdish foreign policy. And the sample I have selected is representative of the
holistic Kurdish scene of international political representations, since it includes all major
parties engaging in Kurdish foreign policy making, at levels ranging from the top
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Brussels; Istanbul; Paris; Washington, DC; New York City; Atlanta; Nashville and
Barcelona.
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leadership of Kurdish factions to an ensemble of local grassroots community
representatives. I begin this chapter with current background information, focusing on the
emergence of Kurdish geopolitics and regional state formations, and the recent
interactions of parties engaged in conflict and cooperation in the Kurdish regions,
especially regional and interregional state capacity building practices. Second, I attempt
to summarize the long history of Kurdish nation- and state-building efforts, from the
early medieval era to pre-modern times, and then up to and beyond the late 19th century.
This concise historical reading helps to illustrate the conditions that created 20th century
stateless Kurdish nationalism, as well as the genealogy and patterns of modern Kurdish
political development. Then, I deal with the most tumultuous era of Kurdish political
history, the 20th century, describing the loss of status and the emergence of statelessness,
and the outcomes and reactions that arose from Kurdish communities dispersed in various
physical territorialities. Overall, this historical analysis comprehensively describes
Kurdish attempts at state formation, and the conditions from which contemporary
Kurdish national movements and foreign policy actions (paradiplomatic and
protodiplomatic) have arisen today in the first part of this chapter.
The second part of this chapter wraps up the overall discussion of Kurdish
paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy, covering various Kurdish regionalities and
territorialities that are in place today and the interlinkages, contrasts, and unique
interactions between them. In this final section, I address (1) why and how Kurdish
paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy are different from and more complex than other
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examples, (2) why and how different regional state formations correspond to different
models of governance, and (3) how the differences and commonalities between Kurdish
regions yield to dichotomous international representations and are welcomed differently
by various global governance actors. The discussion section also summarizes the overall
takeaway and predictive analysis of this case study. I specifically propose assumptions in
the form of scenarios based on the interlinkages between Kurdish paradiplomacy and
state formations/capacity building in the context of future regional conflict in the
conclusion.
Contemporary Background: Emergence and Internationalization of Kurdish
Geopolitics
Various developments indicate the emerging weight and internationalization of
Kurdish geopolitics. The Kurdish issue has global significance, primarily because it
represents a critical political Gordian knot centered in upper Mesopotamia, spilling over
into a much broader region, with the outcomes of its numerous conflicts having multiple
international impacts. First, the Kurdish enclave in northern Iraq has developed into a full
scale state, with increasing territoriality and international recognition, known as the
Kurdistan Region of Iraq, and ruled by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG),
which functions under the Assembly of Kurdistan. The region has expanded its territorial
sovereignty even more in the aftermath of recent conflicts in Iraq, notably in the fight
against Islamic State (ISIS). It has been recognized internationally as a prominent actor,
and even as the most effective ally of the West in this new ground war against ISIL and
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other extremist groups. The Kurdistan Region has its own flag, constitution, and security
apparatus constituted of a heavily armed Peshmerga army, police, local security, and
intelligence institutions.
Second, the Kurdish communities in northern Syria have declared a regional
administration called Rojava, constituted of three self-ruling cantons: Afrin, Kobani and
Cizire. While Kurds in Syria have been politically organized for decades, the Syrian Civil
War has changed the context drastically. The war led to the withdrawal of Syrian regime
forces loyal to Assad, therefore leaving the Kurdish northern enclaves166 to the control of
Kurdish political groups, which created the Kurdish High Council. Rojava’s defensive
forces were hit by heavy casualties, which almost reached the point of losing Kobani
Canton to ISIS/ISIL and Al Nusra Front in 2013. However, Rojava forces have since then
successfully won the defensive battle and gained international support, pushing their
attackers southwards and reclaiming a vast territoriality in northeast Syria. Two of the
cantons, Kobani and Cizire, have merged in 2015 while Afrin is still surrounded by
Syrian Regime, rebel, and ISIS forces.

Except Qamishlo City’s center where there is an international airport protected by
regime forces which allegedly was examined in 2015 and early 2016 by the U.S and
Russia. Following the escalation of hostility by Turkey towards “any kind of Kurdish
regional formation” as declared by President Erdogan and PM Davutoglu as well as other
state officials, the Kurdish Administration of Rojava declared that they are willing to
follow a similar solution to that of Kurdistan Region of Iraq, not challenging Syria’s
unity but becoming an autonomous power in the region, and that they are planning to take
control of Qamishlo Airport, a potential secondary international access point to Kurdish
regions after the Kurdistan Region of Iraq.
166

350
Figure 8: Syria and Iraq Conflicts and the Kurdish Territorial Gains

Source: Wikimedia Commons (Open Source Project) ISIL/ISIS in Iraq and Syria
by 1/1/2016. Yellow areas represent Kurdish controlled areas by KRG and Peshmerga in
Iraq, and Rojava Cantons of Cizire, Kobani and Afrin in Syria, with grey areas and black
dots represent the ISIL/ISIS forces, the green represents Syrian opposition [rebels], red
areas represent Syrian Regime forces in Syria and Shiite forces in Iraq.
When Kurdish forces reached the Euphrates River in the east of Kobani Canton in
2015, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Turkish Prime Minister Ahmet
Davutoglu stated that the Euphrates River was Turkey’s red line, and anyone attempting
to pass that line would be attacked. However, recent news indicates that both the US and
Russia are building military bases in Rojava, possibly representing the only military
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commons of both powers,167 supporting Kurdish forces on the ground. Turkey’s fear, the
merging of Kurdish Syria’s two Eastern cantons with the contiguous Afrin Canton in the
West, is an increasingly possible reality. Should this happen, it would eventually
strengthen the hand of all the Kurdish regions, most particularly because a corridor into
the Mediterranean Sea could upend the current regional geopolitical equation.
Historically, one of the Kurds’ biggest challenges has been their state of being
landlocked, and the fact that they have been surrounded by frequently hostile Arab,
Turkish and Persian regimes that divided and dominated them in their respective political
systems. Third, is Turkey’s Kurdish region in the southeast, which has the largest
Kurdish population168 among all of the Kurdish regions, coupled with the longest

167

In my interview with the ruling president of Rojava, Salih Muslim, I repeatedly asked
for his views on geopolitics, and he openly described his vision about the possible
Kurdish role in a progressive U.S./ Russian alliance. Interestingly, the Rojava region has
followed a strict policy of enhanced diplomacy with almost all actors, including the
Assad regime, its long-term opponent, and even Arab forces who have been present in the
warring factions against the region. The pluralist form of canton governance and self-rule
practices also contributes to the conduct of a balanced preventive-paradiplomacy by
Kurdish regional actors, notably yielding the formation of political communication
channels with different actors. It is important to understand that diplomacy in such hostile
contexts is key to survival, and attempts at building good relations with different actors
does not necessarily mean the choosing of sides. Western officials and analysts often fall
into the fallacy of accusing Kurds of Syria – or Turkey – of having ties with Russia and
Iran, both of which are strong regional players. However, Kurdish communities clearly
express their will to build strong relations with the West, and put much more emphasis on
that compared to paradiplomacy with Russia. While bad habits from the Cold War era are
still pervasive, in a new multipolar – or nonpolar – world there is much greater need and
space for U.S./Russian collaboration.
168
According to the CIA, there are 14-16 million Kurds in Turkey (18% of 81.6 million),
7.6 million in Iran (10% of 80.8 million), 6.5 million in Iraq (15%-20% of 32.6 million)
and 2.2 million in [pre-war] Syria (10% of 17.9 million), which makes roughly 35 million
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genealogy of political formations, and in which a long-term conflict remains in place and
is seriously flaring up.
Throughout Turkey’s tumultuous political history in the last century, its large
Kurdish region and population has been subjected to state-sponsored armed violence,
creation of mass exiles populatoins, and variable mechanics of forced assimilation. In the
late 1970s, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) emerged as an opponent to the Turkish
state. Broader Kurdish political movements in Turkey have gained significant momentum
in the last few decades, increasing in weight, magnitude, and impact. Coinciding with the
first formal initiation of Turkey-PKK negotiations, known as the peace process, which
was put in place in 2013, legal Kurdish politics in Turkey have expanded into a major
nationwide political force, a major opposition cluster, and a densely organized bloc in the
largely Kurdish southeast. The peace process, however, has quickly turned into another
wave of mutual violence in Turkey’s southeast, notably with the intensification of the
Syrian conflict, and the broader proxy war in which not only Turkey is involved, but
actors such as Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, USA, and many other forces are also active.
Kurds are generally considered the largest stateless nation in the world, very
centrally located in the civilizational intersection of Mesopotamia where recurring
conflict has long been present. History plays a central role in the realm of Near Eastern
conflicts, as well as specific conflicts in the Kurdish regions. Before proceeding further

Kurds in the Middle East, and a larger number around the world, when Kurdish
Diasporas are taken into account, according to various sources. See CIA Factbook, 2016;
Gunter, 2008.
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into this comprehensive story, it is useful to ground the most recent developments in
Turkey’s Kurdish region within the broader region’s long durée history, since the present
represents a historically significant moment, not only for the Kurds in Turkey, but also
for all the Kurdish regions and communities in Iraq, Syria, and Iran. Turkey’s Kurdish
issue is key to Kurdish geopolitics overall, for several reasons, particularly because
Kurdish landlockedness and divisions altogether constitute what Kubicek (1997) defined
as a three-level game. While surrounded by hostile states in Iran, Turkey, Iraq, and Syria,
and dominated for a long time, Kurds were faced with the necessity of choosing one of
their opponents as an ally to develop their defensive capacity against other threats.169
Therefore, Turkey, a NATO member, EU candidate, and one of the 20 largest economies
in the world, heavily strategized its presence in Iraqi Kurdistan, which it views as a part
of its national–Ottoman and Turkish heritage. The oil-rich towns of Mosul and Kirkuk
are both defined (within Turkish nationalist discourse) as a part of Misak-i Milli (Turkish
National Territorial Doctrine170), which was declared in the early 20th century during the
Great War, signifying the core national territorialization for the newly emerging Turkish
state out of the remnants of Ottoman collapse.

169

It is crucial to remember that this was before the recent developments in Iraq and
Syria had occurred, and the course of conflict in the latter part of the past decade has
changed the abovementioned equation of conflict. Today, Kurdish gains in the Rojava
region in northern Syria signify another possibility of a Kurdish corridor into the
Mediterranean Sea, posing an alternative to Turkey’s economic and political dominance
and control. Consistently, Turkey strongly opposes any form of Kurdish gains in Rojava,
in order to keep Kurds landlocked and dependent within its state sphere.
170
See Zürcher, 1991; Unaltay, 2004; Demirozu, 2008; Keskiner, 1992; Kostem, 2016
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In January 2016, KRG President Masood Barzani repeated his statement that
whether it is accepted as a fact or not, the era of Sykes-Picot has ended, and the truth on
the ground clearly shows that both in Iraq and in Syria, there is no longer any form of
national unity (along colonial-designated nation-state lines), nor a culture of co-existence.
Indeed, as I do in most of my comparative political courses, I argue here quite
confidently that Iraq and Syria no longer really exist in the usual form of nation-states. In
fact, I go further and argue that they never truly and physically existed as integrated
countries, but were both Baathist forms of Arab governance given dominance over their
complex constituencies. In Iraq, a minority Sunni Baathist government ruled far larger
majority populations, while in Syria the regime was in the hands of the Alawi/Nusayri
minority. Both regimes have extended and expanded their might to keep their populations
under control, with oppressive policies towards their citizens. Both countries have
collapsed in the last two decades, and are now divided into new territorialities controlled
by different and clashing forces. Kurdish regions, both in Iraq and in Syria have gained
significant international recognition and support, emerging as new safe havens, or at least
relatively more secure enclaves, within these countries’ blood-soaked soils. While they
have been dominated militarily, and have been subject to all sorts of brutality including
genocide, mass murder, imprisonment, torture, and forced displacement, Kurds in both
countries have benefited during the recent turmoil by declaring self-ruled regional
administrations. The central question remaining today is what is next, considering the
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presence of Turkey’s and Iran’s Kurdish regions, which have their own unique but
intertwined sociopolitical contexts and conditions.
Although there is currently the real possibility of imminent Kurdish state
formation in the Near East, which today is physically and substantively practiced by the
Kurdish regions in Iraq and Syria, the territorialization of this potential Kurdish state is
an outcome of Iraqi and Syrian deterritorializations.171 It is also closely dependent on the
policies of Iran and Turkey, both of which still have strong mechanisms of control in
Kurdish regions, as well as other major actors such as Russia, USA, EU and the Arab
World, who are also engaged in the course of these conflicts. At the present moment in
history, it is entirely plausible to foresee a potential Kurdish state formation in the form
of the merging of Syrian (Western Kurdistan or Rojava) and Iraqi (Southern Kurdistan)
Kurdish territorialities, which still only represents ‘Southern’ Kurdistan; while still
leaving out both Northern Kurdistan (southeastern Turkey) and Eastern Kurdistan
(northwest Iran), and therefore a majority of the Kurdish population. Today, Kurdish
paradiplomacy – and increasingly protodiplomacy – simply signifies a geopolitical
gem172 in world politics, with a starkly increasing weight and impact in global

171

This can be viewed in the context of what Duran (2013) has described as the central
historical role of Mediterranean paradiplomacies as the locomotives of territorialization,
deterritorialization and reterritorialization practices.
172
This can be explained with the proximity of Kurdish communities to Arab, Persian,
Turkish and other regional actors, and their increasing capability in filling the century
long security gap in the region. Kurds and their fragmentations eventually make them
effective negotiators in the Near East, as they often occupy the boundaries between Shi’a
and Sunni, Iranian-Turkish, Arab-Turkish and Arab-Iranian fault lines, and can therefore

356
governance and security issues. What makes Kurdish paradiplomacy so important is
doubtless the uniquely fragmented and armed mode it represents, which makes their
practices and forms of paradiplomacy somewhat unique compared to others around the
world. Kurdish paradiplomacy represents the most substantial indicator of regional
administrations or substate entities – even self-declared ones – engaging in hard politics.
This engagement by fragmented Kurdish actors, all of whom share common interests, as
well as internal contestations over power, makes for a very complex, plural and contested
scene of policy actions and diplomacy. Therefore, the Kurdish political model
increasingly evolves toward a pluralist confederal state-like structure that mirrors the
turmoil and violence experienced in the regions. However, before more deeply
attempting to unpack the complexities of the current Kurdish paradiplomatic scene, a
review of the equally complex and tangled history is needed, which will then provide
some of the requisite vocabulary for the subsequent discussion. While more recent,
colonial-era institutional structures and nation-state parameters are primary in
understanding tensions and power struggles in the Kurdish world today, the variables and
identity components of these contestations are rooted in much older history and need to
be understood before proceeding further.

potentially play a key role in conflicts and peacebuilding in this context. Not to mention
the frequent provision of humanitarian shelter to other endangered, underrepresented and
indigenous groups of Mesopotamia.
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Toward A Genealogy of the Kurdish Legacy: Early State Formations and
Transformations
Different hypotheses are proposed as to predecessor populations of the Kurds,
with most referring to them as a distinct ethnic group historically inhabiting the
mountainous areas of the South Caucasus (ranging between the Zagros and Taurus
mountains). Kurds are an ancient people in the region, with roots going back to the
Bronze Age, and the early toponym Qardu or Carduchoi (Ozoglu, 2004). The names
Corduene and Carduchoi, used to represent the Kurdish region and its inhabitants, is also
present in classical antiquity, and was used by Xenophon in his Anabasis to define the
distinct Kurdish tribe that opposed invasions of Mesopotamia in 4 B.C. (Rawlinson,
1871). In 520 B.C., Hecataeus of Miletus referred to them with the name Gordi.
Numerous Assyrian, Jewish, and Roman sources also identify the Kurds as a distinct
nation and their geography in Mesopotamia as Gordyene, Tigranes or Corduenes (Grasse,
1909; Buchler, 1956). Kurdish people have heterogeneous origins (Izady, 1992; Van
Bruinessen, 1992) with earlier tribes as societal constituents, such as the Median, Guti,
Lullubi, Lur, Cyrtian, Carduchi, Illam, Goran and Soran (Van Bruinessen, 1992; Limbert,
1968; Bois; 1966).
Two major developments have played significant roles in reterritorialization of
the entire region: the Greek-Persian Wars, which represent a long period of political
turmoil and contestation and global impact, and the collapse of the ancient Persian
Empire as the outcome of long-term internal and external disputes. This collapse, on its
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own, represents perhaps the first major change of status for the Kurds. Earlier, broad
sociocultural and political transformations of the era gave birth to proto-Kurds as the
predecessors of the ancient Persian Empire. The Persian Empire of that time is not
representative of contemporary Iran with today’s dominant ethnic Safavid-Farsi or
Pahlavi character. It was a vast territory with enormous cultural diversity. Kurds were at
the center of this society, often as founders and rulers, and generally as major constituents
of the states and their empires. The Achaemeneid and Median Empires both represent the
golden era of Kurdish rule, with strong defensive characteristics that are still in place
today throughout Kurdistan. The use of the sharp and impenetrable Zagros Mountains
and Qandil as safe shelters against invasions and wars is probably the major factor that
helped these ancient communities develop a culture of survival across centuries in this
hostile region. These mountain ranges have not served as shelter for only Kurds, but also
for other indigenous communities who took refuge to survive. They not only provide
shelter, but also safe passage far from the sight of enemies, interconnecting the Southern
Caucasus, Anatolia, Upper Mesopotamia and the Zagros region. These mountain ranges
continue to serve the same purpose for Kurdish and other indigenous communities today.
A split173 in the ancient Persian Empire helps explain the first loss of status for the
Kurds during the Sassanid Dynasty, centered in the city of Pars (Persis), in the early 3rd
century B.C. The emperor Ardhashir I enforced his reign with the consolidation of

173

Mackenzie (1960) hypothesized that proto-Persians invaded the city of Parthia (Persis)
in the era of the collapse of the Achaemeneid Empire, which also indicates the split of
Kurdish, Baloch and Proto-Persian into three distinct groups.
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Parthian power, and declared war on Kurdish King Madig. Ardhashir was the son of
Babag,174 who was the successor of King Darab, the son of King Darae. Ardhashir was
charged by his father as a shepherd in the rural mountains where he was raised by
Kurdish tribes, who viewed him as their very own son. His later war was a failure,
because Kurds put up a very strong defense and beat his army. Kurdish King Madig was
confident, expecting no more attacks from the already beaten enemy. However, one
night, Ardhashir attacked Kurdish forces again with 4000 warriors, and executed 1000
Kurdish soldiers. This is an important piece of history since it represents the last Kurdish
King of an ancient civilization, and since Madig was the Kurdish King of the Caucasus
(today’s Armenia-Azerbaijan), it indicates a different territoriality than what is thought or
imagined to be the homeland of the Kurds today. This loss of status also coincides with
the invasions of Alexander the Great who was known by the locals as a tyrannical175
emperor with tremendous destructive power. Another important note here is that the
Sassanids of this era are claimed to be the Zazaki people, an indigenous community of
Persia who were later exiled to the west (today’s eastern Turkey), and came to define
themselves as a part of Kurdish society despite their distinct culture and linguistic
differences.

174

I composed this summarized history from the oldest known source on the Zoroastrian
(Persian) Empire, “The Kârnâmag î Ardashîr î Babagân”, (“Book of the Deeds of
Ardashir Son of Babag”). An English summary of the book is available at:
http://www.avesta.org/mp/karname.htm.
175
The source uses the word iblisi which means devilish, see
http://www.avesta.org/mp/karname.htm.
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It is almost impossible to trace all of the indigenities of Mesopotamia and the
Zagros region since the sociopolitical and cultural transformations of this area represent a
very long history in which various civilizations have been born and collapsed. This
includes the civilizations of the Sumerians, Acadians, Babylonians, Assyrians, Arameans,
Chaldeans, Nestorians and others, notably the ancient Persian Zoroastrian communities.
Figure 9: Map of Traditional Kurdish Tribes, Clans and Confederacies

Source: Izady Mehrdad (1999), Gulf2000 Project176 of Columbia University.

While there is a clear Mesopotamian polytheism in ancient history, the
introduction of monotheism changed the social structures drastically, with the arrivals of

176

See http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/maps.shtml.
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Judaism, Christianity, Gnosticism and later Islam. Until the 4th century B.C., the
Mesopotamian religion was still practiced in Assyria, and studies indicate 2100 different
“deities” of Mesopotamia (Bottero, 2001, p.45), each representing a city-state such as
Sumer, Acadia, Assyria, Assur, Nineveh, Ur, Uruk and Babylon. Writing was invented in
Mesopotamia, but could not save the ancient Mesopotamian civilizations from
destruction, although they left an enormous cultural patrimony, most of which has been
destroyed in the last century and continues to be destroyed today.
The introduction of monotheism, numerous and continuous invasions, and the
constantly changing sociopolitical landscape led to important transformations in Kurdish
and other communities in the region. First, Kurds met with Jews who were exiled from
the Kingdom of Israel and settled in Mesopotamia during the Assyrian conquest (Brauer,
1993; Goodman, 2005; Zaken, 2007). Later, a new religion emerged in the Near East, and
quickly spread north into Mesopotamia and Anatolia. The very first Christian churches
were the Assyrian (Syriac) and Chaldean ones, which had a unique form of eastern
Christianity. Although Christian communities were oppressed by the rule of the Eastern
Roman (Byzantine) Empire, the Roman Emperor Constantine the Great declared
Christianity to be the official religion of the Roman Empire. Christianity spread
westward, changing forms and gaining various theological contents and perspectives
depending on different spatiotemporal settings. In the 6th century, another religion, Islam,
emerged in Arabia, which again created a massive wave of sociocultural change over a
broad geographical area for many centuries. Kurds met with this new religion as the
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outcome of invasions coming from the south that led to defensive wars and revolts, most
notably during the Umayyad rule of the Islamic caliphate. Both Sassanid and Byzantine
powers had declined in this era, which provided a space for the Kurds to reconstitute their
own administrations.
Kurdish State Formations from the Medieval177 Era to Modernity
Between the loss of status in the 6th century B.C. and the expansion of Islam,
Kurds remained in their lands, mostly with defensive orientations, under the various
reigns of Seljuks, Parthes and Sassanids in a contested proto-Iran. The beginning of
Islamic invasions, notably in the times of the Umayyad, provoked defense from many
Kurds. A Kurd named Narseh converted to Christianity and changed his name to
Theophobos.178 He fought on the side of Emperor Theophilus, who was also a close
friend of his, and joined the Babak179 rebellion in Kurdistan (Izady, 2015; 1994). The
Abbasids ultimately defeated the rebellion and became the ruling dynasty after the
Umayyad became centered in Baghdad. Although defeated by these Arab-Muslim
invasions from the south, Kurds remained in their mountainous shelter while the very
same invasions weakened both Byzantine and Sassanid powers. This helped Kurds to
declare mountain administrations that once again set up a new Kurdish legacy. This era

177

Although I use this term as a common denominator of [Western] Eurocentric
temporality, there are various periodization for the greater region, given spatiotemporal
paradigmatic transformations represent purely different characteristics. Interchangeably,
the “medieval” here correspond the period between 8th century and 17th century.
178
See Ševčenko, Ihor, et al. "New Cambridge History of the Byzantine Empire." (1968):
109-118.
179
They were exiled and dispersed after the rebellion.
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was also significant in that most of the Kurdish communities converted to Islam. Some of
the known administrations of the Kurds from this period are the Aishanids, Shaddadids,
Rawadids, Marwandis, Annazids, Hasanwayhids, Fadhilwayhids, Ayyarists and many
others which had their own administrations in the Zagros mountain range from the east to
the west, and from the north (Caucasus) to the south.180
It is clear that Islam brought about great changes and challenges to Kurdish
society, which had previously found ways and means of defense and preservation of
culture. Although under the caliphate of Islam since the 8th century, they have found their
own paths towards state building. To add, the Jihadist invasions from the Arab tribes of
the South were known to take slaves and female captives in this era. The last Caliph of
the Umayyad dynasty, Marwan Hakim, had a Kurdish mother, and this family later built
the Marwanid dynasty, which eventually gave birth to yet more Kurdish legacies. The
weakened Arab caliphate also played important roles in Kurds’ development and
advances in the fields of politics, arts, history, philosophy and other sciences (Bacharach,
1996; Blaum, 1993; Fishbain, 2015; Amedroz, 1903). Once a Kurdish family or dynasty
became powerful enough, the others would be dominated and ruled under that dynasty
until an invasion or other form of disruption caused collapse, a phenomenon which can
be seen in many other regional processes of state formation and decline. This was the
case in Kurdistan yet again, when massive invasions of nomadic tribes surged out of the

The southern extent is in today’s Arbil City of the Kurdistan Region where the
Adiabene Fortress was invaded in the 7th century.
180
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steppes of Central Asia; Turkic-Mongolians annexed the Kurdish geography and its
surrounding regions, again changing the course of history.181
The Seljuk Empire was founded by Seljuk Turks. A clan called Qinik of the Oguz
Turks first invaded Iran, and implicitly took control of the weakened Abbasid dynasty,
the caliphate of Islam. In the12th century, Seljuk Sultan Sanjar annexed the Kurdish
regions, and unified them under the name of Kurdistan for the first time (Nezan, 2015).
This specific moment of history (10th-12th centuries) in Kurdish politics gains greater
significant when seen in light of the fact that it remains a central topic in some of today’s
disputes. For example, Kadri Yildirim, an MP in the Turkish Assembly and a respected
expert on Near Eastern civilizations, gave the following speech in the Turkish Grand
Assembly in the aftermath of escalated violence in late November 2015:182
“[…] I would like to start with Amed183 [Diyarbakir], I am specifically using the
name “Amed” since it is the thousands of years old name of the Kurdish capital as can be

181

To clarify, Turkish/Turcoman invasions are the outcome of these communities
abandoning their original regions due to severe Chinese hostility and also drought.
Mongolians, with whom they were ethnically interconnected, also pushed them.
182
As I work on this paper, this violence continues. Only in the last week of December
2015, 44 children were killed in Kurdish towns in Turkey. According to human right
observers, bar associations and HDP MPs, 138 dead bodies brought to hospitals could not
be identified because they were burnt in the basements where people were trapped, and
the massacre was recorded on the phone while victims were asking for help and rescue
from the HDP MPs. In some towns, citizens dug holes to protect themselves from the
deliberate fire of Turkish security forces, especially tanks and snipers, and this is what is
referenced as a historical repetition in the quote below.
183
Kurds call Diyarbakir “Amed” which is the ancient name of the city of Diyarbakir.
The use of “Amed” in popular discourses still attracts anger from right-wingers and
Turkish nationalists. That is important in the Kurdish context since Amed is only one of
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seen in many instances. Turkish Seljuki Sultan Alparslan has demanded help from the
Kurds of Amed who were ruled by Marwanids in 1071, and Marwanids have sent them
the troops of Silvan, which is still seen as the source of victory. These are all documented
in solid sources of history. A century later, another branch of Seljuki Turks have made a
gesture for Kurds, and recognized “Kurdistan” as their lands, as a pay back of their help,
recognizing their rights, culture and language. Another branch of Turks, Mongolians have
later invaded Cizre (Botan) region, and people of Cizre have honorably resisted against
Mongolian invasions that were violent and destructive by digging holes around the town.
Today’s case is also similar. If the Turkish Government recognizes the very basic rights
of the Kurds, speaking their mother tongue, then, I promise the holes will be filled in just
a day […] I can give another example from Quran: “Who can be crueler than those ones
who attack to mosques, destroy temples and avoid people praying in them” says Quran
[…]” (Kadri Yildirim, HDP Siirt MP, Parliament Speech184 on December 15, 2015)
This colorful quotation illustrates just one example of the depth of historical
contestation, and even contestation over the meaning and interpretation of history.
The collapse of the Seljuk Empire provided Kurds substantial space to emerge as
a political power, and the Ayyubids (1169-1250), the successors of the Marwanids,
founded a new caliphate under the great Kurdish commander Salahaddin [Saladin]

many cities, along with thousands of villages and towns that were given new Turkish
names in the early years of the modern Turkish republic, and frequently making use of
their Kurdish names crimes punishable by prison and worse.
184
This is my translation of the original speech in Turkish.
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Ayyubid, beginning what is seen as a golden era in Kurdish history. Saladin successfully
defended the Near East against crusaders, some of whom abandoned the crusader side
and settled in the Near East, joining Saladin’s forces after finding out about and being
welcomed to join in the ethnic and religious plurality and wealth of the region. Saladin
sent forces to help the queen of Georgia against Mongolian invasion (Peacock, 2006;
Tsurtsumia, 2013; Blaum, 1999). After the conquest of Jerusalem, he ordered the city to
be rebuilt, and helped Jews and Christians. Aleppo was notably the pearl of the Near East
under Kurdish rule along with Baghdad, Jerusalem and Damascus in this era where one
could find almost any unique identity of the Near East in coherence with the plural,
interethnic and interreligious communities. Trade, architecture and literature remain as
the most solid evidences of this Kurdish-ruled pluralist state. There are sources arguing
that if Kurds had not sought after this intermediate managerial role, but rather remained
ethnocentric and focused on themselves, they would have a state today (Lyons, 1999;
Saaedpour, 1999). Finally, in his book Kurds: The Orphans of Islamic Civilization,
scholar Fehmi Sinavi (1997) argues that the common anti-Kurdish instincts and stances
of the region remain from the crusaders who were defeated by the Kurds. Islam peaked as
a civilization in this era, along with a common rule of law, plurality and social inclusion,
with minimized sectarianism..
The Nestorian Church, for instance, with its metropolitan center in Kurdistan,
expanded significantly sending out missions in Asia as far as Tibet, Xin Xiang, Mongolia
and Sumatra. They even converted the Mongolian Khan Guyuk in 1248, who was later
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massacred, however, when the world of Islam was ruled by Arab proto-nationalists185
(Nezan, 2015). Turkic-Mongolian invasions intensified in the 13th century, leading to
unrest in the Anatolian, Mesopotamian and Levant regions invaded by Turcoman and
Mongolian tribes who were fighting between one another over domination of the invaded
territories. It is in this very instance that a small tribe mostly known for animal husbandry
and basic textile skills, the Kayi Clan,186 settled near Aleppo under their leader Suleiman
Shah.187 His successor Ertugrul188 was effective in garnering189 a space for the clan

185

This nationalism is different than the contemporary form of it that started with Nasser
in Egypt and deepened with the Baathist forms, but can perhaps be seen as the root of
Arab nationalism in history, mostly organized and institutionalized in today’s Syria and
Iraq as well as the broader Levant region, and producing strong Islamic caliphates such as
the Umayyad and Abbasid.
186
According to Oguz tradition, the Kayi clan emerged from Karakecililer (Black Goat
Shepherds), while there were also Akkoyunlular (White Sheep Shepherds),
Karakoyunlular (Black Sheep Shepherds), Kizilkecililer (Red Goat Shepherds),
Akkecililer (White Goat Shepherds) etc. who moved along with each other westward
throughout a long history referred to as the Turkic-Mongolian invasions. Each of these
large communities was represented by traditional animal husbandry skills and the unique
breed of the animal they possessed and migrated with. It was the basis of their nomadic
lifestyle. Herding constituted their daily lives since trade, textile and food were all reliant
upon it. These clans, all together, constituted an enormous influx of Mongolian Turkish
communities into the west which completely changed the course of history.
187
Turkish armed forces conducted a military operation called Yildirim (Lightning) into
Syrian border regions on 22 February 2015, capturing the three coffins of Suleiman Shah,
and destroying the remnants of the tomb. They also secured and withdrew the 44 Turkish
soldiers who were securing the tomb—the only Turkish soil within Syrian borders
according to the 1921 Ankara Treaty between Turkey and France. This is also the only
loss of territory in the history of modern Turkey.
188
On the Turkish state’s TV channel (TRT), a series is being produced called Dirilis:
Ertugrul (Ressurection: Ertugrul) glorifying Ertugrul and his era, in which Kurds (called
Saladin Ayyubid’s grandsons) were presented as partial enemies, or at least inferior. Most
historical accounts contradict this, since the Marwanids (Saladin’s dynasty) granted poor
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inwards toward Central Anatolia from Seljuk Sultan Alaaddin, which later became the
Ottoman Emirate under his son Osman I, and later the Ottoman Empire, which ruled a
vast territory in Europe, Africa, Asia, and the Middle East for almost 700 years.
In the early 16th century, Kurdish country became a battleground for the existing
conflict between the Ottomans and the Safavid Dynasty of the Persian Empire. Notably
with the invasion of Eastern Ottoman territories including Baghdad and Eastern Anatolia
reaching to the city of Diyar-Bakr (Diyarbakir) Shah Ismail Safavid emerges as the
primary rival of Ottomans. The Battle of Chaldiran in 1514, won by the Ottomans under
the reign of Sultan Selim I (Yavuz) against Shah Ismail, resulted in the Kurds changing
sides at the last moment and teaming up with the Ottomans. The Ottomans eventually
secured all of Arabia, Mesopotamia, northwestern Iran, and eastern Anatolia, in addition
to conquering the majority of Shi’a (Islamic) communities. This conquest was marked at
the beginning by a long-term, destructive war between the Ottoman and Iranian Empires
during the rule of Suleiman I [Magnificient] which lasted for over 40 years, only coming
to an end in 1555 with the Treaty of Amasya.
It is a known fact that Yavuz destroyed a significant number of Alawi and Shia
communities during his conquest, with a ruthless sense of enmity towards non-Sunni
populations, which in fact was a significant proportion with the Turkish-Ottoman

nomadic Turkic clans a place to stay, along with other military aid in an era of Mongolian
invasions from the east, and crusaders from the West.
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According to Turkish historical sources, Ertugrul was granted a land in Western
Anatolia, at the south of Byzantine territoriality to settle with his clan by Seljuk Sultan
Alaaddin.
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community. The brutal policy of Yavuz is partly the outcome of fear of Iran’s Shi’a
expansionism, and there is a great anthology emerged in this era which has a great
significance in the traditional Alawi culture practiced today. Yavuz expanded his
invasions into Arabia and also beat the Mamluks, another Turkish sultanate located in
Egypt, expanding and securing the imperial boarders even further. The entire Middle East
and some of the North African regions were dominated by the Ottomans, a predominantly
Sunni caliphate, until the 19th century when the British and French colonized the region
and initiated the conquest of the Middle East.
A critical narrative that portrays the historical trajectory behind any political
analysis on the Kurds is that of the famous Idris Bitlisi. During the 15th century, most of
Kurdistan was under the rule of two Turkish clans: Akkoyunlular, and Karakoyunlular
which are both Sunni Turcoman clans. The Akkoyunlular State eventually collapsed
after being defeated by Sultan Mehmed II. (Fatih: Conqueror of Constantinople) in the
Otlukbeli War of 1473, and later annexed by Shah Ismail I, the ruler of the Shia Safavid
dynasty (Hur, 2012; Ugur, 1991; Kirlangic, 2001). The realm of war present in the
Eastern borders forced Ottomans to focus on developing a new policy of governance for
the East which was shaped by Idris-i Bitlisi, a Kurdish, later Ottoman, statesman.
Becoming a scholar in Akkoyunlu Palace, he served as a writer, secretary, notary of
Sultans, and he also gained vast experience in exchanging information with diplomats of
other states (Izady, 2015; White and Jongerden, 2003; Yavuz, 1998).
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In 1507, Shah Ismail of Persia invaded Maras, Bitlis, Mosul, and Cizire, shedding
blood to solidify his Safavid rule. Although 11 Kurdish Emirates went to him to show
loyalty, they were imprisoned. At that moment, Bayezid (II) was dead, and his son Selim
II (Yavuz) took the reign. Idris-I Bitlisi was not shown enough care by the previous
Ottoman administration, thus he was assigned to a weaker position than he deserved.
However, Selim (II) gained his support, again making him his right hand during his reign.
They were both willing to fight against Qizilbash Alawis, the dominant population of
Eastern Anatolia who had previously shown loyalty to Shia Safavid Sultan Shah Ismail.
Idris-i Bitlisi carved out a rigorous plan to gain loyalty from Kurdish Emirates, protect
Sunni Kurds against attacks from Shah Ismail, and also called for 28 Kurdish emirates to
come to Amasya in order to gather to debate and negotiate the future of Kurdistan. The
Kurdish Emirates eventually signed a treaty and promised loyalty to the Ottoman State in
exchange for certain privileges. According to Idris-i Bitlisi’s book “Selimname” which he
wrote for Selim (II), 70000 Qizilbash (Alawi) were killed during the conquests of Selim
(Gunter, 2010; Celebi, Bruinessen and Boeschoten, 1988). Idris-i Bitlisi’s role is
important because he unified Kurdish tribes and granted Kurdistan recognition by the
Ottoman state as a province with its various emirates. This victory can also be seen as the
beginning of a 300-year Ottoman-Kurdish alliance. Kurdistan was recognized as a nation
by the Ottoman state, which was later counted190 among the other nations that make up
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Suleiman the Magnificent, successor of Selim (II) defines himself as the ruler of
numerous countries that remain in Ottoman territory among which he also uses
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the Ottoman territoriality. All of the Sultans used “Kurdistan” in their official writings
with other rulers, as it was a tradition to introduce their titles and the possessed territories
in the title as a ruler.
Şerefxanê Bedlîsî [Sharaf Khan Bitlisi], the Kurdish emir of Bitlis, politician, and
poet also plays an important role in the pinpointing of the medieval Kurdish state
formation. He is very important owing to the fact that he wrote one of the oldest official
sources of Kurdish history: “Sharafnama” which is among the rarest pieces ever written
by a Kurd on Kurdish national history and politics.191 He was given the title
“Mirmiran”192 by Safavid Dynasty ruler Shah Tahmasb in 1576, which is equivalent to
“Beylerbeyi” in Turkish, meaning “the emir of the emirs”. His book also represents the
very first comprehensive study putting rich Kurdish culture under a national spotlight
which complements the state formation period initiated by Idris-I Bitlisi under Sunni
Ottoman rule.
Though the 16th century can be viewed as a state formation period for the Kurds,
the great and destructive clashes between the Ottoman and Persian empires
unquestionably put Kurds in a difficult situation: this time their sharp mountains were
invaded. Thousands of Kurds and other Mesopotamians were displaced in this period by
both sides, but notably by Safavids who applied a strict security policy displacing the

“Kurdistan”. Official writings of the Ottoman Empire up until the 20th century also
include “Kurdistan” which represents a country with an ensemble of governorates and
emirates.
191
The original copy is protected at Oxford.
192
This title is equivalent to that of Prime Minister today.
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Kurds. An intensive war between Safavids and Kurds took place from 1609 to 1610,
known as the “Battle of Dimdim”, and is a turning point in Kurdish history. The
victorious Safavid Dynasty slaughtered Kurds and dispersed them by replacing their
territories with Turkish tribes (Reogle and Atas, 2011; Koohzad, 2008; Gunter, 2010). In
1655, another famous war took place called the “Battle of Rozhiki” between Kurds and
Ottoman troops, and the Kurdish stronghold “Bitlis” fell. It is important to note that the
Ottomans and Savafids signed the Treaty of Zuhab193 in 1639, known as “Qasr-e Shirin”,
which divided the Kurdish territories between these two powers. These territories remain
almost completely unchanged since then, and are still in place between Turkey and Iran
today.
Looking back at the history of the broader region, one can easily see striking
similarities between some of today’s deadliest conflicts and security challenges and those
I represent in this historical narrative. Upon the Kurdish decline, and Safavid and
Ottoman rise, which was the aimed end-state for both powers, Kurds were weakened and
restricted although they maintained defensive points in the mountainous heart of their
country. In 1640, Ottoman General Firari Mustafa Pasha attacked the Yazidis of Mount
Sinjar which is also recorded by an important Turkish-Ottoman historian and statesman
from this period: “Evliya Celebi” (1611-1682). In his famous work “Seyahatname” [The
Book of Travels], he indicates that around 4000 Yazidis were mercilessly slaughtered,
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This treaty represents the settlement of Ottoman-Iranian borders, which is still in place
between Turkey and Iran, and also the division of the Kurdish nation.
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which according to Celebi (1991) made up 10-15% of the overall Yazidi population in
the area. This is notably the same Mount Sinjar where Yazidi people were ruthlessly
massacred, abducted, and enslaved during the summer of 2014 by Islamic State (IS)
gangs. A historical text may help one to reveal the similarities between the mentality194
that repeatedly perpetrates fundamentalist massacres and genocides on indigenous
Mesopotamian communities. Before Firari Mustafa, Melek Ahmed Pasha was the
governor of Diyarbakir and is also known to have committed a massacre killing of
Yazidis. Ottoman officials and statesmen are known for their ruthless strictly Sunni
policies for minorities, and one of them, Celebi (1991) describes:
“One side of Mt. Sinjar is called Sacli Dagi (Mountain of the Hairy Ones) and on
that merciless mountain live 44000 or 45000 Yezidis and Bapiris, dog worshippers,
worse than infidels, a band of rebels and brigands and perverts, resembling ghouls of the
desert, hairy heretic Yezidi Kurds. These people felt not the slightest fear or awe toward
the commander, Firari Mustafa Pasha, nor did they pay him the respect of even a token
gift. The commander was extremely annoyed because of this, … and he said: “Evliya
Celebi, I have heard when our father, your lord, Melek Ahmed Pasha was camped in this
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The mentality remains unchanged since the times of the emergence of Ibn-Tavmiyyah who can
be seen as the mastermind of fundamentalist jihadism and the school of Salafiyah, an exponent of
the school of Wahhabis. Belonging to the Hanbeli Sect, these groups are quite marginal in the
world of Islam, however, have gained significant strength and resources since 19th century
imperialism. Today, the so-called Islamic State is another occurrence of the horrendous acts of
this sect.
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place as we are, these infidels paid him no respect either, and so he punished them
severely and got quite a lot of booty…” (Celebi, 1991, p.167)
Figure 10: Kurdish Independent States and autonomous principalities by 1835, Izady
Mehrdad

In 1834, Kurds once again revolted against Ottoman rule under the command of
Kurdish Botan Emir Bedirxan. While Kurds enjoyed the administration of Kurdistan for a
short period of 17 years under Bedirxan, the revolt expanded with another Kurdish
rebellion in Mosul and Erbil led by Muhammed Pasha of Rawanduz. Bedirxan became an
influential leader whose credible name secured a broad Kurdish territory within Ottoman
boarders, and his legacy is still recognized today by Kurdish society. This era represents
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the emergence of numerous administrations and states representing Kurdish rule.
Bedirxan’s rule, however, ended quickly on account of internal conflict that took place
during his reign, and he was betrayed by his uncle who was encouraged by the Turks to
rise against him.
This, within itself, is a specifically Kurdish phenomenon and has since then been
called “Brakuji” (blood shed between brothers) by the Kurds, and is still in place as a
practice195 between Kurdish parties and groups, or at least as a dominant form of political
and discursive politics and rhetoric. Internal contestations led to a divided Kurdistan in
which different substate entities, parties, and groups battled with each other over power
and ideology. An individual or group living under these intense conditions of internal
contestations often ended up collaborating with the national contenders of the Kurds
(Dalay, 2016; Ghaderi, 2014), otherwise known as the enemy, in hopes of gaining power
over the internal contenders196. Kurds clearly and visibly condemned Brakuji at a
grassroots level, even presenting it as a political sin or great shame.
Imperialism, Colonialism, and the Great War: Unsettled Legacies of Pax-Brittanica
The Ottoman decline and eventual collapse brought about unprecedented
outcomes including a Great War (World War I) which was destructive in many aspects,
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Another word that became quite popular in political-military jargon of Kurdish groups
is “Jash”, meaning “mule”, and used to label the “traitor” Kurds who collaborate with
enemies against their own people.
196
There is a parallel between this form of division waged by outside agents, and the
formal British and French colonial policies of divide and conquer, as well as modern and
contemporary practices of similar kind in various post-colonial contexts.
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and represented a global intensification of conflict. The first great loss suffered by the
Ottoman Empire was Egypt in the earlier century. Mehmed Ali Pasha was an Ottoman
Ruler with Albanian descent, who later declared himself as the ruler of Egypt [against
Ottoman rule in Istanbul] with support from Britain197. Subsequent Ottoman losses
intensified when the British began arming the Arab tribes who had been living under
Wahhabi rule since the 18th century and were prepared to rise against Ottoman rule.
These tribes are known to have come from Arabia and Egypt into Syria, and to have
perpetrated horrendous brutality in Syria from 1839 to1841 on behalf of the British
mercenaries who armed and supported them against the Ottomans (Atay, 1964). On the
other hand, the Ottoman state developed close ties with Germans, especially their
emperor Kaiser Wilhelm, the mastermind of the Mesopotamian Genocide198 (Dadrian,
1989; Sarkin-Hughes, 2011; Erichsen and Olusoga, 2010; Hovannisian, 1998; Kaiser,
1998; Gust, 2013), as his ultimate dream was to conquer Mesopotamia by any means, in
hopes of benefitting from its endowed resources.
The Great War was not only a war of trenches and armed clashes, but also very
much associated with a massive social engineering project involving genocide, cultural
destruction, and the annihilation of livelihoods occurring within and as part of the
transformation period from empires into nation-states (Atay, 1915). In 1915, an

He is seen as the founder of Egypt’s military, political and economic modernization.
Although many sources refer to “Armenian Genocide”, I use Mesopotamian, since
Nestorians, Chaldeans, Yezidis and various others were annihilated before and along with
Armenians.
197
198
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overwhelming portion of indigenous Mesopotamian communities were slaughtered by
the Ottoman armed forces, mostly led by Talat Pasha and Enver Pasha, both of whom
were members of Ittihad Terakki [Progress and Reunion]. This plainly marks the peak of
the ongoing slaughter committed by paramilitary Ottoman Brigades occurring since the
late 19th century and which brought terror to rural Anatolia and Mesopotamia, and most
specifically to indigenous minorities. In 1915, the slaughter took an even uglier face
when the horrendous destruction became systematic genocide. There are very clear
accounts and records that exist, including the writings of Henry Morgenthau, the U.S.
Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, showing clear evidences of genocide, along with
many other countless documents and reports that are far beyond the scope of this chapter.
However, a few points bear examination, and help shed light on this dark historical
moment, which remains a major component of Kurdish foreign policy actions in the
contemporary world.
In a special edition199 of the AGOS newspaper, an insightful article mentioned
how my hometown, the major Kurdish city, Diyarbakir, was the third wealthiest city of
the new Republic of Turkey in 1924, but is now ranked at 60 among Turkey’s 80+ largest
cities (Diken, 2992). This tragedy of purposeful underdevelopment not only caused major
losses in regard to the people’s economic wellbeing, but the very soul of the cities and
villages of Anatolia and Mesopotamia were also lost as a result of this destruction,
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shattering thousands of years of sometimes turbulent, but always consistently normative
cultures of coexistence and plurality, as was common throughout most of the Old
World200 The losses of the Kurds in this era were massive in scale and magnitude, and
resulted in political, economic, social, cultural, and environmental set-backs and
transformations.
Revision and reform movements within the Ottoman Empire were initiated in the
18th century at Sultan’s order, focused mostly around the concept of Westernization of
institutions, notably the military schools (Ahmad, 2008; Hanioglu, 2001), which later
have become the laboratories of modern Turkish nationalism. The students were able to
join exchange programs in Western European countries, where they witnessed the
“progress” of modern European states. They were very impressed after experiencing the
advanced "civilized" life of the West, and were also depressed about the roaring collapse
of their centuries-old empire, not to mention desperate for territories in a highly colonial
world system. Therefore, Turkish nationalist idealism was a kind of last hope they
gathered around. The founding body of modern Turkey and Turkish nationalism was
started by a group of young Turks who referred to themselves as “Jeune Turcs” [Young
Turks] among whom was Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, Ismet Inonu, and their friends.201 Most

See Janet Abu-Lughod (1991) “Before European Hegemony” and Rashid Khalidi
(2010) “Resurrecting Empire”
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Although there are accounts from dozens of different military officers, what
essentially played a role is the military caste system, in which older classes and
classmates create their own chains of control and are superior to their younger cohorts.
Most of the enmities and friendships emerge under this context, although they are
200
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of the Young Turks experienced and participated in both the Balkan Wars and the Great
War, the latter of which resulted in the victorious allied countries colonizing most of the
Ottoman territories, and declaring their their own, new colonial legacies in the region.
The failure of the first Ottoman constitutional monarchy (1876-1878), known as “First
Mesrutiyet” was an important attempt to secretly begin the society known as “Committee
of Progress and Reunion”, and slowly emerged as a systemic political contender,
gradually increasing its political power in the early 20th century. In 1908, the Second
Mesrutiyet was declared and recognized as the Young Turk revolution (Akcam, 2007;
Akmese, 2005; Aksin, 1987; Mardin, 1992; Hanioglu, 1981). The revolution originally
emerged as a liberal reformist movement of the imperial state; however, it represents the
first seeds of Turkish nationalism and idealism as a nation-state, which would soon
become substantially more active in forming the future cadres of Turkey.
The Turkish national indoctrination among the Young Turks was drawn from a
few written works, such as Yusuf Akcura’s “Uc Tarz-I Siyaset” [Three Policies]
published in 1904, and others like it that have been deemed inspirational (Yavuz, 1993;
Georgeon, 1996). Akcura was a Tatar Turk from Russia comparing three policies:
Ottomanism, Pan-Islamism, and Turkism, and advocated for Turkism among these three
(Akcura, 1909). Another important text that further shaped Turkish nationalism is written
by Ziya Gokalp, a Kurd from Diyarbakir that eventually became recognized as the

members of the same political community with different ideologies and tendencies about
diplomacy.
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“founding father” of Turkish nationalism after publishing “The Principles of Turkism”, in
1923 (Sadoglu, 2003; Georgeon, 1996; Parla, 1985; Oran, 1988). He can be seen as the
architect of a long-term problem, when he defined Turkism as a supra-identity over
various ethnicities, and further encouraged Turks to assimilate the various ethnic
minorities through the brutal Turkification process that is still in place.
The creation of Turkey out of the Ottoman heritage was a highly militarized
process, as it was for most other countries in this period. It is also the outcome of a long
contestation over peace. Opposing the Istanbul Government that represented Ottoman
rule, Mustafa Kemal and his friends first went to Eastern Anatolia to organize a defense
movement under paramilitary troops, along with creating another government in Ankara
which ended up receiving Russian aid. The defeat of the British Navy in Gallipoli, for
instance, was the outcome of this aid which deterred the British from helping the forces
of Tsarist Russia against the Bolsheviks. Young Turks were not the only ones who
organized their political, diplomatic, and military organizations in the era of Ottoman
Collapse. Another noteworthy development of this era was “Society for the Rise of
Kurdistan” [Cemiyeta Tealiya Kurd], which appeared in 1918 in Constantinople aiming
toward an independent Kurdistan. Based on the Treaty of Sevres202 (1920) and the
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Signed between Ottoman Empire officials and allied forces from France, UK, Italy
and Japan. The treaty posited a referendum for Kurdistan according to Section III Articles
62-64, including Mosul Province, but Kurds were quite divided at this juncture. A
Kurdish entity was proposed by Serif Pasha in 1919, who represented the Society for the
Ascension of Kurdistan [Kurdistan Teali Cemiyeti] at the Paris Peace Conference,
defining a Kurdish territoriality except the Van region, which was claimed by Armenia.
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principles of Woodrow Wilson, the society created local branches in the Kurdish
principalities gathering a considerable force as well as the alliance of the Kocgiri Tribe, a
major Kurdish community in Northern Kurdistan. There are claims that the organization
was used by the British against Turkish nationalists, mostly based on the encouragement
and support received from British major Edward William Charles Noel when Kurds were
fighting against the Turkish army in the 1921 war that resulted in the defeat of the Kurds.
The organization was then banned by the Turkish national assembly, although its
members kept publishing their journals from elsewhere for a while.
The Betrayal: Contemporary Dynamics of Kurdish Statelessness in the 20th Century
Although defeated in World War I, Turks were extremely stubborn at the table of
the peace negotiations in which they followed intense tactics of attrition policy. The end
of the Great War, and the Turkish refusal to accept the new peace terms initiated another
war in which Greeks were defeated, and Anatolia was secured by the Turkish forces ruled
by Ankara, later becoming the Republic of Turkey in 1923. The key to this outcome was,
for sure, the creation of the Assembly and ruling government in Ankara which organized
the war and diplomacy, two major pillars of Turkish state building. While this war of
independence was heavily supported by the Kurds at the beginning, since they were
promised collective rights (and also under the banner of the fraternity of Islam, as it was

This dispute was later overcome between Kurdish and Armenian delegations, however,
but the treaty was never implemented after the War; and Turks won their “independence
war”, which reproduced another peace treaty, The Treaty of Lausanne (1926) that
recognized Turkey but no Kurdish entity.
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used in the Ottoman era many times), the situation changed shortly after the war. In the
1921 Constitution of the young state of Turkey, Kurdish rights were recognized, but after
the war this completely changed in 1924. More specifically, in the aftermath of Lausanne
Treaty of 1924, the international recognition of today’s Turkey ended with Kurds were
being removed from any public space, and a constitution was instituted in which
“Turkishness” was defined clearly to be the only definition of citizenship. With the
confidence of Lausanne, Turkish nationalists simply declared a policy of Kurdish
annihilation.
The origins of most of the highly aggravated contestations of the contemporary
Near East, along with the Kurdish cases of statelessness, coincide with the beginning of
the 20th century. Conflict is continuous within this region due to its long history and the
Ottoman collapse, however a series of wars and peace treaties determined the course of
conflicts occurring within the last century. Significantly, the French and United Kingdom
both practiced “breathtaking” imperialism as Dan Snow, a British historian,
acknowledges (Snow, 2012). The French and British signed a secret treaty, known as
Sykes-Picot,203 in 1916, which became public knowledge after Lenin released all the state
secrets later in 1917, forecasting the division of Mesopotamia between France and UK.
Two officers: Sykes from Great Britain, and Picot from France drew a line from Beirut to

203

British and French were the parties of the treaty, Russia was a witness. It also
represents British-French military alliance and an important pact of collaboration
between French and British colonial empires.
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Kirkuk that further determined subsequent Near Eastern territorialities as well as
underlying conflicts.
The very clear loss of Kurdistan and Kurdish Status from world politics was a
result of this agreement made in 1915, which was later formalized in March 1916
(Gunter, 2009, p. 196). These talks were also associated with the Zionist engagement in
British political debates since at least 1914,204 mostly over their aspirations for an
independent state in the Levant, and about the future of Palestine. The conditions of
Sykes-Picot conflicted with the previous treaties that were still in place such as the
Reglement Organique of 1861 and 1864 that guaranteed the non-intervention of Muslim,
Druze, Maronite, and Orthodox Christian communities regarding their governance,
notably in Lebanon and Syria. The agreement was also in conflict with the HusseinMcMahon Correspondence of 1915-1916, which distinctly settled British-Arab relations
under the rule of King Hussein in Jordan. The British promised Arabs a country, as
clearly noted by famous British envoy T.E. Lawrence (of Arabia), and also made
promises to others, such as the Zionists, who heavily lobbied in London. The British
agenda became even more ambiguous in the aftermath of the 1917 Balfour Declaration,
which intensified hostilities between these contested actors [Arabs, Palestinians, Jews,
Druze, and Kurds], and caused further complications in world politics.
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Talks here refer to the statements, expressions and other information on the debates
over Zionism, or at least the engagement of it in British politics, mostly started in 1914
by David Lloyd George in the British cabinet, and so on.
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At the end of the Great War in 1918, the disappearance of the Ottoman Empire
was officially and physically enforced by the allied forces under the conditions of the
Armistice of Mudros. The defeated Ottoman Army was ordered to dissolve and disarm its
members following the diplomatic decision to surrender at the Armistice declaring
British and French colonial mandates in former Ottoman territories. Meanwhile, a team
of Young Turks were initiating a counter-attack geared toward independence in 1919
under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal and his friends, by organizing a heavy defense in
Anatolia. They first went to the East, and secured support from mostly Kurds, then
organized a heavy defense against the allied forces. In 1920 the Treaty of Sevres was
signed between allied forces and the Ottoman Empire, provisioning an independent
Kurdistan and Armenia. The French had already invaded Syria, while the British were in
today’s Iraq, Jordan, Arab Peninsula and Palestine, and the Greeks were at the West
Coast of today’s Turkey; however, their plans of invading Turkey have changed after a
series of violent battles that ended with the victory of Turkish forces.205 The Ankara
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Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk) initiated the movement that further led to War of
Independence with the support of many of his colleagues form military school, first going
to Samsun in 1919, and passing into Eastern Anatolia, and gathering grassroots support in
Sivas, Erzurum, and Southeastern –mostly Kurdish- cities. These calls have further
become conferences and congresses which framed Turkish War of Independence.
Following the declaration of Turkish Grand Assembly and the new capital of the country,
Ankara, a series of wars in the West (Aegian Coast) against Greeks were won, and
Greeks were swept out after Sakarya, Inonu I, Inonu II and Dumlupinar Wars. The
French invasion in the Southern cities of Antep, Urfa and Maras was also swept out with
heavy defense wars in which Kurdish tribes have played significant role. Following the
western-alike declaration of new Turkish Republic in 1923, it was soon recognized as the
successor of Ottoman Empire securing the territoriality which is today’s Turkey, except
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Government was definitely effective in its defense movements, going so far as to emerge
as a significant proto-state, with Russian support.
All the while, British and French mandates both orchestrated the colonial partition
of the Near East, out of which emerged today’s contested map. This division of the
Middle East was somewhat akin to the prior and somewhat better known Scramble for
Africa in the mid-1880s, which also saw the emergence of most of today’s modern
nation-state distribution, but more telling was also focused on creating boundaries that
bisected existing indigenous societies, to seed the divide and conquer agenda they’d
perfected by the twentieth century206. Both the destruction and division of Kurdistan, as
well as the removal of Kurdish representation from the international scene of peace and
diplomacy-making, was met by strong opposition in Kurdish communities, notably a
revolt led by Mahmud Barzanji against the newly defined and conquered territories of
British Mesopotamia and the British Mandate in Iraq. Barzanji’s first insurgency took
place in 1919, and resulted in his being exiled to India and imprisoned for a year. He then
returned as governor [of Duhok Sanjak], as he remained the leader of the Qadiriyah order
of Sufism, a strong sect especially in Southern Kurdistan. Barzanji quickly gathered a
number of indigenous Kurdish, Iranian and Turcoman tribes, and even other ethnic and
religious minorities, then declared himself as the “ruler” of Kurdistan in 1922 with a

the Hatay (Alexandria) Province which was annexed in 1936 from Syria. Lausanne was
signed in 1923, and was effective in 1924 which coincides the removal of the Kurds from
Turkey’s political system.
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Thanks to Dr. Jesse Benjamin for suggesting this linkeage.
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revolt once again (McKierman, 2006, pp.31-32; Tripp, 2007; Lortz, 2005). However, the
British did not support him, and finally defeated him once again in 1924, with military
operations that included alleged chemical attacks on Kurds by British forces207
(Eskander, 2000; Lortz, 2005; Khidir, 2004).
In 1921, the new government of Turkey adopted “Teskilat-I Esasiye”, meaning
“constitutional law”, as an interim document for the creation and defense of the new
state. It included “autonomy” for the Kurds as their support was quite central for the
needed defense of the west of the country, which consisted of mostly Aegean coasts and
Istanbul at that point. Following a heavy defensive war in Anatolia and Gallipoli,208 the
new Ankara Government was successfully recognized by the allied forces, and was
accepted to be diplomatically represented in the Lausanne Peace Treaty in 1923,209 which
is thus the official declaration of modern Turkey. However, as they were encouraged by
the Lausanne delegates, the Turkish core of this new state simply declared war on the
very Kurds to whom they were beholden for helping to militarily secure the new country.
In 1924, the promised “autonomy” was officially removed with a new constitutional law
that can be defined simply as a “protofascist” Mussolini-esque code. The constitutional
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While some sources accuse Churchill for being directly responsible, others have
denied this connection.
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Gallipoli is such a significant moment in Turkey’s national history, since it was a
decisive battle against the common wealth, which again is an important issue in today’s
political discourses, since there was a significant number of Kurdish soldiers that lost
their lives in these battles.
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The full text of the treaty is available online at:
http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Treaty_of_Lausanne

387
law was heavily modernist and secular, mostly reflecting the ideals of the secular Young
Turks, aimed at promoting the suppression of any elements that might be part of the
opposition. The outcomes of this new policy included destruction of communities, and
execution in a systematic manner that still lingers in the memories of the Kurds. Sheikh
Said, a noble, faithful, Kurdish wise man who was beloved by the Kurds because he
openly defended Kurds’ rights, was hanged in the central square of Diyarbakir in 1925 by
the new Kemalist regime, along with his friends and family.
Despite being restricted and heavily punished, the Kurdish political movement
remained alive. Kurds are one of the most displaced people in the world with waves of
exiles occurring steadily since the 1920s, usually forcibly by the government or other
security forces,. It is imperative to acknowledge a prominent name that played a great
role and left an impact on the future birth of contemporary Kurdish identity, most notably
in its Westernized and modernized form: Celadet Bedir Khan (1893-1951), a Kurdish
diplomat, writer, politician, and son of Mir Bedirxan. He spoke many languages and left
Turkey in the early 1920s as an exile. He created a Kurdish journal called Xoybun, and
organized a Kurdish national conference in Beirut. His progressive movement took
substantive shape when the Republic of Ararat (1927-1930) was declared in Agri
Province, only to be destroyed by Turkey shortly thereafter. Iranian Shah Pehlevi offered
him a position in the consulate under the condition that he stay away from Kurdish
nationalists, however, he rejected and left to Syria. He is symbolic in part due to his
adaptation of the first Latin alphabet for Kurdish, which was published in important
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French journals; along with making strides in Kurdish ‘modernization’ generally, a
process that has often lagged in Kurdish regions due to power dynamics, forced
marginalization, and purposeful underdevelopment processes. His work acted as a
lifesaver for millions of Kurds who were about to lose their maternal language. However,
being the son of the “beaten” Kurdish leader did not yield him a contented life, as he feel
from being the ruler of Kurdistan to his end as a poor farmer on the Syria-Iraq border. His
work, however, was published and presented at the Sorbonne, and served as a seed that
eventually allowed the emergence of a distinct scholarship: Kurdology.
Figure 11: Kurdish Practice of Self-Rule in 20th Century (Source: Kurdish Institute of
Paris, Izady Mehrdad, 1998)
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After the major rebellions of Kocgiri (1920), Sheikh Said (1925) and Ararat
(1930) all of which ended quite bloodily and destructively for the Kurds, a horrendous
genocide took place in 1938, which was well documented and even finally recently
officially recognized by the Turkish Government.210 Thousands of Zazaki Kurds were
slaughtered as a result of systematic operations and bombardments led by Turkish armed
forces, an event known as the “Dersim Genocide of 1937-1938”,211 (Bruinessen, 2007;
McDowall, 2002; Besikci, 1990; White, 2000; Aygun, 2009). The leader of the Zazaki
Dersim Movement, Seyid Riza, who is often praised by Kurdish movements, notably of
Northern Kurdistan (Bakur) in Turkey, was eventually hanged along with his sons and
friends in 1938. Recent release of the official documents revealed that he was interviewed
directly by Mustafa Kemal, to whom he said: “We have done everything you have told us
to do, we have paid taxes, we have provided armed men for the war, we are not guilty for
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Dersim Genocide was finally recognized by Turkish officials at the highest level,
however, with a purely misrepresentative discourse and no true reconciliation. In his
speech, Turkish President Erdogan pointed out the so called “massacre” [it is a wellplanned and documented operation for annihilation of a mass which makes it genocide
according to many] as if it is perpetrated by secular Kemalist CHP Regime and its
mentality against people with faith [of Islam] which is misguiding since the massacre is
simply against Dersim and people of Dersim who are ethnic Kurds [mostly of Zazaki
descent] willing to self-rule.
211
Although recognized as a genocide by Turkish President Erdogan, and on many
instances in the EU Parliament and other significant international audiences, there is
definitely an international insensitivity towards Dersim, more to say representing a
trouble to international scholarship focusing on Turkey. Bruinessen (1994) points out
how there is no single word in books of Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern
Turkey, or the History of Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey (Shaw and Shaw, 1977).
He also gives former Turkish Army general Muhsin Batur’s memoirs in which he writes:
“"I beg my readers to be excused, I shall not write this page of my life” (in Musa Anter,
1990).
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anything as you treat us this way” (Caglayangil, 1990). He continued: “This is a shame, a
pity, we are guiltless, we are sons of Kerbela,” while he was made to watch his sons and
friends being hanged, and finally added: “I could not deal with your games and that
became my pain, but I did not put myself on my knees in front of you; that shall be your
pain”,212 before being hanged by the Kemalist regime. This quote remains a popular
motto of the Kurdish political movement in Turkey today. Memories, witnesses, and
stories regarding Dersim are very much alive in Kurdish society, and very central to
contemporary Kurdish political movements.213
In 1941, the allies invaded Iran, while Soviets controlled the north, mainly as a
measure against Hitler’s ambitions to reach the oil-rich region. The Soviets organized a
Kurdish nationalist movement, in the absence of a central Iranian government, which
middle-class Kurds later developed in the town of Mahabad. There they eventually
formed the political party known as “The Society for the Revival of Kurdistan,” under the
leadership of Qazi Mohammed. Although he ruled the region for many years, and even
declared the region the Republic of Mahabad in 1945, this movement was destroyed by
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While Caglayangil wrote this story in his memoirs in 1990, recent release of MAH
(the name of the Turkish Intelligence before today’s Turkish Intelligence Agency [MIT]
was created) reports were published by mainstream media, fueling new discussions on
this issue. Moreover, Seyid Riza’s letters to the UN asking for help, and to Mustafa
Kemal asking forgiveness and peace, were released. In his letter to Mustafa Kemal, Seyid
Riza stated that he was fine accepting exile, he just did not want a bloody war.
213
The EU officially organized a Dersim Genocide conference. See
http://www.guengl.eu/news/article/events/12th-international-conference-on-theeuropean-union-turkey-and-the-kurds-26 and the Conference at the EP on 26th May 2011
titled “Dersim 1937-1938” available:
www.guengl.eu/uploads/_old_cms_files/Dersim%2026-05-2011.doc
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Iran in 1947 (McDowall, 2004). The Soviets betrayed the Kurds with the withdrawal of
their substantial aid,214 significantly after the Kurdish rejection of being assimilated into
the newly emerged Azerbaijan state, as they did not agree with its administration. Among
those who supported Qazi and his short-lived Republic were Molla Mustafa Barzani,
Ibrahim Ahmad, and many other prominent names.
Another important source for illuminating the determination of Kurdish status in
the post-World War II era are the memoirs of Turkish diplomat and statesman, Numan
Menemencioglu, trusted legal counsel of Ismet Inonu, the second president of the
Republic of Turkey, who was known as “national chief” or “the second man”, after
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. There he recounts:
“Churchill and Roosevelt invited me and Inonu to Cairo in 1943 to convince us to
join the war. Distant to this idea, Inonu said: “we can’t fight in this war unless they
donate our army”. But neither Churchill nor Roosevelt trusted Turks since they could
collaborate with Germans after the aid. So, they put pressure on us with the Kurdish
issue. While visiting the world of Islam, they brought experts on the region. Churchill
asked Inonu: “Pasha, do you speak Kurdish?” Inonu was shocked, and could not figure
out what to say, and I quickly answered “excellence, we do not speak Kurdish. It does not
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There is a much more complex geopolitics here, around my use of the term betrayal,
yet in 1946 Western powers led by the U.S. were heavily bargaining with the Soviets,
supporting Iran and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iranian Azerbaijan. When the
Soviets withdrew, this move completely isolated the Kurdish state within Iran, therefore
leading to its destruction. Barzani and his men were permitted to go to Soviet territories
where they took refuge after the fall of the Mahabad Republic.
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exist, and nobody speaks it”. Then, Churchill turned to his expert, and asked him “is this
true, sir? Is not there a Kurdish language?” The expert quickly stood up and said “Of
course there is a Kurdish language with formidably rich literature, and I may tell you a
poem from Diwana Ciziri”. While he was reading this wonderfully written poem, we did
not understand him, but he said it was in Kurdish. Churchill asked: “write this poem on a
paper for us”, and then he asked him to translate it into English, French and Turkish.
Churchill asked me to approach them, and asked me: “Tell me sir, while I was translating
this wonderful poem into three different languages, how many foreign words were
needed to be added? French translation was with no foreign words added. In English, few
Latin words were added. In Turkish translation, almost all of the words were foreign and
non-Turkish. Churchill has put the document in front of us with an expression on his face
meaning “are not you ashamed?” and told us: “Gentlemen, see the richness of the
Kurdish that is being spoken as a maternal language in a major part of your country.” I
don’t remember another instant in my foreign affairs career that I was that much ashamed
before…” (Musa Anter’s 215 “Hatiralarim216, 1992).
The political, social, and economic destruction that occurred worldwide during
World War II were not experienced in Turkey, and Kurds did not have any backing from
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Musa Anter was a Kurdish intellectual-writer and wise man murdered by Turkish
paramilitary forces (JITEM) in the early 1990s. This was one of thousands of
extrajudicial killings that were recently exposed in the media, when with the victims’
bodies and mass graves were found and officially documented during the past decade.
Also revealed were many of the names of the perpetrators, who were never seriously
judged, nor brought to any form of substantive justice.
216
I translated this from the original Turkish text
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any major power. Instead, they were constantly bombarded by the Iraqi, Turkish, and
Iranian regimes each time they attempted to organize a national movement. Even if
Turkey did not directly experience the Second World War, this new country suffered
severe hunger and poverty during this era, and even after, in order to keep a large army
intact as they faced the threat of invasion by Hitler and Stalin. Similar to the Soviet
model in its process of politic, economic and social construction, in addition to its overall
orientation toward military preparedness, Turkey was a highly authoritarian country ruled
by a single-party, the CHP (People’s Republican Party), a Weberian central-left party
with Turkish nationalist and Kemalist tendencies.217
During the Cold War years, Turkey’s geopolitical significance has consisted
mainly of its centrality to NATO’s containment strategy, as can be seen in the accession
of Turkey into NATO in 1952, and subsequent deployment of NATO nuclear missiles in
Turkish territory. The multiparty electoral system adopted in 1945 by Turkey produced
the governance of the Democrat Party (DP) led by Adnan Menderes who overthrew
Turkey’s founding and ruling political party, CHP, but was then not received very well
by the secular military whose members led a coup d’état in 1960, ending with Menderes
and two of his ministers being hanged. Ismet Inonu has been severely criticized for his
authoritarianism,218 and left a significant legacy which many view as a source of current

The six arrows in this political party’s logo represent Weber’s principles of a national
organization of statehood.
218
In a recent speech to parliament, and perhaps to divert attention away from himself,
Turkey’s increasingly extreme president Erdogan called Inonu “Your Fuhrer” as he
217
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conflicts. After the death of Mustafa Kemal in 1938, Inonu declared himself the second
man or officially the “national chief”, and monumentalized Mustafa Kemal in almost
every sphere of the country. This created a web of authoritarian centralized power, what
is called the doctrine of Kemalism, and ossified inherited enmities. For example,
Kemalists generally adopted anti-Kurdish, anti-Alawi, anti-Left, and anti-religious
stances to define their complicated form of Turkish secular nationalism, now the official
state ideology. This ideology, however, is not purely secular, and in fact has a strongly
organized Sunni Islamism component,219 a hybrid political form that in most recent
interventions has been reactivated, especially in the aftermath of the neoliberal coup of
1980. Thus, Kemal – who established a national policy of annihilation of Kurdish
communal and political enclaves in the 1920s, which then intensified in late 1930s, and
has continued episodically ever since – has been institutionalized and lionized in the
official state ideology and discourse of Kemalism.

referenced the CHP party; accusing him of being anti-religious. In fact, Inonu was a
proponent of secularism, but his strongest political color was being anti-Kurd, even
though he was from a prominent Kurdish family from Bitlis. Inonu promoted and applied
brutal and oppressive policies towards Kurds.
219
Sunni grassroots organizations and institutions existed since the 16th century, the era
of Yavuz Sultan Selim I described in the previous section, and since then Turkey
represents a Sunni stronghold although it has adopted a Western infused secularism under
Kemalist doctrine. In 1908, Sultan Abdulhamid II, for instance, attempted to revitalize
the Muslim World against the allied forces invasions using his “caliphate” title, but was
not successful. In crisis times, such as the current conflict with the Kurds, religion
politics become significant, not only in Turkey, but also in Iraq, Iran, and Syria, as a
major strategy of the central regimes willing to avoid regions’ demands of rights.
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Resurgence of Kurdish Political Activity: 1960s – 1980s
Turkey and its Kurds have gone through significant changes and challenges since
the 1950s, notably in regard to urbanization as it relates to the development of capitalism,
which evolved around the newly emerging private sector, especially after Turkey’s
NATO membership and its geopolitical shift toward the west. New classes were born
consisting of workers, students, and intellectuals, while national markets were more
interconnected to the global scene than ever before. Coupled with the relative comfort
enjoyed by aristocrats, a considerable bourgeois class appeared in Kurdish cities. The
collapse of the Iraqi monarch in 1958, and the constitutional recognition of Kurdish
existence and their associated collective rights of language, culture, education there,
legitimized the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) creating a strong inspiration among
both Turks and Kurds. Still, Kurds remained a mostly rural and traditional nation in most
Kurdish regions until the 1980s.
In Turkey, however, the words “Kurd” and “Kurdish” were still banned, and
instead the Kurdish populated movements were called names such as Dogu or Doguculuk
meaning “East”, or “Easternist” in Turkish, bluntly representing the Turkish ban against
acknowledging anything Kurdish in these years, even their name and their presence
(Eriten and Romine, 2008; Ikizer, 2011; Ergil, 2008). There was a group of intellectuals
engaged in journal publications in Turkey who were later judged for being “Kurtcu”
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[Kurdists] in the famous trial called “49s”220 [Kirkdokuzlar] and ultimately imprisoned
by the DP government in 1959. All factors reflect the prominent fear of the Turkish
government of the possible diffusion of the Kurdish revolt in neighboring regions
(especially Iraq) into Turkey. This was eventually borne out, in a sense, as Kurdish
political movements have indeed grown since then in Turkey, but it is unclear if this is
more a result of the state’s preemptive repression, or the diffusion of ideas from nearby.
Ultimately, both were important factors. A political party founded by Yusuf Azizoglu
from Diyarbakir in 1961, YTP (New Turkey Party), was the second major party in
Kurdish cities, and the third after the 1965 elections. In 1970, Kurdish autonomy was
officially recognized in Iraq, and this played a very significant role in the emergence of
Kurdish movements in other parts of Kurdistan. KDP’s Turkey branch was founded in
1965 by Sait Elci, Faik Bucak, and others, and called T-KDP.221 Sadly, Faik Bucak was
murdered222 in 1966 and later, a dispute representing an internal fragmentation occurred
between Sait Elci and Sait Kiziltoprak, and both of them were murdered in Iraqi
Kurdistan in the 1970s, crimes which remain unsolved.
Young Kurdish students and urbanized Kurdish members of the working class
were often influenced by left-wing politics in the 1970s, which gradually increased the
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This name comes from the trial of 49 Kurdish individuals, activists, and intellectuals
who expressed the Kurdish rights for the first time after previous wars and interventions.
221
T-KDP stands for Turkey’s KDP, while in Iran it is I-KDP, and in Syria it is S-KDP,
all of them follow KDP in Kurdistan Region of Iraq historically.
222
Various sources and the party archives claim that Bucak was murdered by Turkish
Intelligence (MIT) for leading T-KDP that was seen as a Kurdish separatist/nationalist
movement.
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turmoil of the Cold War. In 1972, a CIA supported coup d’état severely punished the leftwing with thousands of torture cases and the famous hanging of three student leaders:
Deniz Gezmis, Yusuf Arslan, and Huseyin Inan,223 which only further antagonized the
left and brought about hundreds of consecutive murders and massacres. Kurds were also
internally antagonized after the fragmented left-wing created their own political groups
such as Rizgari, PKK, Tekosin, Kawa, and Ala Rizgari. Turkey in the 1970s became a
laboratory for Kurdish politics, gradually becoming more politicized and expanding
under various ideological tendencies. The split between Turkish and Kurdish leftist
movements is still visible in this era, along with the internal ideological fragmentations
between these groups. The Kurdish movement had developed, up until 1975, in parallel
to the Iraqi Kurdish emergence that had so inspired the Kurds of other regions, notably in
Turkey’s Kurdish regions. The overwhelming weight of the military and its ongoing
repressive operations in Turkey’s politics has also played a significant role in this
development.
Kurdish Autonomy was recognized by Iraq in 1970 after heavy, long-term
fighting, but it was quickly lost again in 1974, with dire consequences for Kurdish
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Influenced by the global popular youth movements, and specifically the context of the
peaked Cold War, the hangings of 1972 were also related with the military regime
(although there was a government, in 1972 army released a “muhtira” a statement of
order, and was quite engaged in judicial and legislative processes. These students were
also involved in a few incidents, such as pushing the U.S. marines into sea in Istanbul
while they were on a mission visit. While there have been many hardliner events some of
them are highly suspicious in the light of numerous confessions, most of the popular left
youth movements were not violent until being antagonized by the attacks of the armed
and trained right winger “grey wolves”.

398
communities. A secret agreement was made in 1973 between the US and the Shah’s Iran
to fund Kurdish rebels fighting against Baghdad with assistance from both the CIA224 and
Mossad (Mamikonian, 2005; Minasian, 2007; Gibson, 2015; Freij, 1998; Keddie, 1981;
Alvandi, 2014). This resulted in an immensely aggressive Iraqi Army, and left the entire
region under fire, with thousands of Kurds trapped within Iranian-Iraqi-Turkish borders.
The Iraqi Government made a proposal, with the mediation of Algerian President Houari
Boumediene, to recognize Iranian demands that Iraq stop its interference,225 if they
stopped supporting the Kurdish rebels against Baghdad. This was coupled with a
comprehensive settlement between Iraq and Iran, known as the Algiers Agreement of
1975. Kurds were completely abandoned at the hands of their respective aggressors, and
Molla Mustafa Barzani had to leave the country, while thousands of Kurds surrendered
en masse, with many being executed by Saddam’s infamous regime. Over the 15 years,
the Iraqi government intensified its military and cultural campaign again the Kurdish
region as part of its strict Baathist Arabization policy, resulting in the loss of tens of
thousands of lives and the displacement of many more226 (Anderson, 1993; Ratner and
Abrams, 2001; Gunter, 1999; Geiger, 2000; Black, 1993; HRW227, 1993).
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Gibson (2015) notably explains the Kissinger War and Kurds in detail.
The main demands were that Iraq end its support of Kurdish and Baloch separatists,
and respect Iran’s borders.
226
See http://uk.gov.krd/genocide/pages/page.aspx?lngnr=12&pnr=37 and
http://www.ncas.rutgers.edu/center-study-genocide-conflict-resolution-and-humanrights/al-anfal-and-genocide-iraqi-kurds-1988
227
See http://www.refworld.org/docid/47fdfb1d0.html
225
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The heavy defeat of almost all Kurdish aspirations in Iraq during this period of
atrocities and repression across all levels of civil society, was mirrored in Turkey. Kurds
in all regions were fragmented over their ideological differences and external alliances, at
the height of Cold War machinations. In terms of human rights violations, ethnic
cleansing, and the most overt repression even of routine manifestations of Kurdish
culture, this era generally represents a severe nadir in Kurdish history. The defeat also led
to the emergence of critiques of the KDP, the long-standing Kurdish political actor,
giving birth to the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). This split was felt in Turkey’s
Kurdish politics as well, and a multiparty era emerged in Kurdish politics. In fact, the
period saw the rise and proliferation of Kurdish political groups until the 1978-1980
conjuncture.
The US-backed military coup228 on 12 September 1980 in Turkey was a game
changing factor, repressing and further antagonizing the urban and non-violent political
movements, and inciting an armed Kurdish movement. The coup dramatically intervened
in daily Kurdish social life as a massive repressive apparatus was set up across the
country, criminalizing the language, all manifestations of Kurdish identity, and also
implementing the forced removal and urbanization of millions of rural Kurds from their
historic agricultural and pastoralist communities. The Kurdish population was to this
point a mostly rural society, dispersed in fertile Mesopotamian soil, filled with agriculture

Also known as “Evren Coup” in Turkey, since Kenan Evren was the chief of the
armed forces and mastermind of the coup.
228
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and animal husbandry, which is why any political or social movement across the history
reviewed here has needed to be rurally sovereign, a factor that remains salient in the
context of contemporary, twenty first century political-armed movements. Although
heavily eroded, almost completely banished in many ways from former rural spaces, and
submerged in the new conditions of urban life, the long heritage of the grassroots
confederacies in Kurdistan signify much more than a simple primitive feudal
infrastructure.
The increasing significance of Kurdish political movements in Iran played a
significant role in the revolution against the Shah, which eventually led Ayatollah
Khomeini to come to power in 1979, an eventuality that was never in fact the intention of
the left-leaning Kurdish groups. What the Kurds had imagined to be a revolution along
with other left-leaning or pro-democratic groups in Iran, was actually the birth of a new
regime known as the “Islamic Republic,” which rules the country under the primacy of
Shia Islamic law. Since the birth of this new regime, there has been a strictly
authoritarian and centralist style of governance making no provisions for regional
autonomy. Sunni Kurds, as part of Iran’s Kurdish population, were stripped of their
voting rights under the pretext of “being vulnerable to the exploitation of external
powers,” and therefore in order to protect the young Islamic republic.
The new constitution of Iran was written completed without any participation
from Iran’s Kurdish communities, who were directly banned from the process when they
were denied a seat in the “Assembly of Experts” in 1979. The elected representative of
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the Kurdish region, Dr. Ghassemlou (Qasimlo) was denied a seat by Ayatollah Khomeini,
foreclosing any Kurdish representation in the new regime. Kurds who had fought a longterm battle for their rights in Iran during the Shah’s Regime were extremely frustrated by
this blanket rejection under the new regime. Discouraged also by the setbacks and
repression of Kurdish communities in Iraq, Turkey, and Syria, the Kurdish movement in
Iran was eventually antagonized to the point that armed clashes broke out between Iran
and the Kurds, or more delicately put: between the Iranian state and its Kurdish citizens.
Two major Kurdish groups with political organizations and armed forces, the Kurdistan
Democrat Party of Iran (KDPI) and the Komala (Revolutionary Organization of
Kurdistan), were the skeleton of this movement. Ayatollah Khomeini and his regime
declared Jihad (holy war) against the indigenous Kurdish movements in August 1979,
with dire consequences, having accused the Kurds and their movements of violating their
Islamic doctrines.
Kurdish Inferno in the 1980s and 1990s: Multilateral Destruction of Kurdistan229
In 1980, Kurdish cities (Mahabad, Sanandaj, Pawe, and Marivan) were all
invaded as a result of a massive military campaign in Iran, which was launched at
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Although wars, massacres, oppression and destruction of Kurdish livelihoods have
been continuous throughout the long history I describe in this chapter, and people mostly
attribute to the early 20th century the destruction of Kurdistan and its loss of international
recognition and status, the 1980s and 1990s represent a singular moment during which all
four regional nation-states (Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria) brutally cracked down militarily
and socially on their Kurdish populations. I therefore construct this juncture as
representing a more or less coordinated or de facto, and semi-officially/diplomatically
agreed upon, multilateral destruction.
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Khomeini’s order, resulting in the killing of thousands of Kurds. This military campaign
destroyed entire villages and towns, in addition to holding unfair trials where the victims
were sentenced to immediate death, executed just after the trial (Mazinani, 2014; Neriah,
2012; Gresh, 2009; Ahmadzadeh and Stansfield, 2010). At the level of official
international conflict, the bloody Iran/Iraq War from 1980 to1988 was one of the
deadliest, longest, most violent conflicts in the modern history of warfare, where
weapons of mass destruction were heavily used (Browne and Snyder, 1985; Takeyh,
2006; Ali, 2001; Cordesman, 1987; Karsh, 2002; Metz, 1988). Kurds were often the
primary victims of this war, as they were used as proxy populations in the conflicted
territories, which were themselves subjected to international power dynamics, namely the
Cold War and its steady overy and covert interventions. In 1989, in what can only be
characterized as an extreme in the annals of diplomatic history, Dr. Ghassemlou, leader
of Iranian KDP and two of his other associates agreed to negotiate with the official
Iranian committee about a possible peace treaty. However, at the meeting in a Vienna
hotel room he was attacked and killed by the official delegation sent by Tehran
(Prunhuber, 2010; Hakakian, 2007; Hennerbichler, 2010).
In 1978, a few Kurdish students created the PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) in
Turkey, which expanded enormously and later became recognized worldwide as an
armed Kurdish group that is still in place today, and maintains significant territorial
sovereignty. Although originally created as a political movement in 1978, it devolved
from the leftist groups in Ankara, and the first armed move of the PKK occurred in 1984
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in Eruh Town of Siirt Province. Since then, the PKK has expanded its political and
military reach, finding great support in the grassroots. Supporting the claim of many
scholars, intellects, and politicians, it is very clear that the 12 September 1980 coup d’état
by the Turkish Army played a very significant role in the expansion and growth of the
armed Kurdish movement230 (Bozarslan, 2001; Ergil, 2000; van Bruinessen, 2007;
Karabelias, 1999). Turkey’s soviet styled democracy was not corresponding well with the
needs of markets and institutions to cooperate with other NATO member countries, and
the new supposedly “neoliberal” Turkey was merely declared by a military regime that
cosmetically “adjusted” the democratic balance of Turkey for the sake of expedience.
Famous Turkish Journalist, Mehmet Ali Birand, met and interviewed some very
prominent members of the U.S. administration from this period, such as CIA Ankara
Lead Paul Henze, who cabled a message to Washington saying “Our boys [in Ankara]
did it” as the 1980 coup unfolded, and which is said to have been positively received by
Henry Kissinger and other U.S. officials (Duthel, 2014; Deliso, 2007; Daniele, 2005).
This neoliberal coup was closely related to the spirit of the Thatcher-Reagan era,
and the outcomes were clearly similar to what happened in Latin America, especially in
Chile and Argentina. It was also closely linked with the regime change in Iran in 1979,
distinctly representing the priority given to Turkey by NATO in the Cold War years.
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Various prominent names of Kurdish politics have faced imprisonment and tortures in
this period woth some of which I found the chance of interviewing. All of the accounts
and memories I gathered from primary victims indicated the momentum gained by
Kurdish armed movement in the aftermath of the abuses of the military regime.
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Turkey needed to be kept in line with NATO policies and militarily secure for a regional
strategy, in what was notably an era of turmoil in which almost all its neighbors were in
direct contestation. In the decade that followed, 650,000 people were arrested; 1.6 million
citizens were labeled in state archives with titles such as Alawi, Kurd, fundamentalist,
etc.; 230,000 citizens were judged in the courts of force majeure; 7000 of them were sent
to trial with demand of death penalty, of which 517 were sentenced to death (Turkish
Grand Assembly, 2012; Amnesty International, 1988; Birand, 1984; Naylor, 2004).
Among the death sentences, 49 were executed including the famous 17-year-old Erdal
Eren. Over 30,000 citizens left the country in exile, 366 were dead in suspicious
incidents. Unions, parties, and organizations were banned, and most media institutions
were closed.
Figure 12: Turkey Official Regions [Regime Enforcing] Map, declared in aftermath of
1980 Junta

Source: nationsonline.org
Kenan Evren, the Pinochet-like leader of the military regime, along with four of
his generals, made up the “High Council” that ruled the country until 1983, instituting a
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proto-fascist Mussolinian Constitution and a right-wing security apparatus with a strongly
fortified state policy fed by Turkish nationalism. This was accompanied by a direct
declaration of total war on peaceful leftist movements, which were mostly comprised of
Kurds, and later gave rise to armed opposition movements, when all other legitimate
channels were completely blocked. Dozens of Kurdish intellectuals, political community
leaders, activists, scholars, writers, musicians, and very ordinary people who were
harmless to others were murdered or tortured brutally. The Junta administration carved
out a new map of Turkey, dividing the country into seven administrative regions.231
Kurdish-predominant cities were largely divided between the Eastern Anatolia Region
and the other major Kurdish region, Southeastern Anatolia. In addition, curfews were
imposed and force majeure was assigned to a super-governor,232 located as a colonial
outpost in the de facto capital of Kurdish Turkey, Diyarbakir, together with outposts and
agents in all the prefectures and all the cities with Kurdish majorities. This supergovernor was specifically designated to fight so-called terrorism (as unilaterally defined
by the state), and was responsible for military and security issues.

231

These regions were determined by the ruling Junta, and aimed purely to create regimeenforcing administrative units, especially to legalize curfews and military/police
operations in the Kurdish populated Southeast. None of these regions, however, represent
any form of decentralization; instead, they served as conduits for enforcing direct central
state rule by the military regime over the heavily contested Southeast.
232
On many occasions violence, torture, massacres, and deliberate attacks were in fact
planned and managed by this very regional administration. However, this new
regionalization did not reflect or represent the public it encapsulated, and was instead
intended primarily for the purpose of military occupation, division, and administration.
Because the outcomes of this violence were enormous, this administrative arrangement
eventually collapsed under its own weight.
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Diyarbakir’s Prison Number 5 has a popular story233 similar to the “Garage
Olympo” of Argentina234, and is recognized worldwide today with hundreds of
interviews, books, articles, and documentaries, either witnesses released or published
recently, informing the public of the horrendous massacres235 that took place under the
psychopath director of the prison, Lt. Esat Oktay Yildiran236 who was later killed on a
public bus in Istanbul apparently by one of his torture victims. Even democratically
elected Kurdish mayors and parliamentarians were subjected to abusive torture and
violence. This central instrument of very public and symbolic repression, along with
thousands of other murders and bombings, have all played a key role in the escalated
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Various articles, books and studies focus on Diyarbakir Prison Number 5 in literature.
Notably former Diyarbakir Mayor and spouse of Leyla Zana, Mehdi Zana wrote a book
on his encounters: http://kurdistan.org/prison-no-5-eleven-years-in-the-turkish-jail/. Also
see Zeydanlioglu (2009), Gambetti (2008) and also the work of Westrheim (2008):
“Prison as Site for Political Education: Educational experiences from prison narrated by
members and sympathizers of the PKK”.
234
Perhaps best known with the movie “Garage Olympo”, Argentine has very similar
experiences to Kurdistan, where left-wing activists are tortured by extreme right fascists,
and were drugged and thrown from airplanes to the ocean, quite well-documented with
evidences, and similar to the numerous cases of Kurdish rebels thrown from Turkish
helicopters alive, such as the famous Kurdish singer and guerilla Suleyman Alpdogan
(aka Hozan Serhad).
235
Besides the unending torture scenes, at least 299 political prisoners died while
incarcerated, dozens in hunger strikes, and dozens shot dead, or killed during severe
torture. In 1982, four young Kurdish prisoners set themselves on fire to protest inhuman
conditions, which sparked a major intensification of resistance in Kurdish politics.
Somewhat akin to the events at Attica Prison in the United States, the worst experience
was on 24 September 1996, when special commandos, gendarmes, and prison guards
stormed the prison, killing 10 inmates and heavily wounding 46. The EU Court of Human
Rights formally charged the Turkish Government, on May 2010 (application), for these
abuses, because the judicial process in Turkey was not being properly conducted.
236
He was later killed in a public bus in Istanbul by one of his victims.
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participation of youth in the PKK in the 1980s and 1990s. Westrheim (2008) explains
how the prisons served as a kind of political school237 for Kurdish political movements in
Turkey. Indeed, perhaps a majority who survived this heavy torture and abuse later went
out to the ‘mountains’ to join various PKK fronts in the fight against the regime, as has
been clearly expressed by many.238
It is clear from instances occurring in the 1980s and 90s that Kurdish political
organizations were among the primary targets in the realm of warfare in the Middle East.
States followed authoritarian and conflictive policies against them, even planning and
implementing mass annihilation and dehumanization projects of Kurdish inhabited lands
to further marginalize Kurdish populations and sovereignty. This era witnessed turmoil in
each of the four states that exercised violence on Kurdish regions under totalitarian or
militarist regimes. For example, the Anfal Campaign, meaning the “spoils of war”, was
conducted between 1986 and 1989, in a series of systematic attacks against Kurdish
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Numerous individuals I interviewed passed through this traumatic experience, some of
whom are now the leading figures of Kurdish politics in Turkey. Esay Oktay Yildiran
would gather Kurdish prisoners in the aftermath of the coup, and would walk around
them with his dog “Jo” and tell the prisoners: “This is a school, not a prison, I will teach
you how to be Turkish here,” before his infamous scenes of brutal torture, during which
dozens of important Kurdish elites and political activists have lost their lives. Never, of
course, his intent, Kurds nevertheless managed to survive, to meet and struggle with one
another, and to find greater common ground in prison, building up a significant political
culture that gradually played a role in Kurdish movements and politics. Most of today’s
Kurdish elite and political leaders have a record of criminalization, and a great majority
of elected Kurds are lawyers.
238
I have interviewed several survivors of this period, and I also participated in a
gathering at Bogazici University, for the gala launch of the documentary movie, “Prison
No. 5”, by Cayan Demirel, where survivors shared their stories.
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populations and their means to livelihood, costing more than 2,150,000 lives, mostly
children, women, and the elderly (Akreyi, 2011). 4,000 villages were destroyed,
displacing at least a million people. In one instance, 8,000 men from the house of
Barzani, an important Kurdish clan with significant leadership in Kurdish politics, were
gathered from their homes and executed by Saddam’s brutal soldiers (Black, 1993;
Anderson, 1993; Hardi, 2012; Makiya, 1992; Salik, 1995; Leezenberg, 2013; Johns,
2013; Mlodoch, 2012; Montgomery, 2010). Since then, all family members of the
Barzani clan wear black and mourn.
The destruction took an even uglier shape in 1988, when a separate Anfal
operation executed against Halabja and its surroundings, deployed chemical agents
(likely nerve agents like sarin, tabun, and VX, along with mustard gas; ie.: weapons of
mass destruction) against thousands of civilians. The almost pleasant garlic-like smell
caused thousands of people to die where they stood, within a matters of minutes. The war
between Iran and Iraq cost over a million lives239, most of whom were Kurds, and the end
of the 8 year war was in fact the beginning of the real catastrophe for the Kurds. What
ultimately led to an international intervention in Iraq started as Saddam Hussein’s
invasion of Kuwait in 1990. With his regime threatening regional and especially Saudi oil
resources and the balance of oil production generally, a US-led coalition waging war on
Iraqi forces soon followed. Following their destruction of the majority of the Iraqi
military, Saddam once again lashed out locally and pursued revenge on the Kurds in
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See http://kurzman.unc.edu/death-tolls-of-the-iran-iraq-war/
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1991, using chemical weapons and killing more than 5000 Kurds, gravely wounding
more than 10,000, and forcing more than a million civilians to seek refuge in the harsh
mountains after being rejected entry to Turkey (Kelly, 2008; O’Leary, 2006; Watts, 2012;
Casey, 2003; Rochtus, 2012).
With US and French mediation, and the attention of the international community
focused on it, Turkey decided to develop relations with Iraqi Kurds, thereby sharply
altering its longstanding ‘refusal policy’ in relation to the Kurds under Turgut Ozal’s
presidency. At this point, a no-fly zone was declared in Northern Iraq by France, the US,
the UK, and Turkey, under the authority of UNSCR 688. This intervention played a
historically significant role in providing a safe haven for the remaining Kurds of Iraq. In
1992, elections were held in the region, and the KDP-PUK coalition was formed with an
equal balance.
It is vital to acknowledge the individual effort of former French First Lady
Danielle Mitterrand,240 who dedicated herself to the preservation of human rights, and
courageously visited the scene of genocide in Halabja, during which her convoy was
attacked by a bomb and she barely survived. When she returned home, she brought the
famous videotape she had personally recorded as evidence that she presented to the
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Mitterrand earned a truly unique role in the endorsement of Kurdish paradiplomacy
during this violent era, giving witness and legitimacy to the Kurdish people before
international audiences, and ultimately helping yield considerable additional Kurdish
visibility and political representation on the world stage.
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international media. The video, made available on YouTube241, displays the horrendous
scene of the aftermath of the Halabja chemical attack, where hundreds of dead children
and women can be seen, fallen directly to the ground where they had been standing, with
the voice of Mitterrand in the background, wailing loudly. Mitterand even opposed her
own husband, Francois Mitterrand, former president of France, who was not willing to
demonstrate any will to help the Kurds, and especially not to harm strategically important
French-Turkish commerce. Kurds later declared Danielle Mitterrand “the honorable
mother of the Kurdish nation”, and have even opened up a school complex in her name.
In 1994, a civil war emerged between PUK and the KDP that lasted for three
years. The KDP appealed to Iraqi troops for help, in order to defeat the PUK, which was
receiving support from Iran. In 1996, Erbil City was taken by KDP forces, together with
parts of Sulaymaniyah, and a formal government was declared there. Later, PUK took
Sulaymaniyah back and declared its own government. In 1998, the U.S. administration
invited leaders of both parties to mediation, thus marking the end of “Brakuji” Wars, the
internal civil conflicts that had long weakened Kurdish internal security.
Turning back to Turkey, the major factor in Kurdish politics, the PKK, began as a
group called “Apocular” in 1974,242 and was institutionalized politically between 1978
and 1980 by its involvement in urban warfare against the increasingly authoritarian state.
The organization moved to Syria in 1980, having been pushed out by the military in
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https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O0w12DJ3tjk and See
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xcri1UMw0pg
242
Apo is synonym for Abdullah in rural Kurdistan, thus this word means “Apo-ists”.
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Turkey. It found a safe haven in Syria, but had complaints about Turkey’s 80% cut-off of
the Tigris and Euphrates Rivers, due to the latter’s large “Southeastern Anatolia”
infrastructure project.243 Indeed, the project was all about possessing and controlling the
vital water sources of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, along which dozens of dams were
built, and consolidating Turkey’s position as regional “water hegemon”. The project is
also the most substantial step in the aftermath of the neoliberal coup d’état in terms of
applying a clear state-led development plan and ultimately fostering a highly clientelist
private sector in Turkey. The Turkish construction industry, for instance, is the second
largest in the world today. In addition to highways being built, deepened corruption and a
lack of transparency and accountability have also arisen. Although the essence of this
strategy was state-led development, since most of the large infrastructure projects were
state bids, another purpose was to create and boost the Turkish private sector. The
Southeastern Anatolia Project has been a major political and economic arm of the
Turkish state in the Kurdish-predominant Southeast, which again reflects the use of water
as a weapon of governance244, while controlling its distribution in a zone where water
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The Southeastern Anatolia Project represents one of the most significant challenges to
the Kurdish cultural, economic, and political status quo in the region.
244
The project is still controversial today, and is “incomplete” although still in progress.
The outcomes of the project can be listed as the significant cut-off in the water debit
along with the decrease of water quality, and also massive displacement of Kurdish
population, loss of livelihoods and depropertization. The dams were all privatized and
given to Turkish corporations which sells the electricity to public, and make immense
benefits. Water simply has become a weapon, and a powerful one since it is now
controlled and is provided to “Good Kurds”, who represent loyal wealthy locals taking
side with Turkish Government. Not all of the dams are built for energy production or
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means everything about power245 and eventually is a cause of contemporary conflict
(Harris, 2002; Tekeli, 1990, Starr, 1991, Bilen, 1997; Zeitoun and Warner, 2006; Lorenz
and Erickson, 1999; Carkoglu and Eder; Kibaroglu and Unver, 2000; Kibaroglu and
Scheumann, 2011; Daoudy, 2009).
During this period, many groups of Kurds joined the PKK from all parts of
Kurdistan, along with individuals from numerous other nationalities. Hunger strikes were
orchestrated in the prisons, while cases of routine abuse were common, helping the
apparatus of resistance find some ground at the public level. Many of those who fled
from the brutal intervention of the military in Turkey, those with left wing and Kurdish
politics, joined the second PKK congress in Lebanon in 1982. The first armed PKK
operation, against a Turkish military post in Eruh, is said to have been a reaction to prison
abuses by Abdullah Ocalan. Between 1984 and 1992, the war between Turkey and the
PKK escalated. In 1987, Turkey declared “force majeure” in its Kurdish-inhabited
Southeast. The PKK also expanded its armed operations, adding state buildings and
equipment to its list of targets, and self-organized militarily and diplomatically,
developing relations with Syria, Lebanon, Northern Iraq, Greece, and Russia. Turkey
responded by formally establishing a “koruculuk” system, based on arming Kurdish

agriculture, but also to fill certain passages between mountains to avoid the mobility of
Kurdish rebels.
245
The cause of water in international conflict is an increasingly developing area of
research, with an increasing impact at global level, including the contemporary armed
conflict in Syria, Iraq, Turkey and Lebanon and many regions of Africa as well as
Palestine and Israel.
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villagers in exchange for their help to fight against the PKK; thus institutionalizing the
very problematic village guard system throughout most Kurdish regions.
1991and 1992 were the bloodiest years in PKK history, as most of its members
were killed in the Turkish Army’s operations against them. Subsequently, the PKK
shifted its effort to creating the institutions of statehood, focusing on transforming its
forces into an army. The organization also promoted party politics, which eventually led
to the creation of its own media institutions and cadres in urban areas. Many scholars
maintain that the Iran-Iraq war created a power vacuum in Northern Iraq, and in the
greater region (Pelletiere, 1992; Swearingen, 1988; Pipes and Clawson, 1992). This
significantly helped the PKK in the transnationalization of its movement, which was
further bolstered by its strong diaspora in the EU and Russia. Thus, it was soon able to
initiate diplomatic relations with Baghdad, and later with Tehran in 1988.
For the first time since the aftermath of the 1980 coup, Kurds were once again
able to engage in the legal politics of Turkey. Although anything related to being
“Kurdish” was forbidden, Kurds collaborated with the left Turkish party SHP (Social
Democrat People’s Party), under the leadership of Erdal Inonu. Seven Kurdish MPs thus
won seats in the Turkish Grand Assembly, and later formed their own party group, the
HEP (People’s Labor Party). However, the Turkish Constitutional Court banned the party
from politics in 1993, and the party was succeeded by the DEP (Democracy Party). Then
Kurdish MPs were banned outright from representation in parliament, in an era of brazen
chauvinism. When elected Member of Parliament and participant in this group, Leyla
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Zana, appeared in Parliament wearing a yellow, red and green scarf in her hair,246 the
entire parliament was so outraged that she narrowly escaped physical harm. The
parliament then voted to remove the immunity of MPs, and the entire defiantly Kurdish
parliamentary representation was later sentenced to 15 years of prison. The Turkish state
had effectively removed all lines between even the slightest manifestations of Kurdish
identity and what the state referred to as incitement to terrorism and treason. It became
legally dangerous to be visibly Kurdish.
In 1991, the Diyarbakir Chairman of DEP, Vedat Aydin, was taken from his home
by state officials, and later found dead. This was later found to be one of the thousands of
JITEM murders. JITEM (Gendarmerie Intelligence Organization Administration) was a
paramilitary organization of the state whose existence was officially denied by
government authorities, but was more recently disclosed and confessed to on numerous
occasions by former participants in both the media and in front of Turkish courts.
Turkey’s so-called unsolved murder cases are well known, where in fact thousands of
citizens were abducted and killed by state-spnored agents. Many of the victims were later
found to include prominent Kurdish intellectuals and political activists. Most of these
episodes have now been admitted to by their very perpetrators,247 who were never truly
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The colors represent the Kurdish flag, and were therefore considered forbidden. As
part of this repression of the Kurdish national colors during the military regime, certain
Kurdish towns had the green in their traffic lights replaced with blue instead. It was also a
risk to wear anything with these colors on it, as this was sufficient reason for
imprisonment.
247

The Human Rights Organization has released a map of mass graves (See
http://www.ihddiyarbakir.org/Map.aspx). On many occasions, JITEM confessors such as
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judged. It is clear from every memory of that era that Kurds were not permitted to have
involvement in politics, and were heavily restricted as a society. At the peak of the war in
1992, the PKK organized its first urban mobilization in Cizre Town, on 21 March 1992,
during the special Kurdish national day of “Newroz”. The day started peacefully, but
when the Turkish military intervened, 4 were left dead, and many wounded.248
Turkey was ruled by what was known as an MGK,249 or National Security
Council form of government and its military representatives, a consistent remainder from
the military regime, enforcing military involvement in politics. The Turkish security
apparatus expanded even more in the 1990s, with the integration of police, military, and
intelligence used as a key strategy in the Turkish fight against the PKK. Although the
regional states followed a policy of denying assimilation and integration, coupled with
repressive security measures, it is of critical importance to note that Turgut Ozal had

Abdulkadir Aygan, Ayhan Carkin and dozens of others who witnessed or were involved
have officially confessed, and located the mass graves, or revealed other important and
corroborating details of these incidents.
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In one notorious incident, the tortures in Cizre have become an international issue,
when the inhabitants of an entire village were forced to eat feces. This incident was
carried to international courts and institutions, and international visits were made to Cizre
in its aftermath. The European Court of Human Rights has charged Turkish Government
for this incident, along with thousands of similar cases, because it now has jurisdiction
over Turkish justice.
249
This council is formed of military and government members, and intelligence
directors. There is also another important detail, the existence of a “red book”, which
represents the highest level doctrine of Turkish rule that binds every statesmen. Though a
highly secret document, its existence has been revealed by many.
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taken progressive steps for peacebuilding and resolution of Turkish-Kurdish conflict.250
He met with Kurdish MPs, and even sent a delegation to Syria to negotiate with
Ocalan,251 given the changing dynamics of the greater region during the first Gulf War,
notably the volatile status of the Kurds. The negotiations, however, were suddenly made
obsolete at that very same moment, when Turgut Ozal suddenly lost his life, in what
many speculate was actually an assassination.252 What makes the issue more complicated
is that Ozal was among the very few politicians working on peace, and he collaborated
with Esref Bitlis253. The General Commander of the Turkish Gendarmerie, and former
minister of finance Adnan Kahveci both lost their lives in similarly suspicious
accidents.254
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This is a subject to such a great discussion. Ozal was a successful engineer with a US
educational background, and he was promoted by Suleyman Demirel, Turkey’s long-term
center-right leader who had participated in three military interventions. However, when
Demirel’s party (DP) was dissolved by the 1980 Military Junta, Ozal created his own
party, the ANAP (Mainland Party), which later become the single party government
under Ozal’s leadership in 1983. Ozal is seen as both a right-wing and a
moderate/religious/liberal person. He is severely criticized for contributing to corrupt and
destructive politics and power dynamics in Turkey, yet praised by others for investing
significantly in developing state capacity and infrastructure through support of the private
sector. Ozal’s sudden suspicious death, however, gave way once again to Suleyman
Demirel, Ozal’s maître and later rival.
251
Kurdish MPs Sirri Sakik, Ahmet Turk and Orhan Dogan were asked by Ozal to talk
with Ocalan in Syria.
252
Many claim that this was an assassination by the intelligence services, using poison.
253
Bitlis was a moderate figure with progressive approach to Kurds, which was criticized
by hardliner ultranationalist Turkish officials. His plane crashed, and the suspicion over
the incident is significant in Turkey.
254

Kahveci has lost his life with his wife in a suspicious traffic accident, while Bitlis also
lost his life in another suspicious incident in which his plane crashed.
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After Ozal’s death, Demirel became the new president of Turkey, and the seat
emptied by Demirel was filled by Tansu Ciller, the first woman prime minister of Turkey,
who was a Turkish economist-scholar imported from the U.S. Although Ciller made a
statement proposing to debate a “Basque Model” form of resolution in the years of
intensified violence, Turkey was ruled by a Security Council dominated by the army.
Thus the army’s role in Turkish politics ultimately formed the ruling political parties,
wrote the constitutions, orchestrated coups and various changes of governments, and
decided on all manner of vital issues. Ciller was severely opposed in this chauvinistic and
ultranationalist environment, but she soon made a drastic turn, becoming one of the
masterminds of state terror.
Figure 13: Map of Kurdish Mass Graves in Turkey

Source: Interactive map from Human Rights Association, Diyarbakir Branch,
based on official data of the extrajudicial cases. In 348 mass graves that were relocated,
4201 people were buried, while 303 of the mass graves were claimed (red), and 45 of
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them opened (yellow). Retrieved on January 3rd, 2016 from:
http://www.ihddiyarbakir.org/Map.aspx.
Though PKK declared a ceasefire during the negotiations with Ozal, this dramatic
turn by the new government threatened the fragile peace, as did the suspicious255 attacks
of off-duty soldiers in the city of Bingol on 24 May 1993, which ended in the death of 33
soldiers. The escalation of violence and terror was significant during the Demirel-Ciller
administration. Ciller even bluntly recognized the “Castle Plan”, and numerous
engagements of her government in the creation of state terror, stating for example: "We
know the list of businessmen and artists subjected to racketeering by the PKK and we
shall be bringing their members to account,” after which approximately one hundred
Kurdish businessmen and leaders were kidnapped and killed by security forces,256
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It was suspicious, from the outset, when no one took responsibility for such a
significant incident, particularly the PKK, which was known to recognize almost all of
the actions it has undertaken. Recent investigations and increasing societal curiosity over
this incident have revealed the presence of an enormous body of infiltrators within the
Turkish security apparatus, exposing a possible underground organization acting illegally
in accordance with JITEM. Semdin Sakik, the former PKK commander who is accused
of the attack, but denies any responsibility, says the order was given by Dogu Calisma
Grubu [East Study Group], a secret organization within the Turkish Army that intended
to launch a coup.
256
Terminological details are important, informative, and needs to be acknowledged
here: “Itirafci” [confessors] are people who were caught alive by Turkish security while
they were active in the PKK movement, or they were secured inside the prisons. The
State offered them amnesty if they collaborated with JITEM. Many JITEM personnel
were selected from among these confessors, who are seen as “traitors” in almost all
Kurdish political circles. In the last decade, roughly a dozen of them have exposed
themselves, and were even brought to trial. They’ve confessed important details, such as
what they have done, where they killed, who they killed, in which year, and the location
of mass graves. Amongst these individuals, who once again confirmed the dirty secrets of
the state security apparatus, Ayhan Carkin and Abdulkadir Aygan were especially
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including Savas Buldan,257 Behcet Canturk, and many others258 (Gunter, 1998; 2008;
Atilgan and Isik, 2002). The “Castle Plan” was simply aimed at annihilation of Kurdish
movements by using any means necessary. Armed Paramilitary groups were called
“korucu”, illegal counter-guerilla groups were formed clandestinely, in addition to the
legal special warfare departments. Significantly, a specific new group called the “Grey
Wolves” was activated, and quickly became Turkey’s infamous ultranationalist
enforcers,259 having been armed and trained by the CIA and NATO (Gunter, 2003;
Soyler, 2013; Gunter, 2008; Jacoby, 2010; Yesilgoz and Bovenkerk, 2004), 260 and then

significant because they identified an entire set of attacks, massacres, and incidents that
have been central determinants in the course of the politics of this violent conflict.
257
Years later, Buldan’s wife, Pervin Buldan, became one of the most prominent figures
in Kurdish politics, an MP of HDP (and former BDP), and also a major pioneer of the
peace talks between Turkey, the PKK administration, and imprisoned PKK leader,
Abdullah Ocalan.
258
See http://en.ihd.org.tr/index.php/2009/02/22/botas-and-other-acid-wells-should-beexcavated-disappeared-persons-should-be-found-and-perpetrators-should-be-tried-in-acourt/ and http://bianet.org/english/human-rights/34829-saturday-mothers-demand-justice
259
Ulkucu, or “grey wolves”, are a violent and often corrupt ultranationalist cluster,
which can be seen as the grassroots of Turkish extreme nationalism, often affiliated with
far right parties such as the MHP (Nationalist Movement Party), founded by Alparslan
Turkes, who was an officer in the Turkish Army, and a NATO officer in the US for a
period, after which he returned to Turkey, attempted a proto-fascist coup, and then later
founded Turkey’s extreme right wing party. In many other instances, grey wolves also act
under various Turkic-Islamic organizations, such as the BBP (Great Union Party) or the
Osmanli Ocaklari (Ottoman Barracks), known for their exercise of deliberate violence
against civilians, including the murder of significant individuals such as Hrant Dink.
260
A few examples would help clarify this statement. Abdullah Catli, a young
ultranationalist was at the center of this violent organization, and was documented as
receiving significant aid from the Turkish state (most of the funds were CIA-NATO
funds, allocated for asymmetric war against perceived Soviet threats). Until a suspicious
traffic accident, known as “Susurluk”, in which Catli and a high level security official
lost their lives, these links were not publicly unknown. Catli was also part of the team
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deployed in the war against the Kurds (Fernandes and Ozden, 2001; Jacoby, 2010;
Gunter, 2008; Criss, 2002).
Outcomes of the Protracted War against Kurds in Turkey: Roots of Contemporary
Paradigmatic Changes in Regional Politics
By 1994, the PKK had around 10,000 militants fighting against Turkey’s massive
security apparatus, which was estimated to have about one million soldiers, policemen,
and other personnel (Ozcan, 2007; Pike, 2004). According to official Turkish State
claims, over 7,000 Turkish security personnel were killed and around 22,000 PKK
militants lost their lives between 1984 and 2012,261 while others cite a considerably
higher death toll, ranging between 30,000 and 45,000 (BBC, 2015). Civilian casualties
are generally estimated at around 18,000, according to independent sources, while 20,000
were killed by so-called “unknown assailants”, and as many as an additional 18,000 were
executed (internally). 17,000 can be listed as missing. Moreover, more than 3 million
citizens were displaced, as part of a scorched earth plan by the government, to dislodge
Kurdish support in the countryside (Jongerden, 2007; IDMC, 2011). The violence peaked
between the years of 1992 and 1995. The Turkish state deforested a massive rural area in

that murdered a group of left-wing students in Istanbul, known as the Bahcelievler
Massacre. He played a crucial role in hundreds of violent events that destabilized
Turkey’s politics, and prepared the country for the 1980 neoliberal coup, this marking
Catli and his colleagues as members of a protofascist intervention. He also played a
significant role in the aftermath of the coup, further repressing Kurdish political
movements. Another member of these ultranationalists, Mehmet Ali Agca, attempted to
murder the Pope, and was imprisoned for years.
261
Beyond these disputed numbers, the death toll has also continued to increase since
2012.
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the Kurdish region, burning down over 3,000 villages with ground troops and helicopter
gunships, forcing populations to flee to larger towns and cities (Etten, Jongerden, Vos
and Klaase, 2008; McKiernan, 1999). Some villagers were invited by the state to become
an armed village guard (korucu), requiring Kurds to chase their own rebel relatives.262
Villagers who refused were either massacred, or their village was burnt down, causing
forceful displacement. Cities and major town populations have drastically increased as a
result, along with the formation of ghetto-like neighborhoods in urban and peri-urban
neighborhoods called “gecekondu”.263
The violence of the 1980s and 1990s forced thousands of Kurds to flee to Europe,
where they soon became a settled and strong diaspora. It also forced political and social
reorganization of the Kurdish political movements in regional cities. In 1995, the Kurdish
Parliament in Exile was founded at the Hague, in the Netherlands. These decades were
the years of the inferno for Kurdish people in all parts of Kurdistan, especially in Turkey
and Iraq. It is almost impossible to keep exact track of the destructive long-term conflicts
between Turkey and Kurds that occurred – and still occur – in the numerous periods of
escalation, decline, and even peace negotiations; whereas disinformation, propaganda,

The aim of forcefully creating paramilitary Kurdish armed groups called “korucu” was
to prevent PKK rebels from being present and based in villages, towns, or cities, and to
drive them to the mountains. However, these armed korucus were comprised mostly of
uneducated villagers, many possessing low morals, leading some to execute their own
neighbors in hopes of simply possessing their belongings and property.
263
These massive peripheral settlements were mal-urbanized in the same sense that some
talk about underdevelopment; and have subsequently become extremely significant in
Turkey’s politics.
262
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and features of asymmetric warfare are also frequently observed. The tallies of death tolls
are often dichotomous and dispited, reflecting conflicting figures recognized by warring
parties or factions. On numerous occasions, single cases have been recorded and
documented in which the public was misinformed and manipulated to believe that
particularly bloody incidents had been perpetrated by Kurds and the PKK, when in fact
these acts were executed264 clandestinely by state security forces to justify further
repression and impunity (Goral, Isik and Kaya, 2013; Mater, 1999; Gambetti and
Jongerden, 2015).265 The outcomes of such long-term conflict are often unprecedented
and difficult to predict, especially considering that the conflict is still occurring, even
escalating, and historical recounting and reconciliation have not yet begun.
There are political, social, economic, cultural, and environmental outcomes as
well as externalities that are the indirect outcomes of any given situation of intergroup
violence. In the context of Turkey’s Kurdish conflict, specific development of a
politicized social cluster has taken place, out of the convergence of victims, political
activists and opposition movements. Since the victims of the State and its violence were
not only Kurds, but also all of the “others” that stood outside Turkey’s nationalist
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Aslo see http://kurdistan.org/who-committed-the-guclukonak-massacre/
For example, the Guclukonak Massacre was perpetrated on January 15, 1996, ending
with the horrendous mass killing of 11 innocent villagers in a small van, their bodies
burnt completely beyond recognition. While at first presented on state-run media as a
PKK-perpetrated massacre against innocent civilians, it was soon clearly revealed that
there had been no PKK members in the area, and the massacre was in fact perpetrated by
state security forces (JITEM). This fact was even admitted by the highest level officials,
for example, Minister Adnan Ekmen, 13 years after the incident.
265
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formulations,266 they formed local, national, and transnational advocacy coalition
networks, making this social cluster stronger than its marginal size within the country.
The “Saturday Moms”, for example, similar to the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in
Argentina, were a group of mothers most of whom have lost their sons in extrajudicial
killings who protested in the form of civil disobedience, demanding answers about their
losses from the government. They gathered in front of Galatasaray High School on
Istiklal Street in Beyoglu, the busiest and most central place in Istanbul, for their acts of
peaceful civil disobedience. Toward the late 1990s, the heavy toll of the war could no
longer be hidden from public view. It was so visible that in any city there were families
who had lost their relatives as victims of violence perpetrated by both parties, mostly
civilians, women, children and the elderly.
Signs of drastic societal changes have been present for some time, as in the major
crisis of Turkey in 1997, called a “postmodern coup” by many, and referred to by others
as the events of “28 February.” As I previously mentioned, Turkey has passed through
significant transformations over many decades. From the highly agrarian society present
in the beginning, an industrialized and rapidly developing actor emerged in the 1960s,
with sharp neoliberalization of the political economy in the 1980s. Besides the chronic,
largely forced internal migration in Turkey, from village to city, Kurdish displacements
have also created a heavy social toll. Millions of Kurds were forced to move from where
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In this context, others can be defined as all of the non-Turkish and non-Sunni
constituents of Turkey’s population and also supporters of the left-wing.
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they lived, and from their ancestral connections and modes of subsistence, finding
themselves instead joining the impoverished members of the city’s periphery, the
‘gecekondu’ neighborhoods. This also signifies the birth of a new socioeconomic cluster.
While Turkey’s 1980 junta regime presented itself as apolitical, and opposed to both the
left and the right; in reality it was the Left that was substantially crushed, while the rightwing was instead trained, indoctrinated, and armed. Religion was also imposed under
clear state-led policies, as admitted by the architect of the 1980 coup, Kenan Evren, who
added religion courses into education curricula, and advocated tolerance toward different
religious affiliations. Upon criticisms rising from secular Kemalists, Evren defended
himself saying “a Muslim must at least know how to pray”, and: “they were not sending
their daughters to school, I wanted to fight with them with their own weapon”; while also
trying to distance himself from official governmental religious doctrines.267
In the 1990s, the state also formally built groups called “Hezbollah”. Not to be
confused with the better-known Hezbollah based in Lebanon, Turkish Hezbollah was not
related to Iran or the Shia denomination, but was formed by JITEM and other
fundamentalist-Turkic individuals, to be used in the fight against PKK and other left wing
groups. More recently, the clandestine atrocities of Turkish Hezbollah were publicly
exposed by some of its victims, recounting cases of brutal torture and murder (Sozer and
Sever, 2011; Cinoglu, 2008; Ozeren, De Voorde, 2006; Uslu, 2003; Cline, 2004;
Hermann, 2003; Duran, 2010). Turkey’s central-right policies in the aftermath of the
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1980 coup and their leadership into the 1990s also represented failure and corruption.
While the army continued to retain significant weight in Turkey’s politics, an economic
crisis hit the country. The first wave, during Ciller Administration, was known as the “5
April Decisions” of 1994. Hyperinflation was staggering, and the Turkish Lira was
suddenly devalued in a single night (Toruner, 2009). Government issuing of 400%
interest bonds was another indicator of how serious this crisis was for Turkey. While in
January 1994, dollar/lira parity was 19.000 TL/$ and reserves were around $7 billion, in
April 1994, parity became 38.000 TL/$ and reserves had dropped to approximately $3
billion (Kepenk and Yenturk, 2015). Since then, the economic crisis has deepened as
inflation and devaluation continue to escalate.
All these elements of crisis contributed to the birth of a new – or long-avoided –
political incumbent: Pan-Islamism. Although the political Islamist movement in Turkey
was present before the coup, under the lead of Necmettin Erbakan, the creator of the
Selamet Party (which later dissolved), Islamism has remained well-supported and strong
at the grassroots level. Ozal’s governance in the aftermath of the coup can also be seen as
promoting religious conservatism, although it remained tolerant and obedient to the
secular Kemalism that remained the red line doctrine of the army. In the 1990s, Erbakan
once again created a party, the Refah Partisi [Welfare Party], promising stability, peace,
and most importantly economic wealth to the masses. Increasing economic and social
issues and troubles during the fragmented right-wing governments of the period also
played a role in the development of grassroots support for Islamist movements, which
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with a well-organized network, promoted a policy called “Adil Duzen” [Fair Order]. The
secular-religious conflict further heightened in the aftermath of a bloody event known as
the Sivas Massacre, in which 37 intellectuals, writers, artists, and musicians were burnt
alive in Madimak Hotel of Sivas town.268
The Refah Party won over 5 million votes (20% of ballots cast) and 329
municipalities in the 1994 elections. Kurds were completely banned from the political
system, Kurdish MPs were imprisoned, and their party was dissolved. Thus, the Refah
Party benefited significantly from this gap, continuing to grow, and notably receiving
many Kurdish conservative votes (Cakir, 1994). In the 1995 general election, having
secured 158 MPs (out of 550), the Refah Party was the largest party in the assembly,
leading to the creation of the “RefahYol Government”. Later, in 1996, a coalition
developed between the Refah Party of Erbakan and Tansu Ciller’s Dogru Yol Partisi
[Right Path Party], which was the successor to Demirel’s Democrat Party. In 1997,
secular Kemalists’ complaints escalated, and members of both the judiciary and military
escalated their harsh tone toward the Refah Party. On 28 February, this was officially
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The angry mob was activated by an unattributed announcement made from mosque
speakers, informing people that Aziz Nesin, a famous atheist Turkish intellectual-writer
and translator of Salman Rushdie’s controversial book, was in the city. Much the same
was the case in the 1980s Corum and Maras massacres, in which hundreds of Alevi
civilians were brutally murdered. In all of these events, elements of a nascent TurkicIslamist proto-fascism were used. Later, some of the major pioneers of the Refah Party
acted as defense lawyers for the perpetrators of the Sivas Massacre, in a trial that was
never properly prosecuted. The perpetrators were known to have been clearly implicated
by copious evidence and records, but nonetheless avoided accountability for their crimes.
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stated in a letter written by the army generals that later led to the dissolution of the party
by the Turkish Constitutional Court.
The Refah Party thus dissolved, and some of its members were banned from
politics. The successor of the Refah Party came with the creation of the Fazilet Party
[Virtue Party] by some of the former members of Refah including Abdullah Gul, Bulent
Arinc, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan in 1998, before it too was banned in 2001. The ban
was justified by “increasing propaganda and actions of the political party members
against secularism [laïcité]” which is [or was] officially a major component of Turkish
state (Atacan, 2005, p.188), especially gaining momentum after an MP of the party,
Merve Kavakci, attempted to attend the Turkish Grand Assembly wearing a headscarf
after being elected, and was severely attacked by other members of parliament for that
act, including Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit.269In a later dispute with President Ahmet
Necdet Sezer, during an MGK meeting, Ecevit had a copy of the constitution thrown at
him by President Sezer. This crisis at the head of the Turkish state coincided once again
with a deepening economic crisis, creating the context for dramatic change at the political
level in Turkey. Another minister, Kemal Dervis, was imported from the U.S. to Turkey
to “fix” Turkey’s economy, working closely with the World Bank and IMF to prepare a
comprehensive stand-by agreement, and to restructure the defective economic

Ecevit is a long-term center-left leader known as the “lucky guy” of Turkish politics.
He was prime minister in 1974 when Turkey invaded Cyprus, and was again prime
minister in 1999 when Abdullah Ocalan was captured. Both events have boosted his
support, and enabled his party to win elections.
269
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institutions. While the reforms designed by Dervis have significant outcomes in
recovering Turkey’s collapsed economy, secular political movements both at right and
left were fragmented, from which JDP emerged as a major group. JDP under Erdogan’s
rule, indeed, capitalized on the economic recovery in this period based on which the first
electoral success of JDP took place.
Kurdish Politics and Global Paradigmatic Changes at the end of the 20th Century
As can be seen in the Kurdish political history summarized immediately above,
Kurdish politics and diplomatic activity only achieved sustained presence and significant
depth in the last few decades of 20th century, rounding out a century constituted of wars,
massacres, genocides, displacement, and the destruction of Kurdish livelihoods and
culture. Not only the various Kurdish communities, but also their nation-state hosts
Turkey, Iran, Syria and Iraq passed through substantial transformations, constituting a
state of political and military entropy spilling into the wider region and its power
dynamics.
The last few years of the 20th century were of great significance to contemporary
Kurdish political history for a few reasons. First, following years of internecine wars
between the Kurdish political actors in Northern Iraq, the US Government held
significant mediation meetings and carved out a Kurdish internal peace plan, thus leading
to the creation of the Kurdistan Region in Iraq. Second, in Turkey, following decades of
war against the PKK, continuous suppression of legal Kurdish political representation,
and a general government security policy that brought regular violence against left-wing
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citizens, groups and minorities, the weight of conflict had a profound political, economic
and social toll. In 1999, US officials proposed to the Turkish Government a plan to help
“catch” and “hand in” PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in a CIA-backed operation in Kenya.
Ocalan was no longer wanted by Syria’s Assad Regime, since Turkey had gradually
increased its pressure on Syria, even public threats of invasion and war against Syria
made by Turkish PM Ciller and President Demirel. Ocalan left Syria in 1998, and his
long travels in Italy and Russia did not yield him any permanent refuge because Turkish
officials publicly threatened any power willing to potentially help, notably Greece.
Ocalan attempted to take refuge in the Greek Consulate in Nairobi, Kenya, where he was
conned by Greek officials who said he needed to be transferred, as his life was in danger.
Ocalan was captured when he stepped onto an airplane, waiting for his transfer, and was
handed to Turkish officials. Apparently, the Turkish government had given advance
promises of the removal of its death penalty, and various other related reforms intended
to ease both its European integration and its collaboration with multilateral institutions.
His trial concluded with the death penalty, which was shortly thereafter banned in
Turkey, and his sentence was therefore commuted to life in prison on Imrali Island, a
small island in the Marmara Sea with a single-celled jail where prominent Turkish
politicians had previously been kept in the aftermath of military coups.
Ocalan’s capture by Turkey was a severe blow to the PKK, which quickly came
to the brink of collapse, and has subsequently been forced to restructure and potentially
reconstitute itself. Hundreds of members left the PKK, and smaller groups were formed,
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especially during the declared ceasefire that lasted until 2004. At the same time, Ocalan’s
capture coincided with Turkey’s economic crisis, and increasing public support for
reforms, notably in the political, social and economic sphere. Democratization had
significant public support, although Kurds’ political participation remained significantly
foreclosed. First, Kurds were allowed to participate in Turkey’s local elections in 1999,
and elected a few mayors in the major Kurdish cities in the Southeast. Although these
mayors were subsequently arrested and brought to trials on numerous occasions, this step
was the beginning of the expansion of Kurdish political participation in Turkey. It was
also an early test run of Kurdish politics at the local level, as Kurds were finally able to
manage their own major cities, further contributing to Kurdish political development and
expansion. While security was the main focus in 1990s Turkey, the situation seemed to
shift toward the turn of the century, when Turkey joined the Maastricht Treaty, and EU
membership was presented as the new international diplomatic direction. Reforms were
strongly supported at the grassroots, creating new social expectations; and EU
membership, which gained momentum after Ocalan’s capture, was a presentable
opportunity around which to pass these reforms. The table was set for the development of
more substantive Kurdish political representation and fuller paradiplomatic and
protodiplomatic engagement in the rapidly shifting current context of the 21st century
Middle East, which will be the subject of close examination in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 8: KURDISH PARADIPLOMACY AND PROTODIPLOMACY IN
WORLD PRACTICE, PART II: AN INTRINSIC QUADRI-REGIONAL KEY CASE
OF CONFLICT AND PEACEBUILDING IN THE AGE OF GLOBAL WAR

Dramatic changes took place at the beginning of the 21st century which have not
only changed the status of the Kurds and the significance of their struggle, but also the
entire paradigm of international relations and world politics. First, the global magnitude
and scope of intrastate conflict, which escalated since the end of the Cold War, has
steadily intensified, with most of these wars turning into protracted conflicts in which
violent practices and new means of warfare predominate. Numerous violent groups,
armed crime organizations and terror networks found space and resources to emerge,
develop and even expand their activities and influence in the 1980s and 1990s (Mamdani,
2005; Ward and Smith, 1987; Gurr, 2000; Cronin, 2002; Schmid and Jongman, 1988;
Hoffman, 1999). The 11 September 2001 attacks were definitely a game changer in this
realm of violence, indicating a new direction of expansion for global warfare. Since then
the already heavy toll of violence only increased, along with massive human
displacement and increasingly regular environmental catastrophes. I turn now to a closer
examination of the cases of contiguous stateless Kurdish paradiplomatic and
protodiplomatic efforts in this contemporary global arena.
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Kurdish Paradiplomatic Statecraft at the Turn of the Century: The Complex
Geopolitics of Turkey and its Neighbors in the New World Order
Kurdish regions were impacted by all of these contemporaneous challenges, in
addition to their long existing internal issues. When the Bush Administration defined the
“axis of evil” as Syria, Iraq, Iran and North Korea, three of the countries had in common
repressed and restive Kurdish populations, all of which are subject to severe oppression
and assimilationist practices under their respective national regimes. Therefore, the
beginning of the 21st century represented a new page for the Kurds. Besides Syria, Iraq
and Iran, Turkey, a NATO ally, was not removed from this equation and in fact remained
a close US ally, given its shared and volatile borders with Iran, Iraq and Syria. Kurdish
political movements in Turkey were also passing through significant changes in this era.
Long-term violence declined, with the capture and imprisonment of Ocalan in 1999,
representing a moment of re-organization in terms of both armed PKK activities and also
within Turkey’s political arena, where Kurds relentlessly pushed for gaining basic
political representation.
During a short-lived period at the beginning of the 2000s, Turkey experienced a
period of slight democratization, at least an environment of political discussions, which
had not been possible previously, and which has diminished precipitously in recent years.
The deepened economic crisis, decades-long intrastate violence towards various identity
groups and ideological camps, severely declined trust of political institutions, and
drastically changing global security parameters, together contributed to the emergence of
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this environment. Turkey, indeed, was on the brink of a significant paradigmatic change,
since the country was in search of a new identity as “the bridge” between the West and
the East. This process, however, was highly complicated and contested, especially with
the escalation of global war in Middle Eastern regions, and also the responses and
interventions of the European Union and the U.S. Administration. In a context in which
emerging global powers around the world increasingly constitute a multipolar or nonpolar world, Turkey’s internal cleavages and contradictions eventually led to a significant
political transformation and the emergence of new political actors.
As a solution, membership to the European Union was promoted in Turkey’s
daily politics, creating a hope, and at least a solid framework for policy change and
political transformation. Turkey’s EU relations go back to the early 1950s, and in fact the
country was among the first members of the Council of Europe in 1949, as well as being
a founding member of OECD in 1961, and OSCE in 1973. Turkey signed the Customs
Union agreement with EU in 1995, following which the EU became a primary
consideration and focus in Turkey’s political arena. While Turkey was recognized as an
official candidate for EU membership after the Helsinki Summit in 1999, the official
negotiations started in 2005. The membership process led to the awakening of a new
political atmosphere in Turkey.
Changing political parameters at the national and global levels have also created a
split in Turkey’s continuously growing Pan-Islamism. A prominent figure, Recep Tayyip
Erdogan, the former mayor of Istanbul from the Refah Party, and later a member of the
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dissolved Fazilet Party, was sentenced to 10 months prison for a poem he publicly recited
in Siirt in 1998. After his imprisonment, he and many former party members created a
political movement, a modernized version of the party that split from traditionalists in the
Pan-Islamist group, and was later named the “Ak Party’ [Justice and Development Party,
or JDP] in 2001. Promising peace with Kurds, economic welfare, change, modernization,
and a liberal form of democracy presented as “respectful” to both religious and modern
voters, was an appealing and popular platform. JDP won 363 seats with 34.2% of the
votes in 2002 General Elections, a surprisingly disproportional representation due to the
fragmentation of the right-wing, most of which stayed out of the parliament with
considerable votes. At the same time, in order to keep Kurds out of parliament, Turkey
now applies a 10% electoral threshold rule which is something invented in the aftermath
of the 1980 coup and subsequent military regime to explicitly disenfranchise Kurds and
their possible political representation. Its the highest such electoral threshold in Europe,
and thereby effectively excluded a string of hopeful Kurdish parties from parliamentary
representation, chronicled below, including: DYP (9.54%), MHP (8.36%) GP (7.25%),
and the pro-Kurdish DEHAP (6.22%).
JDP’s victory in 2002 also removed the traditional right wing parties from
Turkey’s politics, and ossified the major political camps under four broad groupings: the
ruling and conservative-liberal/centrist270 JDP; the Secular-Central Opposition with Alevi
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This very first iteration of the JDP received significant support from liberals and even
some center-left and center-right parties, as well as Kurds, because it promised the
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and center-left tendencies consisting of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), and the
nationalist and extreme-right MHP; and the left Kurdish party, the Democratic People’s
Party (DEHAP). Although repeatedly banned from Turkey’s politics, Kurdish political
movements remained active, with growing grassroots support. This was first clearly seen
when DEHAP received more than 6% in national voting when it emerged as the first
party in most of the Kurdish Southeast and its cities. This momentum has gained depth
over time, but the party was dissolved once again in 2003 by a Turkish Constitutional
Court that claimed DEHAP supported PKK. The remnants of the party soon merged with
other similar groups, and formed DTP in 2005, led by the famous Kurdish MPs Leyla
Zana, Selim Sadak, Orhan Dogan, Hatip Dicle, and Ahmet Turk, all of whom were
imprisoned in 1994 and not released until 2004. It is important to note that the first years
of JDP rule represented an era of promises and hopes for change, and a road map to
change was publicly announced at almost all levels of governance, most notably in the
form of focusing on reforms needed to advance the EU membership process. Initiated
with a comprehensive reform of the Constitution, attempting to minimize its
authoritarian/Mussolinian character, new regulations were enacted, creating a phase of
what can be called a short-lived period of slight democratization. Alternative media
institutions were created, and funds – although limited – were allocated to local

resolution of major issues, and change. It portrayed itself as a conservative movement
with central/liberal tendencies, which drastically changed in the aftermath of latter
elections.
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administrations, permitting them access to EU grants and funds, and marginally
empowering their authorities.
JDP promised a conservative liberal policy with promises of change, justice,
economic development and peace with Kurds and all “others”, following a policy
opposing CHP’s secular Kemalism, which has been the major political opponent of the
party, as Kemalist indoctrination remained sovereign in the army and judicial system. At
the same time, it promised to keep undertaking policy reforms to frame a harmonization
process for EU membership. This environment helped encourage the liberation of
oppressed political clusters present in Turkey’s grassroots, and Kurdish representation
became stronger than before, together with other enclaves of left-wing opposition. In
2004 local elections Kurds collaborated with the Turkish left wing under the umbrella of
the SHP (Social Democrat People’s Party) and 67 mayors were elected in Kurdish cities
(who later joined DTP when it was launched as a party group). This municipal victory
was significant since it opened a new gateway for the expansion of Kurdish inclusion in
Turkey’s politics. In 2007 general elections, the Kurdish political movement finally
decided on a new strategy271 of running the elections with independent candidates to
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This strategy was previously proposed by prominent names in Kurdish politics and
Turkish scholarship such as Ahmet Insel and Seyfettin Gursel both of whom are
economists, and my professors from Galatasaray University. I found the chance of
closely observing this creative and innovative intervention into Turkey’s politics that
aimed to open up democratic political space, probably the most effective and perhaps the
only real step in Turkey’s unsuccessful democratization. The campaign was first named
“Bin umut adaylari” [Thousand Hope Candidates], and is representative of a form of
European new left wing projects, pluralist and inclusive. This strategy successfully
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overcome the threshold. This strategy required more votes for a single constituency
(around 1.5 times more in Kurdish inhabited cities) in order to compete with other major
parties (especially JDP). 26 MPs were elected by the Kurdish political movement, who
later in the parliament formed the party group called DTP. This was definitely a victory
for long-banned Kurdish politics, as the first time Kurds were represented in the
assembly, together under their party group, after being completely criminalized in the
1990s. Although disproportional, and still a small party group, the impact and outcome of
this progress can be overstated.
The increasing possibility of war with Iraq initiated military plans for invasion by
the U.S. led coalition under the Bush administration. Turkey, a major U.S. ally and
NATO member, was a key actor, since the invasion was planned to be initiated in
Northern Iraq and from within Turkey’s borders with support from the Kurds, and
required the use of the Incirlik Base in Southern Turkey for logistic purposes together
with portions of Kurdish inhabited Southeastern Turkey. Turkish Parliament rejected the
use of Turkey’s soil for logistical purposes, which created a shockwave in Washington,
DC, and has been a turning point in Turkey-US relations. The invasion still took place
from the South, along with Kurdish support from the North.
Established in 1992 under the threat of a weakened but still hostile Saddam
Regime, Kurds in Iraq have advanced their status quo into a quasi-state around the

overcome the 10% threshold problem in a decade, steadily growing since then, and
becoming the 3rd largest party group in Turkey by 2015.
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Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Three major parties, KDP, PUK, and PKK are
all armed factions with political structures and related organizations. While almost
always contested, the US mediation between PUK and KDP in 1998 endorsed the newly
founded Kurdish quasi-state in Northern Iraq, and turned KRG into a key actor in Iraq
and in the Near East. Since then Iraqi Kurds have become a key US ally in the region,
and a rare pro-Western unit. This has been a very big issue in Turkey, since banning
Kurds and Kurdishness from all spheres of public and political life was a state policy
taught and indoctrinated to millions. However, Turkey has pursued good relations with
Iraqi Kurds, even though the contested national claims over the oil-rich Mosul and
Kirkuk regions never ceased and actually escalated after the US intervention. Still, the
creation of KRG created a boost in Kurds’ international political representation, which in
the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq intervention has become even more significant. An
important incident occurred in 2003 when US soldiers raided the Turkish base and put
hoods on the heads of unarmed Turkish soldiers who they were arresting, and this was
later leaked to the media.272 Given that Turkey has the second largest army in NATO, and
its military means a lot in Turkish sociopolitical culture, along with the troops being in

The ‘Hood Event’ happened in July 2003, when the 173th Airborne Brigade of the
U.S. Army raided the Turkish base in Northern Iraq, and neither side subsequently
apologized. The event is an important indicator of deteriorating Turkey-US relations,
notably during the Bush Administration. The brigade was located at Sulaymaniyah City
in the Kurdistan Region, and allegedly the Turkish convoy was planning the assassination
of the Kurdish préfet of Kirkuk City, which is why they were arrested.
272
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Kurdish controlled soil and nearby Turkish-claimed areas, the incident created a shock in
Turkey, and stagnation in Turkish-US relations.
While Western support of the KRG has provided a shield to the landlocked
region, deterrence has led the region to recover from previous wars, and to stabilize and
develop a growing economy. Although Kurdish access to resources is quite limited and
costly in a landlocked region, this deterrence has helped Iraqi Kurds to be recognized and
respected by Iran, Turkey, and various Arab neighbors that were usually hostile toward
Kurds. At the same time, all of these neighbors still view Kurds as their enemies, since
they fear the awakening of Kurdish aspirations in their own territories. Demonstrating
this tension, a football match in Syria in 2004 ended in serious violence between Kurds
and the forces of the Assad Regime in Qamishlo City, the major predominantly Kurdish
city in Northeast Syria. Assad’s forces killed 65 Kurdish civilians, injured over 160, and
hundreds were imprisoned and tortured during the incidents273 (Brandon, 2007; Blanford,
2005; Fattah, 2005; Gambill, 2004). Similarly, any Kurdish demand – notably the ones
with national inspirations – was brutally responded to in Iran, including the execution by
hanging of hundreds of Kurdish intellectuals and even poets and writers.274 Much the
same was the case in Turkey, although the legal Kurdish political movement expanded.
While all of these states followed oppressive policies toward the advancing of collective
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See http://www.economist.com/node/21559959 and
https://www.meforum.org/meib/articles/0404_s1.htm
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See: http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/iran-executes-hundreds-brutal-crane-hangings-megaprison-outside-tehran-1508986 and http://unpo.org/article/18310.
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demands by their own, internal, Kurdish populations, these states also conducted
diplomacy with certain Kurdish political groups in the Kurdish regions of neighboring
countries, often for pragmatic purposes. This is a unique context in which a kind of
quadratic regional paradiplomacy emerged, and only makes sense from a transnational
perspective that looks at policies across as well as within national borders.
In 1999, the PKK applied a unilateral ceasefire, and withdrew its militants from
Turkey’s territories into the Qandil Mountains,275 in a ceasefire that was in place until
2004. With momentum gaining in Turkey’s politics by pro-Kurdish actors, the PKK also
escalated its pressure for negotiations for peace, but was repeatedly denied. In August
2004, PKK initiated its second insurgency, ending the long-term unilateral ceasefire
during which there was not a significant peacebuilding process. It is also possible to say
that besides Turkey’s unwilling stance towards peace and resolution of its conflict with
Kurds, the significant geopolitical changes in the region also played a role in PKK’s
decision to end the ceasefire. Thus, Kurds were no more a clandestine nation, but were
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PKK withdrawal in the Kurdish-Turkish context of conflict represents one of the most
crucial steps of peacebuilding. The 1999 experience was definitely a horrendous and
traumatic one for Kurds, because following the unilateral PKK ceasefire, and withdrawal
started, the Turkish Army had intelligence and knew the path of withdrawal (a process
taking 2 to 10 days, depending on where the Kurdish groups are located in Turkey). With
heavy offensive engagement, over 500 Kurdish rebels were brutally killed by Turkish
Special Forces. Most of the guerillas were aware that they would be killed, however they
obeyed the strict order of Ocalan to withdraw. This is specifically important, as are the
other instances when the Kurdish party compromised in favor of peace, but only received
in return a coup in its soft-belly. Similarly, the withdrawal of 2013 was unsuccessful, also
because of the traumatic experience of 1999. See details on 1999-2004 PKK unilateral
ceasefire at: http://www.self.gutenberg.org/articles/TurkeyPKK_conflict#1999.E2.80.932004:_Unilateral_ceasefire.
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now recognized as partners and close allies of the Western world. Numerous clashes and
attacks ended with hundreds dead and injured from both sides. While there was solid
public support for peace talks, there were also chauvinist and provocative individuals and
groups accusing any form of peace talks as themselves being an act of terrorism, or at
least aiding terrorism. While the ruling JDP approached the Iraqi Kurds, notably the
KDP, and improved Turkey-KRG relations, it remained distant and adversarial toward
the pro-Kurdish parties of Turkey (DTP/BDP, and later HDP). PKK released numerous
official messages via Turkish media and press, including calls for peace negotiations,
urgent calls to action, and even challenges to the war while the armed conflict was
escalating, but none of this found significant response or engagement.
It is important to acknowledge that the second victory of the JDP in 2007 has
been a game changer in Turkey’s politics. Although Kurds previously had a small party
group, they were a major rival to the ruling JDP, notably in Kurdish regions where votes
are often divided between the more conservative JDP and the leftist DTP. JDP promised
peace with the Kurds, at first promising peace and a lasting solution to the Kurdish
question, and began to appear significantly more progressive in its actions between 2004
and 2007. However, its tolerant and progressive policies came to an end as a consequence
of the second victory of JDP in 2007, under Erdogan’s rule, and since then has moved
steadily in a more authoritarian direction. It is important to remember that Erdogan
promised peace, and also initiated a process called “Demokratik Acilim” [Democractic
Opening] which was severely criticized by Turkish nationalist hardliners, and also
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criticized for the increased violence since the end of the ceasefire. Numerous bloody
events have contributed to the escalation of violence, for example the bombing by TIT
(Turkish Revenge Brigades) in the major Kurdish city of Diyarbakir in 2006, in which 10
civilians were killed.276 PKK also increased attacks on Turkish security posts in the
Southeast, and dozens of Turkish soldiers were killed. War horns were already in place,
with a particularly chauvinistic contribution made by mainstream Turkish media, and
transborder military operations were brought into Iraqi Kurdistan in 2007, and again in
2008, under the pretext of fighting against PKK. Turkey’s repeated cross border
operations in Iraq created concern in the US, and contributed even more to the increased
tension between Turkey, the US, and the KRG.
All the while, Turkey’s Kurdish politics have steadily grown and developed. An
important factor to consider is the existence of the Kurdish representation in the
assembly, and the overall change in status of Kurds on the international stage. The
emerging and rapidly developing Kurdish diplomacy worldwide has been notably
fruitful, following a string of Western endorsements. For instance, when the highest level
officials of other countries visited Turkey, pro-Kurdish party leaders were included in the
bilateral meetings, including meetings with George Bush, Condoleezza Rice, Hillary
Clinton, Barrack Obama, and Joe Biden. This was a significant endorsement for Kurdish
representation worldwide, since it opened the path to development of formal Kurdish
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See Radikal Newspaper, 29 June 2007,
http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=225482.
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diplomacy, and also recognition of Kurdish political actors in a binding environment of
foreign policy making.
For Iraqi Kurds, these relations have grown even stronger, since there are visible
and strong ties between US Republicans – notably under the Bush Administration – and
the secular Iraqi Kurdish elite. This is a specific type of relationship which continues to
progress277, including around popular Israeli-Kurdish solidarity groups, and recently
developed ties between Canada’s former Prime Minister Ben Harper and Iraqi Kurds.278
Kurdish deterrence – under the wings of Western powers – has helped Kurds build a
stabilized enclave, which continued to deepen Turkey’s concerns with Iraqi Kurdistan. At
first, there were always close relations between Turkey and Iraqi Kurds, including trade
and military support since the 1990s, mostly aiming to keep Iraqi Kurds away from PKK.
However, this relationship was taboo at the public level, politicians officially denied it,
and even used threatening discourse toward Iraqi Kurds. Then, Erdogan and the ruling
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While relations between center/right governments in Canada, USA, Germany, UK and
other countries are visibly strong, there is also a great institutional endorsement by certain
lobbies and groups as can be seen in the visits of KRG delegations to the US, where more
significantly planned and broad diplomatic programs are increasingly held. The
welcoming of the KRG presidency by the Carnegie Institute, USIP, Atlantic Council, The
Washington Institute for Near Eastern Policy, are substantial evidence of the level of
diplomatic recognition endorsing KRG.
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Although Kurdistan Region in Iraq has formal bilateral diplomacy with Palestine, but
not with Israel, since Iraq and Israel have no formal relations, there is a great connection
between Kurdistan and Israel, mostly in the form of backchannel communications.
Netenyahu and numerous other high level Israeli officials have declared Israeli support
for Kurdistan Regions’ independence, and various personal connections are manifest over
recent decades. See: http://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/03/18/israel-and-thekurds-love-by-proxy/, and: http://saradistribution.com/barzanisisraelresa.htm for a
detailed description of Israeli-Kurdish relationship.
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JDP changed this unofficial state policy and advanced direct bilateral relations with Iraqi
Kurdistan at a much higher level, visiting the KRG and accepting their delegations at the
highest diplomatic levels, and collaborating on large-scale energy projects. This was a
step beyond Ozal’s former policy of quietly getting closer to Iraqi Kurds. Yet, although
they were getting closer to the KRG, the Turkish Government and the ruling JDP regime
had not changed anything about the status of Kurds in Turkey, who continued to lean
toward the PKK.279 JDP even viewed the pro-Kurdish party as a primary rival, or perhaps
more accurately as a primary target, especially in its work to gather nationalist votes in
the elections. At the same time, the so-called “democratic opening” had already failed,
and was no longer a real political agenda.
It is very important to develop a holistic understanding of the scene of conflict
and peace between Kurds, their surrounding neighbors, as well as major political actors
around the world – too often these cases are studies in isolation. Turkey’s failed so-called
“democratic opening” was a project designed to gain time, but no real peace talks took
place, with only a few new regulations implemented, such as the de facto implications of
new rules providing for the non-penalization of the use of Kurdish language. However,
with each instance of the re-escalation of armed conflict, public debates and calls for
peaceful resolution experienced significant stagnation. Moreover, after the 2007

“Good Kurds, Bad Kurds”, a documentary movie (2000) made by Kevin McKiernan,
explained this dichotomous approach toward Kurds, one which is still in place as a
Western policy, although there is increasing activism and grassroots support toward
delisting Kurdish organizations from the terror lists of the U.S. and the EU.
279
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elections, Erdogan began to view Kurds as more of a political rival, or even an enemy,
than as a party with which to negotiate, and consequently there have been few meetings.
This second electoral victory of Erdogan is significant because it marks his shift toward
the right-wing, and an escalation in his offensive stance against Kurds. In fact, this was
the long-term plan of the Turkish state, and was even presented in NATO meetings, as a
plan to undertake policy reforms to appeal to Kurdish citizens while marginalizing their
political and armed movements.280
The Interrupted and Volatile Peace Process in Turkey as a Lens on Kurdish
Paradiplomatic Challenges and Potentialities
It is important to note that not only Turkey, but all of the regional states including
Iran, Syria, and Iraq followed anti-Kurdish politics at that time. Iran expanded its military
operations against PJAK (Kurdistan Free Life Party), an armed wing of the PKK acting
in Iran. Syria kept criminalizing its own Kurdish population and their increasing demands
for development, autonomy, and representation. In an unusual move between these two
countries with a long history of tension and border conflicts, Syrian leader Bashar Al
Assad traveled with his wife to Bodrum in Turkey, the famous holiday town by the
Mediterranean coast, joining Erdogan and his family in August 2008. Such close family
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Various asymmetric warfare plans and simulations of Turkish and Iranian armed
forces were released against Kurds by their media, and the “Cokturme” [Subduing] Plan
carved by the Public Security and Order Directorate of Turkish Government in
September 2014 foretold the deaths of 15000 Kurds, and displacement of 300,000. See:
http://sendika10.org/2015/12/davutogluna-soru-15-bin-kurtun-olumunu-ongorencokturme-plani-gercek-mi/.
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relations were also reflected in diplomacy, as Turkey, Iran, and Syria coalesced around
their anti-Kurdish aspirations and co-organized armed operations against Kurdish armed
factions. Although Iraqi Kurds were relatively removed from these major forces, due to
the deterrence they had established over the previous decade, it was quite clear that these
countries viewed them as hostile. Most importantly, the Iraqi Regime in Baghdad has
always been in dissent with Kurds, which from time to time turned into open military
combat between Kurdish Peshmerga forces and the Iraqi Army. Any attempt of Kurds to
sell oil, sign agreements, conduct diplomacy, or receive humanitarian, military, or
financial aid was avoided and undermined by Baghdad, further escalating tensions
between Erbil and Baghdad.
In 2008 and 2009, armed violence further flared up between Turkey and PKK,
even while some progressive but limited steps were taken by the government, such as the
creation of official Kurdish television.281 Pro-Kurdish DTP had a victory in the local
elections of 2009, significantly decreasing the number of JDP ruled municipalities in the
Southeast. The Kurdish victory also signified a major threat against JDP’s single party
rule, as local elections often predict the results of upcoming general elections. At the
same time, limited steps were being taken, such as officially restoring the original
Kurdish names of villages, expanding the scope of freedom of expression, strengthening
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Although TRT6 was created, it was severely criticized for not being managed by
Kurds, and because its agenda was determined by the state and its ongoing Kurdish
politics. While this channel was created, the state continued criminalizing the Kurdish TV
channels broadcasting from Europe, and even executed an international raid operation
against Kurdish TV in Belgium.
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local government, and even proffering amnesty for Kurdish rebels. However, this
expanding national discussion and growing public support for peace were once again cutoff by the state when the Turkish constitutional court reverted to a full ban on Kurds from
national politics in 2009, dissolving their political party and dropping their MP’s seats in
parliament. Yet, this serious setback was accompanied by a new opening. Upon the call
of imprisoned Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan, in order to construct a new ground for the
blocked peace talks, a group of PKK members –specifically selected from among those
who had not joined in any armed attack or any criminal act – entered Turkish borders
from Habur Camp in the Northern Iraq Region, where there is a significant Kurdish
refugee population that had been previously settled there by the UN. This reconciliation
and reuniting of Kurdish communities across this tense border would have numerous
implications.
The group’s entry to Turkey’s Habur Border Management site was a major event
for the Kurds.282 As had been previously prepared by the negotiating parties of both the
Turkish State and the Kurdish side, a prosecuting lawyer of the state was put in place to
quickly process the formal legal procedures to officially release from all state charges the
PKK members who had come to Turkey at the call of Ocalan. This was a momentous
step that surely meant a lot for the Kurds, who had waited for this moment for decades.
Consequently, hundreds of thousands of Kurds flowed into the border administration of
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What makes this especially significant was the unusual action of the Turkish state in
favor of the peacebuilding process, notably officially undertaking the decriminalization
of the members of PKK.
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Habur, with Kurdish flags and an incredibly visible joy, and a day later this was covered
by the world’s media. In Turkey, nationalists, right-wingers, and even the secularKemalists were all furious about Habur, calling it an act of supporting terrorists, saying it
revealed the state’s weakness against so-called “terrorists”. Upon the increasing reactions
from the nationalists, Turkish PM Erdogan accused the Kurdish movement of turning the
scene into a “big show”. It is clear that Kurds have often kept a low profile when
sensitive negotiations were taking place; however, the spontaneous outpouring of joy by
thousands of people was not necessarily in the hands of Kurdish MPs or politicians.
The issue of the Habur experience was clearly explained by Kurdish politicians,
in an almost apologetic tone, as if the celebrations were a mistake that was uncontrollable
due to the public’s joy for peace. They explained that the joy and excitement of a people
hungry for peace after a century-long struggle must be tolerated and understood. After
all, people were just dancing and singing in place, hugging the peace committee members
sent from Mahmur, and enjoying the big event of peace. Unfortunately, tension grew, and
the peaceful Kurdish group’s members were one by one imprisoned, despite not having
prior criminal records in Turkey. They have remained imprisoned since then. This drastic
policy change represents Erdogan’s ruling JDP’s broken promises of change, and also his
return to conservative, authoritarian, Turkic-Islamic tendencies. This was not surprising
to some, because Erdogan always subscribed to Turkic-Islamic tendencies, as seen by his
loyal membership in the Turkish National Students Union in his youth (Cakir and
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Calmuk, 2001).283 This also explains his repeated citing of Necip Fazil Kisakurek, a
mastermind of Turkic-Islamic ideology, which nowadays is referred to as “NeoOttomanism”, Turkey’s new official doctrine. Erdogan has reaped the benefits of
switching back to right wing politics, where there is a significant voter base and potential
to grow. He also realized the difficulties of resolving Kurdish issues, or perhaps he never
really wanted to, and imagined a completely different scenario of gaining peace with
Kurds by assimilating them under a more religious than ethnic form of political
representation. Thus, the 2009 elections had projected hopeful signs in the significant
shift of votes from Erdogan’s JDP toward Pro-Kurdish DTP – but these were quickly
undermined by state repression and retrenchment.
In December 2009, the state extended its anti-Kurdish policy even further, and a
new period started in which the Turkish state imprisoned over 1400 elected Kurdish MPs,
mayors, party members, political activists, writers, journalists, and intellectuals who had
worked within the framework of the KCK (Koma Civaken Kurdistan, or Kurdish
Communities Union]. Subsequent trials accused and criminalized these legal Kurdish
political actors of supporting terrorism and attempting to create a by-pass state (Gunes
and Zeydanlioglu, 2014, p.33). Erdogan assigned Idris Naim Sahin, a hardline rightwinger with significant anti-Kurdish views, as the Minister of Internal Affairs. Violence
against civilians, abuse of human rights, and improper judicial practices peaked even
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Milli Turk Talebe Birligi was a conservative organization with Islamist and Turkish
nationalist tendencies.
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more in this period, and the trials attracted significant attention of the international
community.284 Consequently, armed conflict once again escalated, with numerous attacks
and killings from both sides.
In 2010, PKK ended its ceasefire and left its defensive position while continuing
to call for peace negotiations. Ocalan also issued another call to re-establish the
negotiations. Although PKK declared numerous ceasefires at this juncture, none of them
were welcomed, and Turkish security increased its armed operations. A referendum also
took place in 2010 asking voters whether or not they approved changes to the
constitution. The 1982 constitution imposed as a result of the 1980 coup remains one of
Turkey’s major problems, since rather than fostering social cohesion it represented a
protofascist text outlining forbidden things and mostly praising the security state and its
institutions (Gunter, 2012).285 The majority of voters in 2010 decided ‘yes’ (57.8%),
while many explained their decision as: ‘It is not enough, but yes’. Kurdish voters,
however, boycotted the referendum, which interestingly created a third unexpected
cluster on the map of results, where voter participation in the Kurdish inhabited southeast
remained below 60%. Whenever Kurdish political movements have been allowed to
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Hunger strikes of thousands of political prisoners, the solidarity campaign of the bar
association and support of prominent figures and institutions from Western countries can
be cited as examples. For details, see: http://www.mesop.de/chronology-of-kck-trials-indiyarbakir/, and: https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/04/18/turkey-kurdish-party-memberstrial-violates-rights.
285
See: http://www.mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/turkey-politics-newdemocratic-constitution?print and
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/tu-military-coup-1980.htm.
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participate in Turkey’s politics, their presence and the significance of territorial
representation became more visible and more substantiated, increasingly so with each
election, where pro-Kurdish parties consistently dominated in Southeastern Turkey.
From whatever angle one looks at Turkey in 2011, it was a year of chaos,
polarization, and conflict. The 2011 general elections impacted the political arena, and it
was a rigorous race for the Kurds, since electoral violence took place, and unfair electoral
activities, including the unlawful discarding of the already elected Kurdish MP, to
various practices of electoral fraud (Robbins, 2013; Deloy, 2011).286 This time,
conservative Kurds turned to the pro-Kurdish HDP. The Kurdish political movement was
constantly reforming itself, increasing its women’s representational quota to 50%, the
highest in Europe, and also including almost all minority and underrepresented groups,
such as women’s and LGBTQ organizations, Armenians, Assyrians, and other ethnic and
regional representatives of Turkey, including Turkish individuals.
Kurdish leader Serafettin Elci –known to be closer to KDP, and broadly
conservative – also joined HDP, and was elected as an MP. The increasing chauvinism of
right-wingers and ultranationalists failed this time at the ballot box. There was an
ongoing peace process, or at least a discussion about it, and it found its ground in the
public. JDP ruled again after the elections, with an increase in the number of votes but a
smaller number of seats, while secular CHP significantly increased its seats, relying on a
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See: http://www.fpri.org/article/2011/06/understanding-turkeys-2011-generalelection-results/ and http://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/doc/oee/oee-699c-en.pdf.
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deeper policy of inclusion under Kemal Kilicdaroglu. He had replaced Deniz Baykal, the
hardliner Kemalist of CHP, after a sex tape scandal in the media. The extreme right wing
MHP lost many seats as well. However, without having party group candidature, proKurdish candidates entered the elections as independent MP candidates, and 37 of them
were elected, signifying a victory for the Kurdish political movement once again. 287
It is of great importance to discuss the official peace process initiated by the
government in this period. As it was a long-term prior public discussion in Turkey, in
fact, the government had already initiated peace talks, mostly using its intelligence
organization, MIT (National Intelligence Organization) headed by Hakan Fidan.
Negotiations had been in place since 2008, and in fact even much earlier, between PKK
and Turkey on many occasions, as we now know from leaks to the public by various
sources.288 This time was different, however, as one of the key official peace talks in Oslo
between PKK leadership and Turkey was recorded and leaked to the media in September
2011. There were foreign government [allegedly British289] mediators or parties, along
with a known member of PKK leadership, and Turkish officials on the tape. Turkish
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This number, however, was often reported as 36, because one of the candidates, Hatip
Dicle, a leading figure in the Kurdish political movement, was imprisoned during the
KCK trials. He was approved as a candidate, and ran in the elections, and was elected as
the 1st MP of the Kurdish stronghold, Diyarbakir City, but, then the Higher Electoral
Committee canceled his membership, and gave it to JDP candidate Oya Eronat, a mother
that lost her son in an attack allegedly carried out by PKK.
288

See: http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/chronology-of-oslo-dialogues-withpkk.aspx?pageID=238&nID=31190&NewsCatID=338 and
http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/2426/illegal-tape-alleges-secret-pkk-talks.
289
https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/docs/70/707319_iran-israel-turkey-egypt-turkish-islamist-presshighlights.html.
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Intelligence Lead, Hakan Fidan, stated that he was sent for negotiations representing [as a
special envoy on behalf of] Mr. Erdogan. Discussions and even disputes escalated once
again, and the public learned that this was only one of the ongoing talks of the peace
process. These developments made the Kurdish political and armed movement gain
strength, because Kurdish party members had been claiming the talks for a long time, but
they had never been confirmed officially at any level of public discourse. Interestingly,
Turkish public support for the peace process was also high.
On 28 December 2011, two F-16s bombarded the Roboski (Uludere) town of
Sirnak City in Turkey, killing 34 Kurdish civilians, most of whom were youngsters
smuggling tobacco and cheap diesel to maintain their lives. This event, known as the
Roboski Massacre, was such a shock to Kurds that it was seen as a breaking point of the
process. The massacre was covered by worldwide media, and eventually emerged as an
ugly example of the international security-intelligence complex when the Wall Street
Journal published details of how US-Turkish intelligence and military agreements played
a role in this attack, because the US shares intelligence with Turkish military on PKK
movements in the region, with satellite images, based on prior agreement to collaborate
against terror (Entous and Parkinson, 2012)290 However, the bombing operation was still
confirmed and initiated in Turkey, by Erdogan’s administration. This civilian massacre
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See
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303877604577380480677575646.
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attracted severe reaction by Kurds both in political parties and also in their armed
organizations.
Despite the imprisonment of hundreds of Kurds after the KCK Trials, there was
no progress on the case, and dozens of political prisoners did not even know what they
were officially accused of. When thousands of pages of accusations were eventually
released, they were criticized severely for improper judiciary practices.291 It was indeed a
“hostage” operation against Kurdish politics, as almost everyone was saying in the media
and in public, and was very closely linked to the emerging war in Syria and the Kurdish
regional actors linked to PKK (PYD/YPG). These political prisoners, indeed, were used
as a means for bargaining while the peace talks were still in place. In 2012, the hearings
of the KCK trial finally started, but the political prisoners began to speak in Kurdish in
front of the court when they were asked to testify, and this was recorded officially as an
“unknown” language by the courts, so that none of the hearings were properly processed.
Contrary to the Kurdish television narrative created by the government, along with many
other practices where a translator was used, the trials were approached politically. At the
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I have read the entire accusation, alongside more than one hundred lawyers who
followed this case, and discussed it with Tahir Elci, who was the lead of Diyarbakir Bar
Association at that time (before his political murder in 2015). The accusation was
prepared by simple police officers based on unlawful recordings of interpersonal phone
calls, most of which were not grounded in any legal basis, nor signifying any form of
alleged crimes. Although the accusation aimed to construct ties between imprisoned
Kurds and the KCK, which is the urban wing of PKK, there was no significant basis for
the claims, since they were based on “secret witnesses” who were later revealed to be
intelligence-linked individuals. Most of the highest level elite, MPs, mayors, and other
prisoners were liberated a few years later.
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same time, the visits made by the lawyers to Imrali Island to meet with Kurdish leader
Ocalan were routinely cancelled.292
Meanwhile, three leading figures of Turkish intelligence, Hakan Fidan, Afet
Gunes, and Emre Taner were called to give testimony to a prosecutor in Istanbul, who
allegedly had close ties to the Gulen Society. Government members and ministers
supported Fidan, while accusations about the peace talks in Oslo attempted to criminalize
the process, as if Fidan’s meeting with the other party was an act of terror. Fidan refused
to testify, instead going to Cankaya Residence in Ankara to meet with President Gul, and
later an order of arrest was issued for him. The prosecution lawyer Sadrettin Sarikaya,
then replaced him. Within a week, new legislation was prepared and voted on in the
parliament, known as the “MIT Legislation Template,” that changed the authority of
MIT’s head, connecting him directly to the Prime Minister’s authority, and therefore
providing a legal shield for intelligence matters at the discretion of the PM (Tastekin,
2014; BBC, 2014).293 This event signified the first public exposure of the serious conflict
between the Gulen Society and Erdogan. The stagnation of the negotiations, escalated
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Another prior crisis also revolved around Ocalan, when Kurdish politicians used
“Sayin”, a Turkish term of respectful address similar to “Mr.” before Ocalan’s name.
This was used in state media as propaganda to continue criminalizing Kurdish politics.
Ocalan has gradually gained respect from a considerable number of groups, including the
ruling JDP’s leadership and president Erdogan himself, although they always avoided
using “Sayin Ocalan” and instead use “Imrali”, the small island where Ocalan is
imprisoned, to neutrally refer to him.
293
Various individuals, groups, institutions and organizations have also endorsed the
peace process, including Fethullah Gulen and TUSIAD, which strengthened the hand of
negotiators.
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public reactions, and the above-mentioned interventions all contributed to the slowdown
of the peace process. Moreover, starting in August 2012, numerous deadly attacks once
again reproduced mutual violence in which both sides accused the other of responsibility.
On 26 September 2012, Prime Minister Erdogan said that the Oslo negotiations were
made in the framework of a peace process, but that this was now off the table, because
the PKK had shared the meeting’s recordings with the media and were therefore not
genuine in their desire for peace.294
In response, thousands of political prisoners started a hunger strike protest, which
further escalated the already boiling conflict, and also contributed to the
internationalization of the Kurdish issue once again, attracting severe criticism from
human rights organizations and mostly left-wing political groups in Europe. With the
increasing national and international discontent and complaints, Erdogan publicly stated
that peace talks were still being held in December 2012. Moreover, the crackdown on
Kurds was not as easy as it had been during and before the 1990s, because Kurds were
now seen as a close Western ally, and also now as an official legal constituent of
Turkey’s politics. Therefore, the KCK Trials, hunger strikes, Roboski massacre, and
other human rights abuses and issues were no longer seen as solely internal issues, but
were now repeatedly reflected in Turkey’s diplomacy with other countries.
Considering the importance of Turkey’s EU membership, NATO relations,
Turkey-US relations and many other spheres, most of the reports prepared by
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See: http://bianet.org/bianet/diger/141135-muzakere-olacaksa-imrali-oslo-ve-bdp.
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independent monitors and agencies in the US, such as the State Department, as well as
the European Union’s official progress reports (which are binding in the membership
negotiations process) were all critical of Turkey’s policy on cracking down on the Kurds.
These criticisms were not particularly harsh, but also clearly stated the steps Turkey must
take to promote peaceful resolution of the Kurdish conflict. This further confirmed the
internationalization and triangulation of Turkey’s conflict with its Kurdish communities,
and some of the grounds on which Kurdish paradiplomacy have been and will continue to
be built.
Another Round of Talks? Between Apocalypse and Peace in Kurdish Guernica
It is known that PKK leader Ocalan remains popular for his smart moves and
interventions in Turkey’s highly restricted political arena. He can only communicate with
the outside world through his lawyers, but his messages have always had impact and
weight in Kurdish politics.295 Ocalan is also known for the timeliness of his moves,
notably in the Habur case when the peace talks were almost cut-off, and also at the outset
of the hunger strikes, which strikingly escalated political tension at the grassroots level,
as had the Roboski massacre, the KCK trials, and countless other abuses. Meanwhile, in
early 2011, civil uprisings were sparked in Syria, mostly in the context of the so-called
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Many criticize Kurdish political movements as extremely hierarchical, and for
monumentalizing Ocalan. Some even claim that the PKK and its Ocalan model reflect
most closely the North Korean model. Those who oppose PKK and Ocalan in Kurdish
politics are numerous, but notably the ones who lean toward KDP or other critical
liberal/conservative movements, as well as a limited number of left-wingers who are in
fact mostly former PKK cadres who left the organizations after disputes.
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Arab Spring. This was not new under the Syrian Regime, which had seen previous
uprisings in Hama in 1984 (Wiedl, 2006; Khalidi, 1984; Kahf, 2001; Deeb, 1992), and
Qamishlo in 2004 (Altug, 2013; Caves, 2012; Kahf, 2013); both of which ended with
brutal military interventions by the Syrian Regime that left many thousands dead. This
time was no different, and the violence quickly escalated into what has so far become the
most destructive war in the 21st century. While Syria’s Sunni dominant population has
been ruled by ethnic Alawis and Nusayris, along with Kurdish and Christian minorities
for decades, the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt – and previously Iraq – have all
contributed to the regional marketing of the Ihwan movement,296 a spread of political
ideology based on Islamic thought. Assad’s crackdown on protesting mobs ended quite
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Although a topic for another possible study, since it is beyond this dissertation, Ihwan
is a key factor to be considered along with numerous other faith-based communities,
organizations and networks. Ihwan was first a militia in Saudi Arabia, which is different
than the Ihwan I refer to here. The Ihwan movement in general is described as The
Muslim Brotherhood in its contemporary sense, founded as a transnational Sunni Islamic
organization founded in Egypt. Egypt has great significance in the greater region’s
political history, given it is home to numerous religious organizations and networks and
has a unique construction of identity within the worlds of Islam, the Middle East and
Africa. Modern Arab nationalism peaked under Nasser, and the creation of a militarybased regime is a common post-colonial legacy, which severely impacted the rise of
Baathism in Iraq and Syria. Ikhwan represents more of a transnational network of Sunni
Islamism aided by the “Sunni Belt”: Saudi Arabia, Turkey’s Islamist political
organizations, Qatar and the rest of the Sunni Islamic world. It emerged to struggle
against modern nationalism, and to form a Sunni Islamic political cluster, which at the
beginning represented itself as a moderate actor, and even won the elections, such as
Mursi in Egypt, but were suppressed militarily and judicially, and therefore a split took
place with part of the organization being antagonized and heavily militarized, and
becoming more extreme. Notably in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon, numerous units are taken
under the control of Wahhabist and Salafist terror networks.
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bloodily, and the Syrian opposition was pushed toward criminalization and armed
conflict.
Although PKK has declared numerous unilateral ceasefires in its greater than
three-decade history, and even has conducted operations of withdrawal from Turkish
soil,297 the most recent Kurdish-Turkish peace process, in 2013, represents the only
moment of two-sided official peace talks and process. The last unilateral ceasefire
declared by PKK in 1999 took place until 2004, and then conflicts started again,
specifically increasingly in 2011 when Erdogan’s third electoral victory was
accompanied by the JDP’s turn to the right. The increasing authoritarianism of Erdogan’s
rule created an environment in which the words he uttered on state media were accepted
as if they were official orders. In December 2012 he joined a TV program and stated that
negotiations are being held with Ocalan in prison. Shortly after this statement, three
Kurdish women were murdered in Paris, in January 2013. Sakine Cansiz, a prominent
figure, was a founding member of PKK,298 Fidan Dogan was a French-born Kurdish
paradiplomat, and Leyla Saylemez, a Kurdish youth activist, were all murdered in a
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The last withdrawal ended quite bloodily, since the withdrawing PKK members were
killed in operations by Turkish armed forces while attempting to cross the borders,
mostly while entrapped on Turkey’s border with with Iraq.
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Sakine Cansiz was a significant name in the Kurdish political movement. As a
political prisoner in the bloody Diyarbakir Prison she was brutally tortured, her chin was
broken, and her breasts were cut-off by Turkish soldiers. She later fled and joined the
rebels in the mountains, and she is often referred to as the Kurdish “Rosa Luxembourg”
because of her monumental story of resistance against torture.
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brazen assassination.299 This was rather devastating to Kurdish hopes for the peace
process, which had been raised by Erdogan’s statements on television. The appearance
was certainly created that while Erdogan was publicly speaking of peace, the attacks were
directly coordinated by the government, reducing his claims as a legitimate partner in
negotiations and dialogue to almost null. That the crime was committed on French soil
also raised numerous diplomatic and paradiplomatic issues, and was largely treated as
delicate and therefore suppressed by both France and the EU, in fear of allowing a major
crisis between Turkey and the West. Nevertheless, this created room for Kurdish
diplomats to navigate, particularly among genuinely angry and disenfranchised French
and EU circles.
In February 2013, records of a meeting between Ocalan and HDP committee
members were leaked to the media, again undermining ongoing peace talks. All of these
incidents were commonly spun as willingness on the part of one of the parties to
undermine or cut-off the peace process, while no serious investigations were undertaken.
Peace talks were later said to be continuing, notably by HDP MPs who were visiting
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This murder created a shockwave among Kurdish communities, because it happened
during a crucial moment of peace talks. While most suspicion immediately focused on
the Turkish state as the likely culprit of the crime, a leaked record of correspondence
between an intelligence officer and the murderer confirmed these suspicions. In this
record, the intelligence officer was guiding the alleged perpetrator, about how and when
to perpetrate the attack. Later, more information was released by the French minister of
internal affairs, Manuel Valls, who was directly engaged in the investigation, and it was
proven that the murderer was provided accommodation and training in Ankara, and was
provided all sorts of means to sneak into Kurdish organizations and to prepare the
conditions for this assassination. In this record, many other prominent names were also
on the list of targets.
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Imrali Island where Ocalan is imprisoned. The first up-to-date photographs of Ocalan
were released in the aftermath of one of these meetings. Meanwhile, on 21 March 2013,
which was the Newroz celebration – which Kurds and many other cultures in Iran, the
Balkans and Central Asia celebrate as a welcoming of Spring – a letter written by Ocalan
was read to almost a million Kurds gathered for celebrations in Diyarbakir. This was a
major historical moment, since the statement signaled a major move during the peace
process, by clearly declaring for peace. The letter declared that PKK’s struggle on
Turkish soil had ended, and in this new era, PKK members will withdraw from Turkey’s
territories, and the armed struggle will be ended in Turkey.
Figure 14: 2013 Kurdish Newroz Celebration in Amed (Diyarbakir) with Ocalan’s Letter

Source: Kurdish Institute of Belgium, Retrieved on 1/8/2016
The letter was positively welcomed by almost all parties, while the Turkish
government stated that more substantial steps would be taken when PKK members
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withdraw. In late April 2013, the PKK lead in the Qandil Mountains stated that PKK
members will withdraw into the Kurdistan Region in Northern Iraq, signifying multiparty
approval on this condition of the peace talks. All parties seemed to be in agreement about
proceeding to the second step: making constitutional changes and legal arrangements to
endorse the peace process and prepare conditions for disarmament and resolution of the
conflict. In July 2013, a legislative proposal was sent to the President of Turkey,
Abdullah Gul, under the title “Ending Terror and Enforcement of Societal Integration
Law”, and was published in the Resmi Gazete [Formal Journal], becoming a law.
In April, the government released a list titled the “Committee of Wise People”
which was expected to mediate the conflict resolution, organized under seven regional
committees. Except for a few good and representative choices, the list was full of cliché
and inappropriate celebrity names,300 and was therefore widely criticized. However, it
was nonetheless internalized and accepted by the Kurdish side, which did not have much
choice. Not a single Kurd was on the list, people hostile to Kurdish politics and known to
be close to the ruling JDP were listed. Therefore, the committee was dysfunctional from
its inception. Also on the list was famous Turkish actor Kadir Inanir, who made
numerous statements backing Kurdish politics, at significant personal and professional

Creation of a truth and reconciliation commission and a “committee of wise people”
were Ocalan’s long-term ideas, and widely supported by the Kurdish grassroots
movement. However, the question of how to prepare such a list was controversial. The
list I discuss here included many popular names in Turkey, mostly pop music stars, and
others who do not really represent a societal consensus. The people in this list were
selected by Erdogan and other JDP members leading the process, instead of by both
negotiating parties, let alone truly consulting the whole society.
300
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risk, considering the aggravated environment of conflict at the grassroots level.
Participation of such beloved personalities allowed for some impact of the the general
publics’ opinion, although not very strongly. It also encouraged other figures and
personalities to make similar statements, gradually reactivating a chain of supportive
sentiments and events.
Civil War in Syria: Destabilization, Shifting Geopolitics and Paradiplomatic
Openings
While the peace process was in place, a major paradigmatic change occurred in
the wider Kurdish political process in 2012: the intensification of the Syrian uprisings
into a full scale, highly destructive civil war in which numerous external actors were also
involved. The use of all sorts of deliberate violence – including chemical warfare301 – by
the Syrian Regime and Syrian opposition created a shockwave around the world, with
drastic escalation of human destruction in this conflict creating a dangerous spillover of
violence throughout the region. While the Syrian Regime’s crackdown on rebel groups
brutal, causing more polarization and an escalation of violence at the public level, the
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There are still question marks on the use of chemical agents as a means of war.
Although the UN was involved in the investigation, and many initially claimed that it was
the Assad Regime that used them, many reports and experts later confirmed that it was in
fact more likely to have been the work of extremist rebels. For further discussion on the
use of chemical weapons in Syria, see: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east34212324; https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/14/syria-chemical-weaponsattacks-almost-1500-killed-report-united-nations;
http://thehill.com/policy/defense/269551-isis-used-chemical-weapons-against-the-kurdsus-officials-say; and: http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/chemical-gas-attack-kurdish-held-areaaleppo-says-kurdish-red-crescent-1553741.
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opposition quickly shifted from peaceful protests to armed insurrection. The war also
quickly turned into, and has since remained, the theater for sectarian proxy wars in which
numerous international actors were engaged (Prashad, 2007; Cooke, 2012;302 Abunimah,
2016;303 2016; Chossudovsky, 2016;304 Taylor, 2016;305 and Beehner, 2015306).
The Syrian Regime lost control over a vast territory of the country, and withdrew
its forces toward the west coast to protect its remaining territorial sovereignty. This was
down to about 40% by 2013 (Hubard, 2013), with others claiming that the Syrian Regime
had lost control of 83% of Syria’s territories (Strack, 2015). By September 2015, the
Syrian Government held only 25% - 30% of Syrian territories, with slightly above 60%
of Syria’s Population (Champion, 2015; Bremer, 2015). Syria is now a country divided
into three territorialities, controlled by the Alawite/Nusayri Syrian Forces of the Assad
Regime, Armed Sunni Groups (Syrian Opposition, Al Nusra, ISIL/ISIS), and the Kurdish
Cantons of Rojava. Along with Syrian Regime forces, Shia militias and Hezbollah were
backed by Iran, while Russia has also recently lent its significant military might. Sunni
forces are more fragmented, consisting of organized fundamentalist groups, which
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See http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/6486:proxy-war-in-syria-threatenscatastrophe-for-the-middle-east.
303
See https://electronicintifada.net/blogs/ali-abunimah/grand-bargain-between-saudiarabia-and-iran.
304
See http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-syria-proxy-war-against-the-islamic-state-isishas-reached-its-climax-military-escalation-towards-a-us-nato-sponsored-groundinvasion/5507357.
305
See http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-davos-exclusiveidUSKCN0V10BO.
306
See https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2015-11-12/how-proxy-wars-work.
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unfortunately have destroyed the entire genuine Syrian opposition – partially murdering
them and replacing them with violent gangs. This has created a scene of violent actors of
terror such as Al-Nusra, Ahrar Al-Sham and ISIS.
While Syrian regime forces have withdrawn its forces, mostly due to severe losses
and widespread gang violence, Kurdish inhabited Northern Syria was left without any
serious clashes in 2012. Local Kurdish militias had already been in place for decades, at
least in the form of an ensemble of political factions. The People’s Protection Units
(YPG) were created by the Kurdish Supreme Committee to defend the Kurdish enclaves
in the north, and in 2012, the cities of Kobani, Amuda, and Afrin were under Kurdish
control. Two major Kurdish groups in the region formed a joint leadership entity called
the Kurdish Supreme Committee. It was comprised of the KNC (Kurdish National
Council), which includes KDP-leaning members, and PYD (Democratic Union Party),
which leans toward KCK/PKK and controls the YPG forces. Later in 2013, PYD
announced an interim government divided into three autonomous cantons: Kobani, Afrin,
and Cizire.
In 2013, ISIL initiated violent attacks in Kurdish enclaves, forcibly displacing
Kurdish communities, specifically from the Al-Raqqa region and Tel Abyad, and
threatening thousands with death and rape. Abandoned Kurdish neighborhoods were
completely demolished by ISIL bombs, and images of destruction were frequently
distributed online. The drastically escalating toll of the war changed everything,
particularly the horror of the emergence of proxy groups such as the Al-Qaeda linked Al-
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Nusra front and ISIL/ISIS. These terrorist organizations and gangs were funneled arms
and financial support, as well as logistical support, by a number of countries.307 The oil
trade was a great contributor to the emergence and expansion of ISIS/ISIL as well. Many
sources have comprehensively covered the entire story, and the scene has become
obvious especially with the Russian release of satellite images showing ISIS oil trucks,
and documentaries showing how global jihadists are passing into Syria and are helped by
neighbor countries. Another important event occurred when a Turkish prosecutor stopped
trucks full of ammunitions on the way to Syria, which was leaked to the media quickly,
which ended up exposing how Turkish intelligence’s involvement in Syria War was
significant, since these arms were simply given to the gangs exercising horror policies in
the region.
The Turkish government has followed a hardliner policy of opposing its own
Kurds and Syrian Kurds, both of which are known to be PKK/KCK leaning. However,
with this in mind, and in light of shifting regional realities, it has also followed a policy
of improved relations with Iraqi Kurds. In November of 2013, Turkish PM Erdogan
invited Iraqi Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani to Diyarbakir, the major Kurdish city in
Southeastern Turkey, which must be seen as an historic event, in light of the longstanding
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David Phillips, from Columbia University, presented one of the best studies about this
in two articles based on strong research, showing Turkey-ISIS trade; help from Qatar,
Saudi Arabia and other countries; recruitment and oil trade support of the terror network;
and many other details. See: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-l-phillips/researchpaper-isis-turke_b_6128950.html, and http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-lphillips/research-paper-turkey-isi_b_8808024.html.

467
fragmentation of Kurdish communities between bordering territories. Barzani’s visit was
even more significant because the region was publicly referred to as “Kurdistan” a longterm taboo in Turkey’s narrow nationalist politics. Turkey also let Iraqi Kurds send a
Peshmerga battalion to Kobani to join PYD in its fight against ISIL, and the convoy was
stopped and celebrated in each Kurdish village as it passed through Turkey on its way to
northern Syria. Despite all sorts of restrictions, Kurdish celebrations and political
movements have increased their collaboration with neighboring Kobani, which since then
has reclaimed most of its territories from Sunni terror organizations.
Kurds’ have organized their cantons and forces in Syria, however, their forces
were weak compared to those of the Syrian Regime and terror networks such as Al Nusra
Front and ISIS, both of which possessed or had acquired advanced high-tech weaponry.
Kurds on the other hand, as a stateless, landlocked force, had relatively poor weapons,
mostly what can be found in black markets, used or outdated material that is largely
ineffective against ISIS. Al Nusra attacks, and the later ISIS offensives toward Kurdish
enclaves were brutal; however, Kurds put up a now legendary defense, organized at
grassroots level.308 The Kurdish cantons were all cut-off from each other, with the most
advantageously placed being Cizire, since it directly borders neighboring Iraqi Kurdistan.
The offensive escalated in 2014, notably in the town of Kobani, which was sieged by
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See: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/12/syria-kobani-kurdishfighters-islamic-state.html; http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/kobani-kurdish-stalingrad-crucialbattle-war-against-islamo-fascism-isis-1469716; and also for a detailed timeline of
Kobani Siege, see: http://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/kobani-timeline/.
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gangs, and in which a notorious Stalingrad-like battle was waged. Kobani almost fell
numerous times, while Kurdish solidarity and uprisings grew stronger worldwide, notably
with the spread of the news about this battleground, with media showing courageous
Kurdish fighters defending the town.
The conflict escalated even further when Turkey’s PM Erdogan said, “Kobani is
about to fall”.309 This was seen as a means of targeting the Kurdish opposition in Turkey,
which at the time was protesting Turkey’s support of violent gangs and terror factions in
Syria. This created public outrage, and millions of Kurds joined protests against the
Turkish government’s position toward Syrian Kurds, ISIS, and most significantly
Kobani. Finally, in 2014, YPG and the Free Syrian Army collaborated with US-led
airstrikes and removed ISIS gangs from the region. The Kurdish status since then has
significantly changed, with Kobani and Cizire cantons starting to receive limited military
and financial support. Both cantons merged their territories in 2015, while Afrin in the
West remained landlocked and cut-off from other Kurdish enclaves.
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This is a controversial issue. Erdogan later stated that President Obama told him
Kobani would fall, and this was reflected in much of the international media coverage
(New York Times, Haaretz, Independent, Deutsche Welle), as if Erdogan had been
warning that Kobani would fall into the hands of ISIS. However, in his speech, Erdogan
was actually targeting the pro-Kurdish opposition, notably HDP. His speech was not
about a warning, but perceived more as a threat, meaning: “no matter what Kurds do in
Rojava, they will not be successful, and now their Kobani is about to fall”. Since Erdogan
and his administration kept backing Jihadists, clearly arming and supporting them, and
declared Kurds as “enemies” or “terrorists” or at best as “friends of Assad”, there is
clearly no friendly warning in his message. This is an indicative point of difference
between the reading of events in Kurdistan, versus their perception in the West.
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Turkey’s Renewed Electoral Cycles and Escalated Anti-Kurdish Violence
In June 2015, Turkey held general elections, and HDP won 13.12% of votes and
80 seats. This was historic, as it represents the first time that a pro-Kurdish party
surpassed the 10% electoral threshold, the highest such threshold in the EU, and
especially considering that this barrier was put in place to prevent Kurdish representation.
Rather than as independent candidates, HDP ran in the elections as a party group. Despite
the violence towards its electoral campaign,310 its success created a mechanical cut-off in
the seats of the ruling JDP, notably due to the decrease in votes in Kurdish populated
cities, which won 40% of votes. Since JDP lost the majority, the constitutional reform
and presidential system they were aiming to legislate was no longer viable. While
coalition building was a failure, due mostly to malpractices at the presidential level and
inter-party polarization, violence drastically escalated all around the country, and another
early election was soon scheduled for November 2015.
During this electoral cycle, a series of incredibly violent and tragic events
unfolded. On 20 July 2015, a group of young students were in the remote town of Suruc,
Sanliurfa, at Turkey’s southern border, bringing toys and clothing to Kurdish children in
Kobani City in Syria,311 when they were attacked by two suicide bombers while making a
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Just two days before the June 2015 elections, on the 5th of June 2015, two bombs
exploded at an HDP rally in Diyarbakir, its stronghold, where 4 were killed, and 100
were wounded. Beside this, many other cases of local violence occurred during the
campaign.
311
Kobani City became a worldwide symbol of Kurdish resistance against ISIS and
Turkey in 2013 and 2014. The city was almost entirely destroyed, and while it was about
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press speech; 33 of them died. Then, on September 2, 2015, the world woke up to the
awful image of a Kurdish baby’s dead body on the shores of the Aegian Sea.312 A
previous inhabitant of Kobani town, he was driven from his home, along with his family,
by the civil war. His name was Alan Kurdi, and while trying to cross from Turkey into
Greece, he drowned, along with his mother and sister, as have hundreds of other Syrians
before and since then, who found themselves trapped in Turkey in the aftermath of the
Syrian Civil War.
Then, in perhaps the worst happened in Turkey’s capital, Ankara, on 10 October
2015, just 21 days before the early general elections of November 2015. In the explosions
of two suicide bombers in front of the Ankara Train Station where there was a
collaborative “labor, peace, and democracy” rally of left-wing groups, unions and NGOs,
102 people lost their lives while over 400 were injured. This was a deadly blow to the
forces of civil society fighting for peace and inclusivity, and is felt by most observers to
have played a major role in the results of next election, which turned back to the direction
of security and conservative rule. In addition to these death tolls, over 150 security
personnel were killed in the clashes, while dozens of Kurdish rebels also lost their lives

to fall against heavily armed terror gangs, an unforeseen Kurdish solidarity emerged, with
participation by international forces and volunteers, and put up a resolute defense that
eventually swept out ISIS, Al Nusra Front and the other fundamentalist gangs.
312
While many in the world and in mainstream Western media identified this boy simply
as a refugee, or as a Syrian refugee, and not specifically as a Kurdish refugee, the
Kurdish community and others aware of the Kobani conflict were very much aware of his
specific origins and identity. Whether as a general symbol of the refugee crisis, or as a
specific one, the devastating image of his body on the shore circled the world, and put a
very tragic human face on the growing refugee crisis, perhaps as never before.
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since the end of the ceasefire in July 2015. Thus, 2015 was a uniquely violent year in a
series of violent years.
Figure 15: Turkey-PKK Armed Conflict Casualties over Time
Casualties of Armed Turkey-PKK Conflict
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Source: Uppsala Armed Conflict Database (1989-2011). I calculated the last four
years’ estimates based on various sources for casualties. I expect a drastic increase in
2016, since in only the first two weeks of the year dozens of casualties were registered
among the rebels, soldiers/security personnel of Turkey, and civilians.

Following this especially violent electoral season, Turkey once again held general
elections in November 2015, during which numerous accusations of fraud were raised,
notably in the Kurdish Southeast. HDP once again successfully passed the 10% threshold,
but lost votes compared to the June 2015 election. They receiving 10.32% of the votes
and 59 seats, while the ruling JDP won 49.50% of the votes and 317 seats, an 8.6%
increase in just a few months. In December 2015, right after the election, the Turkish
Government started a comprehensive military operation in the Kurdish-populated
Southeast of Turkey. Tanks, heavily armed vehicles, and aircraft bombarded prominent

472
Kurdish towns such as Cizre, Nusaybin, Silopi, Dargecit, Yuksekova, and Diyarbakir,
which is seen by the Kurds as the capital or symbolic city of Kurdistan.313 The ancient
Citadel neighborhood of Surici, which has symbolic significance not only for Kurds but
for all Mesopotamian civilizations,314 was invaded by the heavily armed Turkish security
apparatus,315 and cut-off from the rest of the metropolitan city,316 where 2 million
habitants, most of whom are ethnic Kurds, reside. The neighborhood was emptied while
hundreds of houses were destroyed by tank shells, helicopters, and mortar attacks. The
bombings destroyed numerous precious cultural sites and thousands of years of history in
the citadel, which had just been approved as a UNESCO World Heritage site in 2015, a
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In many historical accounts, Amed [Diyarbakir] is seen as the Kurdish national
capital, although contemporary regional Kurdish state formations signify different
political or military centers in its most up-to-date forms.
314
See Diken (2013), Halifeoglu (2013), Tabbaa (1993) and Cayli (2015).
315
Unlike before, Turkey legislated and re-institutionalized all of its security institutions
in the last decade, creating a collaborative mechanism between the army, police,
intelligence, and justice – to an extent media as well. This has been severely criticized
worldwide, because it coincided with increasing authoritarianism in Turkish politics and
represents a disturbing trend. The implications were seen later in the destruction of
Kurdish towns. See: https://roarmag.org/2015/12/11/diyarbakir-sur-curfew-destruction/
and https://tr.boell.org/de/2016/04/15/what-has-been-happening-diyarbakirs-sur-districtfebruary-4-2016-when-are-we-going-raise.
316
Surici [the Citadel] is both the ancient city of Diyarbakir and an administrative center
with over 20 thousand residents, most of whom left due to curfews, military orders, and
heavy armed operations. The ancient town represents the heart of the Kurdish region,
since its millennia-old history and artifacts constitute an emotional cultural connection
for Kurds, Armenians, Assyrians, and other communities. After the operations, Turkish
PM Ahmet Davutoglu and other leaders from the ruling JDP said the town will be rebuilt
as a tourist center. Unsurprisingly, this was met with severe criticism, as this so called
development is based on dehumanization and authoritarian state violence, and represents
the most cynical neoliberal urbanization policy, far removed from the needs of the local
community and its people.
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few months before the attacks. This action, perhaps more than any of the recent acts of
the Turkish state and PKK,317 represents the end – or at least a severe stagnation – of the
ongoing peace process between Kurdish political movements and the Turkish
Government.
The heavy truth is that a history of more than 7000 years, and belonging to
multiple human civilizations, was simply destroyed in less than a 6 months period.
Meanwhile, the entire political discourse from the Turkish state, the perpetrator of this
destruction318, was immensely blunt. For its part, the PKK/KCK is also criticized for
“digging trenches” in the streets for so-called defense319 purposes, playing a central role
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Here I would like to commemorate Tahir Elci, noted human rights advocate and the
Head of the Diyarbakir Bar Association, whom I had the good fortune to know, meet, and
interview for this project. He was brazenly assassinated in broad daylight, in December
2015, in the heart of ancient Citadel of Diyarbakir, while making a speech to the press
calling for peace and a ceasefire, and for an end to the destruction of the UNESCO
heritage site. Elci was also one of the major pioneers of Kurdish paradiplomacy, and was
recognized by numerous law and human rights authorities around the world, as he
represented the largest Kurdish bar association internationally, and was well-known
worldwide as the lawyer in hundreds of judicial cases in Kurdish regions.
318
See: http://www.dw.com/en/death-and-destruction-in-diyarbakir/a-19009781; and:
https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2016/feb/09/destruction-sur-turkey-historic-districtgentrification-kurdish and http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35403260.
319
I am not attempting to legitimize this act at all, yet, I am simply against digging
trenches by some grassroots militants (YPS) linked to PKK personally, especially in
Surici neighborhood causing severe destruction. There is a vicious cycle that must be
seen, these trenches were used as a pretext by Turkish state to conduct operations and
destroy Kurdish towns and displace thousands, but were also the outcome of the threats
made by the ultranationalist and militarized discourse of the state and its ideological
tools, notably media. Instead both sides could avoid the escalating moves, which is not
easy since they are both tied in a much broader and harder scene of militarized regional
conflict, and mutual moves are often resulted by a chain of transnational hard policy
interactions rounded by a multiplicity of security apparatus.
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in both disturbing the public and the state. In addition to this assault on the cultural hearth
of the Kurdish region in Diyarbakir’s Sur District, the massive state operation also
included similar patterns of destruction in Cizre,320 Nusaybin, Yuksekova, and Silopi,
with heavy military operations assisted by militarized bulldozers. This was accompanied
by the destruction of ancient Hasankeyf City, the oldest capital of human civilization on
the Tigris River (Yilmazer et. Al, 2009), in conjunction with the Ilisu Dam Project, which
is still in its construction phase, despite the international condemnation of and
withdrawals from the project by international authorities and organizations because of its
destructive cultural implications. More than two million worldwide signatures have been
gathered against it. All together, these activities represent the components of a destructive
neoliberal politics, clearly indicating that war and destruction is being imposed by the
state, rather than the peace and development it pays rhetorical credence to. The dam
project is a good example of the thinly disguised military objectives of ostensible
development projects and other seemingly innocuous state activities. Violence therefore
continues to escalate, without end, and without real outlet for significant peace
elaboration. There are conflicting claims for the death toll of the conflict in 2015,
reflecting the strategic and propaganda goals of each side. Turkey claims 504 Turkish
security personnel were killed, against 7078 PKK members and 258 civilians, while PKK
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See: http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/turkey-families-return-shattered-kurdish-town-cizresecond-kobani-1547103; and: http://www.dw.com/en/german-lawsuit-accuses-turkey-ofwar-crimes-in-military-operations-against-kurds/a-19361089.
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claims 1557 Turkish security personnel were killed,321 against 220 PKK; while various
sources claim the civilian death toll to be around 1000. Further, more than 350,000
people were displaced during the escalation of the conflict in 2015.322
Figure 16: The Images of Sur District in Diyarbakir City before and after the Turkish
security operations, indicating the scope of destruction.323

Source: Aljazeera (Retrieved on 25 May 2016).
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See: http://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/8c60f8cf-02e5-4037-8e6add9dd4970941/PKK-claims-killing-7-000-Turkish-soldiers.
322
See: http://www.dw.com/en/spread-of-violence-in-turkey-shows-no-sign-of-abating/a19320797.
323
For a detailed interactive satellite image of the destruction, see:
http://www.aljazeera.com.tr/interaktif/uzaydan-sur-oncesi-ve-sonrasi.
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Following the increasing violence and casualties,324 as well as the destruction of
livelihoods, 1128 scholars formed a group called “Baris Icin Akademisyenler”
[Academics for Peace], and signed a petition calling for the government to end its
violence and return to the negotiation tables of the peace process.325 Turkey’s President
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, PM Davutoglu, and numerous ministers reacted to the statement
furiously, calling the academics “traitors” and ordering their prosecution. This resulted in
the nationwide targeting of scholars, imprisonment, and opening of judicial cases. This
targeting of academics received strong support from ultranationalists and the right-wing
in Turkey, which increasingly collaborated with conservative governing bodies under the
doctrine of Neo-Ottomanism, the blend of Turkic-Islamic ideology referred to above.
These actions have also been severely criticized by a great ensemble of worldwide
scholars, who have themselves made declarations supporting the Turkish and Kurdish
academics’ call for peace. Signatories include internationally prominent scholars,
including Noam Chomsky, Judith Butler, Slavoj Zizek, Angela Davis, David Harvey,
Etienne Balibar, Immanuel Wallerstein, and hundreds of others from the US, Canada,
UK, France, Germany, and other countries. This has helped garner some attention in
international media. The dispute has grown and reached the diplomatic sphere, with the
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Following similar prior statements by President Erdogan and PM Davutoglu,
notorious mafia leader Sedat Peker, known for numerous organized crime cases, made
the following public statement in relation to Kurdish rebels and their restive constituents:
“We will shower in your blood”. The death toll has since increased. See:
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/notorious-criminal-threatens-academics-calling-forpeace-in-turkeys-southeast.aspx?pageID=238&nID=93834&NewsCatID=341.
325
See: http://barisicinakademisyenler.net/.
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U.S. Ambassador to Turkey, John Bass, releasing a kind, but naïve message backing
academics’ freedom of expression,326 while many other diplomatic representatives,
including the UK ambassador and several EU representatives have also expressed
concerns about freedom of expression and academic freedom. Turkey’s Kurdish issue has
been a major presence shadowing its diplomatic relations with the world in the last
century, and has gained significant momentum in the last few decades.327 There is now a
visible and recent trend of increased internationalization of Kurdish politics, enabling
numerous major actors to engage directly with the scene of conflict. This has complicated
Turkey’s – as well as Iran, Iraq and Syria’s – handling of their “Kurdish issues”, given
the circumstances of geopolitical transformation in the broader region, as will be
discussed in greater detail below.
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See: http://turkey.usembassy.gov/statement_01152016.html.
As a part of the discourse and content analysis of my research, I investigated a total of
15 Annual Human Right Reports of the U.S. Department of State from 1999 to 2014
(available at: http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/). These are known to have importance
in Turkey’s politics, and each of the reports had at least a section dedicated to the course
of conflict and peacebuilding between Kurds and the Turkish Government. The emphases
in the reports vary by years, but the general discourse is representative of the strained and
constrained diplomatic relations between the US and its strategic ally Turkey. Another
significant annual report I reviewed is the European Union Membership Process Progress
Report (available at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailed-countryinformation/turkey/index_en.htm), which is a more comprehensive annual report that
reviews political, economic, social and cultural areas in detail. In this report, the Kurdish
issue and the inclusion of Kurds and other minority groups are often emphasized,
reflecting Turkey’s effort and undertaking of formal policy reforms in the framework of
European integration and membership. Both of the reports have become more
“concerned” in the last few years, warning directly about increasing authoritarianism.
327
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Discussion: Towards a Redefinition of Kurdish Paradiplomacy and Protodiplomacy
As can be seen in the long political history of the Kurdish regions described and
summarized in this and the previous chapter, the Kurdish question is deeply shaped by
these historical developments and processes, and one must take the magnitude and
longitude of this geopolitical timeline into consideration when investigating
contemporary Kurdish politics and the nature of the relationships Kurdish regions have
developed with the rest of the world. This path-dependent genealogy describes the
evolution of significant contemporary patterns. While considering the patterns, it is also
important to observe the new alliances and enmities that emerge with the contemporary
structures of global governance.
Kurdish paradiplomacy and/or protodiplomacy is a millennia old practice as
documented, experienced and practiced in different times by various actors and regional
formations. National and proto-national Kurdish state formations and grassroots
organizations have intervened and/or assimilated into the dominant state structures
sovereign in Kurdish lands, particularly in the modern era. Kurdish nationalism and its
exponents have also been systematically repressed, and in extreme cases annihilated
from, this scene. While Kurdish communities have benefited from autonomy and
provincial/confederative political structures, they were also dependent on these states for
centuries. The absolute loss of status in the early 20th century, in the context of the
hegemony of the nation-states form in the international system, represents a critical point
in Kurdish politics, as well as in broader Middle Eastern geopolitics. Kurdish
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statelessness, and the creation of modern Turkey, Iran, Iraq and Syria have produced a
physically divided Kurdish territoriality. This not only degraded the political environment
for Kurdish political and regional movements, but also created a security gap and a power
vacuum in the broader region, which can be seen as a primary source of instability,
unrest, and violence in the region. Despite being the overwhelming majority in their
regions, Kurdish populations suddenly become minorities in these new countries. Since
then, Kurdish politics has become primarily a matter of demanding rights within new
state structures, a perpetual state of recovering from atrocities, and pushing for
decentralization in their national contexts. Some have worked to gain autonomy,
organizing national conferences,328 while others have fought for outright independence,
as well as for regional re-unification, for greater autonomy and/or potential
independence.
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Organization of a trans-regional national Kurdish conference has been a major priority
and long-term dream of Kurdish political movements and communities. However,
geopolitical conditions, inter-party disputes over the questions of who will be
represented, how and with how many representatives, and who will lead the process, all
greatly complicated these efforts. Although the declaration of a Kurdish High Council in
Erbil, with participation at the highest level of trans-border leadership from KDP, PUK,
PKK/KCK and Goran groups signified a promising development at the grassroots level,
the intensification of armed conflicts in 2015 have once again forestalled the possibility
of a national conference in the immediate future. Another major issue for any such
(trans)-national conference is its need for international recognition, a challenging step
that necessitates diplomatic excellence in preparation for such an event. Thus, such an
event can only be organized when international actors clearly and substantially support
the process. Previous experiences of unilateral declarations – usually party based – and
attempts to build multiparty coalitions, have also played a role in developing this rigorous
process. While it has been delayed, the idea of an internationally recognized Kurdish
national conference still holds a primary place in Kurdish political aspirations.
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Schumpeterian Dynamics of Kurdish Paradiplomacy
In this discussion, I redefine Kurdish paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy, which
have passed through dramatic transformations in the last decade, and have therefore
gained both significance and depth in the arenas of global governance. First, I consider
various forms of intensified Kurdish paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy, reviewing in
consecutive order those efforts that were initiated as humanitarian, hard [policy
engagement], soft [policy engagement], and development-focused initiatives in the
contemporary era. Following this primary typology, I specifically discuss
preventive/security-oriented and development/state-capacity focused paradiplomacy in
Kurdish regions, notably the context specific issue of resources (water, mineral, energy).
I also focus on the interregional, interparty, and ideological fragmentations of the Kurdish
communities, which ultimately reproduce a fragmented scene of paradiplomacy and
protodiplomacy at the international level.
There are numerous other instances of paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy
involving multiparty political systems, including most of the cases in the global northern,
including: Catalonia, Quebec, Scotland, Wallonia, Flanders, Northern Ireland and others.
However, none of these represent anything like the unique physical/nation-state divisions
experienced by Kurdish regions, nor the fragmentation of political and economic power
among armed political factions among neighboring interdependent territorialities. This
makes the Kurdish case unique in the annals of paradiplomacy research. What especially
becomes significant in this context is that throughout the deconstruction and failure of
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post-colonial authoritarian state legacies, Kurdish regions, once never found a chance of
developing their self-ruling abilities nor even basic rights, are now able to gain systemic
power at substate level. This more recent trend eventually makes Kurdish regions more
active and attractive in the international affairs, especially in parallel to the broader and
complex equation of conflict. Although still not able to overcome the dominance of their
national contenders,
Kurdish regions gain additional power and diplomatic recognition, especially in
the context of multiethnic and interreligious/intersecterian wars of the region as can be
seen in Syria, Iraq and even in Turkey. There are various motives, interests and complex
dynamics explaining this recent phenomenon which I call Schumpeterian since the solid
emergence of Kurdish regions in Syria and Iraq exactly coincided with the collapse of
authoritarian Baathism. In both countries, Kurdish regions simply became the
internationally pro-active units with various functions that were previously only
attributed to traditional nation-states, such as territorial sovereignty and defense,
maintaining armed forces, constitution making, own education system and government
structures. This process did not emerge all of a sudden as an outcome of the escalated
terror and violence perpetrated by various non-state actors or networks, but in fact, it
represents a long-term accumulation of synergy by the communities who were deprived
of their basic and collective rights. These communities kept their struggles alive
throughout the century against the international state system in which they were
constantly excluded. This synergy eventually was unleashed when the authoritarian
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national contenders were collapsed in civil wars, international interventions or simply
mass terror outbreaks as can be seen in Syrian Civil War or Iraq War. Therefore, once the
excluded and underestimated stateless actors, these regions gained additional significance
and importance, especially attracting a worldwide attention and even grassroots support.
Humanitarian Paradiplomacy: From Multilateral Intervention to
Geopolitical Partnership
Initially, Kurdish paradiplomacy was the locomotive of Ottoman-Persian wars
until the 17th century,329 as Kurdish regional state formations either allied with one side or
the other to gain a form of independence and autonomy. In the early 20th century, Kurds
once again emerged as actors seeking statehood in the course of the Ottoman Collapse,
after the Great War, as part of post-war peacemaking. However, these attempts were
unsuccessful,330 beside the short-lived Kurdish Republic of Mahabad. The Kurdish
Republic of Mahabad was created by Kurdish communities who found greater
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Although Turkish-Iranian borders were settled and have remained unchanged since
the 17th century, neither Turkey nor Iran’s strong hand in Kurdish politics subsequently
relented.
330
In a recent report published by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the British House of
Commons, titled “UK Government Policy on Kurdistan” (2015), the British Government
didn’t necessarily deny the British (and French) roles in creating Kurdish statelessness. It
recognized the British role in the creation of Iraq in 1921 under a Sunni ruler, that the
British have not been friends of Kurdish nationalists, were silent at the League of Nations
when Iraq annexed Mosul, and finally that they supported the Sykes-Picot agreement in
the aftermath of the collapse of the Treaty of Sevres in 1923. However, the report defends
British and other European powers for their role in Kurdish statelessness by attributing it
to the victory of the Turkish in their independence war, as well as Russian aid to Turks
which left them little choice (Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons,
2015, p.19-20).
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opportunity in the lack of political authority in Iran, but was then later cut-off from the
support of Soviet Russia, and collapsed. The collapse of autonomy in Iraq in the 1960s,
and numerous subsequent conflicts have produced conditions ill-suited to the pursuit of
Kurdish autonomy in the region. In the 1980s, massacres and genocides took place in
Kurdish regions, especially during the 8 year Iraq-Iran War that took place mostly in the
Kurdish regions of both countries. In the 1980s and 90s, the entire Kurdish geography,
including Kurdish regions of Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Syria were experiencing heavy
conflicts and wars. At the same time, this represented an era of multilateral destruction
across Kurdistan, which PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan called the years of “Kizilca
Kiyamet” [Very-Red Apocalypse] in 1995.
In this challenging context, the celebration of unique moments in contemporary
Kurdish politics,331 even at the darkest times, expressively manifested the value attributed
to the development of foreign relations between Kurdish regions and international actors.
French First Lady Mitterrand’s individual intervention in Iraqi Kurdistan, seeking
humanitarian progress after the atrocities of the Saddam Regime, can be seen as one of
these moments. UN Security Council Resolution 688 gave Kurds a safe haven in north
Iraq with a non-fly zone, notably after Mitterrand’s efforts to file a joint resolution with
the UK and the US. Although severely destroyed in the war, the Kurdish region of Iraq

The declaration of Mitterrand as the “honorary mother” of the Kurdish nation is
evidence of this celebration, while other diplomatic achievements such as the recognition
of the Kurds as allies by Western countries, or the international awareness and solidarity
of individuals, groups and communities that changed the course of war in the Battle of
Kobani, can all be given as examples..
331
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has since developed a sense of regional administration around the idea of post-war
reconstruction and international economic development.
This can be described as a constructive primary step in the birth of contemporary
Kurdish paradiplomacy. Its focus was initially humanitarian,332 in response to decadeslong brutal policies conducted by Iraq and neighboring states, all of which are themselves
post-colonial/neo-colonial states. An intervention was sorely needed, and in this instance
it came partly from the push of a single courageous individual. This form of humanitarian
paradiplomacy is not unique to the Kurdistan Region in Iraq, but what must be
acknowledged is that Kurds had been waiting for decades for such a moment – for such
an opening. They quickly formed a dynamic state-like organization, aiming to regain
their independence. Thus, there was a definitively motivated grassroots, traumatized
though it was by its immediate prior experiences, actively seeking reconciliation in the
wake of systemic repression and genocide.
While humanitarian paradiplomacy was initiated by a multilateral intervention
which eventually led to the creation of the Kurdistan Region in Iraq, this was not a
momentary channel of diplomacy, but represented more a preliminary step in a series of
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On many occasions during my interviews, and also in the comprehensive content and
discourse analysis I conducted (using the material, media, and documents comprised of
writings, statements, speeches, and other forms of expression by members of
PKK/KCK/PYD, HDP, KDP and PUK), Kurds view their struggle as a necessary means
of survival. There is therefore a definite national/collective attribution of these defensive
actions to the success of proto-state formations. The growing military and its string of
successes, as well as the emergence of successful and high profile international
diplomacy are both seen as primary fields in which to invest.
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progressive actions constituting an arc of sustained humanitarian paradiplomacy. After
the initial interventions of the 1990s, numerous additional steps were taken by the
institutions of global governance, such as the UN, UNESCO, UNHCR, World Bank,
USAID, Oxfam and many other international, national, subnational and local
organizations and institutions. While most of the humanitarian projects in the 1990s and
2000s were about reconstruction, between the years 2000 and 2010 most of the projects
were about human capacity development and economic development in the form of
infrastructure building. These were aimed at providing real relief to suffering
communities.
With recent developments in the region, especially the aggravated armed conflicts
in Iraq and the greater region, humanitarian paradiplomacy in the Kurdish region has
become not only a conduit of aid, but also a proactive force creating state and human
capacity. It is estimated that over a million people recently took refuge in the Kurdistan
Region in Iraq, while significant internal migration from within Iraq has also been
significant. Most of these human flows bring traumatized communities escaping brutal
conditions of war at the hands of ISIS, Al Nusra, and other extremist terror networks. In
this context of humanitarian emergency, KRG emerged as a significantly endorsed
partner of the UN in humanitarian efforts as well as recognized by other bilateral and
multilateral diplomatic partners for its efforts. Given the peaked toll of humanitarian
crisis and war in the greater region, and the additional stress this added to a region that
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was still itself in the early phases of reconstruction, development has stagnated to a large
degree in the region, while the focus shifted to defense and security.
In August 2014, thousands of Yazidis were entrapped on Mount Sinjar in the
Shingal district in Iraq, under the attack of heavy ISIL offensives that killed an estimated
5,000 Yazidis and saw the abduction of several thousand women and children (Hopkins,
2014). As one of the oldest civilizations of Mesopotamia, and a core constituent of
Kurdish culture and history, the Yazidi massacres were condemned by most of the world,
including international institutions such as the UN.333 The UN and numerous states issued
declarations, statements, and communications recognizing the massacres, and even the
possibility of genocide.334
While the world watched this horror slowly begin to unfold in real-time, without
any real plan to intervene, KRG and PKK/KCK leaning groups organized a joint
operation to take back the region and save thousands trapped in this challenging
mountain terrain. KRG initiated a worldwide campaign to protect Yazidis, including the
formation of relief funds, organizing logistical support for international aid, and
conducting military operations to rid the south of Mt. Sinjar from ISIS. This arc of
humanitarian paradiplomacy can clearly be seen in the still unfolding story of Iraqi
Kurdistan, and to a lesser and newer extent also now in Syria.
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See: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-31962755.
See: Cumming-Bruce (2015), “United Nations Investigators Accuse ISIS of Genocide
over Attacks on Yazidis,” New York Times, March 19, 2015.
334
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Hard Paradiplomacy: Unique Substate Defense of Kurdish Regions
Massacres, genocides, and mass murders, such as the Halabja Chemical Attack,
the Anfal Campaign, the Dersim Genocide of 1938, the Yazidi Massacre of 2015, the
Roboski Massacre, the Cizre Massacre, and dozens of other moments of acute trauma in
Kurdish history, makes up an important part of Kurdish diplomatic expressions. The lack
of justice and reconciliation, and the continual addition of new experiences, increasingly
put emphasis on the necessity of having a state in Kurdish politics, so as to develop
defensive capacity in the face of these events. It is a matter of utmost importance to
understand the hidden interconnection between the humanitarian paradiplomacy
conducted by Kurdish regions, and the hard policy actions of Kurdish actors (mostly
victims) in their diplomatic engagements. The behaviors of hostile diplomatic actors are
broad in scope, ranging from peace talks to genocide and mass destruction, all of which
have been present in recent history. It is especially notable that humanitarian
paradiplomacy is not necessarily a soft and limited set of actions. It is also a direct
pipeline toward international markets and institutions in which there are great
opportunities for international recognition. Therefore, there is an interchange between
humanitarian paradiplomacy and state capacity building, notably in terms of hard policy
power engagements by regional (substate) entities in Kurdistan.
Up until the mid-1990s, Kurdish groups fought between each other over power
and territoriality. The first accomplishment in regard to Kurdish internal peace was
achieved by PUK, PKK, and KDP reconciliation, with partial mediation provided by
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other states, such as the United States. US mediation between the warring Iraqi Kurdish
factions of KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party) and PUK (Kurdistan Patriotic Union) in
1998 confirmed the emerging and progressive Kurdish-US diplomatic connection. This
has further turned into a form of advanced collaboration, probably one of the rarest forms
of paradiplomacy, with a strong emphasis on hard policy engagement. The significance
of the Kurds in U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East rapidly gained notoriety, notably
during the second Bush administration. Traumatized by a largely negative relationship
with the US, which was once aggravated by Kissinger, PUK and KDP leaders were
somewhat doubtful when US officials met with them to mediate and agree on terms for
the future invasion of Iraq. However, after being initiated by humanitarian intervention,
then after the following period of humanitarian paradiplomacy aiming for international
economic development of the de facto Kurdish substate entity, US-Kurdish relationships
progressed even further in 2000s, turning into a more advanced diplomatic collaboration.
This included significant military support, and may well represent the most advanced
diplomatic relations the U.S. Government has with a single substate entity.
During the course of the Iraq invasion in 2003, the diplomatic engagement
strengthened to a much more advanced level and also widened in scope. Bilateral ties
were built between the Kurdistan Region in Iraq and almost every major state actor, in
addition to multilateral endorsements and connections with important collective global
power centers such as the UN, EU, and/or allied forces that joined the fight in Iraq and
later in Syria. While Kurdish paradiplomacy primarily aims for international recognition,
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the most in-demand and focused policy fields are consistently hard policy questions
regarding the landlockedness of Kurdish regions and its security and related socioeconomic concerns. In addition to hostile national hosts/contenders, paradiplomacy
remains heavily focused on creating a secure environment in the serious power vacuum
in the greater region. With US intervention in Iraq in 2003, and the reconstruction of Iraq
as a federal state, Kurds have upgraded their de facto status into a highly autonomous
regional government. What signifies the second major step a decade after the
humanitarian intervention is the creation of the Kurdistan Region in Iraq, endorsed by the
Kurdistan Regional Government, and representing a primary end-state goal in the
emergence of Kurdish paradiplomacy. Since then, the Kurdistan Region has built several
bilateral and multilateral connections with international political actors.
Further evidence of Kurdish substate entities’ engagement in hard politics
(military, defense, territorial sovereignty) is the creation of the Rojava Region in Syria
during the course of the Syrian Civil War. Following the state-like Kurdish regional
formation in Iraq, the withdrawal of the Baath Regime in Syria from the Kurdish
enclaves in Northeastern Syria335 has led to a security gap that was quickly filled by the
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The central city of Qamislo in Cizire canton was a significant exception to the
withdrawal of the Syrian state. It is the largest and key canton of Rojava, neighboring the
Botan region in Northern Kurdistan (Southeastern Turkey) and Iraqi Kurdistan. Assad’s
forces remain in Qamishlo Airport, at the urban center, which is a major problem in
Rojava and for greater Kurdish politics. Rojava’s declaration of federalism was rejected
by the Assad Regime, and was also not supported by Western administrations who
wanted to keep Turkey at bay. There have been repeated clashes, ending with several
deaths between Assad forces and Kurdish YPG/YPJ forces in Qamishlo. However, when
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Kurds. The region has witnessed some of the most horrendous scenes of modern warfare,
and Kurdish regions were on the brink of annihilation by extremist terror networks such
as Al Nusra Front, Ahrar Al-Sham, and ISIS – all of which received significant external
military and financial support, and waged a destructive war that impacted the lives of
millions. Kurds in Syria have declared three self-ruled cantons: Afrin, Kobani, and
Cizire, and these cantons have organized their own defense units. Meanwhile, the united
Rojava Region significantly demonstrated its will to conduct intensive paradiplomacy,
engaging in hard policy actions and actively seeking international military support.
Although the magnitude of destruction outweighs the support and aid that Kurdish
regions have received, a substantive societal organization gained popularity worldwide,
focused on reconstructing Rojava with policies of self-rule, solidarity, pluralism, gender
equality, and ecology. Kurds’ limited access to defense equipment and basic essential
humanitarian materials is well-known to most international actors, and become a

I asked the ruling president Salih Muslim in summer of 2014: what the reason is that
Kurds do not proceed to take the airport, his response was that doing so would cause it to
lose its formal jurisdictional international status, since Kurds are not formally recognized.
Kurds do not support Assad’s Regime, and have long struggled against it, often in the
form of armed clashes. The Assad Regime is strictly Arab nationalist, outright denying
Kurds recognition and state power sharing, and employing extremely repressive policies
toward Kurdish regions. However, they now have lost their authority in Northern Syria,
except for the Qamishlo airport. Although the Assad forces remain “symbolically” in
Qamishlo, sooner or later they will either be removed, or there will be a formal
recognition of the Rojava federation, which may allow for a diplomatic accommodation
for them to remain. However, it must be noted that Russia’s involvement and current
actions of building an airbase, along with the Allies (USA, UK, Germany, France,
Canada, Australia and others) who are apparently building other military bases. This
indicates potentials complexities and challenges to progress yet to come.
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worldwide conversation during the heroic defense of Kobani in 2013, attracting global
sympathy and support. The Kurdish political model has emerged as a promising remedy
to the horrors exercised by fundamentalist terror networks that revolve around money,
plunder, arms and violence. Kurdish paradiplomacy definitely gained depth from its
strong diaspora communities in Europe, USA and Russia, as well as the grassroots
support Kurds receive with their increasing popularity worldwide, especially in Global
North countries. From this perspective, the invasion and horror committed by the
fundamentalist terror networks gave Kurds the excellent opportunity to market their longexcluded political agenda, to build a country of their own. Their positive representation
on the global stage was a tangible benefit, although the cost was extremely high, which
seems to have always been the case in Kurdish regions.
Table 6: Hard Policy Engagement of Rojava [Kurdistan] Region in Northeast Syria
Actor

Category

USA

Military

France

Military

Russia

Military

Actions

Joint Military Operations, Direct Ground Troops Support,
Training and Intelligence Support, Equipment Support, Airto-Ground engagement in joint operations
Diplomacy Diplomatic Recognition and Support (Presidential Level,
Envoy)
Joint Military Operations, Equipment Support, Air-toGround engagement in joint operations
Diplomacy Diplomatic Recognition and Support (Presidential Level
Meeting at Paris)
Joint Military Operations, Air-to-Ground joint operations,
anti-air defense, training, intelligence, equipment aid
Diplomatic Recognition and Support (at Presidential and
Diplomacy Foreign Minister levels), Diplomatic Representation in
Moscow, Support for Rojava’s inclusion in the UN and
Geneva
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Kurdistan
Region of
Iraq

Military

Joint Military Operations, Direct Ground Troops Support,
Equipment Support
Diplomacy Diplomatic Support and Assistance to Rojava
Representatives

Canada

Military

Joint Military Operations, Air-to-Ground engagement in
joint operations, intelligence and ammunition support.

With the advent of increasing worldwide protests and domestic political pressure,
the US Administration abandoned its silent position, and declared its support for Rojava
fighters, while bombarding ISIS oppositions, along with Canada, France, and the UK.
Increasing international pressure also helped convince Turkey to permit a convoy of
military support to transit from Iraqi Kurdistan into the Kobani Canton. The convoy was
celebrated by Kurdish populations in Kurdish towns that were on its way to Kobani, and
this also signifies the very first Kurdish [formal] paradiplomacy between two Kurdish
regions336 in terms of hard policy engagement. Moreover, dozens of international
individuals relocated to both the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, and also to the Rojava Region
to join and support Kurdish fighters on the ground. These individuals represent a diverse
group of people that includes veteran U.S., UK, Canadian, Australian soldiers, French,
German, and other European citizens, and even Dutch biker-gangs and soccer moms. As
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Two notes on this historical event: First, the arms support was arranged by PUK
according to high level key informants I interviewed, which later was also published by
Kurdish media, since there is a substantial KDP-PKK dispute over numerous issues,
notably on Rojava, and the relationship of KRG with Turkish Government. Second, the
celebration of Kurdish groups has also created an outrage amongst Turkish nationalists.
The permit was given by Turkish government for that convoy following a long
negotiation during which the U.S. Government has played a key role of intermediation,
convincing Turkey.

493
a result, a unique brigade was created in Rojava called the “International Brigade of
Rojava”, which was later renamed “The Lions of Rojava”. Highly active in the fight, and
contributing significantly to Kurdish troops, The Lions of Rojava have also lost a few of
their members during the clashes with the Islamic State, such as former Royal Marine
Eric Konstantinos Scurfield, Australian Army reserves Ashley Johnston and Reece
Harding, German volunteers Kevin Joachim, Ivana Hoffman and Gunter Helsten,
American volunteer Keith Broomsfield, and Canadian volunteer John Gallagher.337 All
were declared to be “Kurdish martyrs” by Kurdish communities, which attributed great
significance to these individuals. This was equally true in both the Kurdish regions, and
throughout the diaspora where these individuals were from. This all reflects the
relationship between and influence of international solidarity and social movements, on
the political sphere of paradiplomatic engagements.
Although Russia had been distant to Kurdish regions and their national agendas,
its stance on Kurds has drastically changed in recent years, now providing full military
support to Kurdish regions, and even creating a second “no-fly” zone in 2015, with the
deployment of s-400 anti-aircraft missiles in Northern Syria. This action was in response
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I found the chance of meeting both the Reece and Harding families on social media
after they lost their sons in Rojava’s Kobani Battle, both of which have been attributed a
great and honorable value in Kurdish political culture, even becoming a worldwide
symbol of Kurdish paradiplomacy. Each of these individuals and their stories made
possible the international voluntary contribution to the Kurdish defense in Kobani of
Rojava, and this voluntary contribution later grew into a much broader military
cooperation, which has now turned into something closer to what the kind more often
seen between two states.
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to the shooting down of a Russian warplane by Turkey’s airforce, and Russia’s
subsequent aim to secure the entire Syrian border from Turkish air forces, which
constitute a significant portion of Turkey’s firepower on the battle ground. In the course
of the conflict, the Kurdish-led coalition in Northern Syria made significant territorial
gains, inching closer to the unification of Afrin and Kobani Cantons. This is strongly
opposed by Turkey, and a heavy artillery barrage took place in February 2016 from the
Turkish borders territories into the zones taken by Kurdish-led coalition forces. US VicePresident Biden stated that the artillery barrage and bombings must be stopped
immediately, in concert with the leaders of France and other states, while Russia and
Syria brought the issue to the UN. Moreover, Syrian Kurds were welcomed by French
President Hollande to the Elysée Palace in Paris, and were also sent official envoys from
the U.S. President.
In this context, recognition of the interplay between the bilateral and multilateral
development of foreign relations is crucial. The US/UK-led coalition and the support of
other actors such as France, Germany, Italy, Canada, Israel, and Sweden in multilateral
engagements have led to what might be called collective encouragement in the scene of
global governance. This has enabled dozens of other countries to be attracted to
developing ties with Iraqi Kurdistan. Although initially emerging and developing as
popular freedom movements, mostly around left-wing values of community building in
severe conditions across the past century, this new development in the Kurdistan Region
of Iraq is clearly a neoliberal intervention, representing a series of top-down foreign
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policy actions made by the major powers. Since this aspect is visibly interconnected to
neoliberal global governance and aligned with the synergy of world politics, Kurds’ proWestern preferences and strong grassroots community organizations were quickly
mobilized to respond in the context of urgent need, pulling the wagons in the same
direction, and therefore reinforcing the emerging political structure.
Table 7: Hard Paradiplomacy Engagement of Kurdistan Region of Iraq
Actors

Category

USA

Military

Diplomacy
UK

Military

Diplomacy

Actions
Joint Military Operations, Direct Ground Troops, Training
and Intelligence, Military Equipment (Both Direct, and
also Limited via Baghdad) support, Air-to-Ground
engagement in joint operations
Diplomatic Recognition338 and Support (Presidential,
Vice-President, Secretary of State and other ministers)
Joint Military Operations, Training and Intelligence
Support, Military Equipment Support (Limited, via
Baghdad), Air-to-Ground engagement in joint operations
Diplomatic Recognition and Support (Prime Minister
Level, ministers and members of the House of Commons)

Turkey

Military
Diplomacy

Training Support, Military Equipment Support
Diplomatic Recognition (Presidential level, Prime
Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs)

Russia

Military
Diplomacy

Equipment Support (Limited, via Baghdad)
Diplomatic Recognition (Ministry Level - Minister of
Foreign Affairs)

Germany

Military

Joint Military Operations, Direct Ground Troops, Training
and Intelligence, Military Equipment (Both Direct and

The reason I used “diplomatic recognition” for the diplomatic activities of KRG is the
mutual creation of diplomatic representations which even advanced more recently, in
parallel to the combat against the Islamic State. However, “diplomatic interaction”
defines these types of activities better, since they cannot be compared to “full scale
diplomatic recognition” in the sense of traditional international relations yet.
338
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Diplomacy
Canada

Military
Diplomacy

France

Military
Diplomacy

also limited via Baghdad), Air-to-Ground engagement in
joint operations
Diplomatic Recognition (Presidential, Prime Minister,
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Defense)
Joint Military Operations, Training and Intelligence
Support, Equipment Support, Air-to-Ground engagement
in joint operations
Diplomatic Recognition (Prime Minister and Ministry
Level)
Joint Military Operations, Training and Intelligence
Support, Equipment Support, Air-to-Ground engagement
in joint operations,
Diplomatic Recognition (Presidential Level, Prime
Minister, Minister of Defense, Minister of Foreign
Affairs)

Czech
Republic

Military
Diplomacy

Equipment Support
Consulate General

Italy

Military
Diplomacy

Training Support, Equipment Support
Minister of Defense, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Italian
Parliament

Croatia

Military
Diplomacy

Equipment Support
Consulate General

Sweden

Military
Diplomacy

Joint Military Operations, Training Support, Equipment
Support
Minister of Defense, Minister of Foreign Affairs

Israel

Military
Diplomacy

Training and Intelligence Support
Low-level diplomacy339, Back Channel / Track II
Diplomacy

Estonia

Military
Diplomacy

Equipment Support
Diplomatic Support (Minister of Foreign Affairs)
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Although the description of low-level, or low-profile would be used to describe IsraelKRG relations, this tie seems to be stronger than is imagined. Although Palestine has
official bilateral diplomatic representation with KRG while Israel does not, because Iraq
and Israel do not conduct any form of direct diplomacy Israel has developed a strong
informal relationship with Southern Kurdistan in recent decades.
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Possibly the most important takeaway of the international intervention in Iraq, and
according to the global recognition and endorsement of the Kurdistan Region, is that both
bilateral and multilateral relations and agreements have contributed significantly to
deterrence in the region.340 This is all the more notable considering its landlocked
position, surrounded by hostilities. While maintaining their hostile stances, states such as
Turkey, Iran, Syria, and even Iraq (the Baghdad Government) have all recognized the
region, and have developed political and economic relations. The PKK movement is
widely known to represent the 29th mass Kurdish revolt in the last century (Bilgin and
Sarihan, 2013; Birand, 2008; Olson, 2000), whereas the recognition of the KRG signifies
the very first step toward a status change of the Kurdish regions. This time, the region
was recognized, in a period without external militarily interventions, with the exception
of Turkey’s transborder military operations into Iraqi Kurdistan’s Qandil Mountains to
fight against PKK.
The Kurdistan Region of Iraq has also developed relations with some Arab
countries, although in a limited and cautious manner, consisting of mostly formal
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Following the turmoil in Iraq over the last decade, and expanding terror in other parts of Iraq, most
countries have moved their central Iraqi diplomatic missions to Erbil, the capital of the Kurdistan Region.
A total of 18 Consulates General are present in the Kurdistan Region, representing Iran, Russia, Germany,
France, UK, USA, Jordan, Egypt, UAE, Czech Republic, Hungary, China, Netherlands, Kuwait, Sudan,
South Korea, Palestine, and Italy, while Saudi Arabia has also taken steps toward opening a consulate
general in the Kurdistan Region. Countries such as Bulgaria, Sweden, Romania, Poland, and Austria have
consular representation in the Kurdistan Region, along with other representatives, such as honorary consuls
of Spain, Japan, Denmark, Belarus, Slovakia, and Brazil Further, one can list the presence of the Economic
and Commercial Affairs Representation of Greece, the Japan International Cooperation Agency, the Korea
International Cooperation Agency, a UNAMI (United Nations Assistance of Mission of Iraq) Regional
Representation Office, the European Union Delegation Office to Kurdistan Region of Iraq, and an ICRC
(International Committee of Red Cross) Regional Office.
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diplomatic procedures required by geopolitical dynamics. Countries such as Jordan,
UAE, Egypt, and even Saudi Arabia have undertaken political and economic steps in
agreement with KRG to invest in the Kurdish region and even to open diplomatic
representations. However, these relations have remained less desirable, due to the sense
of protodiplomacy developing somewhat strongly at the grassroots level in accordance
with historically grounded negative feelings towards Arab communities.341 This is also
reflected in regional governance. The Arab World and its actors are seen by grassroots
communities as responsible for decades of destruction in the Kurdistan Region.
Worsening the already contested relations between Kurdish and Arab nationalists is the
notable genocide of Halabja and the Anfal Campaign. Accordingly, the Kurdistan Region
increasingly applies a form of protodiplomacy for international audiences, against its
Iraqi national contenders. While the Kurdistan Region conducts protodiplomacy against
the Baghdad Government in its international audiences, it retains paradiplomatic ties with
Iraq’s neighbors Iran and Turkey. Both Iran and Turkey have large Kurdish populations
and do not allow or encourage Kurdish nationalism within their Kurdish regions, while
maintaining significant authoritarian power over them. Therefore, there is a significant
interplay between the paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy employed by the Kurdistan
Region in Iraq.
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These feelings remain from Baathist Arab Nationalism and are quite visible in Iraqi
Kurdistan, while this is less the case in the Rojava region, or in the Kurdish region of
Turkey.
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Quadri-Regional Kurdish Paradiplomacy: From Interregional Relations to New
Layers and Levels of Paradiplomacy
A unique feature of Kurdish paradiplomacy is that different from any other
example around the world there are four neighboring Kurdish regions with predominant
Kurdish populations, which are nonetheless physically divided. The boundaries are
physical, official, and internationally recognized, but do not signify the containment of
interactions between Kurdish regions. Indeed, this physical division plays a significant
role in the grand strategy regarding the formation of Kurdish regions, thus effecting their
paradiplomatic actions. While previous studies described regions conducting
paradiplomacy with other regions (national or transnational/transborder), nations, and
international/global actors, in the Kurdish case there is an additional inter-regional level
which only occurs between Kurdish regions, and which happens to be one of the major
variables in regard to regional armed conflicts.
When a Kurdish region gains political legitimacy, territoriality, and recognition
within the international scene, it is often seen as a nightmare to the neighboring countries.
The Kurdistan Region in Iraq, for instance, was not welcomed by Turkey, Iraq or Syria.
However, it was protected by the deterrence of multilateral interventions. Thus, this
shelter has eventually provided a basis for the region’s recognition by other significant
actors. Scholars have defined this context, in the given landlocked conditions, proposing
a two or three level-game, in which the [Kurdish] region chooses one of the surrounding
actors to collaborate with while remaining hostile to the others. As a result, the Kurdistan
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Region of Iraq chose Turkey as an ally in the 1990s, notably with Turkish PM Ozal’s
warmer policies towards Iraqi Kurds, and the policies of later Turkish governments.
While the Kurdistan Region has substantially benefited from this relationship, the nature
of it has created severe dependency in the Kurdistan Region on the Turkish economy and
its business. At the same time, the relationship between the KRG and the Turkish
government is highly contingent on dynamics within the Kurdish political movements in
Turkey
Given that both Iran and Turkey represent industrialized, strong political actors,
the Kurdistan Region in Iraq conducted only “soft paradiplomacy” with these countries,
keeping a low profile in terms of collaborating with the Kurdish regions of these
countries. Therefore, the Kurdistan Region of Iraq developed good relations with Ankara
and Tehran, but at considerable cost, because KRG lost ground in neighboring Kurdish
regions when it was perceived as “collaborating” with the oppressors of the Kurdish
populations in both countries. Moreover, political actors in the Kurdistan Region, such as
political parties, government representatives, local government representatives, and
NGOs periodically organize inter-regional visits between Kurdish regions, as well as
delegations, representatives, and community members. These visits occur between the
Kurdish regions of Syria, Turkey, Iran and Iraq. While politics is generally the primary
ostensible topic of these meetings, they occur in the form of soft paradiplomacy, intended
to foster cultural, political, economic, and social ties.
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Yet, another form of Kurdish paradiplomacy is conducted by the Kurdish
population in Turkey, which can claim on several grounds to be the most dynamic and
vibrant Kurdish community, and also the most politically organized one. Hosting most of
the Kurdish uprisings and state formations throughout history, the Kurdish region in
Turkey represents a distinct situation in which Kurds are not permitted to organize any
form of collective movements, and Kurdish rights are not recognized. The 40-year armed
conflict between PKK and Turkey may be characterized as the most recent Kurdish
uprising, with an estimated 40,000 deaths, thousands of villages burnt, and millions of
displaced and impoverished people. The continuous struggle of Kurdish movements, at
great cost, have allowed Kurds to gain local governance administrations in elections, and
then found ways to overcome the electoral threshold and gain partial representation in the
national assembly. Through a successful negotiation of Turkish national politics, they
finally surpassed the newly raised threshold and have manifested a measure of
proportional representation.
The progressive moves of Kurdish communities in Turkey reflect and represent
the amount of legitimacy that the Kurdish political movement has gained in the
international legal arena. Any official diplomatic missions in Turkey now include
Kurdish representatives, including at events, meetings, and continuously organized visits.
Kurdish political representatives have met with the US President, Vice-President, and
Secretary of State, as well as with the highest level delegates and representatives of
German, French, British and other significant powers. They also have the opportunity for
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representation in the EU, which above all provides institutional access and this otherwise
inaccessible forum. These bilateral and multilateral relations, however, occur within the
frame of Turkey’s politics, a NATO member, and Turkey’s foreign policy rules the
context. Nonetheless, the dialogue between Turkey’s Kurds and international actors
continues. After the recent crisis between Russia and Turkey, the pro-Kurdish HDP was
invited and welcomed in Moscow. As the third largest party group in Turkey’s Grand
Assembly, HDP opened its Moscow Office, which significantly coincided with the first
official diplomatic mission of the Rojava Region in Russia.
International political actors have applied a foreign policy that has been
compellingly called the “Good Kurds, Bad Kurds” policy. This is important because this
it means recognizing Iraqi Kurdistan as an actor and delists Iraqi Kurdish political parties
from terror lists, while Kurds in Turkey and Syria are very much excluded from such a
shift in status. Both are excluded because most bilateral and multilateral ties to Turkey
are the outcome of Turkey’s geostrategic position, as a strong NATO member, and one of
the 20 largest economies in the world. Kurds, however, remain stateless as Kurds,
although their regions are located in resource-rich areas that are attractive to international
markets. Over the past decade, however, the “Bad Kurds” policy of the West drastically
changed for a few reasons. First, Turkey’s internal political parameters have changed
remarkably, with the emergence and establishment of the authoritarian JDP regime,
which has an aggressive doctrine carved out of Turkish nationalist and Islamist ideals.
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The secular and center-right lost their institutional power, while Kurds have struggled to
open up political space for themselves despite the arduous context.
In this new setting, Kurds eventually emerged as a new-left group, with an
emphasis on pluralism, peace, gender equality, and democratization. Also, the Kurdish
Region in Syria, Rojava, is ruled by PYD, which has very much the same grassroots
movements as the Kurds in Turkey, and therefore shares a similar progressive ideology.
Even their style of political-military organization, known as leaning toward PKK,
although Rojava officially distances itself to fulfill the legal requirements of its
recognition as “non-terrorist” by major actors such as the EU, USA, Iran, Syria and
Russia. PYD’s heroic battle was the only military success against ISIS and other
extremists in the region; therefore, the global sympathy gained by these Kurdish groups
has created a significant awareness and popularity for these formerly “bad Kurds,”
substantively changing their international perception342 Ordinary citizens from all around
the world have demonstrated support on various occasions, and governments increasingly
make positive strides toward their own PKK-leaning diasporas.
Turkey’s attitude toward its Kurds, however, has not changed very much. The
peace process ended badly, the predominant Kurdish political actors have been
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The most substantial evidence of this status change is when Turkey criminalized the
Kurdish groups of Syria (PYD/YPG), while the U.S. has repeatedly expressed that it does
not share Turkey’s views. The U.S. definitely made it clear that it preferred this de facto
substate entity over its long-term NATO member ally in this instance. Russia also
provided significant support for the group, effectively shelter a force of deterrence
against Turkey’s offensive policy.
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criminalized, and it was declared that they were to be excluded from future peace efforts.
The armed conflict has re-escalated, together with massive security operations in the
Southeast. Any attempt of regional governance formation by Kurdish political actors was
severely annihilated. The KCK Trials, for example, targeted Kurdish elected mayors who
had attempted to create an organization called GABB (Union of Southeastern
Municipalities), as a legal formation. Accusations were produced in a paranoid manner,
as if these attempts signified the creation of a parallel state and therefore constituted a
direct threat. Yet, there was simultaneously an ongoing peace building effort in place,
whether mainly rhetorical or not, and eventually everybody expected some form of
debate or at least discussion of a salient political model, and whether it would be a form
of autonomy, decentralization, or federalization. Furthermore, if such a model was to be
put into place, it might ensure that all parties that were constituents of the state formation
were legitimate, official, and elected bodies representing the people’s voice. The peace
process was dead as soon as it was described as a “democratic opening”. It was then
changed to “resolution process.”
In summary, three context specific motives emerge in the Kurdish case of
paradiplomacy that represent the intent of the use of paradiplomacy. These are: (1) as a
means for gaining and building legitimacy for international recognition and
intraregional/transregional state capacity building which represents the most dominant
use of it. (2) As a means of escaping landlockedness via the objective of bypassing
contested region-center relations to directly reach international markets, institutions, and
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authorities directly. And finally (3), as a means of extra-state movement to ensure Kurds’
and Kurdish regions’ inclusion in global governance, particularly by constructing
bilateral and multilateral ties, and by so doing, pushing their national contenders towards
negotiations for decentralization and autonomy.
In the Kurdish case, paradiplomacy was clearly expressed and defined to be the
most crucial means for survival and power. Both in my interviews with the highest level
Kurdish political leaders, elected representatives (mayors and MPs), and diplomatic
representatives, and also very visibly in the longitudinal discourse of all the engaged
actors of Kurdish politics across the various Kurdish regions, paradiplomacy was seen as
the primary way to build defensive power and state capacity, and also to be recognized
officially as a diplomatic community among the nations.343 While it seems largely
impossible to find a Kurdish political actor backing any form of isolation, some
interviewees with visibly realist/neorealist tendencies made it clear that they view
Kurdish regions’ self-sufficiency and internal development as far more important than the
foreign relations built with other regions and states. Mostly referring to previous
experiences during which international actors betrayed Kurds, these views support
national organization and unity, attributing to them greater strategic value than the
relations Kurdish groups, communities, parties, and regions have with other international

None of the interviewed participants were aware of the term “paradiplomacy” until I
defined it; however, it was also clear from the responses that Kurdish foreign policy
actions with major actors such as USA, Canada, EU, Russia and others were referred to
as being crucially important.
343
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actors. Still, no one advocated isolation, and even those promoting the development of
internal competencies agreed on the necessity of some form of internationalization of the
regions.
Fragmented Actor Structure and Kurdish Paradiplomacy/Protodiplomacy
It is important to consider that Kurdish paradiplomacy/protodiplomacy actions do
not represent acts of a monolithic monopole embodying a formal or de facto government
or entity, but rather reflect various fragmentations between actors at different levels. It is
impossible to fully categorize these fragmentations, but the following three typologies
provide some initial considerations. These include, (a) Interregional typology: Four
divisions mark four regions with distinct political contexts, and constitute the primary
basis of legitimacy in the face of international actors and institutions of global
governance. Therefore, the predominant, first rule of the game is to consider these four
regionalities in their own contexts, and as a part of a greater regional political scene. (b)
Interparty typology: While Kurdish regions are officially and internationally divided into
four pieces, another important fact is that the territorial sovereignty is held by political
factions that have political parties, armed groups, and their own grassroots communities.
Three major political groups are PKK/KCK, PUK, and KDP all of which have various
territorial, political, and military capacities that often traverse the 4 regions and their
borders. Although PKK is rooted in Turkey, while PUK and KDP are rooted in Iraq, for
example, they each have different capacities in Iran, Syria, Turkey, and Iraq that should
be taken into account. (c) Ideological typology: There are also ideological categories that
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determine the nature of Kurdish paradiplomacy. Kurdish nationalism is present in
grassroots communities in all Kurdish regions, however, PKK/PYD and other left-wing
groups critique nationalism, defining it as “primitive”, and increasingly promote
pluralism and coalition building with the participation of Arab, Armenian, Assyrian,
Yazidi, Turcoman, and other minority communities. Still, it is possible to encounter
Kurdish nationalisms latent or visible in all political groups, but notably amongst the
members of KDP and PUK. There is also a liberal/neoliberal cluster in Kurdish politics,
which is again present across all political communities, but this remains somewhat
marginal all around. PUK fits better in this category though it has both nationalist and
also left-wing tendencies and backgrounds. Both KDP and PUK have strong neoliberal
connections, notably enforced in the aftermath of the Iraq invasion, while PKK/PYD are
strictly opposed to any form of neoliberalism. However, this must not be confused with
Western interventionism or anti-Americanism. While refusing neoliberalism, capitalism,
and imperialism as a natural outcome of ideological preferences, PKK/PYD-leaning
communities promote values of the new-left, but also express clearly their will to
collaborate with Americans and other Western allies. Besides a liberal Kurdish tradition
in daily politics, there is also a libertarian tendency at the grassroots level, which
sometimes advocates collaboration with Western allies while remaining ideologically
closer to New Left and anarchist values.
There is an interplay between the power balance in Kurdish politics, and the
functions and roles of major political factions, and these often traverse national borders.
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KDP acts as the primary motor of Kurdish nationalism, with the longest standing Kurdish
political movement, while PUK has emerged as a contender in Iraqi Kurdistan, with the
participation of opponents of KDP, Barzani-related movements, and former KDP cadres.
Iran has played a significant role in the creation of these parties, and also in their course
of political actions, especially in the outcome of their contestations with Iraq. The PKK
emerged in Turkey, but has developed strong grassroots support in Syria since the 1980s,
especially its northern Kurdish regions, but also in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley. PKK’s
existence and actions in Iraqi Kurdistan territories has led to repeated cross-border
military interventions and operations in the Kurdistan Region managed by Turkey and
Iran. There is also significant internal competition, which rises at times into outright
rivalry and even war, as has happened many times between PUK and KDP, and between
PKK and KDP. KDP accuses PKK/KCK of failing to employ democratic practices in the
Kurdish region of Syria, and of relying too much on identity politics, instead of fostering
international development. This is mostly based in their ideological criticism of its
Marxist nature.
One of the most discussed and criticized factors is that PKK/KCK, PYD, and
HDP representatives have all clearly expressed that they are against the “state”, because
they view the state as the source of all problems Preferring “stateless democracy”, they
are accused of formulating empty policy, and this is increasingly criticized at the Kurdish
grassroots level. Kurdish nationalists, however, advance independence arguments and
nation-building in their strategic perspectives. These disputes and contestations became
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amplified during the Rojava conflict, and the overall tension in internal Kurdish politics
remains high, particularly under conditions of war. The ISIS invasion of the Shingal
Region and Mount Sinjar, and the subsequent genocide of the Yazidi community has
been one of the major incidents that revealed these interparty tensions, along with their
long histories of contested military, diplomatic, and governance actions.
PKK/KCK, PYD, and HDP-leaning communities have accused KRG of being
extremely neoliberal, underproductive, and politically “unaware”. The ISIS attacks have
indicated a weakness in Kurdish defense lines, allowing the destruction of Yazidi
communities and created public outrage. PKK sent armed groups to defend Mt. Sinjar,
which was later taken back from ISIS. KRG was criticized for siphoning away eternal aid
dollars, investing in unnecessary fields, building luxurious houses, while producing a
highly dependent economy. Corruption and luxury in the Kurdistan Region are given as
examples from the news to support this claim, and these are also imputed as possible
causes for its slow Shingal response. However, KRG has since then reacted and received
international support in its battle against ISIS, and has also provided an immense strategic
pipeline for all besieged Kurdish communities including Rojava.
The conservative cluster in Kurdish politics is also significant, and is similarly
fragmented into numerous subgroups and categories. Conservatives are present in all
political groups and regions, however, they have distinct characteristics making them
somewhat unique compared to other nations in the Middle East. However, before
discussing them a little further, some broader context on pluralism and secularism is
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needed. First, there is a strong Kurdish national movement, which in the majority of
Kurdish regions represents the most dominant political characteristic. Most of the
Kurdish population is secular, which is not only a reaction to the Sunni and Shi’a
religious nationalisms that arise amongst their neighbors, but a long-term practice.
History bears its influence on the construction of contemporary Kurdish identities, and
reflects more of an inclusive Mesopotamian identity, rather than privileging any sect,
ethnicity, or micro-ethnicity, which in Kurdistan represents hundreds of different deities,
origins, and social clusters. This represents the deep cultural sources of pluralism, and yet
also probably contributes to the fragmented scene in Kurdish regions.
The period of Saladin can be noted as bearing some striking similarities with what
is being experienced today; a period of protracted conflict, in which no single group or
community remains untouched, where all experience serious contestation coupled with
the presence of increasingly engaged external actors. Another factor that has played a role
in Kurdish secularism are the post-Cold War conditions during which leftist Kurdish
uprisings have found considerable ground in Kurdish society. Turkey and its secular
politics have, until recently, played a significant role in determining the wider regional
tone of secularism, with its relatively consistent laïcité version embedded into the
military and bureaucracy. Thus, the transformation of Turkish and Kurdish lefts occurred
as a co-dependent process, interrelated with other Mediterranean and European new left
movements.
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The existence of liberals, social democrats, and moderate conservatives can also
be seen as the outcome of this notion of secularism in Kurdish regions. However, the
large Kurdish parties all have left-wing histories in their emergence, although in Iraqi
Kurdistan they have passed through a drastic transformation and neoliberalized. In
regions where PKK/KCK, HDP, or PYD-leaning populations are dominant, a cluster of
socialist Muslims also exist, often as an extension of Turkish or Kurdish politics. The
representation of these groups in HDP’s party group, as the outcome of its pluralist
policies, has significantly impacted Turkish politics, since this handful of MPs are seen to
be the voice of millions of constituents. Further, these voices challenge the ruling JDP,
which views conservatives as its primary source of support. All this being said, in all
Kurdish regions there are clusters of conservatives who are collaborative with their
national hosts. These Kurds follow close relations with Ankara and Tehran, maintain
conservative political leanings, usually identifying with either Shi’a or Sunni sects. They
generally do not engage in Kurdish politics, while remaining loyal to Ankara, and
generally represent the accommodationist and assimilating side of Kurdish society. They
do not refuse their Kurdish identity outright, but instead emphasize their membership
within the Ummad and Islam generally, as a means to build bridges with the ruling
society, and then make themselves available as conduits of its power in Kurdish areas.
Many are often accused of being collaborators, and certainly the central states have long
practiced policies of cooptation that target such individuals.
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Despite the above-mentioned fragmentations and internal divisions, it is important
to acknowledge that there is nonetheless great solidarity for the concept of an emergent
Kurdistan at the grassroots level, with all of these varied constituents aiming for and
desiring the same end-state344. In that sense, while rivalries exist over political, economic,
and sociocultural power, these diminish in significance when it comes to greater
Kurdistan and its urgent needs, and even the most fragmented parties are pushed toward
each other by the grassroots communities they must remain responsive to. This was seen
in the defense of the Kobani and Rojava Regions, and in the creation of Kurdistan Region
in Iraq. A totality of KDP-leaning parties have constituted a council called the Kurdistan
National Council, while later this mechanism created the Kurdish Supreme Committee,
representing the merging of the dominant political groups PYD and KNC. In 2013, KDP,
PUK, PKK/KCK, and other major political groups made a common declaration of
solidarity in Erbil City, in the Kurdistan Region. Similarly, the agreement between PKK,
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A great set of evidence support this claim in all parts of the Kurdish territoriality. For
instance, throughout the Kobani War, the uprising in Kurdish regions of Turkey and Iraq,
and the interregional support in political, economic and military terms between Kurdish
territories are the greatest evidences of this grassroots level of support. Moreover, the
internal criticisms and oppositions among the Kurdish movements are common, notably
when it comes to having political and economic relations with the national contenders of
the Kurds. While Kurds of Syria and Turkey have a quite common criticism towards their
armed and political movements for giving less priority to the Kurdish cause, KRI’s own
groups of opposition criticize their armed-political clusters for following good relations
with national governments of Iran, Turkey and Iraq as well. In a sense, grassroots support
keeps Kurdish political parties and movements in line while they are encouraged to
demonstrate solidarity with the Kurds of other regions, compared to national
governments of other regions, even if there are broader benefits in these relations notably
military and economic gains.

513
PUK, and KDP in the mid-1990s can also be used as an historical example of efforts to
create internal peace and solidarity; now an increasingly predominant political condition
in Kurdish regions.
Paradiplomacy and International Development: Water, Energy, and Human/State
Capacity Building
When redefining Kurdish paradiplomacy, development is probably one of the
most salient issues to address, since all of the various forms, motives, and outcomes of
paradiplomacy I describe aim at the development of state-like capacity by regional
constituents. Kurdish regions have followed distinct paths toward development. Most of
the time their development initiatives were heavily dependent on their national
contenders, therefore representing something less than a zero-sum game. Still, the means
and ways Kurdish regions strive for development needs to be described, since they also
play a significant role in the making of an overall impact on Kurdish regions’
paradiplomatic actions.
The Kurdistan Region of Iraq has followed neoliberal policies of economic
development, mostly in the aftermath of the Iraq intervention, and largely dependent on
outside actors and fluctuating oil prices. Its economic infrastructure is provided in a topdown manner of international institutions and organizations, and especially with the
endorsement345 of important actors of global governance.346 In Turkey, Kurdish political

See the solid example of Germany’s top knowledge-producing region, BadenWürttemberg, conducting “knowledge paradiplomacy” in Kurdistan Region of Iraq:
345
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groups have passed through extreme conditions and a conflict that remains very much
unresolved, but the Kurdish political movement has largely focused on Europeanization
and adopting a form of New Left politics with secular and plural characteristics. In this
context, the reforms applied by Turkey for a few short years in context of the EU
membership harmonization process, allowed the application of local governance funds by
local municipalities to issues of local resources and development, while slightly
increasing the authority of local governance. EU development funds were provided
directly to Kurdish municipalities in the early 2000s, which for the first time were ruled
by Kurdish political movements, and therefore directly investing significantly in local
development, which found encouraged and support at the grassroots bases of Kurdish
movements. Water and infrastructure especially hold significance in this realm, since the
limitations of budget allocation from Ankara to the Kurdish cities of Turkey’s southeast
greatly limited the developmental capacities of pro-Kurdish municipalities. However, the
completion of water purification and distribution projects in urban areas allowed by this
unusual paradiplomatic opening provided a source of income for these municipalities,
which eventually created a domino effect of additional impacts.

http://www.ingbw.de/fileadmin/pdf/Flyer/Tagungsmappe-englisch_klein.pdf, covering
the Civil Engineering Congress held in Erbil, Kurdistan with the participation of Baden
Ministers and various global industry representatives.
346
This specific actor structure represents a mechanism much like that of a conventional
nation-state, is multilateral and multilayered, moving from the most local level to the
regional, national and transnational/international.
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Infrastructure projects, cultural preservation, agricultural and industrial
development have all been components of this process; however, two major factors must
be specifically discussed in the context of Kurdish regional development and
paradiplomacy actions: Water and Energy. Water is the single most important issue of the
Near East,347 increasingly becoming a problem of global importance. Water also plays a
crucial role in violent conflicts both intrastate and interstate (Harris, 2002; Wolf, 1999;
Gleick, 2000; Scholz and Stiftel, 2010; Wolf, Kramer and Carius, 2005; Yoffe, Fiske and
Giordano, 2004; Kibaroglu and Unver, 2000; Kibaroglu, 2007; Dinar, 2007). Water is
important, and Turkey is the hegemonic water-power in the region, as it possesses most
of the riparian Euphrates, Tigris, and Orontes river basins, along with numerous other
lesser river basins. If there is a single most important component of the Kurdish regional
economy, one that affords a comparative advantage for Kurdish regions, it would be
certainly be water more than the usual hydrocarbon and other endowed mineral
resources. Water, fertile soil, and the ecological nature of the region holds the most
significant place for all Mesopotamian cultures, not just for Kurds.
Many scholars emphasize that the water [or riparian river basin] conflict has
played a crucial role in the making of Turkish-Arab, Turkish-Kurdish, and Kurdish-Arab
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Here, my argument has two dimensions. First, the infrastructure investments at the
level of local development created a domino effect for the Kurdish political movement,
which was “being tested” in the early 2000s, and the source of income from household
water use simply enabled other projects. Second, however, the key large infrastructure
projects, such as the enormous SAP which for many decades included the with building
of dozens of dams, also had the inverse effect, since it represents the Turkish
Government’s hegemony over water, a vital resource for the entire region.

516
conflicts (Kibaroglu and Unver, 2000; Dinar, 2007; Kibaroglu, Bogardi and Castelein,
2004; Carkoglu and Eder, 2001; Gleick, 1994), overdetermining the contexts of war and
diplomacy between Turkey, Iraq, Syria and their common trouble, the Kurds, who have
the good fortune of finding themselves at the headwaters of perhaps the most contested
water resources in the world, certainly in the Near East. Syria’s backing of PKK-leaning
groups is commonly seen as the outcome of Turkey’s destructive water policy, starting in
the 1970s when Turkey first started to focus on enforcing its hegemonic position on
water. For Turkey, which had worked so hard to become industrialized throughout the
century, energy and development were core issue. Planned in 1936, directly by Turkish
leader Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, and later initiated physically in the1960s, Turkey’s
Southeastern Anatolia Project [GAP] stands as one of the largest infrastructure projects of
its kind in the history of the world (Kaygusuz, 1999; Yuksel, 2006; Unver, 1997;
Kendirli, Cakmak and Ucar, 2005; Harris, 2002). The project aimed to build dozens of
dams on the Tigris and Euphrates, to provide electricity production and control
agriculture. However, the project has become more than that, and used also as a strategic
weapon against Iraq and Syria. When the flow of water was reduced and regulated, the
drastic decrease in both the flow and quality of water left millions impoverished.
Syria brought the issue to the UN, while maintaining its support for the Kurdish
insurgency movement. The interstate dispute escalated in the 1990s when both Turkish
President Demirel, and PM Ciller threatened Syria with invasion. Demirel said, “How
can they claim rights over the snows of Erciyes Mountain?” as a way of denying outright
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any sharing of the rights over river basin management. Turkey’s water policy was
neoliberalized in the 1980s (Kibaroglu, Baskan and Alp, 2009; Warner, 2008; Harris,
2008), and the project was pushed even further in order to foster the construction industry
in the country, in the form of a direct state-led development. It was also billed as a
solution for the conflict and poverty in the Kurdish populated Southeast. However, the
project could not be completed for decades, and created environmental and cultural
destruction, massive displacement in Kurdish regions, and also a new state-controlled
bureaucratic and military regime that the large agricultural and farming Kurdish
population now had to contend with. Therefore, depropertization and ultimately
urbanization were built into the essence of the project, along with underlying security
purposes. Some of the dozens of projects were overtly revealed as having nothing to do
with economic development at all, when it was shown that certain dams were not
intended for agricultural or energy production, but as mechanisms to cut-off logistics and
the paths used by PKK militants.348
From a comparative perspective, the large key infrastructure project in the
Kurdish regions, notably the GAP, has not only created destructive outcomes of the
Kurdish region in Turkey, but also the regions in Iraq and Syria. The best way to assess
the outcome and impact of the GAP is to compare it with Hydro-Quebec, a similarly
scaled large water project in Quebec province of Canada, which started in the 1950s and
has since then only expanded, making Quebec one of the most powerful energy players in
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See: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/pkkya-karsi-irak-sinirina-su-engeli-12044286.
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the world, particularly in the area of clean energy production capacity. This sector was
central in the broader boosting of Quebec’s modernization and industrialization in
general. In Canada, Hydro-Quebec filled an economic gap and created a massive source
of provincial level development, while giving birth to a political-economic constituency
in Quebec. The Quebec Government gained considerable power in its relations with other
Canadian provinces, as well as neighboring North American states, given its capacity to
produce the lowest cost energy production in North America. This is why Hydro-Quebec
is the seed of Quebec’s paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy. The Southern Anatolia
Project, on the other hand, represents much the opposite of what Hydro-Quebec became.
It is not so much a failure in terms of development, but a strategic underdevelopment, and
a national hijacking of the regional development process itself as a multifaceted part of its
hegemonic process. Water management in the Kurdish regions reflects the worst of the
destructive potential of water-power in the Mesopotamian region, reduced to little more
than the purpose of strengthening Turkey’s hegemony in the greater region, politically,
economically and most importantly militarily. The project served to carve out a new
Kurdish regional dynamic internal to Turkey, with a militarized division of society into
“good Kurds” (tribes and quasi-feudal communities loyal to the state) and “bad Kurds”
(Kurdish communities in dissent against state policies). Dozens of livelihoods were
swallowed by the massive project, severe displacement of communities caused decades
long immigration, ultimately acting as a powerful tool of social engineering.
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The second major factor ruling the context of Kurdish paradiplomacy – and
protodiplomacy – is the energy sources, notably the rich oil and mineral fields located in
Kurdish regions. In this specific context, one might refer to the intensified actions around
energy as: energy or hydrocarbon paradiplomacy. Most obviously, in the Kurdistan
Region in Iraq, a substate entity focused its efforts on reaching international institutions
and markets to secure its emerging economy, a context in which resource management
and trade is of key strategic importance. Following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and the
creation of federal Iraq in 2005, the Kurdistan Region rigorously carved a path to being
able to export oil sources, notably initiating substantial new legislation to open the
hydrocarbon markets.349 Turkey, as a water-rich but oil-poor industrialized power also
had a volatile century of nationalist indoctrination, starting with the trauma of the
Ottoman Collapse. It viewed oil-rich Mosul and Kirkuk as part of its national heritage,
and therefore the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Turkey have agreed on oil trade in the last
decade. The Kirkuk-Iskenderun pipeline has started to function, and provides the
Kurdistan Region a formidable outcome, a critical economic input to support its
economic development. Numerous international energy giants have opened offices in the
Kurdistan Region, and many international agreements were signed between KRG and
these players, despite the severe opposition of the Baghdad Government. While the
official deal between Erbil and Baghdad was to give only 17% of national oil revenue to

349

The Kurdistan Oil and Gas Law was ratified in 2007, setting the legal-competitive
ground for the hydrocarbon markets in Kurdistan Region. See:
http://cabinet.gov.krd/a/d.aspx?s=04030000&l=12&a=20267&r=107&s=010000.
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the Kurdistan Region, this was never applied, and instead the Kurdish Region made deal
to establish its own oil trade.
The nature of the hydrocarbon industry and paradiplomacy is little different than
any other oil-rich player’s diplomacy actions, as its grounded in a neoliberal marketbased essence. In the Kurdish context, and neocons also directly, and in particular
capitalized on this situation, especially in conjunction with security policy. The Kurdistan
Region has focused on its management of resource trade, notably under the lead of Ashti
Hawrami, Kurdistan Region’s competent minister of resources. In order to foster deals
with international giants, the Kurdistan Region has agreed to have a smaller share of the
revenue; thus providing sufficient incentive to attract major international oil market
players.. A milestone was reached in 2014 when an oil tanker filled with Kurdish oil was
in the seas on its way to the US but was exposed in the media. Turkish chauvinism tried
to project the oil trade as if Kurds had won the entire battle and were recognized. When
the issue became a national priority, the US canceled the shipment; however, the tanker
later went to Israel, which thus became the very first client of Kurdish oil. Finally, oiltrade became a key economic action of the terror networks, particularly ISIS, which
secures most of its income by trading oil. This was recently documented and published in
world media, especially when Russian airplanes destroyed some hundreds of ISIS oil
trucks in just a day (Zuesse350, 2015; Eleftheriou-Smith351, 2015). Therefore, it is
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interesting to rethink conventional understandings of trade, since in this context trade
ultimately becomes a hard policy action providing military might, rather than the softpolicy action it is usually considered to be.
Conclusion: The Future of Kurdish Paradiplomacy
Kurdish paradiplomacy, taken in its totality, constitutes a kind of center of
gravity, a constellation of forces and a nexus of power that needs to be investigated and
studied, and which constitutes an increasingly significant element in international and
regional politics and diplomacy. This is a case with an unusually long political history.
The contemporary environment in which Kurdish regional actors continuously attempt to
gain degrees of autonomy and even independence, and the harsh outcomes of the power
vacuum caused by the regional security gap, make this a very complex case. I argue that
Kurdish exclusions are central to regional politics, but are also part of broader
Mesopotamian exclusions that affect many dispossessed peoples and communities in the
region, and that this also partially accounts for growing solidarity among these
constituencies, and the forging of creative and imaginative new politics. The growth of
Kurdish autonomy and regional power, in most corners of their contiguous territories, and
the growing communication and coordination between these regions and movements,
collectively constitute a center of gravity. This center is grounded in the Kurdish regions,
their internal constituents, and also in their collective attitudes toward one another, and
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notably in the making of a single sovereign force that has become an undeniable and
necessary component in the regional field of forces.
For a comparative politics scholar, one of the most interesting contemporary cases
of conflict is that in Iraq and Syria. Both Baathist post-colonial regimes have collapsed,
although in Syria there is still a significant presence of the Syrian State, now representing
just about one-third of the territoriality of the country. While Iraq reflected Sunni Arab
nationalism under the long rule of Saddam Hussein, Syria reflects more Alawite/Nusayri
leadership who align themselves with the Shi’a world. However, both Baathist regimes
follow broad Arab nationalist military doctrines and statecraft, a form of policy that can
be seen as similar to Kemalism in Turkey,352 and substantially inspired by Nasser-era
Egypt and the greater post-colonial regional context. The emergence of the Kurdish
regions, first in Iraq and then in Syria, represent and/or coincide with the decline, or
collapse the Baathism. Once released from the Baathist’s iron hands, both regions have
quickly organized their regional governance institutions. However, the different way
these Baathist regimes declined or collapsed, and the differences between the subsequent
interventions they experienced also represent very different outcomes. While the
Kurdistan Region in Iraq was simply a preliminary step, neoliberal and internationally
endorsed, it opened the gates of the world to engage directly with Kurdish regions.

352

Kemalism and Baathism can be seen as similar, since they share a common root,
nationalism of Turkish (Ittihad Terakki [Progres and Reunion]) and other Arab actors
representing nationalist-conservative values with a tone of modernization in the postcolonial era.
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Despite considerable economic dependency and ongoing security crises, the region is still
strongly interconnected with the rest of the world. However, the creation of the Kurdish
region in Rojava, representing the second step, is entirely different. It is not characterized
by a top-down and largely imposed neoliberal intervention, but rather represents the
context of intensified regional war and national disintegration. This started as a proxy
conflict with hard engagement from numerous actors, but quickly turned into the scene of
globalized and multivalent civil war, which has entailed for Syrian Kurds an ostensible
release from the long-oppressive state apparatus.
The emergence of Kurdish regions in both Iraq and Syria have created conditions
of territorial and cultural autonomy, and the advent of what can be called “Southern
Kurdistan,” since the Western (Syrian) and Southern (Iraqi) Kurdish regions have the
very real possibility of merging. Northern Kurdistan (in Turkey), and Eastern Kurdistan
(in Iran) still hold some 30 million Kurds, under the much different contexts of the
authoritarian rule of the powerful and industrialized Ankara and Tehran regimes. Despite
their significant external geopolitical impacts, internally both countries have fragile
grassroots and civil society constituencies, with multi-ethnic and inter-religious
characteristics and conflicts. Two large axes of power are emerging, in relation to the two
new Kurdish proto-states. Iran, Russia, and Syria seem to be building ties with the
Kurdish regions in Syria, as are the major Kurdish movements in Turkey. Whereas
Turkey follows a policy of remaining close allies with the Kurdistan Region of Iraq,
together with countries such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the US, and NATO. Although Kurds
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have built a strong hand in this challenging and shifting political game, often promising
to create the “Switzerland” of the Near East as their regionally unique and internationally
popular political model, both Turkey and Iran refuse to yield any opportunity for
substantive autonomy, let alone independence. Recent debates in official Turkish
discourse ominously revolve primarily around the Tamil model (Aktan, 2016353), a case
in which the Sri Lankan state and military simply cracked down unilaterally on its Tamil
population, approaching total annihilation. Such is increasingly the situation in Turkey’s
southeast.354
Confederalism once again emerges as a potential remedy for the ultimate pain
experienced in the region, since it provides a basis of pluralism and solidarity for
contested communities, promising the recreation of a universally humane rule of law.
However, despite the worldwide recognition of the heroic defensive actions mounted by
the Kurds in Syria (and Iraq), the failure of the UN peace talks for Syria in Geneva (I-IIIII) over the last five years represents a nightmare for global governance. Kurds have
been excluded from the peace table at the pressuring of Turkey, while including some of
the most notorious terror organizations’ representatives instead. Russia has worked
toward the inclusion of Kurds, and the Obama Administration sent a presidential envoy to
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the Kurdish Region in Rojava, in what was surely an encouraging sign of engagement.
However, the exclusion of Kurds from the negotiations represents a malfunctioning of the
institutions of global governance, further alienating already vulnerable Kurds, who
nevertheless constitute the only effective fighting force against extremist violence, and
therefore pushing them toward the axis of the Syrian Regime and Iran. While Syrian –
and Turkish – Kurds may seem to be closely collaborating with Russia, Iran, and Syria, it
is important to remember that this perspective is contingent on the changing and difficult
context. In such a hostile region, everybody is the potential enemy and wary of each
other, and everybody conducts diplomacy within severely constrained parameters,
whether openly or discretely.
The ideal resolution proposed by the highest-level Kurdish representatives in
European, Russian, and North American diplomatic representations, as well as leaders,
presidents, ministers, and other prominent rulers of the Kurdish regions, is to foster a USRussia collaboration in the Kurdish regions. Although some may perceive this notion as
naïve, since the bad habits of the Cold War linger in both Washington and Moscow, there
is an increasing need for dialogue between the US and Russia, particularly in this context.
Kurdish regions, indeed, are excellent prospective laboratories for further progressive
collaboration, and possibly the only chance for such a US-Russian alliance. However, it
is still important to observe other important variables in the equation of the game, such
as: electoral outcomes in these countries; their new foreign policy structures; the impact
of other significant players such as the UK, which played a pioneering role in the making
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of the negative perception of Russia; and Israel, which strongly supports the Kurdistan
Region in Iraq but remains quite distant to Kurds in Syria and Turkey.
What is currently referred to as “democratic autonomy” by Kurds, indicates a
solution based on confederalism, as distinct from the federalism applied in Iraq, and this
is often seen as the most suitable outcome for the Kurdish case (Galtung, 2012).
Greenstein asks: “who learns what from whom, under what circumstances, and with what
effects?” (1965, p.13). The most important takeaway from this study is the process of
collective learning, in which individuals and key group members find and create
opportunities to practice sovereignty and policy learning. Here is the main question to
ask: Tamil or Switzerland, which one will best reflect the path for Kurdistan in a world
where so many are talking about World War III? Unfortunately, despite numerous
statements and speeches, steadily growing public support, and openings created by
international developments and incidents, the possibility of peaceful power sharing
between Kurds and their nation-state contenders seems less and less likely. Almost all of
the regional nation-state actors reject direct dialogue and negotiation with the Kurds in
their territories, preferring instead the path of violence, and also intermittently the
triangulation of Kurdish actors in neighboring countries, when considered expedient.
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CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSIONS: COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF
PARADIPLOMACY AND PROTODIPLOMACY

This final chapter summarizes the findings of the comparative analysis of the
three case studies of this thesis in the form of Most-Similar-Systems (MSS) and MostDifferent-Systems (MDS) design, and comparative checking with an extended number of
other relevant cases for triangulation purposes as well. Through the comparison and
contrasting of my three case studies: Quebec, Catalonia and Kurdistan, as well as some
additional international cases used to triangulate the empirical data, this chapter unfolds
the major argument set of this thesis. It explains the relationship between paradiplomacy
and protodiplomacy, and between international development and conflict transformation
and management. Engaging especially in inductive theory-generation in the discussion of
the main arguments arising from the comparative case analysis, the following questions
are addressed: (1) What are the motives, actions, responses, trends and limitations [of
SEs355 and their respective national government contenders] to the emergence and

I use the term “substate entity” here as an umbrella term, because diverse propositions
have been made by scholars of paradiplomacy depending on case differences and
contexts, including: regions, provinces, islands, riparian units, cantons, NCGs and
subnational units. While corresponding to all of these units as a general term, the unifying
term I propose here expands the category by including de facto or regional formations
together with informal jurisdictions, such as the Kurdish regions in Syria, Turkey or Iran
(as well as or many other regions in Asia, Africa and the Middle East). These type of
355
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intensification of paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy in conflictive/secessionist regions?
(2) How can one describe the interplay between paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy and
the outcomes of the use of both in today’s democratization, conflict resolution, and
peacebuilding efforts? (3) How can one describe the opportunity structure for the use of
paradiplomacy/protodiplomacy in international development and the betterment of the
global governance/security environment?
Globalization and the Foreign Policy Actions of Substate Entities
Substate entities have various motives for going international, some of which can
be sketched here. (1) Federal Regions may attempt or aim to fill the national foreign
policy gap on issues necessitating international collaboration and cooperation (as seen in
parts of USA, Canada, and Australia). (2) Regions of Europe under various forms of
national governance (unitary, quasi-federal, federal, confederal) are redefined in the
context of supranational (EU) governance frameworks, agreements and treaties that have
endorsed the development of their self-competence in foreign policy making (as
sanctioned by the Treaty of European Union, and its predecessor and subsequent treaties
and agreements). (3) Regions may also go international when they have multiethnic,
multilingual or interfaith settings and they attempt to bypass their national hosts, to gain
recognition and autonomy, to seek support for decentralization and regional structures of

regions in conflictive contexts do not mean the absence of paradiplomacy or
protodiplomacy; hence, their paradiplomatic presence may become so significant that it
involves hard-policy actions, as well as acting as a formal constituent, diplomatically
bypassing the national center.
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governance, to overcome their oppression and landlockedness, and/or to secede, declare
independence and be recognized internationally (as seen in Kurdish regions, Catalonia,
Basque Country, conflictive Russian [and Caucasus] regions, China’s conflictive regions,
the Tamils, Northern Ireland, Quebec, and Baluchistan).
As an increasingly encountered and observed form, (4) “Knowledge Regions” go
international because they are self-sufficient, highly productive strong players in the
global political economy, with a capacity to develop their own strategic foreign policy
mechanisms (as seen in: the German Länders of Baden-Württemberg, Bavaria, Hamburg
and Bremen, Quebec, British-Columbia Catalonia, Lombardy, Rhône-Alpes, California,
New York City, Sao Paolo, Hong-Kong, Guangdong) to take their place in global
political economy and governance as “global substate entities”. Finally (5) there are
regions with cross-border, neighboring, or riparian interactions with other units, sharing
river basins, forests, coasts, fisheries, lakes, and increasingly the air, where
paradiplomacy is redefined as “green”, and represents a distinct form of actions and
actors focusing on environmental and resource politics, and the preservation and
protection of these shared sources.
Expanding Comparative Literature of Paradiplomacy Research
The literature and theory of paradiplomacy focused at first on conceptualizing
paradiplomacy as a (1) liberal/neoliberal trend in which paradiplomacy was seen as a
complement to, or an extension of traditional state diplomacy in which SEs undertake
various foreign policy actions. These actions do not necessarily intersect with interstate
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diplomacy, but rather focus on areas of collaboration and cooperation that remain outside
or on the periphery of it, therefore constituting a complementary layer (McHugh, 2015;
Kuznetsov, 2014; Lecours, 2008; Michelmann, 2004; Sharafutdinova, 2003; Aldecoa and
Keating, 1999). (2) Paradiplomacy was conceptualized more recently as a
neofunctionalist concept in which devolution of governance units, notably from the
national-center toward substate and supranational entities, constituted the core
characteristic of the formation of the multilateral layers of the European Union and
integration (Obydenkova, 2006; Garcia et al, 2014; Jordan, 2001; De Groof, 2009; Guay,
2014; Gehring, 1996). This type of conceptualization was declared “obsolete” by the
founding father of the theory: E. Haas (2004) notably following the French and Dutch
rejections of the European constitution, and also other states that refused to give up their
national authority and sovereignty on a variety of issues as pointed by
intergovernmentalists who opposed neofunctionalism (Moravcsik, 2005; Schmitter, 2005;
Cooper, 2011; Jensen, 2003).
Another major scholarly camp with significance in paradiplomacy theory is
constructivism, where theorists view subnational entities as interacting with the state and
its actions under conditions of interdependence, and where identity and nationality
construction play a dynamic role in center-region contestations (Reisinger, 2013;
Finnemore and Sikkink, 2001; Green, 2002). It is important to note that, in some more
recent theoretical contributions, the “old regionalism” which represented the aftermath of
the World War II, has been replaced by what is now called the “new regionalism”,
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notably starting in late 1960s (Väyrynen, 2003; MacLeod, 2001; Hettne, 1999; Keating,
1998; Ethier, 1998). However, “new regionalism” has also been challenged since the
1990s, especially with the emergence of multilateralism in international relations, which
promoted multilayered organization of units while not necessarily opening more space
for SEs (Lovering, 1999; Spector, 2010; O’brien, 2000; Happaerts et al, 2011). This was
also therefore contested This can indeed be seen as a complement to neoliberal
institutionalism, representing a systemic reset for the advancing space of SEs in world
politics. Eventually, even after European regionalism was ratified in the early 1990s, it
seems to be collapsing in the beginning of 21st century as part of a global response.
Therefore, multilateralism gained strength, along with the insistence of neoliberal
institutionalism on the idea of the intergovernmental nature of global multilayered
governance. All of this meant limited engagement with SEs.
Global Substate Entities (SEs), Paradiplomacy and Global Governance
In the context of global governance, an ideal “global substate entity” can be
nominally defined as a unit consisting of a “global city356”, a multiplicity of urban centers
(cities and towns), and also a well-connected rural hinterland, all together making of the
substate entity a globally competent unit with state-like power, enabling it to engage in
international agreements with sound jurisdictional value. Such a unit, if it can be said to
exist, can be seen as a political economic, social and environmental actor of
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For the detailed theory and analysis of the Global City, See Scott (2002), Sassen
(2000;2001), Brenner (1998), Isin (2013), Ball, Macrae and Maguire (2013) and Hall
(2002)
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contemporary world politics. When a country has multiple competency units such, as
German landers, States in the US or Provinces in Canada, there is a higher level of
institutional quality, competence and economic output both due to the multiplicity of selfcompetent units as well as the leverage implied as an outcome of the inter-unit
competition and specialization. Not all SEs are global, indeed some of them are simply
cut-off from the rest of the world, such as the landlocked regions of China and Russian
Federation or Kurdish and Druze regions, as well as numerous other SEs in Africa, Asia
and Middle East. SEs are numerous and various, extremely diverse with specific political,
economic, social and cultural conditions; however, they all have a common their
increasing importance in the context of global governance. In a sense, paradiplomacy is a
large subset and major component of the very process of interconnecting SEs with the
outside world, which both includes the most local units’ internationalization, but also the
creation of transnational or supranational layers of governance in which state-power,
ruling authority and sovereignty of the nation state is eroded in both directions.
The opportunity structure derived from the new constituency role of the SEs has
definitely a strong premise (Wolff, 2007), since the multiplicity of their collective actions
eventually lead to the formation of transregional/interregional layers of politics and
economy, such as the EU, NAFTA and many other intergovernmental and interregional
organizations. They may reorganize and restructure themselves into competent units for
advanced international development and collaboration in certain contexts, notably as
knowledge regions. In the context of supranationalization and the globalization of world
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politics, government devolutions and decentralization of governance units is very much a
required complementary process (Kettl, 2000; Perkmann, 2002; Rosenau, 1997). More
importantly as this study reveals, SEs and their paradiplomacy actions more accurately
represent an agenda of “accurate management,” the development of self-sufficiency and
sustainable development through local and subnational practices of policy making and
governance as a kind of instantiation of an alternative to the nation-state. This is
especially evident in post-conflict and conflict settings where existing substate entities
were oppressed or restricted and now constitute key units demanding collective rights and
a form of self-ruling authority.
Paradiplomacy has great significance in the contexts of democratization, conflict
transformation and peace building. The level and scope of intrastate conflict is seen in its
immense share in annual global violence statistics (Pettersson and Wallensteen, 2015,
Gurr, 2000; Gleditsch, Wallenstein, Eriksson, Sollenberg and Strand, 2002). SEs,
therefore, can bridge the most immediate human needs and become core constituents of
global governance and international development. IN positive cases, they can emerge as
the pioneers of reconstruction and human security, especially where the nation-state
remains paralyzed and dysfunctional, or worse, the cause of the conflict. This evidently
was seen in various international development research and projects in which SEs are the
main units of analysis and/or the primary actors (Synder, 2001; Coleman, 2000; Boex,
2009; WHO, 2009; De Oliveira, 2009; Meyer and Nguyen, 2005). It is also seen in some
contemporary conflicts, notably in multiethnic, interreligious or multilingual societies
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with intergroup/intrastate violence, where SEs have emerged and remained as the only
possible contenders of the state for defense and reconstruction; such as in Kurdish
regions in Iraq and Syria, or most of the post-Yugoslav and post-Soviet countries, and
other multiethnic societies ruled by authoritarian dominant parties.
A Conceptual and Empirical Expansion to Paradiplomacy Research
The theoretical frame of this research proposed an innovative expansion and
therefore a contribution to the field in the form of a series of new openings in the concept
of paradiplomacy. Derived from the previous literature and theory I emphasized before,
this study expanded on previous liberal/neoliberal, neofunctionalist and constructivist
frameworks of paradiplomacy, by opening up the debate around newly emerging units
and SE-building to include Schumpeterian categories and characteristics in the sphere of
politics.
Paradiplomacy in today’s world represents a much broader scope than the
previous conceptual frameworks allowed, constituting the very functions of the state, or
the very core constituency in various cases, even including direct engagement in “hard
policy” actions by SEs. Therefore, rather than keeping the focus on repeatedly studied
cases of Global Northern substate entities, and their “complementary” functions within
multilateral global governance, this study explores cases from different settings that share
common features such as conflict and international development. Based on the grounded
theory and empirical findings of this study, paradiplomacy needs to be redefined as a
central concept with a variety of functions in various cases, with significant interrelation
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with conflict transformation, international development, democratization and
peacebuilding.
In order to address the main research question revealing the interrelation between
paradiplomacy, international development and conflict in a broader scope and to answer
the guiding questions, I used a comparative case study method in this research, with a
sampling of three case studies: Quebec, Catalonia and Kurdistan (N=3). The data
structure of this research is constituted of primary and secondary data for independent
comparable case studies (See Chapter 4). Based on mixed methods for the analysis of the
cases through the use of historical and political analysis, narrative analysis, discourse
analysis, conflict transformation analysis and methods of inductive reasoning and process
tracking, this study expands the empiricism of paradiplomacy research through the use of
the hypothesis-generating format of grounded theory. The research design used in the
comparative analysis of this study is designed based on the idea of comparing the
abovementioned key Kurdish case study which is constituted of the study of Kurdish
regions and their respective political-territorial formations, possibly constituting the most
complex form of paradiplomacy ever investigated, given the quadri-regional nature of
Kurdish paradiplomacy with four Kurdish territorialities contiguously spanning Turkey,
Iran, Iraq and Syria. These SEs have different political, economic, sociocultural systems
and contenders, therefore, they deviate from each other in many ways, while revealing
important commonalities such as nation and state building, and the fundamental
construction of a collective national imaginary. Moreover, in this comparative analysis, I
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also included various other cases, for triangulation purposes, whereas inductive
arguments require a greater amount of evidence. All of these additional triangulation
cases have some sort of relevance in relation to the three primary cases studied here,
especially Northern Ireland, Scotland, Basque Country, Wallonia, Flanders, BadenWurttemberg and California.
A Summary of Analysis Findings
The findings of the comparative analysis of the three cases studied as well as the
cases included for triangulation can be summarized as follows: (1) Paradiplomacy is
notably relevant in contexts of key decision making processes both at public and also at
institutional levels, and there is a significant connection between the direction of
paradiplomacy/protodiplomacy and key political-economic infrastructure decisions. The
more a substate entity is progressively approached by its national contender/center and is
provided space for development, the less antagonist the key decision making processes
are likely to be. Exclusion from key decisions increases the likelihood of antagonism of
paradiplomacy, and may therefore create a shift from paradiplomacy toward
protodiplomacy. (a) Paradiplomacy represents a general subset for the comparative
advantage and international development of SEs under a direct and indirect relationship.
In this context, the national political-economic context, notably over
constitutional/jurisdictional authority, rule of law and sovereignty of substate entity,
determines the role of substate constituency. Key infrastructure projects, important fiscal
decisions and especially substate niche, competence building and comparative advantage
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heavily rely on the decision making process. When a substate entity is enabled to make
decisions and plans for infrastructure, the greater is state capacity building. Exclusion of
substate entities from key political-economic decisions leads to more antagonism,
stagnation and/or decline in international development outcomes. (b) Paradiplomacy also
represents a strong variable in determinations of conflict management and
transformation, notably in conflictive cases where sharing state-power and pluralist
governance in the context of democratization are the main issues between the substate
entity and the national center. Federalization of government structures and
decentralization of state power in multiethnic/multilingual settings decreases the
possibility of substate antagonism. The more pro-unitary are the national
centers/contenders, the less progressive are conflict management processes, and the level
of decentralization plays a role in classification of a given case in regards to conflict
density. In contexts of economic crisis, state failure or other contemporary political issues
with significant social impacts, the stronger the international support for the substate
entity, the less will be the political and economic risk associated with conflict. At the
same time, the more a substate entity faces blockages from their national contenders, the
greater will be the momentum of shifting its paradiplomacy toward protodiplomacy.
Finally, in heavily armed and highly conflictive cases where the focus is purely on
security, proxy alliances and enmities generally determine the outcomes of
paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy.
Key Decisions and Key Political-Economic Infrastructure in Relation to
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Paradiplomacy and Protodiplomacy
The very first and possibly the most generalizable empirical finding of this
research is the relationship between paradiplomacy [and/or protodiplomacy] and key
decisions made at public and state/institutional levels. Moreover, the formation,
development and quality of the key political-economic infrastructure that enables the
substate entity as the core unit of decision making eventually gains importance, given its
importance in regulating the layers of SE interaction with the outside world. In the
context of this study, the examined regions all have in common historical political
conflicts and their settlements, as well as facing important decisions about their present
and future. The “Brexit” vote in 2016 is strong global evidence that even a full member
state to the EU, in this case Great Britain, publicly voted to exit from the union. Britain
had in fact always shown skepticism toward, and what was often called expression of
“British exceptionalism” in relation to, the European project. Two major substate
constituents, both with long political histories of nationalism and conflict with Britain,
ie.: Scotland and Northern Ireland, are simply caught in this process. Both reflected
different public choices in this very key decision, since they both voted to remain in the
EU, along with the global city of London.
Recall that prior to this very recent and immensely critical decision, Scotland
went to referendum, and narrowly voted down independence. This was especially in the
aftermath of the “warm” and “supportive” signals from London, expressing respect for
the public’s decision. This eventually found important footing in the electorate, especially
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when other factors also contributed, such as the demographics and age of the Scottish
population, their common economic, social and political interests, and the costs
associated with independence. However, the Brexit decision, despite Londoners voting
strongly against it, was a sufficiently key decision that the very first exchange of
discourse in its aftermath was the reassertion of the Scottish independence agenda,
coupled with complete European Union support for Scotland. Eventually the shift from
Scottish paradiplomacy thickens, shifting towards protodiplomacy. This has a
supranational dimension as well, given the long-term political-economic infrastructure
between Scotland and the rest of the EU.
Northern Ireland is also on the brink of such a decision, despite the recent
quieting of armed conflict between British security and IRA, and the progressive
possibility of peaceful settlement through mutual recognition and relationship. However,
Northern Ireland finds itself in quite a similar position with Scotland, due to the Brexit
decision, since most of its constituent’s votes were to remain in the EU. Both Scotland
and Northern Ireland are substantial examples of substate entities that are increasingly
global and well-integrated to the supranational political-economic system of the EU.
Therefore, if they remain in the EU, they will need to follow the path of secession, which
is potentially the eventual and unprecedented outcome of Brexit.
In Spain, the entire political equation was shifted by the emergence of the new
political actors, and an increasingly rigorous balancing of the political-economic system.
The political crisis is often associated with the ongoing economic crisis, thus they are
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connected. Catalonia’s continuous attempts to secede or at least to transfer more state
power and authority to the Catalan constituency is an important factor within Spain’s
national politics. Together with the Basque Country’s secessionism, this has created a
multivalent situation similar to the one more recently experienced in Great Britain.
However, in addition to the seismic Brexit vote, there is another critical difference: unlike
Britain, which until recently followed a low-profile and respectful/progressive policy that
soothed secessionism in Scotland and Northern Ireland, Spain has a strong
ultranationalist right wing in Madrid, as well as a more rigid central national system of
politics and judiciary. Therefore, in Spain, the tone of antagonism steadily and slowly
rises.
Catalan voting for independence turned into a crisis in which Madrid did its best
to delegitimize Catalan ambitions of having the issue brought to a public vote, while
Catalan Government Generalitat used its entire power structure to push for it. At best, the
voting, which tallied an over 80% secessionist count, was perceived as a signal, since it
was declared unofficial. Despite this key electoral decision (secession), which was
officially delegitimized and formally avoided by the Spanish state’s judicial branches and
political maneuverings, there is no sign to an end for this conflict. Catalan has clearly
shown its ambitions, and each confrontation further antagonizes Catalans to secede,
especially under worsening economic conditions and losses aggravated by Catalan’s
absence in the control of fiscal distribution. We can also briefly note here, the similarities
and structural parallels between this case, which saw the state delegitimize a popular
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referendum, and the situation of Kurds in Turkey, whose parties have been continuously
dissolved or banned from formal representation, even after consistent electoral victories
that identify and give voice to the presence of the Kurdish constituency.
The key decisions of secessionism, autonomy, various forms of decentralized
units, and also the counter-tendency toward centralization, are all primarily related to the
process of shift between paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy. Madrid’s preservation of its
Francoist past in the form of conservative right wing politics has not been helpful, but
very substantially impacted the political equation of Spain, around an ossified political
cluster of ultranationalists. While the struggle in Basque Country can be defined as
secessionism assisted by armed conflict, Catalans did not advance an armed movement in
the aftermath of the Spanish re-constitution of 1978. Instead, they remained within the
formal political system, while bargaining for political and economic autonomy. This has
been partially achieved at some levels, but has failed to clarify the definition of
sovereignty or authority in regard to state power. Therefore, though it is a highly
industrialized, advanced and productive global substate entity with various ensembles of
comparative regional advantages, Catalonia is remains poor because it has no control
over its own budget, monetary issues or fiscal policy.
Catalonia’s paradiplomacy is global and worldwide, most importantly focusing
on trade and economic development, as well as a variety of issues. However, the
international agreements of Catalonia are limited, and are purely determined by the extent
of approval of the Spanish Government in Madrid. Basque Country, however, has a
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considerably stronger hand in fiscal control; therefore, manifesting a different societal
organization and hierarchy within itself, with different dynamics of politics and economy
that can be briefly referenced, but remain otherwise beyond the scope of this study.
Table 8: Key Decisions of SEs in Comparative Perspective

Catalonia

Basque Country

Northern Ireland

Key Decision-Related Areas and
Issues
Catalan Statute of Autonomy
Catalan Elections
Catalan Independence Movement
Catalan Referendum
Spanish Elections
Basque Statute of Autonomy
Basque Country Elections
Basque Independence Movement
Spanish Elections
Independence Movement
Reconciliation
Brexit and Post-Brexit

Scotland

Scottish Independence Movement
Brexit and Post-Brexit

Kurdistan Region
of Iraq

Recognition of Federal Kurdistan
Kurdistan Region Elections
Kurdistan Independence
Movement
International Agreements &
Alliances
Kurdish Conference
Iraqi Elections
Declaration of Rojava Federation
Rojava Federal Canton Elections
Rojava Constitution Making
War and Peace in Syria
International Agreements &
Alliances

Rojava
Region in Northern
Syria

Paradiplomatic Outcomes
Loss of Fiscal Decision Power
at Substate Level
Shift from Paradiplomacy to
Protodiplomacy
Ceasefire with ETA and
peacebuilding
Fiscal Autonomy
Decline of Conflict with IRA
Brexit-related shift from
paradiplomacy to
protodiplomacy in 2016
Vote for Unity in 2015
Brexit-related shift from
paradiplomacy to
protodiplomacy in 2016
Independence Agenda
Shift from Paradiplomacy to
Protodiplomacy

General Ceasefire and
Negotiation with Syrian
Regime
Conflict with Regime and
Other Armed Groups
Exclusion from Geneva I-IIIII
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Kurdish (Southeast) Turkish General Elections
Region in Turkey
Turkish Local Elections
Constitutional Referendum
Presidential and Constitutional
Voting in Assembly
Decentralization

Quebec

Quebec Federalization and
Recognition
Quebec Sovereignty Movement
Quebec Provincial Elections
Canadian Elections
Canadian Immigration Law

Kurdish representation
nationwide
Kurdish decision making
(vote)
Peacebuilding/Conflict with
PKK
Collapse of Peacebuilding and
Armed Conflict
Decline in Sovereignty
Movement
Liberalization of PoliticalEconomic Infrastructure and
Institutions
Transformation in
Constituency (decline of
Francophone Quebecois in
overall demographic share
with migrants)

Quebec is definitely master in the abovementioned key decision making
processes, because the provincial government progressively increased its status during
decades of political struggles. This eventually shaped Canada’s asymmetric federal
system in which Quebec is a major actor. The resulting years of transformation and
modernization created a different Quebec, giving birth to the industrialized and
modernized provincial economy as well as a much stronger and expanded claim around
the idea of self-rule. With the ability of making key decisions at provincial level, Quebec
has capitalized on various projects of development and infrastructure. This eventually
gave birth to the development of Quebec’s economically significant industries and niche
competences. Hydro-Quebec was definitely a key decision which transformed the
political-economic infrastructure of the province drastically, enabling Quebec to manage
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its own investments and industrial strategies. Based on the provincial jurisdictional status
recognized by Canada’s constitution, Quebec’s ability of key decision making also
permitted the provincial administration to negotiate and sign agreements with other
provinces of Canada, as a constituency with authority and sovereignty. This was notably
true for energy and trade purposes, as well as cooperation in many areas, and most
importantly with the adjacent states of the United States, which further pushed Quebec’s
capacity for being able to manage its own international agreements.
Quebec’s key decision process was the extent to which the province’s self-ruling
competencies woiuld be allowed to go, as made evident in the case of the Quebec
sovereignty movement. Quebec has voted on sovereignty twice, and both times it was
voted down; however, the latter instance was with a small margin of difference (Allan
and Vengroff, 2004; Allan and Vengroff, 2009; McRobert, 1997; Nadeau, Martin and
Blais, 1999; Leahy and Thomas, 1996). However, pro-sovereignty movements seem to be
in decline recently, given the changes of the demographic structure with migration and
growing generational differences, as well as other factors such as political economic
variables and global issues. Therefore, one might say broadly that the rise of the liberals
in Canada was associated with the decline of the sovereignty movement in Quebec.
Not all substate entities have similar powers or opportunities for direct
engagement in the abovementioned key decision-making processes. Kurds in Turkey, for
example, although visibly demanding the rights of at least inclusion in the decision
making processes, could only get partial political representation, with no substate entity
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recognition or even discussion, despite the magnitude of the conflict and losses on both
sides. The Southeastern Anatolia Project, and the entire political and economic level of
decision-making in the Kurdish region are dictated by Ankara in a highly archaic
centralized nationalist political system. Local administrations, including major
metropolitan cities, exhibit only very slight forms of decentralization from which they
might benefit. They generally only gain authority over urban infrastructure, water, and
waste management issues.
Despite the strong push for the formation of regional politics, which Kurds
imagine as “Northern Kurdistan” (i.e.: the Southeastern and Eastern Anatolia Regions),
there is not yet even the possibility of such discussions on the ground, with armed
conflict instead escalating, particularly following the collapse of a most promising round
of peace talks. In this case, the central state in Ankara made a clear decision of not
transferring any state power to a group of substate units that might have potential claims
to becoming more like what Catalonia, Scotland or Quebec have become. Such visions
remain, however, seemingly impossible to even discuss, and it is viewed generally as a
form of “treason” in general Turkish public opinion.
Still, despite a great number of obstacles, Kurds’ visionary representation strategy
frequently yielded impressive results. A handful of independent MPs elected with limited
resources grew into a nationwide political party group, HDP, with dozens of MPs; and in
each general election cycle, the party group successfully broadened its political reach.
Here, although the substate entity does not formally exist, and the representation is quite
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centralized within the political context, it is still possible to provide substantial evidence
of key decision-making participation by local actors. Local elections, general elections,
and referenda are the main indicators of public decision making processes, though in
many cases this has been orchestrated by the Turkish state. The issue is that despite
forced displacement and assimilation, which eventually led to the growth of dense
Kurdish populations in cities throughout the western part of Turkey, there is still a
Kurdish dominant population in the southeast, which in each public poll is reflected with
a different color on the map in terms of voting results. While this color shift most directly
represents the dominant pro-Kurdish HDP, which recently became more of a broadbased, pluralist, left-wing party, and leaving behind its overtly pro-Kurdish stance, it also
diverges sharply from the 2010 constitutional referendum, which asked the public
whether the 1983 constitution must be changed or not.
While the referendum passed with 52% of the votes saying “yes” to change, some
of these were from liberals/democrats whose campaign motto was “insufficient but yes”.
However, Kurds widely boycotted the electorally unfair referendum, creating a third
unexpected cluster on the map again. This example, and many others like it, clearly
indicate the increasingly antagonized dynamics of secessionism in Turkey, although
Kurdish political party representatives often and clearly stated that Kurds have no goal of
independence, but want a solution within the confines of a democratizing Turkey. In
recent years, unfortunately, peace and democratization are the least heard voices, given
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the collapse of the peace process and the resulting escalation of armed conflict, even
representing extremes in Kurdish towns that approximate open Civil War.
Overall, the key decision-making processes both shape and are shaped by the
variables of international development and conflict, in which progressive and flexible
systems with the capacity to settle agreements to deescalate antagonisms of substate
entities are favorable compared to rigid systems with pro-unitary tendencies. In various
settings, the pro-unitary nation-state formation simply means the dominance of the
sovereign-nation over other identity groups. This is an issue in many Asian, Middle
Eastern, African and some European contexts. The more unwilling a central state is to
share state power and authority, the more antagonistic will the substate entity become, in
accordance with its substate identity, productivity and potential.
The creation of the Kurdistan Region in Iraq and the substate government and its
subsequent internationalization did not undermine Iraq’s unity, but as can be seen even
served to protect the unity of Iraq in the aftermath of the invasion. The peace process,
despite including no substantial progressive steps taken by Turkish Government, caused a
decline in conflict during 2013, during which armed conflict in Turkey was minimal.
Iraqi Kurds also have a substantial aspiration for independence, and for years, both a
Kurdish national conference, and a possible referendum, are in the daily political
discourse, debated by a variety of political actors.
Kurdistan Region in Iraq indeed presents an example of a substate entity acting
largely as though it were a nation-state on its own, with its own military, constitution,
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government and foreign policy apparatus. However, despite the significant political,
economic and military support to the region, most of the relationships are
underproductive, perhaps with the exception of German ties to KRG. Similarly, the
Rojava Federation in Northern Syria has three self-declared canton administrations in
Afrin, Kobani and Cizire; however, international law, ongoing war and destruction all
contribute to the total collapse of the region’s international development, from which the
young Rojava federation is suffering in its fight for survival. The Kurdish model in
Rojava gained notoriety at the global level, including significant international solidarity
in its fight against ISIS, Al Nusra Front, and other fundamentalist armed gangs, and as
well as Assad Regime of Syria. Formal relationships are mostly at the bilateral level and
significantly limited due to pressure from Turkey.
Despite the heroic defense of the Kurdish cantons in Syria, the Assad Regime
failed to substantially open up a new discussion for how Syria might be. Yet, they did
recently manage to declare that they will not recognize the Rojava Federation. Both the
Iranian and Syrian regimes are known to fear Kurdish progress and independence, and
Russia’s position in this equation is quite important as well. The U.S., especially under
the Obama Administration, has advanced an exclusive relationship with PYD/YPG, the
ruling party of Rojava, known to be close to PKK. While this relationship has advanced
since the Battle of Kobani, not many substantial steps were taken by either side, and
diplomatic meetings remained the only real means of collaboration. Moreover, Kurds
were completely excluded from Geneva Peace Talks (I-II-III), due in large part to direct
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pressure from Turkey, despite White House Representative Kirby’s repeated articulation
in all of his press speeches that the US does not view PYD/YPG as a terrorist groups, and
will continue to collaborate357. This, in fact, represents one of the most significant
decisions made by the global political actor in its foreign policy in the Middle East.
Key decisions over government systems simply shape the scope, extent, and
overall characteristics of paradiplomacy [and protodiplomacy] in various cases. Britain’s
approach to Scotland and Northern Ireland can be given as examples. So too can
Quebec’s progressive development of self-sufficiency, which can be said to reduce
antagonism, even though the pro-sovereignty movement is still very much intact.
Catalonia’s secessionism as a key decision is shaped by a variety of factors, but most
notably the fiscal and economic policy, which severely impacts the Catalan region
because it is not under Catalan control. If Spain promoted a progressive policy towards
Catalonia, supporting its becoming more decentralized with more sovereignty and
authority, especially enabling Catalonia to restructure its economic production, the
likelihood of repeated secession attempts would eventually decline. However, denial of
this by Madrid’s hardliner nationalists fuels Catalonia’s antagonism.
In Quebec, pro-sovereignty is an outcome of the transformation of the
Francophone community over decades, becoming more competent and modernized over
time, and also undergirded by industrialization and the specialized economy. Inherited
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See http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2016/02/252263.htm and
http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/patrick-goodenough/state-dept-turkey-ally-kurdsare-some-most-successful-fighting-isis.
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within French culture, which naturally creates a self-preserving Francophone identity
along with the church and linguistic patrimony, Francophone institutionalization
especially in the field of government and businesses filled the ground for enforcing
provincial governance. Today, Quebec has significant enough shared economic interest
with the rest of Canada and North America that isolationism seems a less publicly
supported option for Quebec’s global knowledge economy. However, Francophonie is a
distinct cultural heritage, and therefore needs to be preserved. This explains Quebec’s
official policy of Francophonie. The following two sections unfold the key decision and
key political-economic infrastructure discussion into two distinct directions, both of
which represent the highlighted variables in relation to paradiplomacy and
protodiplomacy: international development and conflict.
Paradiplomacy, Comparative Advantage and International Development of
SEs
The sharpest finding that emerges from comparison of the Quebec and Kurdish
regions is about the relationship between constituency type and international
development. While Quebec Province has capitalized on repeatedly improving its federal
consociationalist status, which represents a constructive force as the outcome of
Anglophone-Francophone rivalry, this status enabled Quebec to undertake key
infrastructure projects on its own. A similar trend in Kurdistan Region of Iraq had been
clearly observable since the federalization of Iraq. Moreover, the Kurdish region in
Southeastern Turkey is very similar to Quebec in terms of water resources, which has a
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tremendous share in constituting state power in Mesopotamia, and even throughout the
greater MENA region, as can be seen throughout history, and in today’s conflicts. While
the Southeastern Anatolia Project (SAP) of Turkey was initiated in the 1960s, with
hundreds of dams and infrastructure projects and an enormous amount of spending, this is
reasonably similar to Hydro-Quebec, which over much of the same period became one of
the largest development projects worldwide. However, there is also a great contrast
between the two regions.
In Quebec, the background case in this study, there is a long timeline of combined
colonization and post-colonization, and then the specific international development of
Quebec Province along with significant structural transformation in terms of its
provincial political economy. The Franco-British conflict has shaped Quebec and Canada
in a broader context, and has been quite impactful in the transformation of Quebec
Province. The Catholic Church was a central organization, which in accordance with
British Administration (after the defeat of New France), played a role in creating and
administering institutions, and therefore came to control the rural economy while
maintaining significant political and economic power. This form of conservatism was
challenged by Quebec civil society, which especially was advancing a grassroots
movement for change following lags in modernization. This lead to the years of Quiet
Revolution, during which reforms and improvements took place, creating major political
clusters that last into today’s Quebec political scene.
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Modernization and industrialization geared up, along with significant key
infrastructure projects, such as Hydro-Quebec, making Quebec one of the leading clean
energy producers Worldwide. Capitalizing on the Province’s vast resources, notably of
hydraulic energy, various projects have changed the face of Quebec, boosting the
investment and development environment. The advantage of this wave of development
was assisted by empowering the financial industry, which developed over decades
marked by progressive mergers and acquisitions, creating a core economic ground for
Quebec Province. Excess energy was sold to other provinces of Canada, and notably to
the US, which created an important source of income. Given the lowest cost production
price in North America, Quebec also attracted businesses worldwide.
Hydro-Quebec took place in a transformational era in Quebec, in which the
provincial government capitalized on this key project by developing various sectors at the
provincial level, therefore contributing to Quebec’s political economy and strengthening
Quebec’s hand within the Canadian political context. With development and progress in
various industries, a competitive level of industrialization emerged as a synergistic
development product of the whole. This was reflected in the accumulation of
international agreements Quebec has signed, as Quebec has definitively become a net
energy producer in North American markets.
However, the opposite is the case in Turkey’s GAP, since the project was purely a
central intervention, aiming to enforce the water-hegemon position of Turkey in the Near
East, and also to feed the increasing energy need of Turkish industries, most of which are
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densely located in the West of the country. The project was one of these state-led
development steps during which an immense construction industry was created,
especially through state-bids, which eventually made Turkey the owner of the second
largest construction industry worldwide. This is definitely not a healthy wave of
development, other than at the gross, aggregate levels. Massive displacement, cultural
heritage loss, and destruction of livelihoods took place, notably in Kurdish cities and
towns, as well as a low-intensity civil war and steadily increasing military engagement
for a period of decades. The project was also controversial because it directly created
severe disputes with Iraq and Syria, both of which internationally protested Turkey.
Another major issue that explains the difference between Hydro-Quebec and GAP is the
constituency problem. International development was certainly needed in both regions;
however, if GAP had not been applied directly against the will of the regional population,
and considering their rights and collective development, Turkey probably wouldn’t have
had to face the long-term civil war, which today is still in place, causing tremendous
security issues. Some of the projects and components of the GAP were recommended for
targeted change by various local, national and international authorities, but were simply
rejected.
There is a great constituency problem in Turkey’s Kurdish southeast. The
insistence of a rigid form of unitary nation-state is increasingly being founded on the
basis of a certain type of unique ultranationalism. This is the context in which a
development project may indeed by manipulated and used as a weapon against people. In

554
Turkey, Ankara decides all, and whoever dominates Ankara wins all the bids. Yet, while
decentralization and democratization is loudly demanded by masses all around the
country, the Kurdish population in the Southeast has had so much less to say. While
Quebec gradually has become one of the worldwide leaders of clean energy production,
coupled with the lowest production cost, and definitely a huge advantage for industrial
attraction, the Kurdish region in the Southeast was simply dominated by the Turkish
Leviathan which constructed state-led economic development around the idea of
construction and water hegemony. In Kurdish cities of the Southeast, energy production
facilities are owned by Turkish enterprises, most of which are owned by Turkish
nationalist groups, typically awarded in politicized state-bids. In a sense, Kurds lost both
administrative control of their region in Turkey, and control of their lands and resources,
to the Turkish state. This signifies a great deal for Kurdish communities, which rely
significantly on agriculture and land.
While Quebec has reconstructed itself as a strong province within Canada,
[Northern] Kurdistan in Turkey simply was economically and territorially conquered and
dominated along with the impoverished Kurdish population. Turkish ownership of all of
the means of gaining and maintaining state power, and the highly centralized
administration of the project, simply circumvented development at substate levels. If SAP
was managed with, or at least included Kurdish and Mesopotamian constituents in project
design and implementation, the multibillion dollar project would almost certainly have
created a synergy similar to what was experienced in Quebec. Kurdish southeastern
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Turkey would be an economic powerhouse, and possibly already be in a progressive and
non-conflictive center-region relationship with the Turkish state. However, purely
neoliberal in its organization, and directly linked to the use of military power, the project
only worsened a problem waiting too long to be resolved. Here the main issue is power
sharing and decentralization, which can be the only remedy for an existing center-region
conflict. Yet, in Quebec, Hydro-Quebec coincided with modernization and
industrialization of Quebec society as a whole, representing an “assisting”
transformation, therefore soothing the center-region conflict, and creating a levy for the
Francophone community, which had previously been rural but later became a fully
institutionalized community.
The same type of transformation was possible throughout the SAP. However,
despite decades of delays, problems and issues in the project, as well as significant
debates and political transformations, Ankara never came to agree with the requirement
of sharing state power to develop a progressive policy of regional development. At the
same time, a security-focused approach to Kurdish communities was used, including vast
forced migration and various injustices (including forbidding the maternal Kurdish
language, in personal names, for cities and towns, and for cultural items), and complete
criminalization of any Kurdish political organization or movement, even legally elected
MPs and mayors. It is important to remember the division of Turkey into seven
administrative regions in the aftermath of the 1980 military coup. Kurdish regions
remained in Southeastern and Eastern Anatolia, a concept of regime-enforcing and highly
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militarized regionalism, which eventually aimed at dividing Kurdish territoriality, and
simply focusing on the Southeast, while partially supporting Ankara’s hand in creating its
regionally based Leviathan. Regionalism, provinces, and the federal/confederal system of
governance is not strange to the political history of the Turkish state. The Ottoman
system of incorporating nations was more or less similar in nature, and the idea always
had significant grassroots support in Turkish politics. However, the modern Republic of
Turkey was created as a strictly Unitarian secular country, which in many ways was
founded with a militarist top-down pro-Western approach.
The French system has also been a dominant influence within this tendency.
Despite the preexisting mechanisms of regionalism, and the obvious need, setbacks and
nationalist resistance dominated any possible debate over decentralization. While the
proposed model of discussions at the highest levels by Turkish politicians did indeed take
place on many occasions, much as in the Basque, Belgium or Irish cases, they were
simply accused, criminalized, presented as “terrorists”, and suppressed. However, a
recent discussion emerging from the ultranationalist-conservatives, is based on the
“Tamil model”, referring to the purest crackdown on Kurds, as Sri Lanka was understood
to have done to Tamils. Interestingly, this model was not interrogated or criticized at all,
but was presented as if it was legitimate.
Kurdistan Region in Iraq, on the other hand, represents a contrast with the
situation of the Kurdish region in Turkey. Kurdistan Regional Government is now a
global political actor with military and economic ties with a multiplicity of major state
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actors, and also a central ally in local and Western military operations in Iraq. Kurdistan
Region in Iraq has continuously experienced disruption of agreement with Baghdad,
which is itself increasingly is under the control of Tehran, another historical rival of any
Kurdish aspiration in the broader region. Moreover, KRG’s recovery and economic boom
almost completely stopped since the increased terror and violence in the region.
Resources are allocated to war at great rates, and more than 1.8 million refugees from
Syria and the rest of Iraq have streamed in, adding a heavy toll for KRG economy. Still,
KRG’s dramatic rise in the global scene of diplomacy indicates how far paradiplomacy of
a substate entity can go, This relationship, increasingly shaped as a neoliberal top-down
association, was determined by the factors of security, war and oil, therefore, creating a
highly dependent economy with lack of self-sufficiency. Yet, the Kurdistan Region
maintains both Suleimaniyah and Hewler cities as international cities, interconnected
with the rest of the world, jurisdictionally sound and recognized, and totally able to sign
international agreements with other governments, lately including even military and
“hard policy” related areas.
Most of the substate entities of Europe have significantly benefited from
European integration, which for two decades exclusively encouraged them to reorganize
themselves and become self-competent and productive units. Despite the diversity within
the European state system, German landers, Belgian SEs, Scotland, Northern Ireland,
Catalonia, Basque Country and many other regions experienced a form of
decentralization and state power transfer. In Catalonia, there is a unique set of evidence to
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describe the path of international development. Catalonia has historically been a central
hub, and the largest port in Southern Europe, and it has a history of modernization and
industrialization known to be more advanced than the rest of Spain, given that the region
is at the French border and interacts with Central Europe and rest of the world. Despite
stagnation during the Spanish Civil War and Franco Eras, Catalonia quickly recovered its
political and economic system, most notably thanks to European Integration, which
coincided with democratization of Spain. The funds and sources Catalonia could benefit
from were the product of supranational agreements that helped the completion of key
infrastructure projects. Catalan already had the human resources and know-how, as well
as motivation for institutionalization, therefore, the region has experienced significant
economic growth in the last few decades.
While Catalonia has a variety of comparative advantages as an autonomous
region, it is also important to remember that it has a Global City: Barcelona, which
hosted the World Cup, and then became a worldwide destination of tourism. The region
increasingly invested in tourism, textiles, and a variety of industries. While growing into
a dynamic and productive society, the region is tied in its relationships and controls to
Madrid, which undermines the savings and investment culture in Catalonia in the interest
of the nation-state. Moreover, the region found itself with an immense amount of debt
caused by the highly dependent Spanish system, borrowing heavily from Northern
European banks, a problem that hit the entirety of Southern Europe. In a sense, Catalans
view themselves as a competent wealthy nation, and are furious at not being able to have
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the right of managing their economies. In such context, the decision of secession rises
against its opposite: unity.
One last and very important aspect of the key decision-making is the way substate
entities determine their economic models, which eventually shapes their politics. While
in Rojava, Left and grassroots based community organizations were declared to be
economic actors, the private sector is not regulated or debated, and there is a communal
economic reorganization. In Kurdistan Region of Iraq, however, the economic
organization was quite substantially top-down and neoliberal, notably with core
involvement of military and oil businesses. While Kurdistan in Iraq is supported and
welcomed more in the international community, due especially to its oil wealth, Rojava is
somehow excluded from even the most crucial meetings to discuss peace – talks in which
Rojava Kurds are clearly a major actor, as well as a uniquely progressive and promising
constituency. While Kurdistan draws on a variety of sources, Rojava struggles to create
the most needed economic infrastructure, simply to create a system compatible to
integration with the world economy. Its diplomatic exclusion is the main cause behind the
region’s inability to construct economic development models that can create a thriving
private sector.
Paradiplomacy and Protodiplomacy as Motors of Democratization, Conflict
Transformation and Peacebuilding
While looking at these background cases, which indicate unique and strong
characteristics of paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy, there is a great take away lesson
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for the Kurdish regions, which are emerging as increasingly central actors in global
conflict transformation and peacebuilding. There is a great deal of armed violence and
political conflict in Kurdish regions of Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey. First, the
federalization of Iraq in the aftermath of the Baathist collapse unleashed the Kurdish
constituency, which had long been in a fight against Baghdad over survival. Although it
had gained partial autonomy within Iraq previously, Saddam Hussein’s regime and its
Arab nationalism, conducted by a Sunni minority in Iraq, led to tremendous destruction.
This was on the back of debilitating Western policies toward Iraq, starting with its
creation by twin imperialist world powers, Britain and France. This all peaked in the
1980s, with the Iran-Iraq War, one of the deadliest war experiences humanity has
experienced in the aftermath of World War II, and saw the destruction of Kurdish
regions, outright genocide, and repeated massacres. This finally ended with the
declaration of a no-fly zone, which provided Kurds a safe shelter until the later collapse
of the Baathist regime, in the aftermath of the 2003 US Invasion of Iraq.
Federalism and the subsequent recognition of the Kurdish Region was made
possible simply by Kurds taking a greater responsibility and spending effort to keep
Iraq’s integrity, although this was really only the will of the US and its Western allies.
Meanwhile, Kurds have developed a purely autonomous administration with its own state
power, military, constitution, flag and institutions, signing its own international
agreements. The internationalization of the Kurdish region peaked in the last decade,
becoming similar to an independent small state. As an outcome of the turmoil and
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violence in the rest of Iraq between Shiite and Sunni constituents, Kurds have focused on
protecting their regional administration, and capitalizing on international development
and a form of sufficiency to sustain their autonomous status, while also increasingly
advancing the independence card, notably upon the budget crisis with Baghdad over
revenues.
Although not representing the same type of “me-tooism” Burchens and Deforche
(2010) mention, there is a kind of similar attitude, or at least a perception of a threat by
the Kurdish regions and their possible regional formations posed against the regional
nation-states where they are located. When Iraqi Kurds have progressively advanced in
their autonomous development, bluntly expressing the will for independence and
secession, Iran, Syria and Turkey all cracked down on their Kurdish populations in
various ways, notably out of the fear that Kurds will be inspired for secessionism in their
respective territories. However, it is more than crucial to remember that Kurds and their
political movement in Turkey increasingly followed a path for reconciliation, rather than
directly challenging national unity. Pro-Kurdish party MPs expressed clearly the socalled will of Kurds to remain in Turkey, but to develop autonomy along with other
regions in Turkey, a form of collective national decentralization and regionalism. This
was a risk since nationalist Kurds strictly opposed this agenda, maintaining their rights of
independence, or at least to the creation of a Kurdish regional administration in the
southeast. Unfortunately, at all phases of the so-called “democratic opening” or the
“peace process”, all of which were collapsed by the ruling elite, it was made clear that

562
Turkey and the Turkish state does not permit even “discussion” of any administrative
changes. Erdogan abandoned his rhetoric of conflict resolution in 2007, and then started
to publicly repeat his new ultranationalist motto: “One language, one religion, one flag”,
and to state: “We will not let anybody make a surgical operation on our country”.
Escalation of violence took place since then, along with the catastrophic collapse of the
peace process, which may have been the only remaining chance for Turkey to keep its
political stability. It is of utmost importance to acknowledge that the possibility of peace,
or at least the faith of the grassroots constituents declined terribly. It is highly possibly tis
will yield resurgent secessionism in the coming years.
Antagonism has never served well in the well-studied or other cases of
secessionist SEs. Antagonism emerges mostly from the centralist nation-state, which is
unwilling to share power, and therefore prefers corruption for the sake of protecting its
so-called national unity. The insistence on not giving even a meager slice of
decentralization makes the contested scene worse, with potential of initiating a fullfledged civil war. The Kurdistan Region in Iraq has not even a single pinch of will to
remain within Iraq, largely because violent and genocidal prior experiences caused the
disappearance of any form of commons that would be the usual basis of keeping societies
together. In fact, Iraq was never a really integrated country, but more of a highly
contested post-colonial territory, together with Syria, remaining from the legacy of
Sykes-Picot and the Western imperialism of the early 20th century. While the Kurdistan
Region of Iraq definitely found ground to expand its agenda and develop a parliamentary
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democracy, there are still problems. One is a political party system in which players have
their own armed constituencies and economic resources, and therefore seem to represent
more of a fragmented organism than a coherent modern nation-state.
In Rojava, there is not yet any move towards a similar parliamentary design, since
armed PYD also dominates the political context, and yields very little space for other
party groups. Thus, they attract significant accusations from Kurdistan Regional
Government’s political constituents, notably KDP, which feels its communities and
movements are pushed out of Rojava. Although Kurdish internal contestations are
increasingly replaced with intergroup collaborations, as can be seen in the liberation of
Mount Sinjar by all Kurdish factions, or the Kobani Defense to which KRG sent a
military brigade that changed the destiny of this Stalingrad-like battle. While Kurdistan
Regional Government was endorsed with full-scale international representation, acting
much like a small state, even interacting with multilateral organizations of global
governance, Rojava lacked these kinds of opportunities, and instead was hypocritically
left out of the so-called peace talks held for Syria in Geneva. Thus, in three consecutive
meetings, armed terror networks responsible for mass murders were represented, but
Kurds’ participation was rejected, notably because of Turkey’s resolute opposition. A
libertarian, pluralist regional formation with new-left tendencies, and a people’s
development policy rather than just giving resources to the private sector, certainly
influenced worldwide leftist movements, especially in a period of continuous terror
attacks in Western capitals targeting innocent civilians.
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Despite collaborative military operations on the ground and tremendous
humanitarian assistance and security provided in the Kurdish region of Rojava in Syria,
there is yet no clear progress or agreement towards the international development and
access of the region to institutionalize itself and integrate with the global political
economy. This, along with the lack of economic growth, together contrast the top-down
approach to Kurdish paradiplomacy in Iraq. Yet, the difference between a neoliberal topdown model of paradiplomacy and a more libertarian (anarchist or new Marxist)
grassroots model can be seen in the economic means, as well as the enabling of political
abilities. Finally, while in Rojava grassroots organization is the main source of the
revolution and the contingent creation of a regional economy, which of course suffers
from war, destruction and pure isolation, the effort is still quite significant. Thus emerges
an agile and competent community based on defensive characteristics. Despite its clear
superiority in terms of formal reach to the international scene, economic resources and
other means of state power, KRG has been “slow” in creating such an agile environment,
especially until the emergence of the so-called Islamic state. However, housing, mall
development and other high-end spending were abandoned and restricted, eventually
leaving only a narrow focus on security. Still, KRG seems to be following a long path to
development, toward a sense of “Kurdish” excellence, similar to what can be found in
Quebec or Baden-Wurttemberg, which is a requirement if an order between Kurdish
regions is in question.
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While the Kurdish Region in Iraq has military and political advantages in terms of
international development compared to the rest of Iraq, there are still many steps waiting
to be taken in order to develop the self-sufficient state that is required for the security of
Kurdish regions. Today’s policies only point to a formation of “Southern” Kurdistan
which itself is divided much like Korea, into contrasting ideological camps. However,
both regions need to instead adjust their political economies towards exchanges between
one another, sharing responsibilities, and also development of regional niches which is
the only way for self-sufficiency and international development. Recent moves and
actions indicate increasing collaborative relationships in Kurdish regions in which
political parties, despite their rivalries organize common conferences, discuss politics and
even make common statements, calls and declarations. These relationships increasingly
reflect a form of interregional state capacity building, since lots of policy learning takes
place when local and substate leaders and personnel visit other regions and exchange
ideas, and even ideologies. For example, the womens’ movement traveled through
Kurdish groups, notably starting with PKK/KCK leaning groups, and further attracted
global attention when KRG also started to take substantial steps, such as participation of
women in politics, economics, and even the military. The position of US representative of
KRG in DC, for instance, is assigned to the first female diplomatic representative, Bayan
Abdurrahman.
Comparing the substate governance development in Kurdish regions with
Catalonia and Quebec, it is possible to argue that Quebec has the most sophisticated,
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institutionalized and developed system of paradiplomacy, with numerous international
agreements. Still functioning within constitutional space drawn by Canadian federalism,
Quebec is definitely one of the two pioneer provinces of Canada, which restructured itself
as a global knowledge region. Quebec had a strong pro-sovereignty movement, which
expanded itself in the last few decades. Even if conservatives held political power in
Canada, such as with Ben Harper, they paid specific attention to not fuel Quebec’s
separatism, and in his political speech he used French language along with English during
his post. A similar situation is almost impossible to imagine in Catalan or any given
Kurdish regions. Harper’s defeat by liberals recently indicated the increasingly strong
liberal party, notably with the support of migrants and various political and economic
classes; another short-term indicator that, together with surveys, points to the decline of
separatism in Quebec.
If there were no system of checks and balances in Canadian politics, and liberals
did not expand around the idea of improvements and reforms, it is conceivable that the
pro-sovereignty movement in Quebec could keep its power. However, it becomes less
likely to see a secession move in the near future, unless things don’t go well for liberals
and they suddenly decline. Compared to Catalonia and the Kurdistan regions, both of
which represent centuries of oppression and war, Quebec’s domination by the British did
not yield a destructive outcome. The Francophone community has found the means and
ways to develop. The main focus was definitely to develop the economy and productivity
of the region. Rural communities were modernized, and were connected to urban areas;
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the schooling system was expanded, together with other social state services. The
presence the immense natural resources within Quebec’s vast territory was definitely a
major factor in Quebec’s rapid development.
Catalonia, on the other hand, represents the second best place among the studied
cases for the flourishing of paradiplomacy. Yet, although the Catalan SE is severely
limited and also kept under tight control by Madrid, by all means, there is nonetheless a
Catalan constituency in the form of a multiparty system, with NCG and various
institutions within the statute of autonomy, and from which Generalitat derives its state
power. In a sense, Catalans, thanks to European integration of Spain, passed through a
process of reconstruction and resettlement, re-developing their institutions as a small
state. However, they have also reached the possible frontiers of this development, and
this limitation has become more and more visible in politics and in the economic realm.
They gained their cultural rights, and partial autonomy from Spain, but no substantial
economic control over fiscal systems or wealth. This is very much like the position
defended by the pro-Kurdish movement in Turkey and Syria, fighting for rights and
representation, while emphasizing their will to be non-secessionist or non-separatists.
Some viewed this as a strategic move, aimed at not frightening the Turkish or Syrian
regimes, or at least to have a common ground of negotiations in rigid and authoritarian
politics. But at the same time, Kurdish regional formations did not really attempt to move
in a more autonomous direction; instead they opened up their organizations to other
communities. This can be seen in HDP’s broader MP distribution in the 2015 elections,
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and in the increasing non-Kurdish representation in the pro-Kurdish party, as well as in
the joint operations with Arab, Assyrian, Yazidi and Armenian communities. If these
gestures were welcomed by their national hosts/contenders (the Syrian and Turkish
Governments) the Kurds might possibly have already achieved a strictly limited but
nonetheless recognized SE development in their regions. Overall, despite Kurdish
communities maintaining a genuinely low profile in a rigorous and contested game, and
their willingness to compromise on their BATNAs (Best alternatives to non-agreement),
they did not receive a progressive response, and instead were simply rejected.
Besides Turkey, which is a hardliner in regard to its negative opinions about
sharing state power, Iran is also a major political-military actor with a significant Kurdish
population, but also an important difference: religion. Although Kurds of Iran may be
predominantly of the Shiite faith, Iran’s Kurdish movements are historically significant,
and this must be factored together with the tremendous role Iran has played in the broader
Kurdish issue. In Iran’s archaic theocratic post-Islamist regime, which is highly centralist
in many ways, there are various provinces. Kurds, Azeri, Balochis, Loris and various
other substate groups are constituents of Iran, with no significant political or economic
power, but are rather assimilated into Iran’s state system. Interestingly, Iran has a
Kurdistan province, along with other three provinces with predominantly Kurdish
populations. However, this must not be confused. Rather than SEs, Iran’s provinces
strictly represent regime-enforcing regionalism with no significant capacity for
decentralization. In that sense, Iran and an increasingly transforming Turkey, have
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become soul twins when it comes to Kurdish politics and movements, contrasted only in
terms of their respective Shiite and Sunni faiths.
Although there are similarities between Turkey’s and Iran’s hardliner policies
towards Kurds, there is still a significance difference between the two: Turkey’s EU
membership process. Proximity to Western and European politics eventually had an
enormous impact on the issue of democratization. Although state institutions, nationalist
political clusters and the Turkish political elite generally agreed on not yielding
substantial state power to Kurdish constituents, Kurdish political constituencies
nevertheless managed to advance and expand their political presence, not only nationally
but increasingly internationally. They have thus become the primary locomotive of
democratization in Turkey. The same trend may be seen in many cases of Global North
paradiplomacy, such as Belgium, the UK, Spain and even Canada, where the
multilingual, interreligious and multiethnic nature of politics eventually has played a role
in the transformation of political representation and party systems, as well as
administrative units of national governance. To support this claim, an example may be
drawn from the moment when Kurds in Turkey increasingly become a European actor.
Kurdish citizens’ decades long political-social movements have produced a significant
process of policy learning, in which Kurds increasingly act as “enacted citizens” of
Europe (Keyman, 2014).
While representing only the third or fourth major party grouping in Turkey’s
Assembly, which many underestimate given their reduced share of seats, the Kurdish [or
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Mesopotamian, in its broader sense] political constituency acted as a trend-setter on many
issues that other political constituencies were trying to avoid. This included Armenian
Genocide, the increasing violence and terror of extremists in the broader region, and
many other issues. Moreover, given the formal jurisdictional status gained by the Kurdish
political constituency within Turkey’s strictly Unitarian state structure, Kurds have also
managed to become formal political actors to be represented in both European and also
other audiences, including the highest level diplomatic meetings and talks with the US,
Russia and many other regional and global actors.
Discussion of the Comparative Findings: Toward a Grounded Theory of
Paradiplomacy
From the perspective of new regionalism, it is rationally expected that SEs will
develop their self-competencies and niches, becoming productive units within the settings
of global multilayered governance. This principle was ratified in the Treaty of European
Union, and is also a common principle in many other interregional organizations around
the world. The comparative analysis of the key Kurdish case with the Catalan and
Quebec cases reveals various similarities and differences, notably in terms of the
intersections between paradiplomacy, international development and conflict. The
following arguments are derived from my findings, and are presented in the hope of
contributing to the development of a grounded theory of paradiplomacy.
Self-sufficiency and self-competence are defined as the major functions of global
regions as they work to develop in various contexts, notably within the European Union,
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and increasingly in North America, as well as in various other developed and developing
contexts. SEs are keen to develop their capacity of self-rule in many ways, although in
contested environments this might be partially compromised. When a unit is global, selfcompetent and productive, there are more incentives from national and supranational
contenders to support a progressive policy towards a substate entity. However, setbacks
may emerge depending on the context of the political-economy, as well as secessionism
within multilingual/multiethnic societies. Quebec is a solid example of the regulating,
adjusting and balancing of political and economic infrastructure in which the Provincial
political party system has a great interplay with the Canadian political party system, each
responding to the other’s policy actions. Although admittedly a weaker example, since
there is still great need for a formal settlement, the Kurdistan Region in Iraq constitutes a
somewhat similar example, especially in the aftermath of the Iraqi federation.
Argument Set 1: The Rules of Power Sharing for Mutual Progress
Claim #1: When there is infrastructure regulating, adjusting, and balancing the power
sharing between the region and center, politics at substate and national levels respond
to each other’s policy actions, acting like a pressure valve functioning for both sides.
Claim #1a: The more the substate entity is self-competent and productive, the better
the potential to integrate with the institutions of, and to contribute to, global
governance.
Claim #1b: Constitutional and Jurisdictional factors impact significantly the level,
scope and outcomes of paradiplomacy.
Claim #1c: The more incentives and resources are allocated to a substate entity, and
policies of constructive integration and recognition are adopted, the more a substate
entity builds symbiotic progressive relationships with the national center.
Claim #1d: When substate actors are excluded from the development process, which
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The presence of jurisdictional and constitutional SE constituencies within a
country greatly enhances the possibility for paradiplomatic activity. There are SEs that
still remain in a ‘de facto’ status, or are not even recognized by any formal means, and
are therefore unable to conduct formal paradiplomacy, engaging instead in only a more
limited form paradiplomacy, such as Diaspora and activism-based diplomacy. Federal
and confederal units, depending on the regime type, tend to have more settled
paradiplomacy, given their situation in which non-central government and parliaments
share certain state power, and this makes internationalization of an SE both possible, and
generally more likely. When the national-center, notably in unitary settings, resists any
move toward decentralization of state-power, the two-sided balancing and adjusting
mechanism disappears between the center and region. In severe cases, that may result in
armed conflict or even civil war upon the refusal or denial of SE demands. This is
especially likely in cases of substate nationalism, where a group or community has a
different linguistic, cultural, ethnic or religious identity, and is deprived of the rights
afforded to national citizens. The Kurdish issue, for instance, for many decades fit into
this category, although the federalization of the Kurdistan Region in Iraq, and of Rojava
in Syria, both represent a paradigmatic change with the possibility of constructing a more
balanced power politics in the region.
Substate entities may carve out a plan to build their globally presentable “niches”,
while adapting themselves to globalized local political economies. Numerous factors play
a role in determining the success of a substate entity that attempts such adaptation. These
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can be summarized as international access (capacity of airports, roadways, railroads, sea
transportation, and geopolitics), the presence of industry and modernized institutions, the
recognition and sovereignty of the substate governance authority (constitutional,
jurisdictional, international), the effective management of regional economic capacity
and competences. The three case studies of this research represent different contexts of
international development, and all of them provide solid evidence for the
abovementioned hypotheses and arguments.
When SEs and their political and economic constituents are left out of the process
of development, it is definitely never a good sign, notably for large key infrastructure
projects in their regions. As can clearly be seen in this study, especially in the comparison
of Quebec, Catalonia and Kurdistan, and also many other cases around the world, what
brings real “development” is not central decision making from the capital of nationstates, but instead carefully assessing the substate impact of the project. If the aim is
development, it must include all of the constituents in the given targeted community or
territoriality. However, when we turn to the Kurdish case in Turkey, the Uyghur Case in
China, or of the Tamil region in Sri Lanka, we find much the opposite. In all of these
cases, including many Russian [or former Soviet] regions, a distinct SE is simply
dominated and controlled by destructive investment and infrastructure projects. The
Southeastern Anatolia Project (SAP) in Turkey is definitely a corner stone within the
political-economic context in Turkey and upper Mesopotamia, but the Kurds were left
out, losing their livelihoods while their resources were simply grabbed by Turkish
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companies with the backing of state support. Therefore, the SAP, rather than contributing
to the economy of the region (as was widely claimed), serves instead to create wealth for
Turkish businesses and State institutions. Further, in practice these businesses became
cannibal-like agents, not truly contributing to the local economy with their neoliberally
inflated appetite but acting more as pioneers of inequality. They view every single local
place as a space of potential destruction and construction, even if millennia-old history
and precious cultural or environmental heritage is in question. This neoliberal tendency
not only destroys what I explained above, but also the very competence and selfsufficiency of the society, creating highly rigid archaic institutions, organizations and
structures that eventually only reproduce more problems and issues.
Conflict and marginalization eventually becomes both an outcome of the
abovementioned problem, but also the new status quo for future issues. Therefore, the
lack of productivity and efficiency, and the creation of impoverished masses offset by
only a handful of the very wealthiest, definitely does not provide any real promise for
international development. If water and energy, two crucial elements for not only Kurds
in Turkey but for the entire upper Mesopotamia, was managed by the people of region,
which was the case in Quebec, and which is also the model the Rojava region is currently
proposing, then we might instead see a great substate synergy for the development of
both various regions and also communities. Instead, highly centralized regimes, such as
Iran, Baathist Iraq and Syria, and Turkey at certain moments of its political history, create
uneven and asymmetrical accumulation of capital. This is usually accompanied by
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authoritarian governance, which always ends up with the state cracking down on the
“other”, and in most of these cases this meant Kurds, the common problem of Iran, Syria,
Turkey and Iraq. We can see this not only in the highly contested Kurdish or adjacent
MENA regions, it is also possible to emphasize a similar pattern in Catalonia. Catalans
also stress the feeling they experienced as one of being left out of the decision-making
processes, in this case one Madrid is designing largely on its own. This is seen in the
enormous expenditure for a massive airport in Madrid, or investments of less priority
with extremely high costs paid disproportionately by exorbitantly high Catalan taxes,
while Catalans continue to lack essential services of the state in areas of education,
science and health. In numerous cases, such as the Kurdish, Tamil, Uyghur, Baluchistan,
and many others, the dominant central-regimes even committed to massacres and ethnic
cleansing in the contestation between the nation and center. In many other contexts
around the world, which can be seen in the global armed conflict and violence datasets,
civil war consistently tops the list of the causes of human destruction and death.
Protodiplomacy: Secessionism of Substate Entities
There are political, economic, cultural and social factors behind a region’s will to
internationalize. In conflictive or secessionist regions, all of these factors play an
overwhelming role in regions’ engagements of intense paradiplomacy [or
protodiplomacy], representing a multiplicity of objectives. The first and most significant
objective is to seek political recognition and support for a substate entity’s attempts of
decentralization, sovereignty, authority, autonomy or even secession, as can be seen in
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certain cases. That being said, economic factors cannot be excluded from the equation of
paradiplomacy, since they play a prominent role in the making of the infrastructure of the
interactions. The more equitably settled the economic infrastructure is between a national
center and region, the less a region will develop antagonist motives towards the center.
The distribution of wealth may, indeed, be a problem in various settings of governance.
Thus, when there is a distinct national, linguistic, religious or ethnic community
representing the peripheral unit, then the improper distribution of wealth between the
region and government will be highly likely to produce contested interactions.
Although economic reasons may usually underlie the motives for secessionism,
various scholars of paradiplomacy propose that the presence of regional nationalism at
the substate level eventually causes secessionism, as can be seen in the cases of Basque
Country, Catalonia, Northern Ireland and Quebec. The Kurdish case also has a
nationalism factor which plays a significant role. However, it is important to carefully
assess all of these cases to avoid a misreading, because, neither economic reasons nor
nationalism alone can necessarily explain secessionism. In the Kurdish case, and even in
the Catalan or Quebec cases, and many other similar ones, besides the presence of
economic factors and nationalism, there was a single most important variable that
appeared in this study as a major factor, the perception of opportunity and threat. This
perception is significantly determined by the contextual environment as well. When an
SE and its political and societal constituents collectively perceived a threat, which can
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also be military, secessionism may escalate. Threats and opportunities are not necessarily
only military or political, but also economic, and even cultural.
Argument Set 2: An Explanation For Secessionism and Antagonist Substate Behavior
Claim #2: In a given conflictive, multiethnic, multilingual or interreligious context of
center-region interaction, the perceived premise of economic, political and sociocultural
development plays a key role in collective decision making.
Claim #2a: When the national center fails at effective governance and policy making, or in
supporting economic, social and political development at substate levels, the more
polarized will be relations between the center and region, and the less incentives will there
be for international development. In such cases, even moderates may be in support of
secessionism.
Claim #2b: When secessionism escalates, nationalist and counter-nationalist political actors
rise in the national context as a response to the possibility of substate actions. Depending
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Argument Set 3: The Path to Conflict Management and Minimization for SEs
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Claim #3: Federal Units tend to have lower level conflicts and higher levels of substate
capacity building than substate entities under unitary or quasi-federal settings in
conflictive, multiethnic or interreligious settings.
Claim #3a: When there is no infrastructure of negotiation between the region and center,
and the region’s demands are dismissed, the greater the chance of armed conflict.
Claim #3b: The more central government policy capitalizes on its security-focused state
power in order to dominate its constituents, the more antagonized, difficult and
problematic will be its interactions with them.
Claim #3c: When there is center-region conflict, the engagement of supranational,
transnational, or other global governance actors may create a significant change in the
The relationship between paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy can perhaps best be
equation of power.
explained through the perception of threat and opportunity. If the substate entity’s
Claim #3d: The more the political history of conflict is embedded with violence, trauma
political and economic actions are restricted, criminalized or minimized, the perceived
or criminalization, the more antagonistic emerging contemporary political structures and
threat grows and antagonizes substate level politics. The higher the level of oppression
their parties will be.
and the perception of threat politically and economically, the bolder the political
Claim #3e: When an authoritarian, oppressive and conflictive national regime fails or
discourse of extremists from both sides, and the greater the chance of armed conflict. The
collapses, previously dominated SEs may emerge as new political-military constituents.
more the center capitalizes on its state power to dominate, the more difficult will be its
SEs with prior history of state and nation building attempts have higher motivation and
efforts to decline, minimize or resolve the conflict with its regional contender. This has
levels of competence for capacity building.
been the case in the Kurdish regions, in Catalonia and Basque Country, in Northern
Ireland, and in many other conflictive contexts. Rather than following progressive and
constructive politics to derive positive outcomes from conflict processes, substate
development has been consistently devalued, while SEs are approached with a more
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purely security based focus, in which the SE constituents are the primary risk/target, thus
exacerbating conflict and dispute.
Federal units have less center/region contestations than unitary or pro-unitary
contexts. The highly strict unitary Turkish nationalist state, for instance, simply refused
any substantial progress in terms of the resolution of its long-standing and increasingly
significant Kurdish conflict, rejecting outright almost any form of solution. Spain, even if
not officially unitary in the past few decades, still has a pro-unitary political cluster in
Madrid which continuously imposes Spanish nationalism, mixed with a certain
conservative and right-wing political formula (and supported by many Spanish liberal
and central-left leaders when it comes to national unity). Therefore, Catalonia and Basque
Country also partially suffer from the fact of asymmetric quasi-federalism, in which both
attempted to restructure themselves as federative-autonomous constituents, but were
viewed and treated as administrative outposts of the Madrid-centered nation by Spanish
nationalists.
In the Quebec case, despite decades-long contestations between the Anglophone
and Francophone communities, the political system of Canada was designed as an
asymmetric federal system [which arguably can be defined as a mix of confederalist and
consociationalist components], which therefore created a mechanism of interchange
between the provincial and national governments, enabling a balance between the center
and the region. Kurds in Turkey simply lacked this type of political and economic
infrastructure, which would likely have decreased the tension and could have avoided the
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destruction that is still taking place. Turkey’s increasingly ambitious security-focused
conflictive foreign policy is fed by a malicious internal indoctrination, which is a
grotesque representation of the overconfident romanticism of the Neo-Ottomanist
movement, repeatedly reminding the masses how superior the state once was. Therefore,
militarization with a heavy security-focus can at its best yield only more destruction. Yet,
the disparity of military power between factions not only emerges as a measure of
security limitations, but more simply as a direct regional threat. The creation and
expansion of various armed movements, terror networks and the frequently used and
impactful “state terror,” which above all has a weight in the greater MENA region, can be
given as evidence of the extremely negative outcome of a purely malicious and
destructive focus on security.
To summarize the abovementioned ensemble of arguments on protodiplomacy
and secessionism from a comparative perspective, my research diverges from the
conclusions of much of mainstream political science and media analyses, which remain
nation-centric. Secessionism is not necessarily a product of nationalism fueled by ethnic
differences. Instead, what truly antagonizes SEs is the difficulty of protracted
longitudinal interactions with their national contenders. The case of Scotland clearly
indicates that secession was not necessarily a decision made by the people out of blind
nationalism; in fact, secession was recently voted down. However, very shortly
thereafter, the Brexit decision once again put Scotland at odds with the rest of the UK,
and once again fueled secessionism. The same applies to Northern Ireland, whose armed
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conflict was largely soothed in the last decade, but may now be re-fueled in the aftermath
of the Brexit decision. Looking at Catalonia, it is also reasonable to discount innate
nationalism and the egoism of Catalans as explanations for renewed secessionism, while
increasingly destructive fiscal arrangements and the insistence on banning any form of
progressive power-sharing for key decisions seem to be far better explanations for current
successionist attitudes. The escalated and highly stressed debt structure, sharply declining
budget allocations for Catalonia by Spain, and the overall outcomes of the broader
economic crisis can also be counted as underlying causes of secessionism. Various
economic and statistical studies show clearly that the total gains of succession to the
Catalan economy might be as high as 100% (Government of Catalonia, 2014)358. Here
too, nationalism as an inherent explanation or even as a major explanatory factor is less
convincing than the totality of economic relations and tensions that constitutes the
marginalization of an SE.
Similarly, the Kurdish political movement in Turkey is very supportive of intranational solutions around autonomy and economic equity. Although the Kurdish armed
movement (PKK) began its armed actions in 1984 with the aim of an independent
Kurdish state, this policy was completely abandoned in the late 1990s. In the last decade,
the major Kurdish political discourse in Turkey, with the exception of a narrow
nationalist Kurdish community (mostly pro-KDP), simply declared that the Kurds of

Department of Economy and Knowledge, Generalitat (2014) “Metodologia calcul de
la balanca fiscal de Catalunya amb el sector public central l’any 2011; and Department of
Economy and Finance, Centre Catala de Negocis.
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Turkey are against secession, preferring instead the democratization of Turkey and
initiation of a confederal power-sharing system. Similarly, the Rojava region also
declared recently that it is not after secession from Syria, but instead also aims to
democratize Syria through confederalism. In Quebec, the French language act of PQ
(Parti Quebecois) guaranteed the rights of language, but is also seen as a primary cause of
the decline of the sovereignty movement, since there was no longer a strong agenda for
advocacy. In that sense, Quebec also shifted from protodiplomacy towards
paradiplomacy.
Conclusion
This study compared the key Kurdish case with those of Catalan and Quebec, two
cases with notable similarities and differences that often serve as master cases of
paradiplomacy/ protodiplomacy in Europe and North America, respectively. The
dynamic and complex interrelation between paradiplomacy, international development
and conflict is definitely actual, policy-relevant, and also increasingly significant in the
multilateral and multilayered environment of world politics and global governance.
Paradiplomacy was conceptualized in various forms, all of which are acknowledged in
the framework of this study. This study also makes innovative contributions to the
concept, of paradiplomacy by providing the first detailed socio-historical delineation of
the quadri-regional form of Kurdish paradiplomacy; and to the theory of paradiplomacy
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by expanding the Schumpeterian359 concept beyond its strictly economic origins into the
realm of politics, where it can better explain these regional transformations, and thereby
expand the concept into our explanatory arsenals for conflictive regions.
This study essentially adds the Kurdish key case to the literature of
paradiplomacy. Not only does this expand the conceptual and theoretical framework in
substantive ways, but it reveals the immense role of paradiplomacy as an increasingly
central component of world politics. This is especially so in arenas of peace building,
conflict transformation and democratization, all of which have tremendous interrelations
with international development. In the context of state failure, paradiplomacy may even
emerge as a sort of lifesaver or ‘emergency-state’, permitting a substate entity to become
a central actor upon which regional or international humanitarian efforts rely in their
efforts to stop violence and provide security. Besides contributing to the theoretical,
conceptual and empirical development of paradiplomacy research, this study also has
promises of improving paradiplomatic practice. This may be particularly so in questions
of policies and international agreements, which play a crucial role in not only conflict and
insecurity issues, but also in many other fields. In the context of the increasingly
emerging need for local and regional self-sufficiency, and for structural decentralization

359

Although I briefly describe the context-specific meaning of Schumpeterian theory in
the 2nd and 3rd chapters, I would like to add that I was inspired by Dr. Kevin Avruch, the
Dean of the School of Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University,
when he visited Kennesaw State University to give a speech in 2015. While Dr. Avruch
did not use the term in exactly the way that I do here, he did use the example of the
Kurdistan Region of Iraq to discuss the unexpected growth of a substantial substate actor
in the aftermath of Baathist collapse.
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at a global scale, in order to tackle some of the greatest challenges the world is facing in
contemporary times, the remedy may be to simply encourage regions to become
productive and self-sufficient. There are great lessons to learn from the observation of the
practices and discourse of SEs and their political, economic and social constituents.
While theories and ideas may sound promising, notably in spaces where international
development policies are drawn up, it is important to observe closely the implication and
practices on the ground, which in many situations causes exactly the opposite of the
intended outcome.
This study concludes that the interrelation between SEs and their national,
supranational, transnational and global contenders or partners represent a complex web of
actors and actions with different functions and capabilities. The main argument of this
study is that SEs are not “less important” units in a nation-state system, especially as the
nation-state system increasingly represents a “less efficient” gridlock with significant
international bureaucracy. Development only occurs with justice; so conversely the
accumulation of wealth under conditions of injustice cannot be called health
development. Despite the description of self-determination within the international
political system that emerged at the highest intergovernmental levels decades ago, in the
aftermath of World Wars One and Two, the contemporary age still suffers from SEs that
were never given essential rights or never even recognized. Rather than a rigid system of
global governance, which ultimately serves the interests of nation-states and the nationstate system, and therefore contributes to the possibility of global collapse,
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decentralization of any administrative setting levels decreases the degree of political and
economic risk.
The major premise of the findings of this study in terms of practical implications
occurs at the level of the institutional framework of global governance, where we see that
the global community has yet to define a substantial role and direction for SEs.
Paradiplomacy eases the regional implications of international development projects,
making sure that the project is well rooted locally, and remains within the sphere of
providing community benefits, rather than being only a means of spending excessive
resources to create private wealth for the ruling elite. Paradiplomacy emerges as the only
solution in humanitarian or highly aggravated environments, such as in Kurdish regions.
It provides a great deal of help to nations, regions and units dominated by authoritarian
major powers, such as Russia and China. SEs find ways to develop transnational relations
in order to simply try to survive against their nation-state contenders, or at least to
develop a deterrent capacity. This seems worthy of further theoretical consideration, as it
can be observed in Kurdish snd many other regions, yet is not present in any real
significance in various Chinese and Russian settings. This may be due to the magnitude
and impact of these central regimes, and the fact that their responses to the actions of SEs
are purely disproportional, not inspiring SEs and their political constituents. Questions of
paradiplomacy, and even its secessionist form: protodiplomacy, can even make visible
the “soft-belly” of various authoritarian, massive states. In these states, SEs are simply
oppressed and dominated, and lack of justice for a significant cluster of the society
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eventually and heavily relies on the decrease of institutional quality in order to be able to
legally criminalize the rightful demands of SE constituents. When such a system of
injustice emerges, it not only punishes the secessionist SE attempting to unleash itself,
but it reactivates an entire nation in polarized and contested political camps, which
therefore leads to an overall damage for the nation-state. Kurdish regions in Turkey and
Iran still remain the major questions for these nations, along with the official resettlement
of the victorious young Rojava Federation in Syria. Policies of marginalization and
oppression fueled an issue that is long waiting to be resolved, and, yet, if these actors do
not prefer to solve the issue through reform and decentralization, enabling at least a form
of regional administration for important services, then violence and conflict will be likely
to only continue and become aggravated.
Today, there is no way to save Iraq, which as a nation never really existed, but the
Kurdish constituency within Federal Iraq was able to at least provide a safe shelter for
millions of people who fled from violence, war, rape and destruction. The entire
humanitarian services infrastructure is provided from the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and
emanates outward toward the rest of the country, and even toward Syria. Given the
significant impact of global transformations in politics, economics and other domains, it
is ultimately possible to argue that SEs should no longer be pushed behind their nationstate contenders, to be shadowed and policed by them within the institutional systems of
global governance. Instead, they might play an even more significant role in some of the
most challenging places where violence and destruction can only be avoided with their
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help. Europe’s destabilizing immigration crisis was certainly significant evidence of this
claim, as the amount of migrants Europe received was in fact small compared to the
refugee migration influx into the Kurdistan Region of Iraq, not to mention the
humanitarian assistance they provided, or their heavy security and defense contributions.
A single small SE, with a very recent traumatic history, nevertheless spent a tremendous
effort no nation-state of Europe has been able or willing to provide. The Kurdish regions
have shown the world renewed examples of the presence of another way, the strength and
resilience of “marginalized” communities. The gender-balanced heroic battle victories in
various Kurdish communities have taught the entire world that there are other ways and
tendencies in the Middle East, in contrast to the negative and stereotypical images
presented about the region, in the so-called developed world. Paradiplomacy in this
context is a key component, one that has the premise and promise of bringing an end to
violence and creating formal, sustainable and globally competent and interactive substate
units.
Limitations
This study represents merely a preliminary step in defining Kurdish
paradiplomacy, an increasingly important topic in a highly critical region, and at a highly
critical moment for global transformation. This study aimed to add the Kurdish case, with
its unique paradiplomacy setting, to the discussion of paradiplomacy, and to related
questions about the decentralization of governance. The two background cases, Quebec
and Catalonia, provided useful comparison and contrasting elements, thereby providing
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important validity to the comparative analysis when debating the Kurdish case of
paradiplomacy. Eventually, the comparative method served well for the issues in
questions, and provided an essential set of arguments that help to develop a deeper
understanding of the Kurdish issue, as well as the use of paradiplomacy in peacebuilding,
conflict transformation, democratization and international development.
One limitation in this study is the lack of primary data in the Quebec case study,
which clearly is well documented and studied, with the availability of data, but was
determined to be largely outside the scope of what was already becoming an ambitious
comparative study. The Quebec case study was therefore built relying only on available
secondary data and thus reflects less the actual and contemporary discussions and
directions on the ground in Quebec Province, than the Kurdish or Catalan cases do. In
both the Catalonia and Kurdish cases, the presence of primary data helped a great deal to
go beyond generic questions and issues, but also to develop a much deeper understanding
through the analysis of first-hand experiences and data collection. Although numerous
studies have used data from substate representations at various global settings, this study
represents the first that has done so with regard to the Kurdish regions’ highest level
diplomatic efforts, and thus brought this example into the sphere of broader analysis.
An important limitation in this study is the differences in the institutionalization
and interpretation of the foreign policy actions in different political culture settings. It is
almost impossible to organize any form of centralized accurate data from any given
source from the Kurdish regions, yet, while it is possible to find highly dispersed
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information, primary data sources resolved the problem, notably strengthening the
analysis in terms of diplomatic meetings, contacts, actions, responses, international
agreements and cooperative-collaborative moves. Moreover, secondary data functioned
as a major complementary source, while helping in the compiling of my analysis of the
Kurdish regions since the issue gained its first significant momentum.
Although this study includes the Kurdish substate entities in Iran in its
consideration, and mentions them on many occasions, and discusses the political actions
of Kurdish constituents in the Kurdish regions of Iran, there is clearly a worldwide
blackout on this region, making research only possible among this area’s Kurdish
Diaspora. There is a great and dynamic Kurdish society in Iraq; however, even if it has
certain connections with Iraqi and Turkish Kurds, its paradiplomacy actions still remain
tremendously hidden, or low-profile. Yet, even with these obstacles to research, there is
still a great deal of discussion over Iran’s Kurdish policy and its implications for wider
Kurdish regions. More work remains to be done in this area.
Another limitation may be seen as a byproduct of the methodology, which made
this study possible, but which also dictated a small number of cases, due to manageability
issues for a study of this scale. Increasing the sample size with well-studied cases
definitely has the promise of improving the grounded theory building, and also the
empirical reliability and validity of this avenue study. Moreover, the studied cases are
also still in motion, still transforming, although Quebec seems to be more settled
compared to Catalan and the Kurdish cases where things are continuously heating up.
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Therefore, the incomplete nature of these cases can only be completed when the time
comes and the outcomes are known. While this can be viewed as a limitation from one
perspective, the longitudinal nature of the single case studies must also be acknowledged
as a strength given they substantially describe the conflict transformation and the
continuous development of the paradiplomacy structures in relation to international
development.
Recommendations and Future Directions of Research
This study focused on the international development and conflict environment of
substate entities, notably investigating their paradiplomacy and protodiplomacy practices
in the context of transforming global governance. International agreements, their scopes,
their formal and jurisdictional grounds, and formal legislative outcomes all work to
determine the extent of state power. While paradiplomacy is not necessarily easy to
observe in all political settings, there is a significant need within the economic system, to
focus on and consider substate entities as primary actors of global politics and economic
production. This study merely investigated three cases, Quebec, Catalonia and Kurdistan.
While primarily aiming to look at the Kurdish case holistically, in the light of the Quebec
and Catalan experiences, some additional cases were also discussed in the comparative
analysis. Beyond the international development and conflict relationship issues in the
paradiplomacy research of this thesis, there is a broader scene of units waiting to be
investigated thoroughly.
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The potential for progress is definitely within the newly emerging and promising
units of global governance, such as global substate entities and global cities. While in this
study I preferred to debate the established paradiplomacy cases with political histories of
conflict and their imperialist/colonialist backgrounds, highly promising further
investigation is still very much needed. Paradiplomacy of global cities, notably looking
into global-local partnerships and economic production and infrastructure projects have
definite significance in this context, as can be observed in the work of the World Bank. A
second area of investigation is the role of “green” paradiplomacy, or “water”
paradiplomacy, which will have increasing significance in conflict studies moving
forward. Given that this is an area in which nation-states have proven insufficient, and
that it also promises to contribute to the development of self-competence of substate
entities, this unique form of paradiplomacy definitely has major potential in further
conflict research. Finally, exciting work remains to be done in going even deeper into
aspects and elements of intra- and inter-Kurdish regional interactions and paradiplomatic
activities. This study is only the beginning.
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